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(V)
SYNOPSIS
The thesis examines the powers and tasks of 
primary party organisations (PPO's) in non-production 
institutions in terms of a concept I have called "staff 
generalism". Based on a number of Western line-staff 
models the concept proposes that a PPO's principal task 
is to monitor and work for long-term improvement in the 
performance of its "host" organisation. The closely 
integrated nature of the PPO's relationship with the 
"host" organisation provides the setting for the performance 
of this task, while a limited number of powers, formally 
summed up in the "right of control" but greatly variable 
in practice, provide the means.
The empirical evidence presented in the thesis 
indicates that while "staff generalism" provides a good 
basic understanding of the intended and actual activities 
of PPO's, a number of other factors must be considered.
They also have extensive and important ideological tasks 
not fully explained by "staff generalism"; the Soviet 
authorities appear to expect, and gain, a greater degree of 
involvement in short-term operations than is allowed for by 
"staff generalist" principles; and a large amount of 
illegal and semi-legal PPO-"host" organisation collusion 
prevents a proper "staff generalist" performance.
(Vi)
These findings are derived from a considerable 
amount of empirical analysis of PPO ideological and 
operational activities. (Chapter One examines ideological 
activities; Chapter Two, PPO powers; and Chapter Three 
their operational activities.) Other chapters devote 
specific attention to case studies of PPO behaviour.
(Chapter Four describes the activities of ministerial PPO's 
since 1965 and Appendix B the role of the PPO of the Moscow 
Union of Writers in the 1962 to 1964 literary debate.)
Chapter Six summarises the effectiveness of PPO's.
The thesis presents and analyses a considerable 
amount of previously unused information on the work of 
non-production PPO's. In doing so it has developed, applied 
and attempted to evaluate a concept previously little known 
to political scientists. It reaches the conclusion that 
the concept contributes to an understanding of the Soviet 
system. It also concludes that the leaders of large-scale 
Western organisations, with the benefit of Soviet experiences, 
might use the concept as the basis of a new approach to the 
functioning of staff agencies in their organisations.
1.
INTRODUCTION
STAFF GENERALISM AND THE PRIMARY ORGANISATIONS 
OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY
T.H. Rigby has described the Soviet system in 
the following terms:
The most salient feature of communist 
systems is the attempt to run the whole 
society as a single organization, in 
which almost no socially significant 
activities are left to autonomously 
interacting individuals and groups, but 
instead are managed by centralized 
hierarchical agencies, themselves subject 
to close coordination, principally by 
the apparatus of the party ... Societies 
with these characteristics might be called 
mono-organizational.^
One of the most useful aspects of such a view of the 
Soviet system is that it allows us to apply Western 
organisational theory to the Soviet case. If we accept
1 Rigby, T.H: Totalitarianism'and Change in
Communist Systems", Comparative Politics, 
vol. 4, no. 3, April, 1972, p. 451.
2 .
the whole Soviet system as one large bureaucratic 
organisation, by analogy we can apply to it models and 
theories which in the Western situation, with its plethora 
of autonomous organisations interacting largely through 
market forces, could only be applied to single organis­
ations. Alfred Meyer, although he could be criticised 
for using it in little more than a metaphorical sense, 
draws strong attention to this possibility in his article 
"USSR, Incorporated" and book "The Soviet Political System; 
an interpretation"."*"
I would like to narrow the analogy somewhat and 
examine one section of the Soviet system, the primary party 
organisations (PPO's) in non-production institutions, in 
the light of some Western theories on line-staff relations. 
This general introduction will show that the line-staff 
approach could perhaps be most profitably applied to 
production PPO's. However the lack of specific analyses 
of non-production PPO's in the Western literature and the 
interesting and important developments in the powers and 
functions of these organisations over the last twenty years 
have prompted me to devote the detailed application of the
1 Meyer, A.G: "USSR Incorporated", in D.W.
Treadgold, ed: The Development of the USSR:
an exchange of views, Uni. of Washington Press, 
Seattle, 1964; The Soviet Political System: 
an interpretation, Random House, N.Y., 1965.
3.
approach to them rather than production organisations.
Western writers on the Soviet system usually
acknowledge the importance of PPO's. However detailed
analyses of their activities, particularly within any
general framework, are rare.'*' Western books that deal
specifically with non-production areas of Soviet society
2tend similarly to neglect PPO's. There appears to be a 
need for a treatment of PPO's within a general theoretical 
framework. Such a treatment would be of particular
1 Textbooks, such as that by Fainsod, give
informative, but brief and essentially 
descriptive accounts of PPO activities. See 
Fainsod, M: How Russia is Ruled, Harvard U.P.,
Cambridge, Mass., 1967, pp. 229-234. Those 
treatments of the Soviet system which profess 
to use a general theoretical framework rarely 
deal with PPO's at all. See, for example, 
Brzezinski, Z. and S.P. Huntington: Political
Power: USA/USSR, Viking Press, N.Y., 1965;
Meyer, op. cit. As an exception to this one 
should mention Jerry Hough's book. However
he deals almost exclusively with production 
PPO's. Hough, J.F: The Soviet Prefects, the
local party organs in industrial decision­
making , Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1969.
2 In some cases Western writers seem to completely 
misunderstand the place of non-production PPO's 
in the system. For example, B.M. Frolic, in his 
article on Soviet municipal administration, 
speaks of the party group of the department of
a city Soviet. In fact party groups, as 
described in Paragraphs 68 and 69 of the Party 
Rules, exist only in the Soviet itself and its 
executive committee. Departments have PPO's. It 
is not a terminological misunderstanding, since 
he refers to PPO's in production enterprises. In 
some circumstances the mistake could be of con­
siderable significance, since the subordination of 
PPO's and party groups can be different. Frolic, 
B.M: "Municipal Administrations, Departments,
Commissions and Organizations", Soviet Studies, 
vol. 22, no. 3, January, 1971, pp. 376-393.
benefit if it were able to provide information on the 
relatively neglected non-production PPO's. That they 
make up 41.0% of the total number of PPO's and that their 
members constitute 25.3% of total party membership should 
be sufficient to indicate that they deserve detailed 
investigation.^
I have based the general theoretical framework 
of this thesis on Western line-staff theory. However some 
extensive modifications to what might be called "traditional" 
line-staff theory are necessary before we have a framework 
suitable for our purposes. There are two basic features of 
the "traditional" view of staff agencies. Firstly, staff 
agencies have specialised skills which they use in advising 
and assisting the "generalist" line hierarchies in their 
particular areas of expertise. Secondly, although they 
might have some limited operational powers in these 
particular areas, in general it is considered desirable 
that such operational powers be strictly limited. A staff 
agency which encroaches too much into the area of line 
authority is considered likely to stifle line initiative 
and will eventually be forced to take over all operational 
activities, with subsequent neglect of its proper staff 
functions.
4 .
1 See Appendix A for more detailed statistical
data on non-production PPO's and their 
members.
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If this were the only possible conception of 
line-staff relations the theory would clearly be unsuitable 
for a study of PPO's, since they are not specialised 
agencies and because, although the Soviet authorities 
recognise and guard against the dangers of excessive party 
involvement in "line" operations, they do give PPO's 
considerable formal and informal powers over everyday 
operations.
However, certain writers on Western organisational 
theory criticise these very elements of the traditional 
theory. They criticise it because they feel that it is 
both a poor reflection of reality and that also the reality 
it calls for is an undesirable one anyway. What is most 
interesting for our purposes is that the alternative models 
these critics have devised call for the development of 
institutions which, if they were to be introduced into 
practice, would in many ways resemble PPO's.
I will focus on three particular Western treatments 
- Sampson and Golembiewski on line-staff models and Burns 
and Stalker, writing together, on "mechanistic" and "organic"
6.
modes of management.
1. Sampson's "staff generalist"
Sampson's treatment is the most straightforward. 
He criticises the traditional line-staff theory primarily 
for its over-emphasis on staff specialisation, but his 
analysis is traditional to the extent that it opposes 
staff encroachment on line authority. He considers that 
over-specialisation results in the staff specialist 
being concerned with only his own narrow ideas and there­
fore being imperfectly aware of the situation around him.
1 Golembiewski, R.T: Organizing Men and Tower;
patterns of behavior and line-staff models, 
Rand-McNally, Chicago, 1967; Sampson, R.C:
The Staff Rote in Management: its creative 
uses, McGraw-Hill, N.Y., 1956; Burns, T. and 
G.M. Stalker: The Management of Innovation,
Tavistock, London, 1961. Although Burns and 
Stalker are not concerned specifically with line- 
staff problems, the problems with which they are 
dealing and the solutions they offer have a lot 
in common with those of Golembiewski. Certainly 
they provide the basis for some interesting 
insights into the Soviet system. Sampson's and 
Golembiewski's models, although based on empirical 
observations, are essentially prescriptive. They 
have apparently never been consciously implemented 
in practice. The prescriptive element of Burns' 
and Stalker's analysis goes no further than a 
call for recognition of the advantages of the 
processes that they have observed arising in certain 
empirical circumstances. The analysis in this 
thesis, while using many of the concepts developed 
by Burns and Stalker, will contribute little to 
their further development. However it could con­
tribute considerably to the further development of 
the other two models by providing the opportunity 
for empirical testing of their efficacy.
7 .
This leads to line-staff conflict and lack of
coordination.'1' Staff operational authority stifles line
initiative, which, combined with the former difficulties,
means that staff tends to become involved in short-term
operational activities and that problems come to receive
2no broad attention at all.
It is Sampson's treatment of the problem of
over-specialisation that is of the greater interest to us.
He has two solutions, both of which have some application
to the Soviet case. Firstly, he calls for greater use of
staff "generalists", that is, staff officers without any
particular technical specialties, but with an overall
understanding of the policies, structure and operations
3of the organisation as a whole. This concern with
overall policy and operational matters does not exclude
involvement in the solving of individual operational
problems. What he stresses is that the staff generalist
should always approach such problem-solving with the
eventual aim of not only solving the immediate problem,
4but also attacking the underlying cause.
1 Sampson, op. cit., p. 29
2 ibid, PP . 30-31.
3 ibid, P* 92.
4 ibid, P- 101.
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The role of the party workers of PPO's appears 
to be close to that of the staff generalist. Much of this 
thesis will be concerned with presenting empirical evidence 
which suggests that PPO's involve themselves in all areas 
of the activities of their "host" line organisations, 
including policy-making.^
Sampson hints at an aspect of "generalist" 
concern further developed by Burns and Stalker and of 
fundamental importance to an understanding of the role of 
PPO's, when he speaks of the staff generalist, also known 
as the staff representative, as, ideally, behaving in the 
following way:
The representative views himself as a student 
who tries gradually to help executives to 
understand and accept the best of modern 
thought as far as their own problems are 
concerned. We might call him 'the persistent 
conscience of the management'. He exercises 
a dynamic influence working for better 
management and stronger managers.^
1 The examination in Chapter 5 of biographical
data on PPO secretaries suggests that many 
of them by training and career backgrounds 
are "staff generalists". However many others 
do not have the training and experience that 
the activities of their PPO's would suggest were 
necessary for the performance of such a role.
2 ibid, p. 110.
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There is much about this which reminds us of the "leading" 
role of PPO's. The members of a PPO are expected to 
acquaint themselves with the most advanced thought in their 
areas of concern and to spread it throughout the working 
collective. The tasks of ministerial PPO's in persuading minist­
erial leaders to act in the spirit of recent administrative 
reforms, discussed in Chapter 4, is a good example of this.
The similarity becomes greater when we read 
that Sampson also gives the staff generalist a "value 
counselling" role, "for it is axiomatic that to secure a 
change in behavior, one must first secure a change in 
attitude and values".'*' Thus the overall view, or ideology, 
of the staff generalist enables him to inculcate new 
values among line executives. Although, as will be 
elaborated later, ideology in the Soviet Union has no 
true parallels in Western theory or practice, the "value 
counselling" role of Sampson's staff generalists is 
interesting in view of the close link between the party's 
"leading" role and its ideological authority.
Sampson's second solution to the over-specialisation 
of staff is the integration of line and staff organisations.
He calls for an organisational structure in which each line
1 ibid, p. 151.
10.
hierarchy has built into it a hierarchy of staff generalist 
units. These units are assigned to all levels of the line 
hierarchy.^" PPO's, being situated directly within and 
having overlapping memberships with organisations at all 
levels of the Soviet "line" hierarchies, structurally 
closely resemble the lowest level staff units prescribed 
by Sampson.
It cannot be claimed that Sampson's model provides 
even a close approximation to the structure or functions 
of PPO's. Specific structural and even functional diff­
erences have little effect on the utility of the broad 
analogy, and Sampson's contribution to it, to be used in 
this thesis. However one feature of Sampson's model 
which cannot be included in the concept of staff generalism 
to be used here is his insistence on the need for the staff 
units not to exercise any sort of authority over the line, 
not to involve themselves in any way in operational command 
or control. In this Sampson aligns himself with the 
"traditional" view of proper line-staff relations. However, 
in the Soviet case PPO's do dispose of considerable formal 
and informal powers to exercise authority over those 
organisations.
However it could be said that Sampson is contra-
1 ibid, pp. 203-205.
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dictory on this point. Although he stresses that staff 
must not supplant the line, he does throughout his book 
exhibit a high degree of confidence that his staff 
generalist units will manage to "persuade" line management 
of the desirability of the changes they desire. When he 
describes, in very vague terms, the staff method as 
"planned opportunism" and declares that the "staff concern 
will be that of setting up line and fitting staff to it", 
one wonders how this will be possible without the use of 
some authority.^ It appears very unlikely that Sampson 
would escape the problem of creeping staff encroachment on 
line authority, with the problems it brings of line-staff 
conflict and lowered effectiveness of both line and staff 
organisations. Sampson's problem raises the very important 
question of how PPO's go about achieving goals similar to 
those of Sampson's staff units with some, but still limited, 
formal powers.
Although it would be dangerous to exaggerate the 
degree to which Sampson's model approximates the functions 
and structure of PPO's, there are sufficient parallels 
that some benefit can be obtained from applying it to the 
Soviet case, mainly in providing hypotheses for empirical 
testing. For example, Sampson concludes his book by 
putting forward two objections that could be made to his
1 ibid, p. 101, 201.
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model. Firstly, that staff generalists will not 
be able to cope with the range of functions entrusted to 
them; and secondly, that if they become too closely 
integrated with line units, they will lose their 
independence and objectivity.^ A study of non-production 
PPO's could help decide whether Sampson's doubts are 
justified.
2. Golembiewski and the Colleague model
Golembiewski's staff model has many similarities 
to Sampson's, although he goes further than Sampson in 
criticising traditional line-staff theories not only for 
the over-specialisation they demand of staff agencies, 
but also for their denial of the need for staff operational 
authority.
He claims that the traditional theory emphasises
the superiority of the line hierarchy, denying staff
organisations the right to issue operational orders and
2restricting their role to service and advice. He feels 
that such a theory ignores the fact that staff units do in 
fact, both formally and informally, exercise considerable 
influence over line organisations, going far beyond service
2
ibid, pp. 207-208. 
Golembiewski, op. cit., p. 11.
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and advice. He then goes further in claiming that the 
traditional theory's denial of staff power and the staff's 
reaction to this is the root cause of line-staff conflict. 
The usual reaction is that the staff organisation, equipped 
with technically well-qualified but organisationally 
inexperienced specialists with easier access to higher 
authorities than line officials have, encroach on line 
authority. This results in line-staff conflict which, 
whatever its outcome, ensures that neither line nor staff 
will be doing its job properly.^-
With regard to staff authority Golembiewski 
takes an opposite point of view to that of Sampson in that 
he declares staff exercise of power to be a proper and 
necessary thing, the requirement being to develop some 
system in which such power will have a place which is 
recognised as legitimate by the line.
1 Guest describes the process well in the
first part of his book on Plant Y. If the con­
flict continues the different organisations 
become more concerned with protecting or 
extending their powers than with the good of 
the organisation as a whole. This reduces 
lateral communication and produces an excessive 
reliance on rules by the defensive organisations, 
thereby leading to inflexibility and problems of 
coordination. If the conflict is resolved in the 
line's favour, the staff usually will end up 
neglecting its proper control functions; while 
if the staff wins, the line will abdicate its 
responsibilities to the staff, which will often 
prove incapable of fulfilling them and would 
certainly have to neglect its proper staff duties 
in order to do so. Guest, R.H: Organizational
Change; the effect of successful leadership, 
Tavistock, London, 1962, pp. 24-37.
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In the Soviet Union PPO's do have some degree 
of formal authority over line hierarchies, essentially 
the powers contained in the right of control. Whether it 
is considered legitimate by line authorities and whether 
it reduces or contributes to conflict between party and line 
organisations are questions to be examined. But 
Golembiewski's discussion also raises for us the question 
of whether PPO's find it necessary to go beyond the formal 
limits of their power, and if so, what forms does such 
encroachment on line authority take and what effect does 
it have on party and line organisations and the relations 
between them.
Golembiewski makes a further point about "cultural" 
differences between line and staff. It would appear that 
in Western organisations the staff element tends to be 
younger, better educated and with less service in the 
organisation than line officials. Such differences cannot 
fail to reinforce any tension that might already exist, if 
not be a source of tension in themselves.^  It is worth 
asking ourselves whether the CPSU faces similar problems.
One additional point worth mentioning is that 
Golembiewski believes the problem of line-staff relations 
to be particularly critical in times of technological 
change. He declares that developing technology increases
1 Golembiewski, op. cit., pp. 70-73.
15.
the importance of specialists' occupying those staff 
positions which carry responsibility for introducing new 
techniques and procedures and for seeing that they are 
used properly.^" This is especially interesting for us 
in that the Soviet authorities lay particular emphasis 
on technological development and yet the party apparatus, 
while concerned to recruit technical specialists into its 
organisations, does not play a technically specialised 
role. How it copes, therefore, with technological devel­
opment will have to be looked at closely.
Integration of line and staff organisations is
the basis of Golembiewski's solution to the problems of
the traditional theory. He goes further in this than
Sampson, apparently removing altogether the structural
differentiation between line and staff. His Colleague
model calls for the formation of a hierarchy of Colleague
units, at each level consisting of officials fulfilling
line and staff functions. It is interesting that at the
lowest level he sees the assignment of staff "generalists"
2as being desirable. Golembiewski hopes that making the 
Colleague unit as a whole responsible for the successful 
fulfilment of the tasks around which it is organised will
1 ibid, pp. 43-45
2 ibid, p. 160.
16.
reduce conflict between line and staff functions, since 
their relations will be based on close cooperative effort 
for the success of their collective, rather than a 
functionally specialised hierarchy; that it will speed up 
the implementation of new techniques by bringing staff 
specialists closer to production; that non-conflict-based 
horizontal communications within groups will largely replace 
vertical communications along hierarchies; and that close 
working relations and general lack of conflict will reduce 
the significance of cultural differences.
This solution bears some similarity to that 
adopted by the CPSU, with its primary organisations so 
closely integrated with the "host" non-party organisations. 
Certainly Golembiewski goes further than this, removing the 
specialist staff structure altogether and giving the 
decentralised Colleague unit a far greater degree of 
autonomy than any low-level organisation in the Soviet 
Union would ever attain. However the party's solution is 
close enough to Golembiewski's that it suffers from the same 
major problem, that of collusion and subsequent loss of 
control. It appears inevitable that the greater the degree 
of integration the greater the possibility of collusion. 
Golembiewski appears to be running the risk of having to 
establish a whole new staff hierarchy just to control his 
Colleague units.^ It appears that at times the party uses
1 ibid, pp. 230-231.
its Party Control Committees for this purpose; however 
on the whole it would appear to prefer to avoid this and 
rather to strike some uneasy balance between separation 
and integration; conflict and collusion. An examination 
of the mechanics of this process will make up an important 
part of this thesis.
3. Burns' and Stalker's "organic" mode of management
An interesting feature of Golembiewski's treat­
ment is the extent to which his criticisms of the tradit­
ional line-staff theory are in fact criticismsof the line 
hierarchy as much as the staff structure.^ It can be seen 
that his solution would modify the line structure as 
fundamentally as the staff structure.
This provides a link with Burns' and Stalker's 
treatment of the "mechanistic" and "organic" modes of 
management. Although they are not specifically concerned 
with line-staff relations, Burns and Stalker share with 
Golembiewski a concern with the inadequacy of the traditional 
"mechanistic" system, in times of change, and develop a 
solution based on similar principles.
Burns and Stalker describe the traditional system 
of management as the "mechanistic" mode. It is characterised
1 ibid, pp. 31-38.
18.
by such features as functional specialisation; precise 
definition of roles, rights and obligations; a hierarchical 
structure of control, authority and communication; vertical 
rather than horizontal interaction between members of the 
organisation; and a tendency for operations to be governed 
by instructions issued by superiors.1 2 Although line-staff 
relations are not specifically mentioned, this system 
closely resembles the traditional principles of organisational 
theory attacked by Golembiewski.
Burns and Stalker describe the mode, along with
its "organic" opposite, as an ideal type, unlikely to ever
exist in pure form; in fact they recognise that elements
of the two modes probably exist side by side at the same 
2time. However in general terms the mechanistic system is 
suitable for stable conditions, but is not able to cope 
with changing conditions. The functional specialisation 
which forms the basis of the mechanistic mode, if the 
system is to work efficiently, has an inherent need for 
full definition of the roles and functions of all members 
of the organisation. Anyone whose role is insufficiently 
defined or overlaps with anyone else's cannot fit into the 
system, and indeed will probably disrupt it. So once roles 
and functions are adequately defined the system depends on 
stability for their maintenance. A change in just one
1 Burns and Stalker, op. cit., p. 120.
2 ibid, p. 122.
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would necessitate change in a whole host of others.^
The authors claim that such perfection of 
definition and such perfect stability is not possible in 
practice, which explains why there are always some "informal” 
relations in any organisation, that is, relations outside
2the formal structure and principles of the mechanistic mode. 
Further, their empirical research has indicated that in 
organisations where instability is endemic, where continual 
change and innovation is necessary, relations outside the 
framework of the mechanistic mode become dominant. The 
extreme case is the "organic" mode of management. The 
essential principles of the organic mode are a lack of 
definition or continual redefinition of individual tasks; 
a network structure of control, authority and communication; 
lateral rather than vertical interaction of organisation 
members; and reliance on information and advice rather than
1 ibid, pp. 123-124.
2 Informal relations can be mechanistic. 
Burns and Stalker describe one firm 
where organisational problems had led 
to the development of extensive 
informal relations. However these were 
of a highly static nature and were 
based essentially on a strengthening
of vertical communications. ibid, 
pp. 99, 238-239.
20.
instructions and decisions.'*' The stress on lateral
communications and avoidance of vertical hierarchy calls
2to mind Golembiewski's Colleague model.
4. The Soviet case
It could not be said that anything approaching 
a pure form of the organic system operates in the Soviet 
Union. It is true that at times, notably in the course of
1 ibid, p. 121.
2 It is interesting that the case studies under­
taken by Burns and Stalker have uncovered 
"organic" behaviour and organisation which, 
although not developed according to any pre- 
established theory or plan, bear some interesting 
parallels to the sort of changes demanded by 
Golembiewski. For example, in one factory where 
the introduction of a laboratory development team 
had led to serious conflict with production 
executives, the managing director abandoned the 
mechanistic system of dividing the production side 
of the firm into small departments, each respons­
ible for a single part of the overall process. It 
was replaced by new "developmental groups", each 
responsible for production problems as they arose. 
The result was that jobs took on a more elastic 
nature and vertical communications were replaced 
by lateral communications. ibid, p. 236.
However there was no sign of anyone playing a 
"staff generalist" role since functionally special­
ised roles were retained. Something of more 
relevance to our concerns was the simultaneous 
development of courses for personnel which entailed 
not only training in technical matters, but also
in managerial methods. Such courses presumably 
had an important role to play in the psychological 
preparation of personnel, to facilitate their 
acceptance of a new organisational "ideology".
21.
crisis campaigns in agriculture, roles and functions have 
lost most of their formal definition, the local party 
functionaries taking over from the normal non-party 
hierarchies and operating in whatever way they feel to be 
necessary in the circumstances.
However in normal circumstances the Soviet system 
shows a considerable degree of commitment to the mechanistic 
mode. There are well-established functional hierarchies 
with formal definitions of functions and powers, with the 
stress on a vertical and unitary chain of command. Thus 
the Soviet system, being one in which change of one kind 
or another is a significant feature, exhibits many of the 
problems that strike all mechanistic systems. The 
existence of functionally-specialised "line" hierarchies leads 
to a concentration by the members of those hierarchies on 
their own narrow interests at the expense of the interests 
of the system as a whole. It is not my task to describe 
in detail the problems of the Soviet system. Suffice it 
to say very briefly that the specialised hierarchies produce 
such problems of "sectionalism" (vedomstvennost') as 
hoarding of materials and supplies, duplication of ancillary 
services and manipulation of prices and plan indicators.
In the course of this thesis we will see that all the
1 The current concern with computer-based
system-wide planning and control would seem 
to be aiming at the ultimate development of 
the mechanistic mode.
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non-production branches of Soviet society have their 
own forms of such "sectionalism". The bureaucratic 
complexities of the system, exacerbated by line hierarchy 
jealousies, lead to enormous problems of coordination.
The effect of these problems is increased by over­
centralisation. Because the line hierarchies are 
essentially concerned with production, and this means in 
the Soviet Union perhaps more than anywhere else the 
maximum output in the shortest possible period of time, 
they tend to concentrate on the short-term at the expense 
of longer-term and wider considerations such as improved 
quality, balanced development, capital construction and 
the development and implementation of new technology.
These are major problems facing the Soviet 
administrative system today, problems with which the party 
apparatus is expected to deal. While it would be foolish 
to claim that the use of the party apparatus is the only 
means employed to solve these problems, it does seem to be 
one of the most important. It is hoped that the organis­
ations of the party apparatus, deeply involved in operational 
activities through their proximity to the line hierarchies, 
but without the commitment to specialised interests and 
supposedly without the same absolute dependence on the 
fulfilment of short-term tasks, will be able to combat the 
evils of sectionalism, and coordinate the activities of 
the different line hierarchies, and will have the long-range
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view to enable them to see the importance of the most 
advanced forms of production and management.
It would be tempting to apply the staff generalist 
approach to the activities of the party apparatus as a 
whole. Since it is organised on a territorial basis each 
of its organisations have generalist concerns within its 
territory, while its hierarchy runs parallel to all non- 
party hierarchies. Statements on the functions of middle- 
level party organs such as that made by Fainsod could be 
taken as suggesting a "staff" role for the party apparatus. 
He says:
The party leadership holds its local 
representatives responsible for the 
fulfilment of plans in all areas and 
organizations to which they are assigned.
To be sure, day-to-day operating respons­
ibilities are vested in the governmental 
hierarchy of managers and administrators.
But every level of the governmental hier­
archy is both interpenetrated with, and 
subject to check by, the corresponding level 
of the Party hierarchy ... As a matter of 
accepted practice, (the Party leadership's 
local emissaries) are expected to keep in 
touch with all enterprises and activities 
within their jurisdiction, to be alert to
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any failure of performance, to report 
constantly to their own higher authorities 
on the state of plan fulfilment, and to take 
such measures, in collaboration with local 
administrators, as will ensure the realis­
ation of the goals and tasks which the Party 
high command has set.^
However the activities of the middle and higher-level 
party organs go far beyond even the most generously 
defined "staff" role. The openly admitted direct involvement 
of the party apparatus in the making of policy and operat­
ional decisions and the giving of operational orders and 
its absolute superiority over all other hierarchies give it
a far more "commanding" role than can be allowed for by the 
2staff concept.
PPO's, the lowest organisations of the party 
apparatus, fit the staff generalist framework far more 
closely. As demanded by both Sampson and Golembiewski 
they are closely integrated into line hierarchies and
1 Fainsod, op. cit., p. 215.
2 Although a comparison could still perhaps be 
made with the General Staff of the German 
Army as described by Golembiewski, op. cit., 
pp. 17-18. Nevertheless Hough's comparison 
of the secretaries of local party organs with 
the prefects of the French regional administ­
ration is probably a more useful use of 
Western parallels at this level. Hough,
op. cit.
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fulfil generalised tasks. They are not given the degree 
of formal operational powers that Golembiewski would 
desire, but do not have to rely simply on powers of 
"persuasion”, as expressed by Sampson. An examination 
of the precise significance of the formal powers of PPO's, 
summed up in the right of control, is a fundamental part 
of this thesis.
Golembiewski is of the opinion that the extensive 
devolution of formal powers that his Colleague model 
demands would provide sufficient decentralisation to avoid 
the problems of over-centralisation inherent in traditional 
"mechanistic" systems. While in the Soviet case the right 
of control in itself does bring about some degree of 
decentralisation, the greatest contribution to decentral­
isation is made by the variable and ambiguous interpretation 
of the meaning of the right of control by the Soviet 
authorities.^
They apparently feel that this type of informal 
decentralisation gives them the flexibility to allow them 
to avoid or minimise the problems of line-staff conflict in
1 Andrd Gunder Frank has dealt
theoretically with this type of decent­
ralisation within an organisational 
model known as "conflicting standards 
analysis", while Jerry Hough has examined 
it in the Soviet Union. Frank, A.G:
"Goal Ambiguity and Conflicting Standards: 
an approach to the study of organization", 
Human Organization, vol. 17, no. 4, Winter, 
1958-59, pp. 8-13; Hough, op. cit., 
pp. 88-89.
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reaction to which Sampson and Golembiewski developed 
their models, but which one suspects they would not succeed 
in entirely avoiding. Sampson hopes to prevent conflict by 
firmly denying staff any operational powers; Golembiewski, 
by granting staff some formal powers and making line and 
staff equally responsible for performance. Sampson is 
unlikely to be able to prevent staff encroachment on line 
authority; Golembiewski is likely to find his Colleague 
units colluding to the detriment of organisational perform­
ance. The Soviet authorities try to strike a variable 
balance in the powers of "host" organisations and PPO's. 
Although at different times they are likely to face all the 
problems of line-staff relationships - line-staff conflict, 
staff usurpation of line functions, and collusion - the 
balance of power can be changed relatively quickly in 
reaction to the problem that appears most serious at the 
time. The degree of ambiguity and decentralisation is 
closely controlled by higher party authorities. Monitoring 
and control are strong enough to ensure that the top 
authorities are able at any time and reasonably quickly to 
induce PPO's to provide either greater conflict or 
cooperation with line hierarchies.
As a support to this control by higher authorities, 
and to reduce the incidence of higher authorities actually 
having to intervene, the party authorities use a form of 
ideological indoctrination similar to that discussed by Burns
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and Stalker. The latter stress that the changing and 
unpredictable nature of roles and functions means that a 
strong commitment to the overall goals of the organisation 
is required if it is not to fall apart. In one firm they 
examined, one with a high degree of organic features, "the 
disruptive effects of this preoccupation (with defining 
and redefining roles) were countered by a general aware­
ness of the common purpose of the concern's attitudes.
While this awareness was sporadic and partial for many 
members of the firm, it was an essential factor in, for 
example, the ability of the 'product engineers' to perform 
their tasks, dependent as they were on the co-operation 
of persons and groups who carried out the basic inter­
pretative processes of the concern".'*' They further 
declared that effective organic systems "rely on the 
development of a 'common culture', of a dependably constant 
system of shared beliefs about the common interests of the 
working community and about the standards and criteria 
used in it to judge achievement, individual contributions,
expertise and other matters by which a person or combination
2of people are evaluated". We have already seen the 
mention made by Sampson of the need for staff generalists
1
2
Burns and Stalker, op. cit., pp. 93-94. 
ibid, p. 119.
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to inculcate values in line executives.^ And so in the 
Soviet Union it is the task of the party to formulate and 
propagate the system's ideology. The party authorities 
hope that through the propagation of the ideology their 
organisations will gain moral authority and the workers in 
the line hierarchies will be motivated to accept the "staff" 
role of the PPO's. It is also designed to produce the proper 
attitudes in the party workers, particularly those such as 
PPO secretaries who are closely integrated into line organ­
isations, so that they will behave with the right degree of 
compromise between collusion and conflict.
5. Some problems
To summarise the Soviet system in terms of the 
model I have been describing, it could be said that it is 
basically organised as a mechanistic or traditionally 
vertically hierarchical system. The party inserts a staff 
element into this system in an effort to control and improve 
the performance of the non-party hierarchies. However 
there are many features of this staff element which 
distinguish it from the traditional Western staff model.
1 Burns and Stalker are not speaking of
indoctrination being deliberately under­
taken by Western firms. However Sampson 
seems to suggest that such deliberate 
indoctrination should in fact take place. 
See also R.C. Davis: The Fundamentals of
Top Management, Harper and Row, N.Y., 1951, 
pp. 561-563. He discusses the importance 
of the indoctrination of a sound philosophy 
of management in Western business firms.
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It could be described as a relatively closely integrated 
generalist staff element.
There are problems with the methodological 
orientation provided by the "staff generalist" model.
Firstly, there is the problem of the relative rarity of 
staff generalist models in Western literature and especially 
practice. The benefits of a methodological approach such 
as I am using, based on an analogy, are twofold. Firstly, 
the analogy should give us a broad understanding of the 
object to be studied through comparing it with some more 
familiar object. Secondly, the easier access to the more 
familiar object should provide interesting working hypotheses 
to be tested in similar conditions. But the staff generalist 
model, either in theory or practice, is not very familiar to 
students of political organisation. Therefore it might be 
said that it cannot provide the broad understanding of the 
role of PPO's that I am seeking. Because staff generalist 
models have received no serious practical application in 
Western organisations, it might also be said that no useful 
working hypotheses will be forthcoming.
However in justification of the staff generalist 
model it could also be said that it is so closely based on 
well-established line-staff theories and practice that a 
general understanding should be readily attainable, 
particularly if the reader is not totally ignorant of PPO's. 
Anyone with even a rudimentary knowledge of line-staff
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theories, even of the traditional kind, and of the 
activities of PPO's, should be able to see those activities 
within the staff generalist framework.
The direct derivation of the staff generalist 
model from traditional line-staff theories also enables 
the taking of working hypotheses from it. Sampson's and 
Golembiewski's models have been developed in reaction to 
the working difficulties of traditional line-staff practice. 
The same pressures should be evident as contributing to the 
Soviet development of PPO's. Burns and Stalker developed 
their concepts directly from empirical investigation of 
English and Scottish firms. There is, therefore, sufficient 
practical experience to provide us with some working 
hypotheses.
The fact that there has been no conscious attempt 
to give practical application to the staff generalist model 
in the West makes the position of PPO's particularly 
interesting. Being a practical application of the staff 
generalist model they should provide us with some under­
standing of the sorts of problems to be faced by any 
practical applications of it in the West. The Western 
writers I have been using appear to be aware of the problems 
and have provided some hypotheses for testing in the thesis. 
PPO's become valuable, therefore, as a testing ground for 
hypotheses that cannot be easily tested in a Western context.
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The second problem is more serious. Existing 
staff generalist models fail to allow sufficient and 
proper stress to be given to the ideological functions of 
PPO's. I have extracted some account of ideology from 
Sampson and Burns and Stalker; however it is inadequate. 
Their accounts are valuable in that they allow us to 
identify two largely separate, but both extremely important 
aspects of ideology; Burns and Stalker speak of the 
legitimising and mobilising aspects of ideology, while 
Sampson sees ideology in more "technological" terms, of 
superior and innovatory organisational values and 
techniques. We will see that both these aspects of 
ideology are of fundamental importance to PPO's; indeed, 
particularly in the case of the aspect of ideology discussed 
by Burns and Stalker, of far greater importance than those 
authors suggest. While they are aware of the importance 
of a binding organisational ideology in times of rapid 
change, they cannot, in their context, allow for a system- 
wide application such as is found in the case of the Soviet 
ideology, with its coverage of all aspects of economic, 
social and intellectual life. We should remember that this 
pervasive ideology is not conveyed only through specialised 
ideological agencies, this being equally the function of 
PPO's operating at the work-place level. The organisational 
ideology of which Burns and Stalker speak also contains no 
hint of the total control implicit in the Soviet ideology. 
While their ideology has legitimising and mobilising 
functions, the Soviet ideology takes on a whole new
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repressive function of social and intellectual control.
Another aspect of Soviet ideology not allowed 
for in any of the Western staff generalist models is the 
special role it gives to rank-and-file party members.
While they do not have the political significance of the 
elected and career party officials, they do have a special 
"vanguard" role to play in society, providing a good 
example to and the lowest-level check on the behaviour of 
all citizens. The staff generalist model fails to provide 
for this. While the elected officials of the PPO's can 
be seen as the "staff" personnel of the system, it is 
difficult to fit the rank-and-file party membership into 
such a framework.
The orientation towards the ideological offered 
by Sampson and Burns and Stalker will be used, but far 
greater emphasis will be given to the ideological functions 
of PPO's outside the framework of existing Western staff 
generalist models.
There are other less serious shortcomings of the 
model. One aspect of the activities of PPO's not covered 
at all by the model is the running of their own affairs - 
their own internal operating procedures. This at first 
glance might appear to be of little significance for their 
system-wide operations. However we will see that what 
formally speaking must be described as intra-party concerns
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in fact have enormous significance for the external 
operations of PPO's. Firstly, the PPO relies for its 
successful operation on the most effective organisation 
and distribution of its membership. Secondly, and more 
importantly, the PPO relies very heavily on the powers 
of party discipline to exercise its influence over 
institutional leaders and rank-and-file workers.
Another thing not provided for in any Western 
staff models are PPO functions in the area of leadership 
of other social organisations, primarily the trade unions 
and the komsomol. However these functions can be quite 
easily fitted into the framework. To the extent that social 
organisations contribute to the "production" activities of 
a line organisation, the control of them by PPO's can be 
seen as a further weapon in the fulfilment of their staff 
functions.
All these problems should be recognised, but not 
seen as taking away the usefulness of the staff generalist 
approach. Beyond offering a basic understanding of PPO's 
in terms of a reasonably familiar Western model, it 
provides a more specific focus on some matters. The most 
important to arise from the discussion so far, those that 
are basic to this thesis, are concerned with the nature of 
relations between line and staff hierarchies. The basic 
questions are: what formal powers do PPO's have, how do
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line organisations react to these powers, what further 
informal powers do PPO's come to gain and what is the line 
reaction, and how much are these power relations controlled 
and manipulated by higher authorities. It is hoped that 
Western experience, as well as providing the motivation for 
the asking of these questions, can also give some clues as 
to the answers.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE IDEOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES OF PPO'S
While some Western writers have been willing to 
ignore the emotive connotations of such words as 
"ideology" and "indoctrination" and have used them in 
analyses of Western society and organisations/ there is 
still considerable reluctance among many to recognise 
that ideology and indoctrination fulfil broadly the same 
functions in the West as they do in the Soviet Union.
There are enormous differences between the two systems, 
but Western organisational theory can be used to some 
good effect to gain an understanding of the functions of 
ideology in the Soviet Union. As mentioned in the 
Introduction the "staff generalist" approach cannot in 
itself entirely provide an adequate framework for this 
understanding. However the ideological functions of PPO's 
are important in that they contribute very significantly to 
the successful fulfilment of the PPO "staff generalist" role.
Western organisational writers have long been 
aware of the need for some commonly-held organisational 
"culture", "doctrine", or "code of conduct" - although 
the word "ideology" is never used, its meaning is very
1 For example, Brzezinski and Huntington, 
op. cit., pp. 17-27; Davis, R.C., op. cit., 
pp. 542-582.
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similar - if the organisation is to operate effectively.
While many different words are used, what the writers all 
have in mind can be described in terms of R.C. Davis's 
"organisational doctrine", that is, "any formal statement, 
either express or implied, of objectives, ideals, principles, 
points of view, and general modes of procedures"^. These 
Western writers see this doctrine as fulfilling two basic 
functions. Firstly, it builds up the organisation's 
legitimacy amongst its members, leading to their willingness 
to continue as members of the organisation and, hopefully, 
to perform to the limit of their abilities. I will speak 
of work in this area as "value indoctrination". Secondly, 
it provides a common language for members of the 
organisation so that they all, even those with very 
different functional tasks, will have a common understanding 
of what they are working towards. I will refer to work in 
this area as "operational indoctrination".
Western writers recognise the very different 
natures of these two functions, and that they will be 
present to different degrees in different organisations.
They are most careful when speaking about the first function,
1 Davis, R.C., op. cit., p. 588.
Burns and Stalker provide another definition, 
for their "code of practice for conduct". It 
is "both revealing and acting as the medium for 
specifying the limits of defeasible action, 
whether they are elastic or fixed, and for 
intimating what span of all the rational, 
technical, cultural, and emotional elements of 
a situation or problem may be counted as 
admissible". Burns and Stalker, op. cit., p. 259. 
See also their definitions quoted above, p. 27.
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since it has the greatest "political" ramifications.
They generally recognise that the legitimacy of an 
organisation depends very heavily on the legitimacy of 
the social system in which it is situated. R.C. Davis, 
in speaking of "indoctrination for morale development", 
his term for value indoctrination, writes:
It has to do with the development of a 
community of ideas concerning values and 
organizational relationships between owners, 
managers, and operatives on the one hand, 
and customers and the general public on the 
other. It involves consideration of the 
property rights of employees in their 
services and of owners in their capital.
Most opinions about such values, conditions 
and relationships have an emotional as well 
as factual base. They concern the found­
ations of an industrial economy. They 
therefore have political and social as well 
as economic significance.^
While he declares that a high degree of such indoctrination 
is neither possible nor desirable in a democratic society, 
Davis believes that some basic acceptance of the capitalist 
system by employees, and employers, is essential if an 
organisation within that system is to work effectively.
1 Davis, R.C., op. cit., p. 592.
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Davis's idea of "basic acceptance" becomes perhaps more 
controversial with the statement that the optimum condition 
of indoctrination for morale development "requires merely 
an acceptance of management's philosophy to the extent that 
will cause employees to think as well as listen to opposing 
arguments, that will prevent their being stampeded into 
action which is contrary to the organization's interests 
by emotional appeals to their short-term personal interests. 
Such appeals are often opposed to. their long-term interests". 
It could be said that such a statement bears an unfortunate 
resemblance to Soviet statements on the subject.
Amitai Etzioni gives less significance to 
philosophical indoctrination in Western corporations. He 
speaks of consensus, the result of indoctrination, and sees 
it in six different areas - consensus on general values, 
organisational goals, policies on means, participation, 
performance obligations and cognitive perspectives.
According to the particular definitions he gives the 
different aspects of consensus, the first three, those 
that have the greater "philosophical" content, are considered 
to be of the greatest importance in normative organisations, 
such as religions, political parties, etc. However 
utilitarian organisations, among which he includes Western 
corporations, do not rely on these types of consensus.
1 ibid, p. 593.
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"The basic reason for this is that production is a 
relatively rational process and hence can rest on contract­
ual relationships of complementary interest, not shared 
sentiments or values. It is not mandatory for effective 
operation that management and workers hold congruent views 
of general values, organizational goals, or organizational 
policy"^. Etzioni underestimates the importance of this 
type of "philosophical" consensus in a utilitarian 
organisation. It appears probable, for example, that 
employees who believe that shareholders are entitled to 
the profits of a concern will work more willingly than 
workers who disagree fundamentally with such a view.
Burns and Stalker's treatment of this matter is 
interesting, and not really comparable with Davis's and 
Etzioni's, since they do not relate the philosophical 
values of the organisation to the outside world. Their 
neglect of the general philosophical context in which an 
organisation works could be considered a shortcoming, 
particularly when they do recognise the importance of 
internal philosophical values. But what we can take from 
their treatment and use to good effect is the recognition 
that philosophical commitment to the values of the 
organisation becomes particularly important in organically
Etzioni, A: A Comparative Analysis of Complex
Organizations, on power, involvement, and their 
correlates, Free Press of Glencoe, N.Y., 1961, 
p. 136.
1
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organised institutions. In a mechanistic organisation 
philosophical commitment is replaced by rational proced­
ures established by those at the top of the hierarchy.
As in Etzioni's utilitarian organisations, in a mechanistic 
organisation an employee does not need to concern himself 
with the ultimate values and goals of the organisation 
as long as there is a vertical hierarchy telling him 
precisely what his job is. But when the hierarchy and 
established procedures break down the employee comes to 
rely on his own values to give him a guide and motivation 
to action. Burns and Stalker write:
A second observation is that the area of 
commitment to the concern - the extent to 
which the individual yields himself as a 
resource to be used by the working 
organization - is far more extensive in 
organic than in mechanistic systems.
Commitment, in fact, is expected to approach 
that of the professional scientist to his work, 
and frequently does ... The distinctive 
feature of the organic system is the pervas­
iveness of the working organization as an 
institution. In concrete terms, this makes 
itself felt in a preparedness to combine with 
others in serving the general aims of the concern."
1 Burns and Stalker, op. cit., pp. 122, 125.
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We have already seen in the Introduction that the Soviet
system cannot be described as a highly organic one,
indeed it shows a strong degree of committment to mechanistic
procedures. This limits the applicability of Burns and
Stalker's concept to some extent. However, if we accept
the party apparatus as a focus of organic elements operating
within a relatively mechanistic system, it may be of some
use to us. Being a party member, particularly a party
worker, should involve a sense of commitment like that of
the professional scientist. Whatever the task to be done
by the party member it should be done with a sense of
commitment to the supreme values of the Soviet ideology.
This is particularly important in the case of "staff
generalist" PPO secretaries and rank-and-file party members.
The special nature of their role, particularly the role of
the secretaries, means that commitment to the system's
values is particularly important. Thus much of the value
indoctrination in the Soviet Union is directed specifically
1towards party members.
Value indoctrination is not limited to party 
members. While party members are inculcated with special 
values, it is still important that non-party members of the 
society have a basic commitment to the Soviet ideology, that 
they give it sufficient legitimacy that they will not reject
1 Etzioni's discussion of consensus in
normative organisations is relevant 
here.
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it altogether, and more positively that they work with 
enthusiasm towards fulfilment of its goals. That is, 
value indoctrination, indoctrination in the basic princ­
iples of Soviet Marxim-Leninism, has two main functions - 
legitimisation and mobilisation.^-
While Davis, of the Western authors I have 
cited, places the most emphasis on value indoctrination, 
he still differs fundamentally from Soviet authorities in 
his desire to keep it to the absolute minimum. Why is it 
that the Soviet authorities find it necessary to keep 
indoctrination at as high a level as possible? Why is it 
that the Soviet ideology must be extended to cover all 
areas of social and economic activity? A cynical observer 
might say, with some justification, that the values of a 
Western democratic society are so much more naturally 
acceptable to the population that they do not have to be 
indoctrinated into them.
1 There are three levels of the basic
principles of Soviet Marxism-Leninism.
There are such timeless principles as 
the eventual building of a fully communist 
society and collapse of capitalism, and the 
leading role of the party; more variable 
principles such as the timing of the arrival 
of the communist stage of development, the 
number of permissible roads to socialism 
and the currently desirable attitude to 
capitalist societies; and other principles 
not necessarily derived from Marxist 
philosophy such as Soviet patriotism, 
friendship between different national groups, 
respect for the family and differential 
levels of wealth and income.
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But a more thorough examination of Soviet 
ideology is required for a proper understanding of this 
matter. Soviet ideology is based on a social theory, 
Marxism, which claims to provide not only the means for 
understanding all social and economic processes, but also 
for their manipulation for the betterment of mankind.
While Western society incorporates an enormous range of 
values, including "state interventionist" ones, none lay 
the same degree of stress on predetermined historical 
change and active use of social measures to achieve that 
change as does the Soviet ideology. Lenin's addition to 
Marxism only gave extra emphasis to these elements by 
firmly and irrevocably giving the responsibility for 
undertaking these measures to the Communist Party. As 
Brzezinski and Huntington say:
Thus the ideology, with its stress on 
ideological change, creates a built-in 
compulsion in the ruling Party for 
permanent social engineering, which in 
turn permits the Party to lay claim to 
continued power.
Thus, if the ideology and the party's place in it are to 
maintain their legitimacy it is essential that historical 
progress be seen to be continuing and that the social 
engineering of the party be seen as providing that progress.
1 Brzezinski and Huntington, op. cit., p. 49.
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Putting it rather crudely, it could be said that traditional 
Western liberal values fail each time government involves 
itself in social engineering; the CPSU and its ideology 
fail each time they are not involved.
Brzezinski and Huntington make the point that for 
the legitimacy of the ideology to be maintained it is 
necessary that the population see the involvement of the 
party in historical progress and social engineering as 
having a positive effect on their lives. Since the death 
of Stalin a dramatic decline in the reliance on coercion has 
produced a greater reliance on the legitimisation of the 
Soviet regime for achieving popular compliance with the 
regime's wishes. Legitimacy will be maintained only as 
long as the regime is seen as being effective. Brzezinski 
and Huntington say:
A positive commitment could gradually replace 
the earlier reliance on violence, while Russia's 
increased international stature and technical 
achievements gratified the Russian's sense of 
national pride. Indeed, as far as the masses 
are concerned, the legitimacy of the regime 
as well as the political integration of society 
has been achieved less by conscious mass 
acceptance of the ideology as such than by the 
linkage of the regime and its doctrine to such 
nationally satisfying achievements as the
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launching of the sputnik and Gagarin's and 
Titov's orbital flights, as well as by 
improvements in the material welfare of the 
people. ^
It appears probable that in the Soviet Union it is the 
undoubtedly great improvements in material conditions in 
recent years that give the Soviet regime, including the 
role of the party, its legitimacy in the eyes of the mass 
of the people. The Soviet leaders seem well aware that 
their survival could well depend on continued improvements 
in the standard of living. Certainly Soviet agitation and 
propaganda lay very great stress on the material achieve­
ments of the Soviet application of Marxist-Leninist ideology.
There is the further question of whether Soviet 
ideology provides positive mobilisation of the masses.
While the vast majority of the population apparently accept 
the legitimacy of the ideology and its practical consequ­
ences, it is less easy to say that it mobilises them towards 
great efforts on behalf of that ideology. While it is true 
that the ideology lays great stress on the need for 
collective effort and the responsibility of the individual 
to the collective, it is also true that probably the most 
fundamental principle of the ideology is that one elite 
group is totally responsible for deciding policy objectives
1 ibid, p . 48.
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and procedures. The ideology, and by implication that 
one elite group, promise the population a great deal.
The present combination of apparently insistent demands 
for improved standards of living and low labour productivity 
suggests that the mass of the population see themselves as 
decreasingly responsible for improved standards of living 
and the party increasingly so. With legitimacy depending 
on improved standards of living, mobilisation therefore 
becomes of crucial importance. Although agitation and 
propaganda are still used for mobilisation purposes, 
increasing emphasis is being laid on the very non-ideological 
systems of material incentive. These are largely outside 
the scope of this thesis, but will be examined at least to 
the extent that PPO's are involved in them.
One sign of the pervasiveness of the Soviet 
ideology compared to the Western value system is the far 
greater degree of ideological control that is practised in 
the Soviet Union. The use of coercion has decreased 
enormously since Stalin. However there is still extremely 
tight ideological control of all areas of life, control that 
often takes on a highly coercive colouring. But this 
coercion is not used, as it was before, as a substitute for 
legitimacy, but rather as a support for legitimacy. It is 
a basic tenet of Marxism-Leninism that it provides a 
scientific basis for the understanding and control of all 
aspects of life. Once such a tenet is put forward, is used
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to justify party control of all aspects of life, and comes 
to be generally accepted by the population, it must be 
maintained. If the general population accept the legitimate 
role of the party to determine the "scientific" attitude 
in all areas of life, any action the party takes against 
someone who advances a different position is seen as 
supporting and advancing the legitimacy of the party's role. 
While party leaders no longer interfere as actively in 
scientific life as they have in the past, they probably 
still have a strong negative influence. Certainly all 
scientific knowledge must still be explicable in Marxist- 
Leninist terms if it is to be acceptable. In art and 
literature the influence is probably still a positive one, 
positive in the sense of telling artists and writers what 
sort of work they should do, as well as a negative one of 
simply preventing inadmissible work.
At the beginning of the chapter I said that Western 
writers see two main functions of an organisational 
"doctrine". The first was to provide legitimacy and 
mobilisation; the second to provide a common language for 
all sections of the organisation. All the writers agree 
that a high degree of operational indoctrination is 
permissible and necessary if an organisation is to work 
efficiently. R.C. Davis says that the degree of indoctrin­
ation "may be high when the problem involves the inculcation 
of concepts concerning operative objectives, principles,
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and procedures".1 2 Etzioni says:
Utilitarian organizations require a high 
degree of consensus for effective operation 
mainly in spheres concerning instrumental 
activities ... Basic consensus about the 
scope of performance and participation 
obligations is functionally required, although 
the system can operate quite effectively when 
there are limited differences of opinion. 
Consensus is vital also in the sphere of 
cognitive perspectives. If the employees 
do not accept the organization's definition 
of the technical aspects of production,
2effective production often becomes impossible.
It should not be thought that these writers are referring 
simply to the training necessary to do one's specific job. 
They are placing that training in a wider context, so that 
the individual can not only undertake the specific 
activities required for him to do his job, but that so 
he will also understand the relevance of that job, and 
other jobs around him, for the fulfilment of organisational 
goals. R.C. Davis makes the importance of this clear when 
he says:
The degree of decentralization that is
1 Davis, R.C., op. cit., p. 591.
2 Etzioni, op. cit., pp. 135-136.
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practicable tends to vary directly with the 
degree of indoctrination of the organization 
... A considerable indoctrination with operative 
objectives, policies, and practices is 
necessary wherever considerable individual and 
group initiative is required.'*’
Decentralisation relies on value indoctrination - if a 
superior is to delegate authority to a subordinate he 
must be confident that the subordinate will not take 
advantage of his new authority and abandon the organisational 
interest in favour of personal interests. But it relies 
perhaps even more on operational indoctrination. 
Decentralisation implies that the subordinate will be faced 
with decision-making situations. To be able to cope with 
these he must have a sound understanding of general 
organisational policies and procedures.
This is illustrated well in Burns'and Stalker's 
treatment. In the situation of the organic mode of 
organisation, where decentralisation is almost total, 
operational indoctrination becomes of crucial importance.
The quotations from their book in the Introduction make 
this clear. Firms that they studied with a high degree of 
organic features relied on a "common culture" to order 
working relations between individuals in jobs with very
1 Davis, R.C., op. cit., p. 591.
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little formal definition of responsibilities and 
performance criteria.^"
The significance of operational indoctrination 
is clearly enormous. If the Soviet system is seen as one 
single organisation, it is a very large one with extremely 
long lines of command and an enormous variety of 
functional specialisations within it. Some degree of 
decentralisation is inevitable, while effective 
performance requires considerable cooperation between 
different functional groups. For both decentralisation 
and cooperation to work effectively it is essential that 
all levels and all areas of the system have a common 
understanding of current organisational policies and 
procedures. The party, and its PPO's , have an enormous 
role to play in this area. Their agitation and propaganda 
activities are concerned with basic matters such as the 
supremacy of heavy over light industry, the importance and 
methods of centralised economic planning and control, and 
the role of material incentive. They are also concerned 
with more immediate matters such as the aims of the current 
Five Year Plan, the role of different branches and regions 
in their fulfilment, and communication of the production 
priorities of the time. Particularly in face-to-face 
agitation it is impressed on individuals precisely what
1 See above, p. 27.
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work is expected of them and how important that work is 
for the success of the collective as a whole. All these 
matters must be presented in such a way that all elements 
of the system understand precisely their role, and the role 
of others, in dealing with them.
This is one aspect of operational indoctrination 
that is of particular significance for PPO's. I said in the 
Introduction that one of the most important benefits of the 
staff generalist role is that it allows a degree of 
decentralisation of party control. The broad understanding 
of organisational goals and procedures provided by 
operational indoctrination is essential for this decentral­
isation. The training of PPO secretaries therefore 
requires careful attention.
But it is not only the PPO secretaries who must 
be so indoctrinated. The rank-and-file party members have 
an important part to play in the PPO's staff generalist 
role - they undertake a great deal of the on-the-spot 
observation of organisational activity that is essential 
for control. They must have a broad understanding of the 
organisation's functions and the role of the PPO within it. 
But it is perhaps more important that organisational 
leaders understand the role. Although they are almost 
certainly party members, in their role as non-party leaders 
they have to see the activities of the PPO in a different 
perspective. The system assumes that while they are working
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for satisfaction of the sectional interests of their 
organisation they understand the purpose of the wider 
perspectives of PPO involvement and accept them.
From Western organisational theory we have been 
able to take the concept of an organisational "doctrine" 
providing legitimisation, mobilisation and operational 
understanding. We have had to recognise that Soviet value 
indoctrination, including as it does close ideological 
control of all areas of life, is far more extensive than 
such indoctrination in the West, a function of the basic 
nature of the Soviet system. Extra allowance has also had 
to be made for the special role of the party, not only its 
apparatus, but also its rank-and-file membership.
We must now look in some detail at the involvement 
of PPO's in value indoctrination - legitimisation, ideol­
ogical control and mobilisation; and operational indoctrin­
ation - communication of the policies and procedures current 
in the system, including staff generalist procedures.
Special attention will be paid to this work among party 
members, including building up a special "mystique" of 
party membership. Thus I will describe PPO propaganda 
activities, agitation activities, their involvement in 
material incentive, and their role in the development and 
maintenance of a party mystique.
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1. Propaganda
Robert Conquest quotes Plekhanov for a definition 
of the difference between propaganda and agitation:
A propagandist presents many ideas to one 
or a few persons; an agitator presents only
a few ideas, but he presents them to a whole
, 1 mass of persons.
Propaganda generally speaking concerns itself with long­
term value indoctrination, while agitation tends to con­
centrate on shorter-term operational indoctrination. A 
greater proportion of propaganda is directed towards party 
members than agitation, although this is not to say that the 
Soviet people in general are not subjected to considerable 
propaganda.
Party propaganda is defined as the "oral and
printed explanation and propagation of the ideas of
Marxism-Leninism and the Communist Party ... a means of
ideological and political tempering of cadres, members and
2candidate members of the party and of all Soviet people".
A Soviet handbook for PPO secretaries (henceforth described 
simply as the Spravochnik) says that "propaganda work must 
disclose the scientific bases of the party and government's
1 Conquest, R: The Polities of Ideas in the USSR,
Bodley Head, London, 1967, p. 100.
2 Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, quoted 
in Conquest, op. cit., p. 101.
internal and external policies, inspire a feeling of 
confidence in the validity of these policies of the party, 
and disclose the connection of the everyday affairs of the 
Soviet people with the great perspectives of our develop­
ment, with the victory of communism"This quotation 
indicates the importance the Soviet authorities attach to 
the expression of the benefits of the Soviet ideology in 
terms of concrete achievements even in their most basic 
indoctrination efforts.
The chief means of propaganda are the press, the 
various institutions in the party indoctrination system, 
from the lowest to the highest levels of society, oral 
propaganda and the independent study of party history and 
Marxist-Leninist theory. The role of the press and the 
highest levels of the party indoctrination system do not 
concern us here.^
Most propaganda activity at the PPO level can be 
included under the rubric "independent study" or "self- 
education" . However it should not be thought that this means 
individuals studying entirely by themselves. Conquest
1 Spravochnik sekretaria pervichnoi partiinoi 
organizatsii, Politizdat, Moscow, 1960, p. 505.
2 For a detailed account of the party indoctrination
system, see Mickiewicz, E.P: Soviet Political 
Schools, the Communist Party adult education 
system, Yale U.P., New Haven, 1967. For studies 
of the Soviet press, see Buzek, A: How the
Communist Press Works, Pall Mall, London, 1964 
and Conquest, op. cit., pp. 67-81.
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quotes a Soviet source:
In political self-education the main 
attention must be concentrated on 
collective and seminar forms of 
independent study.^
"Independent" means that as part of the indoctrination 
process the individual is expected to undertake private 
study to prepare himself for collective seminars and 
discussions.
Unlike agitators, who as we will see later are
chosen and trained within the PPO, propagandists are usually
2trained at higher-level party schools. However the PPO's
are still expected to control their work. They are also
expected to organise the collective forms of indoctrination
and the peripheral services needed for independent study.
These peripheral services include "offices of political
indoctrination" where books, journals and various study aids
are provided and advice is given by consultants on methods
3of independent study. Some PPO's have their own method­
ological councils for propaganda. For example, the party 
committee of the All-Union Ministry of Transport Construction
1 Conquest, op. cit., p. 103.
2 ibid, pp. 109-113.
3 Spravochnik, op. cit., pp. 510-511.
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has such a council, led by the head of the BAM
Construction Administration, a deputy minister, and has
25 members. It helps the party committee select lecturers
and prepares methodological and analytical information
and visual aids.^ The council in the RSFSR Ministry of
Rural Construction assists the propagandists selected by
the party committee, controls the quality of their work and
2disseminates leading experience in indoctrination work.
But the most important task is the organisation
of the indoctrination courses themselves. There are various
3types of study circles and lecture series, but more 
interesting are the various political, methodological and 
philosophical seminars. Particularly in non-production 
institutions these appear to be the most highly organised 
form of indoctrination and are particularly interesting 
because of the very close links they establish between 
Marxist-Leninist ideology and specific branches of educ-
4ational, scientific and administrative life.
1 Partiinaia zhizn1 234, 12/75, pp. 58-62.
2 Khaldeev, M.I: Pervichnaia partiinaia organizatsiia,
opyt, formy i metody raboty, Politizdat, Moscow,
1975, p. 192.
3 Conquest, op. cit., pp. 105-107.
4 The greatly increased use of seminars can be seen 
in the data given by the chairman of the Council 
for Tertiary Educational and Research Institutions 
of the House of Political Indoctrination of the 
Moscow gorkom. Whereas in 1974-75 academic year 
there were 564 methodological seminars conducted in 
the tertiary educational and research institutions 
of Moscow, with over 15,000 people, including 7,800 
communists, participating, in 1975-76 there were 750 
seminars with over 20,000 participants. P.2 /2. 10/76, 
p. 25.
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While seminars in research institutions cover
such areas as political economy, problems of international
communism and workers' movements, and the internal and
external policies of the CPSU, they usually place these
in a scientific context. The seminars are expected to show
to scientists the close and practical union of Marxist-
Leninist philosophy, dialectical materialism, and scientific
matters. Thus the medical workers of Minsk studied in their
theoretical seminars such topics as "The system of categories
of the dialectic in the theory and practice of biology and
medicine"."*' Nearly all the staff of the Arkhangel Medical
Institute participate in the political indoctrination
seminars run by the party organisation, including those
concerning the philosophical problems of the natural
2sciences and medicine. It is difficult to say how 
sceptical one should be about the serious attention that 
might be devoted to these seminars by scientific and 
academic personnel. If they only have a value indoctrination 
role, that is, if they are only concerned with presenting 
the dialectical materialist interpretations of science, a 
large dose of scepticism would probably be justified.
1 Kommunist Belorussii, 9/69, p. 14.
2 Barkusov, N.V. and others: Partiinyi kontrol'
deiatel'nosti administvatsii, Moscow, 1973, p. 69. 
In recent years a great deal of emphasis has been 
given to economics, apparently of the applied 
variety. In 1974 up to 65% of political indoctrin­
ation in the Siberian section of the Academy of 
Sciences was in that area. Ianovskii, P.G: 
Politicheskaia uch&ba v nauchnoi kollektive, 
Politizdat, Moscow, 1974, pp. 19, 60.
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However there is some evidence that they are 
used for more than this, that they are used for operational 
indoctrination. If the seminars are used for discussing 
and establishing educational and scientific procedures, 
they cannot be ignored by academics and researchers. At 
a philosophical seminar in the Latvian Institute of Physics 
the participants were examining some articles that had 
appeared in Voprosy filosofii. In the course of the 
discussion a dispute arose over the commonality of matter 
and the possibility of establishing a single theory of 
fields, both gravitational and electromagnetic. The 
conclusion was reached that evidently the two types of 
field are of the same nature.'*' Clearly a scientist con­
tinuing research based on the opposite conclusion could 
have difficulties.
There is evidence that involvement of this kind 
can become close and detailed. A report on methodological 
seminars in the institutes of the Siberian section of the 
Academy of Sciences indicates the use made of them in 
determining or communicating research priorities. The 
report says:
One could say the following about the essence 
of the work of methodological seminars. It is
1 Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii, 1/61, pp. 52-53.
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extremely important for scientific 
collectives to investigate the directions 
of scientific discoveries towards which 
the attention of scientists must be 
turned in order to achieve the greatest 
research effectiveness.^
Another report goes further. Ianovskii writes that often
concrete suggestions on the organisation of scientific
work come out of seminars. He gives the example of the
party buro of the Institute of Inorganic Chemistry of the
Siberian section of the Academy of Sciences which, in
examining the results of the work of the institute's
seminars, alleged that the consideration of such matters as
"Science - a direct force of production in the construction
of communism" and "Communist labour in science and forms
of its development in the research institute" had led to a
great improvement in the organisation of the implementation
2of the results of scientific work in production. Although 
again scepticism about the degree of improvement resulting 
from the seminars would be justified, the implication is 
strong that they are used to influence scientific work.
However apparently such processes can go too far. 
There have been complaints that seminars in some institutes
1
2
P.zh., 20/61, p. 32. 
Ianovskii, op. cit., p. 48.
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have lost their philosophical content and become essentially 
forums for the consideration of the results of applied 
research and other current matters of concern in the 
institutes. In these cases it is considered necessary 
that PPO's remedy the situation by closely examining 
seminar programmes and working with seminar leaders."*"
In educational institutions the seminars are
concerned with both the content and style of the educational
process. Between 1962 and 1963 the party organisation of
the Moscow Conservatorium ran seminars on the philosophical-
aesthetic problems of music and the aesthetics of musical
performance. However in November, 1963 a party meeting
called for a re-examination of these seminars in order to
strengthen their ideological content. The Departments of
the Social Sciences were charged with working out the
aesthetic and philosophical problems of music and their
2links with the musical departments were strengthened.
Concern with the style of the teaching process 
can be seen in the Central Committee decision of 1972 
regarding political indoctrination activities in Tashkent: 
Alongside the mastering of the general 
theoretical problems of Marxism-Leninism
1 ibid, p. 55.
Bol'shoi put', iz istorii partiinoi organizatsii 
Moskovskoi konservatorii, Moscow, 1969,
pp. 110-111.
2
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(the study of) the theory and practice 
of training (students) in communism is 
recommended ... for those employed in 
secondary and tertiary education. ^
Moscow State University has 22 methodological seminars 
running in its faculties, most of which are concerned with
2the philosophical and methodological problems of teaching.
In administrative institutions the seminars are
primarily concerned with administrative and technical 
3matters. There has been particular emphasis on them since
the 1965 reforms. This again suggests an important
operational indoctrination role for the seminars, in that
they appear to be more concerned with current policies
than the general principles of Marxism-Leninism. For
example, after the 1965 reforms the party committee of the
Moldavian Ministry of Food Industry ran thirteen theoretical
seminars on planning and administration of the economy in
4the light of the reforms.
1 Voprosy ideologioheskoi vaboty KPSS, sbornik 
dokumentov, 1965-1973, Politizdat, Moscow,
1973, p. 369.
2 P.zh., 10/76, pp. 26-27.
3 Dubkov, A .E: Raikom partii i pavtiinye organizatsii
uchvezhdenii i vedomstv, Khabarovskoe knizhnoe 
izd-vo, Khabarovsk, 1971, pp. 10-11; Moskovskaia 
pravda, 9/2/71, p. 2; Zavia Vostoka, 22/9/73,
p. 3; P. zh., 15/66, p. 65.
4 Kommunist Modavii, 8/67, p. 60.
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The seminars conducted in the All-Union Ministry 
of Transport Construction consider such topics as "The 
December Plenum on perfecting economic administration", 
"Forms and methods of party leadership of the economy", 
"Experiences in administration in Eastern Europe", "The 
participation of the ministry in a general automated system 
for the collection and analysis of economic information", 
"The organisation of wages under the new economic 
conditions", etc. Seminar courses conclude with examin­
ations, conducted by a commission of propagandists and 
administration, party and trade union representatives. 
Leading workers do not have to attend examinations, but 
have to hand in written essays to be examined by the 
collegium and party committee.'*'
2. Ideological control
Most of this information on indoctrination 
seminars suggests that they are not used to any great 
extent for value indoctrination despite the fact that they 
are part of the propaganda network. The topics listed 
and some of the details on their content strongly suggest 
a primary concern with current policies and procedures, 
Soviet ideology occupying a secondary role. While it 
appears probable that they attempt to reinforce legitimacy
1 P.zh., 12/75, pp. 58-62.
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by exercising some degree of ideological control over 
participants, their main task is to present information 
on current party policies.
Does this mean that PPO's have no role to play 
in value indoctrination, that the authorities rely 
entirely on socialisation processes and press propaganda 
for the establishment and maintenance of legitimacy? It 
appears true that PPO propaganda is not used to any great 
extent for value indoctrination, with the partial 
exception of that conducted by educational PPO's. This 
will be discussed in more detail later. Yet there is still 
an enormous amount of PPO activity in the area of 
ideological control that has not yet been discussed. It 
has already been said that ideological control is used 
in the Soviet system as a device for maintaining legitimacy.
Thus it is of relevance in cases that have 
little direct connection with Marxist-Leninist ideology as 
such, but which, because they include attacks, conscious or 
not, on the power and omnipotence of the party, threaten 
the legitimacy both of the party and its ideology. Thus 
when in 1957 a small group of scientists in a research 
laboratory, under the pretext of criticising the cult of 
personality, allegedly attacked the policies of the party 
in a party meeting, the All-Union Central Committee took 
action against the group and the PPO for allowing the
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incident to occur. One would imagine that following 
such fundamental changes as Khrushchev's speech at the 
20th Party Congress PPO's would have had a difficult 
time ensuring that the changes were not "misunderstood". 
However it is essential for the maintenance of the party's 
legitimacy that such "misunderstandings" be dealt with.
Appearances of nationalism should be seen in the
same light. The problem apparently appeared in the Latvian
Institute of Economics in 1960. The party buro was
criticised for failing to deal with the political mistakes
of the institute's director who had called for the
development in Latvia of only those branches of the economy
2the means of production of which were locally available.
Much ideological control is exercised directly 
in terms of Marxist-Leninist ideology, even attacks on 
various natural and social science doctrines being 
prompted by claims that they distort Marxist-Leninist 
ideology. The most unusual are the attacks on natural 
science doctrines and theories that one would think had no 
connection with the essentially social theories of
1 Kommunist, 17/57, p. 41.
Korn. Sov. Latvii, 1/60, p. 13.2
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Marxism-Leninism.^
The best known case of such ideological inter­
ference in the natural sciences, and the one providing 
the best opportunity for uncovering the reasons behind 
it and the use made of PPO's in it, is the notorious case 
of the Lysenkoist suppression of Soviet genetics.
Attacks on genetics were given extraordinarily crude 
ideological justifications. Zhores Medvedev, in his 
account of the rise and fall of Lysenko, gives numerous
1 Thus for a long time quantum physics was
regarded with disfavour by Soviet 
ideologists because it denies the existence 
of causality in sub-atomic processes. The 
introduction of probability and spontaneity 
into nuclear physics was seen by Soviet 
philosophers as attacking the deterministic 
foundations of the Soviet ideology. 
Cybernetics was attacked on somewhat 
similar grounds. It was considered to 
undermine the Marxist assertion "that 
consciousness is determined by processes 
of objectively developing matter in that 
it (cybernetics) gives human consciousness 
the capacity to exert a controlling influence 
over other forms of reality". Vardy,A: 
"Party Control over Soviet Science", Studies 
on the Soviet Union, vol. 10, no. 1, 1970, 
pp. 59-60. The opposition to these doctrines 
from the ideologists was sufficient to 
prevent research work connected with them 
being undertaken, with disastrous 
consequences for Soviet science and 
production.
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examples.^" Because Lysenko had such difficulty proving 
the superiority of his scientific "discoveries" through 
experimental and practical testing, he had to rely on 
ideological arguments to justify the suppression of 
opposing scientific beliefs. It is obvious from the history 
of his career that although he had no trouble finding 
philosophers and ideologists willing to further his ideol­
ogical arguments, the ideology was in fact only a cover for
1 Medvedev, Z.A: The Rise and Fall of T.D.
Lysenko, Columbia U.P., N.Y., 1969. Very 
early in his career Lysenko claimed that genes 
could not exist since they were contrary to the 
principles of dialectical materialism. He 
considered the very rare and accidental 
mutations produced by genes to be incompatible 
with the deterministic and steady changes in 
nature allegedly demonstrated by dialectical 
materialism. ibid, p. 31. The point was 
developed years later by, for example, Poliakov, 
a supporter of Lysenko, who wrote about genetic 
biology, equating it with "bourgeois biology", 
as follows: "Bourgeois society prefers the 
'theory'of immutability of the old, the 
appearance of something new only from the 
combination of the old or by happy chance.
This 'theory' leads to a passive contemplation 
of supposedly eternal phenomena of nature, to 
a passive expectation of accidental variation." 
ibid, pp. 119-120. The ideological argument 
could descend to the absurd depths of Prezent, 
Lysenko's most vociferous supporter, contributing 
to the downfall and ultimate death in prison of 
the great Soviet biologist Vavilov by noting the 
similarity of terminology in Vavilov's views on 
the desirability of "homologous rows" of plant 
classification and the anti-Marxist philosopher 
Duhring's views on "row positions" in social 
development, ibid, p. 54.
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attacks that were motivated by Lysenko's personal desire 
to secure and widen his power in the scientific community.
Thus Lysenko's support from the ideologists is 
not explained by the ideological soundness of his theories. 
They gave their support only because their superiors, the 
party leaders, had already decided for more pragmatic 
reasons that support should be given to him. The basic 
reason for the top authorities' support of Lysenko had 
nothing to do with ideology or the regime's legitimacy.
They were probably always attracted by the possibilities 
of enormous increases in agricultural production suggested 
by Lysenko and his supporters.^" These possibilities 
probably continued to hold an attraction, particularly in 
the fertile imagination of Khrushchev, throughout Lysenko's 
career. Further once Lysenko's theories had been accepted 
as party policy any attacks against them, even on purely 
scientific grounds, had to be vigorously rejected as 
attacks on the legitimacy of the party. This explains the 
durability of Lysenko even at times when the practical 
benefits of his theories were most open to criticism.
Medvedev gives a number of examples of the use 
made of PPO's in the Lysenko affair. The examples indicate
1 The possibilities arising, for example,
from the ability of a plant to change from 
one species to another simply through a change 
in environment, and of living organisms even 
being produced from non-living matter, if they 
had any scientific basis at all, would be 
clearly enormous.
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that the PPO's were extensively used as forums for 
attacks on geneticists and as a means of taking 
administrative action against them. For example, in 
1937 Lysenko and Prezent used a party meeting in the 
All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences to "expose the 
large scale errors" of Muralov, the president of the Academy. 
The meeting was followed by Muralov's arrest?" In 1948 
Rapoport, a geneticist well-known for his work on mutagens, 
was called on at a party buro meeting (Medvedev does not 
make clear in which institution the party buro was situated) 
to repudiate the chromosome theory of heredity. He 
attempted to demonstrate the practical value of genetics, 
but his arguments were refuted by quotations from a speech 
on the occasion of the 31st Anniversary of the October 
Revolution in which Molotov had sanctioned the theories of 
Lysenko. Medvedev reports Rapoport as retorting: "Why
do you think that Molotov knows genetics better than I?"
For this he was expelled from the party and dismissed from 
his post.^
Vavilov's dismissal as director of the All-Union 
Institute of Plant Breeding and his subsequent arrest,
1 His "errors" consisted of failing to
support without qualification intra­
varietal crossing and to condemn inter­
varietal crossing, which depends on 
genetic mutation. ibid, p. 52.
2 ibid, p. 122.
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imprisonment and death were preceded by an examination 
of his activities by a party commission made up of five 
leading Lysenkoists. The commission wrote the following 
draft resolution to be adopted by the PPO of the institute: 
The party organisation considers essential 
for the purposes of reconstruction of the 
institute the dismissal of Vavilov as director, 
since, as the ideologist of formal genetics in 
the USSR, by remaining at his post he aids the 
activisation and consolidation of anti-Darwinians 
throughout the Soviet Union, thereby interfering 
with the rapid rebuilding of the experimental 
and plant breeding network of the Soviet Union 
along Darwinist lines.
In this case Medvedev makes the point that he has no
positive proof that the draft was adopted by the party
meeting.'*' Two years earlier Vavilov and El'nitskii, the
secretary of the institute's party buro, had been criticised
for failing to prevent various geneticist-inspired practices
and for harbouring politically unreliable people in the
institute. Presumably the secretary was a geneticist
2himself. I do not know his eventual fate.
1
2
ibid, p . 56. 
ibid, p. 53.
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Medvedev's final example concerns his own 
experiences with the writing of his book. He had already 
published an article strongly critical of Lysenkoism in 
the "liberal" Leningrad literary journal Neva. Following 
this the manuscript of the first draft of his book was 
examined in special study sessions organised by the 
secretary of the party committee of the Timiriazev 
Agricultural Academy, in which Medvedev was working at the 
time. The manuscript was found to be anti-party, anti- 
Soviet and anti-science. As a result of this it was strongly 
criticised by Egorychev, the first secretary of the Moscow 
gorkom, at the famous June, 1963 Central Committee plenum 
on ideological and literary affairs. The book has never 
been published in the Soviet Union.^
Clearly extensive use was made of PPO's as the 
forum for attacks on scientists who had gained the disapproval 
of the authorities. It is not clear how much independence 
they were given in the implementation of these attacks.
Once it had become clear that all scientists holding 
geneticist views were to repudiate those views or be 
dismissed from their posts, was the party secretary expected 
to implement that general policy on his own initiative, or 
were all targets and the action to be taken against them 
decided from above? Criticisms of party secretaries for 
failing to take action, such as that directed against
1 ibid, p. 206.
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El'nitskii, do not speak of specific directives being 
disobeyed. Whether they were expected to exercise 
initiative or not, there is some evidence that the PPO's 
did not always play the role expected of them. For 
example, there is Medvedev's uncertainty about whether 
the draft decision of the 1939 party commission in the 
Institute of Plant Breeding was accepted by the PPO. He 
also speaks of attempts to expel from the party a number 
of Leningrad University professors following their 
dismissal from their posts after the 1948 Academy of 
Agricultural Sciences conference, at which a strong new 
anti-genetics campaign had been launched.^ The case of 
El'nitskii is a good example of a PPO failing to play its 
proper role.
A similar case has occurred in a completely 
different area, but one of even greater political significance. 
Within the context of the power struggle between Malenkov and 
Khrushchev in the mid-50's, there was an important debate 
between economists and others over investment priorities. 
Malenkov, or his supporters, expressed the belief that 
investment in consumer and light industry, sector "B", 
should be increased in proportion to sector "A", made up of 
heavy industry. Khrushchev defended the maintenance of 
sector "A" in its dominant position. The protaganists in 
this struggle were at a far higher political level than
1 ibid, pp. 267-268.
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Lysenko. Nevertheless there were considerable similarities 
with the Lysenko affair. It was an issue that could very 
easily be expressed in ideological terms and it was in the 
interest of both sides to attack the ideological validity 
of the other. Khrushchev's control of the party apparatus 
and stronger position among the ideologists gave him eventual 
victory. However it was not without some resistance from 
within the party apparatus itself, particularly at the PPO 
level. Just as El'nitskii apparently refused to attack the 
geneticists in the Institute of Plant Breeding, so the 
secretary of the party buro of the All-Union Institute of 
Economics in 1955 refused to admit that views in support 
of sector "B" that had been expressed in the Scientific 
Council were anti-Marxist. For this he was criticised and 
dismissed from his post by the Moscow gorkom.^
1 P.zh. , 5/55, pp. 53-57; Kom. , 6/55, p. 61.
Agursky writes that after the Soviet invasion 
of Czechoslavakia in 1968 a wall-paper appeared 
in the Department of Mathematical Methods of 
the Research Institute of Machine-Building 
Technology {NIITM). (It was in this department 
that the "Young Turks" of the institute were 
concentrated). The paper contained an article 
critical of the invasion, but the PPO did 
nothing. Agursky implies that this lack of 
action was the result of a lack of power, not 
desire. He observed that the PPO of NIITM, a 
defence industry institute, was apparently of 
considerably less significance than those of the 
civilian industry institutes in which he had worked. 
Agursky, M: The Research Institute of Machine-
Building Technology, a part of the Soviet military- 
industrial complex, Soviet Institutions Series,
Paper No. 8, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 
Jerusalem, September, 1976, p. 51. For a particularly 
interesting example of a PPO apparently failing to 
exercise the required political control, see Appendix 
B for an account of the events in the Moscow Union of 
Writers between 1962 and 1964.
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PPO's were clearly not crucial to the success 
of Lysenkoism or to Khrushchev's defeat of Malenkov. 
However they did have a role to play and to the extent 
that the ideological context in which these struggles were 
conducted contributed to the legitimisation of the regime 
in the eyes of the general population, the PPO's made a 
contribution.^
Cultural PPO's are expected to ensure that the 
correct values of the Soviet ideology are upheld in all
1 PPO's are also used in politically motivated
attacks on scientists when ideological con­
siderations are not involved. Thus when Baraev 
was removed from his post as deputy minister 
for Agriculture in the Kazakh SSR for persisting 
with his demands for the implementation of 
clean fallow sowing methods as a weapon against 
erosion in the Virgin Lands, he was appointed 
director of the All-Union Research Institute 
for Grain Growing at Shortandy. There he 
continued experiments along clean fallow lines.
In early 1963 Khrushchev visited the institute 
and criticised the experiments. The matter was 
then considered in a party meeting and by the 
Scientific Council. The party meeting acknow­
ledged the criticism as justified and noted that 
in the course of experimentation in the institute 
a number of breaches of the rules of agrotech­
nology had been allowed. The meeting directed a 
group of scientists, headed by Baraev, to conduct 
their experiments according to the established 
methods of sowing. The party buro then recommended 
the establishment of methodological commissions 
which would establish closer control of research, 
examining research plans and where necessary 
adjusting them. Although in this case ideological 
arguments were not used, the attacks on Baraev were 
as politically motivated, and as scientifically 
indefensible, as the other cases just discussed.
For details, see Cleary, J.W: Politics and Admin­
istration in Soviet Kazakhstan, 1955-1964, unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation, A.N.U., March, 1967, 
p. 333; P.zh.Kaz., 5/63, pp. 60-62.
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cultural and creative works. Some values are of a more
directly ideological nature than others. For example,
in 1970 the editorial board of the journal Teatr was
criticised in a party meeting for allowing dramatic works
with "one-sided" views of history to go unattacked.'*'
After there had been criticism of the Latvian State
Publishing House in Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii as a result
of the publication of a book with allegedly incorrect historical
facts, the matter was considered .at a conference in the
editorial office of the Political Literature Section and
an open party meeting. The criticism was acknowledged
as justified and the party meeting requested that communist
leaders look more closely at manuscripts before publication.
It also suggested that the party buro strengthen its
2indoctrination work.
It is in the category of cultural institutions 
that the best examples of the concern of PPO's for the 
maintenance of less obviously ideological values are to be 
found. These values are concerned with a "proper" 
portrayal of life in the Soviet Union and the correct 
attitude to matters such as the quality of performances, etc. 
It is part of the party's leading role in society that it 
be responsible for ensuring the maintenance of the correct
1
2
Korn., 12/70, p . 53.
Korn. Sov. Latvii, 2/63, p. 87.
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"tone" of social life. Thus the communists of the Moscow 
film studio Mosfil'm are held directly responsible for 
the lack of films showing the great changes in the economic 
life of the country, particularly in the countryside, and 
in the nature of relations between people.^ In 1973, when 
the Mosfil’m studio was making a film on the work of a 
raikom secretary, the studio's communists invited a local 
raikom secretary to view the film with them. The secretary 
wanted some changes made in order to bring out the film 
secretary's "sincere nobility". The communists supported 
her suggestion and the film was considered now to be much 
better.^
The PPO's responsibility for quality can be seen 
in the case of the Leningrad State Academic Drama Theatre. 
When audiences were down there was a proposal to change 
the theatre's repertoire policy and to begin showing "box 
office attractions". However the PPO took a firm line and
1
2
Mosk. pravda, 27/8/71, p. 3. 
Sovetskaia kul’tura, 6/3/73, p. 2.
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serious drama was continued.
PPO's in educational institutions have special 
responsibilities for value indoctrination, since schools 
and tertiary institutions are among the most important 
settings for socialisation. PPO's have a responsibility 
to ensure that students are socialised into holding the 
right values, both in their curricular and extra-curricular 
activities.
Within the area of curricular activities PPO's 
are expected to place all academic work within a Marxist- 
Leninist ideological framework. In 1968 the secretary of 
the PPO of the First Moscow Medical Institute declared in 
connection with the role of the natural science faculties
1 Pravda, 17/1/71, p. 2. PPO's have extensive
powers in the area of repertoire policy. The 
party buro of the Mossovet Academic Theatre 
participates in the formation of the repertoire 
and makes decisions about suggested plays. 
Sovetskaia Kirgiziia, 8/2/73, p. 4. The party 
organisation of the Moscow Art Theatre has a 
control commission for the quality of the 
repertoire, while a 1972 Kommunist article 
spoke of control by PPO's of the selection of 
repertoire through the party memberships of 
Artistic Councils. Mosk. pravda, 18/9/71, 
p. 2; Kom. 13/72, p. 60. This suggests that 
in individual cases the PPO probably has no 
more than a veto power, but that it is able 
to involve itself in deciding the general 
directions of repertoire policy. One report 
suggests that PPO's have some power to initiate 
works. In 1971 the party committee of the Moscow 
Union of Writers passed a decision that a literary- 
artistic collection on the Krasnaia Presnia 
district of Moscow be published. Literaturnaia 
gazeta, 17/3/71, p. 3.
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in value indoctrination:
We consider that in our institute those in the 
process of giving students knowledge must 
actively uncover the materialist character of 
the biological and medical sciences, demonstrate 
in action the dialectical method of analysis 
of the phenomena being studied, deeply examine 
the social aspects both of the fundamental, 
categories of science and the applied sciences, 
and show the superiority of the Soviet system 
of health care. ^
Most of the work in this area in tertiary institutions is
done through the Departments of the Social Sciences. The
social sciences in the Soviet Union include such ideological
subjects as Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy
and the history of the CPSU. The departments that teach
these subjects are known collectively as the Departments
2of the Social Sciences. The interesting thing about these 
departments is that they exist in all tertiary educational 
institutions, even those with no other connection with the
1 P.2/2., 1/68, p. 49.
2 The party organisation of the Departments 
of the Social Sciences in Tomsk State 
University combines the communists of the 
Departments of Party History, Political 
Economy, the Theory of Scientific Communism, 
Philosophy, Teaching Practice, and Psychology. 
P.2/2. , 6/7 3 , p. 36 .
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social sciences or even the humanities. 1
In the larger general educational institutions,
such as Moscow State University, there are All-University
Departments of the Social Sciences, part of the Philosophy
Faculty. These departments are involved in teaching those
students who specialise in such disciplines. However
all other faculties, whether of the humanities or natural
sciences, have their own social science departments. These
departments conduct compulsory courses and examinations for
the students of those faculties and apparently are responsible
to some degree for the ideological control of their faculties.
Their work is coordinated by an All-University Scientific-
2Methodological Centre. They are in no way controlled by
1 It should also be noted that there are, in the 
more social-science oriented institutions, other 
departments for what one might call "pure" phil­
osophy, economics and history. Presumably in these 
rather more "technical" instruction is given.
2 The Kishinev Polytechnical Institute has a 
Council of the Departments of the Social Sciences, 
presumably similar to the Scientific-Methodological 
Centre at Moscow State University. It coordinates 
the academic, research and indoctrination work
of social science teachers. The council has 29 
members and is headed by the rector. Also as 
members are the party committee secretary, the 
komsomol secretary, the pro-rector for academic 
work, the heads of the departments, and leading 
researchers and teachers. The council gives 
recommendations to the rectorate and controls 
their fulfilment. Vestnik vysshei shkoly, 6/64,
p . 8 .
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the All-University social science departments, which are 
not even involved in the Scientific-Methodological Centre.
I spoke about the departments to a senior member of an 
All-University department at Moscow University and 
expressed surprise that his department had no control over 
faculty departments. He repeated that this was the case and 
that their only contacts were at occasional methodological 
seminars, to which he appeared to attach little importance. 
Therefore it would seem that the faculty departments are 
the more important in terms of ideological control, 
something which must increase the importance of faculty 
party buros, since presumably they have direct responsibility 
for the departments' activities.
The Departments of the Social Sciences formally 
speaking are a normal part of the structure of a tertiary 
institution. However, although formally they are subject 
to the same degree and type of control as any other 
department, PPO's appear to pay them particular attention.
A secretary of the Semipalatinsk gorkom wrote in 1965:
The departments of the social disciplines 
play a special role in ideological work with 
the young. Directing their work, we in the 
gorkom recognise precisely how they are a 
support for the party organisations of 
tertiary institutions.^
1 Partiinaia zhizn' Kazakhs tana, 12/65, p. 50.
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Kommunist lays particular stress on the role of the PPO*s
in the strengthening of the personnel of Departments of
the Social Sciences.^ Partiinaia zhizn' similarly singles
out courses in the social sciences when speaking of the
need for PPO's to ensure that course content is lively and 
2true to life. At Rostov University the work of the
Departments of the Social Sciences is described as being
under the direct control of the party committee, which
together with the rectorate conducts systematic conferences
3of social science teachers.
1 Korn., 5/60, p. 80.
2 P.zh., 1/58, p. 17.
3 Chekhorin, E.M. and G.N. Filonov: Partiinoe
rukovodstvo narodnym obrazovaniem i nauchnym 
uchrezhdeniiam, Izd. "Mysl,n, Moscow, 1967, 
pp. 39-40. At Moscow University it was on 
the initiative of the party committee that the 
texts of lectures in the social sciences were 
examined and found wanting. P.zh., 1/68, p. 49. 
In 1964 Partiinaia zhizn' described how the 
party committee of the Moscow Teachers' College 
organised a conference of teachers of the social 
sciences in order to prevent the overlapping
of course content. P.zh., 21/64, p. 54. The 
Departments of the Social Sciences should not 
be confused with purely party research and 
study organisations. Some educational PPO's 
have their own organisations for social 
research. For example, the party committee of 
the Moscow Technical College has a special 
group for sociological research, established 
to analyse the content and effectiveness of 
ideological indoctrination work and to give 
recommendations for its improvement. Work in 
this group is presumably part-time. Korn.,
10/71, p. 60.
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Primary and secondary schools do not have
Departments of the Social Sciences. However teachers of
Russian language and literature, history and social
studies (obshchestvovedenie) in schools occupy a similar
position to the teachers of the social sciences in the
higher-level institutions.'*' The interest of school PPO's
in the teaching of these subjects can be seen in the report
in a 1962 issue of Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii. When a
secondary school PPO had an open .party meeting to consider
why students had such materialistic views of communism, it
was decided that it was due to shortcomings in the teaching
of language, literature and history. The practice was
therefore introducted of teachers, communist and non-
2communist, checking each other's teaching.
This concern with Russian language, literature 
and culture is of such significance for the general value 
system of the child that it can hardly be seen in terms 
simply of academic work. Similarly the teaching of 
atheism is a matter of social concern far beyond the bounds
1 In the non-Russian republics the teaching of
Russian language, literature and culture is 
considered a fundamental part of the non- 
Russian's education and one of enormous political 
significance. Kommunist Uzbekistana, 8/68, 
p. 68. See also the report in The Times 
(London) on the teaching of Russian language 
in Georgia, 8/6/76.
Kom. Sov. Latvii, 8/62, p. 62. It is interesting 
that the secretaries of school PPO's appear 
usually to be teachers in these areas. See 
p. 423.
2
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of academic work. Thus educational PPO's are responsible 
for the attitudes towards religion held by students. In 
1954 the PPO of the Stavropol Language Institute was 
criticised for not noticing that one of the students was 
religious.^
Indeed educational PPO's are responsible for
forming the correct values in students in all areas of life.
In 1969 Kommunist Uzbekistana declared that the party
organisations of tertiary educational institutions were
not sufficiently concerned with the aesthetic development
of students and that they needed to be more interested in
2what students were reading and watching. In 1961 a school 
PPO was criticised for doing too little to improve the 
aesthetic education of students in the area of dancing and
3similar pursuits. The secretary of the party organisation
of a Kazakh school was praised for his enthusiasm over the
aesthetic education of students, teaching them the beauty
4of nature and art.
PPO's are expected to be interested in the 
physical as well as aesthetic development of students.
The PPO of a school worked together with the director to
1 P.zh., 15/54, p. 19.
2 Kom. Uzbekistana, 10/69, p. 51.
3 P.2 /2., 7/61, p . 50 .
P.zh.Kaz., 5/66, p. 49.4
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improve the sport situation in the school.^ In 1970 a
party meeting of the PPO of the Digi-Dzikhash Technical
College decided on the need for physical education for
2students in their spare time.
Two reports describe two more unusual areas of
PPO concern with the social values and conduct of students.
Kommunist Estonii reports that a struggle has been undertaken
by the PPO of the Tallin Teachers' College against alcoholism
3among students, while the party organisation of a Kazakh 
school was criticised in Partiinaia zhizn' Kazakhstana for 
doing nothing when teachers arranged the marriage of an 
underaged girl student!^
Later in this chapter we will examine the practice 
of giving rank-and-file party members party tasks as a 
method of inculcating in them the special status and 
responsibilities of party membership. Similar reasoning 
lies behind the practice of assigning students to various 
types of "social work". The work is designed to impress 
on students the responsibilities each individual has towards 
society and to foster in students the "collective spirit".
1 P.zh., 6/56, p. 60. The Moscow Technical 
College for Mechanical Technology has a party 
commission for sport. P.zh., 5/68, p. 59.
2 P.zh., 10/70, p. 59.
3 Kommunist Estonii, 3/73, p. 46.
4 P.zh.Kaz., 8/60, p. 33.
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Is usually takes the form of construction and agricultural
work. The best known example is probably the work of
students in the Virgin Lands during the Khrushchev era.^
There are more mundane cases. For example, in the
Novosibirsk Engineering and Construction Institute the
komsomol committee, under the supervision of the party
committee and rectorate, organises construction brigades
2to work on collective and state farms.
There are other forms of student "social work". 
The komsomol organisation of the Moscow Technical College 
organises the sending of student agitation brigades to 
collective farms and military units. The young lecturers
1 For example, in 1958 the secretary of the 
PPO of Perm State University was proud to 
announce that he had been able to send 600 
students to the Virgin Lands. P.zh., 1/58,
p. 18 .
2 Vestnik vysshei shkoly, 8/71, p. 58. In 
"For the Good of the Cause" Solzhenitsyn 
describes the efforts of komsomol students, 
inspired by a teacher attached to the komsomol 
by the party buro, in the building of their
new school buildings. Solzhenitsyn, A: Stories
and Prose Poems, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973, 
p. 49. The emphasis in recent years has been 
on the Student Construction Brigades. The 
brigades are organised by university trade 
union and student committees and are made up 
of students who work at various construction 
jobs throughout the Soviet Union during the summer 
vacation. Although the work is considered as 
contributing towards the fulfilment of one's 
socialist obligations, it is paid, how well I do 
not know, and so could be a quite useful supplement 
to students' incomes.
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receive their preparation in the school for propagandists
within the Department of Scientific Communism.'*' We also
find that students often act as druzhiniki, civilians who
2patrol the streets "maintaining peace and public order".
I will conclude this section with some brief 
summary and further discussion of the means available to 
educational PPO's in indoctrination work among students.
Kommunist listed the more commonplace forms of 
indoctrination work in 1960. The list included personal 
conversations, the use of propagandists, the giving of
3lectures, and question-and-answer evenings.
The use of propagandists, agitators and lecturers 
is one of the most widespread forms of indoctrination work 
and that providing the most usual means for teachers to 
fulfil their "social work" obligations. The work can take 
a number of forms. For example, in 1957 there was some 
debate in the Soviet press about this matter. In one issue 
of Kommunist in that year the secretary of the party buro
1 Korn., 10/71, p. 60.
2 Iuldashev, Kh. and others: Partorganizatsiia 
uchebnogo zavediniia, iz opyta raboty partiinykh 
organizatsii shkoly, tekhnikuma i instituta, 
Combined Publishing House of the Uzbek Central 
Committee, Tashkent, 1968, p. 25.
3 Korn., 5/60, p. 80.
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of the Finance-Economics Institute in Kazan wrote that 
every study group in the institute had an indoctrination 
"tutor" permanently attached to it. He told the students 
about current affairs and party decisions, involved himself 
in their everyday lives, took part in komsomol meetings, 
etc. The director of the Kazan Aviation Institute reacted 
to this negatively. Apparently rather disturbed at the 
thought of having party-directed indoctrination "tutors" 
present virtually permanently in all study groups, he 
declared that such a practice is unnecessary. He declared 
that the PPO needs to raise, not reduce the independence of 
students and that he was attempting to give students a 
greater say in their every-day affairs. Kommunist supported 
the director, although stressing that the degree of student 
independence was already sufficient and that it only needed 
to be more fully developed."^
School PPO's are able to make use of parents in
2their indoctrination activities. In 1972 the party buro of 
a Kazakh school recommended that the Academic Council 
prepare and conduct a conference of parents with the theme 
"The role of the family in the international education of
1 Korn., 7/57, pp. 122-123. A similar debate 
occurred in Partiinaia zhizn ' early the 
next year. This time the journal took a 
middle view, declaring that it was necessary 
to look at each individual case. P.zh.,
1/58, pp. 16-17.
2 In Chapter 3 we will also see the use made of 
parents in maintaining class discipline.
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children".^ School party organisations also invite
2parents to open party meetings.
Soviet schools have parents' committees apparently 
resembling the Parents' and Citizens' Committees of 
Australian schools. These committees are expected to help 
the PPO's with their indoctrination work. The parents' 
committee of one Uzbek school is headed by an old communist, 
the chairman of a makhalinskii committee. On the initiative 
of the committee there was established a parents' university 
"which helps in the character training (vospitanie) of children by 
working through their parents".
In 1966 the PPO of a Krasnoamursk school and the 
local raikom found themselves in trouble over attempts to 
put relations with parents on a highly formal basis. The 
dispute had been foreshadowed in the previous year by a 
letter to Pavtiinaia zhizn ' from a parent of a school child 
complaining that he had received a letter from the school 
demanding that he come to a meeting of communist parents.
He claimed that there were already sufficient means for the 
mobilisation of parents - parents' committees, fathers' and 
mothers' councils, etc., and that an incorrect distinction
1 P.zh.Kaz., 9/72, p. 37.
2 Kom.Sov. Latvii, 7/70, p. 79.
3 Iuldashev, op. cit., pp. 9-10. The 
rnakhalinskii committee is a local admin­
istrative organisation staffed usually on 
a voluntary basis, often by retired 
communists.
was being made between communist and non-communist parents.
He had complained about the matter at the meeting, which 
was attended by a raikom secretary, and to his own PPO (in 
the raiispolkom), but had received no satisfaction. No 
reaction was evident from Partiinaia zhizn1 on this occasion.
However there was a negative reaction to a later 
letter from a parent of a child at a Kuibyshev school, 
complaining about the formation of an artificial party 
organisation made up of communist parents. The organisation 
had a party buro of 15 people and party groups with group 
leaders and deputies in each class. The letter writer 
claimed that the organisation was contrary to the Party 
Rules, in that its members were already in the PPO's of the 
institutions where they worked full-time. However the party 
buro was supported by a raikom instructor in its view that 
no breaking of Party Rules was involved.
A later issue of the journal announced that the 
raikom had claimed to have got around the problem by 
renaming the organisation "the Council of communists in the 
School's micro-raion". Partiinaia zhizn’ expressed
dissatisfaction with this, hoping that the matter would be 
resolved in fact, not just in name. Eventually it was 
reported that the raikom had recognised its mistake and
1 P.zh., 13/65, pp. 64-65.
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abolished the organisation.^
One wonders what the background to these cases
was. It would appear that previously, presumably during the
time of Khrushchev's rule, such organisations had been allowed,
since in both cases raikomy supported them. However the
reports give no idea of the tasks of the organisations and
I have found no mention of them in earlier years, although
interestingly I have seen one report since of a school
party organisation having meetings of communist parents.
2This time the practice was not criticised.
The planning of ideological and social training
is one of the most important tasks of educational PPO's.
In recent times the stress has been on long-term planning,
plans that last for the full period of an individual student's
course. In 1969 Kommunist Uzbekistana criticised the party
organisations of tertiary institutions in Tashkent for working
out yearly plans that have the same activities year after
year. The article claims that these should be replaced by
3plans covering the whole period of a student's course.
The process is described well in the case of the 
Tallin Teachers' College. The programme for the long-term 
plan was originally devised by the party buro secretary. The 
draft programme was then examined in meetings of the Depart­
ment of Marxism-Leninism, the party buro and the party aktiv.
1
2
3
P.zh., 2/66, p. 66; 11/66, p. 78; 17/66, p. 78.
Kom.Sov.Latvii, 7/70, p. 79.
Kom.Uzbekistana, 10/69, p. 53.
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Many changes were made as a result of these examinations and 
of the consideration of directives of higher authorities and 
the experience of other institutions throughout the country. 
The general institute plan was then confirmed in a combined 
session of the Academic Council and the party buro. The 
faculty plans were confirmed in combined meetings of faculty 
councils and party buros, while the study group plans were 
confirmed in meetings of the buros of departmental komsomol 
organisations. The institute's council and party buro were 
to take control of fulfilment, hearing reports (otchety) from 
the deans and party buro secretaries of the faculties. 
Similarly faculty party organisations were to hear reports 
from department heads. Also faculty heads, deans, party buro 
secretaries, pro-rectors for academic and scientific sections 
and the rector, as well as the komsomol and trade union 
leadership, were entitled to personally check fulfilment.^
There have been basically three types of control 
discussed in this section. Firstly, there was ideological 
control in the narrowest sense of the term, ensuring that 
individuals do not express unacceptable views on the basic 
principles of Soviet ideology. The importance of such 
control for the maintenance of legitimacy needs no more 
explanation. Secondly, there was control of intellectual 
attitudes, but in areas that have no direct relevance to 
the basic principles of the Soviet ideology. Such control is 
important for legitimacy because the Soviet ideology 
claims to be relvant for all areas of life. Finally,
1 Kom.Estonii, 3/73, pp. 38-40.
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there was control of social values in the broad sense.
The aim here is to ensure that social life in the Soviet 
Union is seen to be organised on a just, friendly basis, 
that the quality of life is at a high level.^ This type 
of control also contributes to legitimacy. The party seeks 
to show that the society it is building is a happy one 
without serious social problems.
3. Agitation
So far I have discussed the role of PPO's in 
value indoctrination. It was found that their activities 
in the propaganda area are in fact only marginally directed 
towards value indoctrination - such propaganda activities 
as theoretical seminars are used primarily for operational 
indoctrination. However PPO's are still responsible for 
fostering the proper values in the Soviet population. These 
include the correct "political" values, that is, the correct 
attitudes to the basic goals and structure of the Soviet 
system, maintained primarily through strict ideological
1 Later in this chapter we will see the
responsibility PPO's have for ensuring the 
correct behaviour of party members. PPO's and 
other social organisations are in fact respons­
ible for the social behaviour of all members of 
society. One of the leading actors of the 
Novosibirsk oblast’ Drama Theatre got drunk 
and ruined a tour by the theatre. It was not 
the first time he had done so, but previously 
he had been considered indispensable. This time 
the party members decided that it was necessary 
to show that no degree of artistic merit can 
justify drunkenness. They demanded that the 
director dismiss the actor. Sov.kul rtura, 
23/11/73, p. 2.
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control, and the correct "social" values. These latter are 
not of such immediate political significance, but are 
still of ideological importance, because they legitimise 
party involvement in all areas of life and because they 
foster the type of social behaviour necessary for a stable 
society. This fostering of the social values necessary 
for correct behaviour is of particular importance for 
educational PPO's, since it is in educational institutions 
that much of the basic socialisation work in this area 
takes place.
I will now describe those PPO activities that 
are specifically concerned with operational indoctrination. 
We have seen that propaganda is theoretically directed 
primarily towards the legitimation of the regime. By way 
of contrast agitation is generally concerned with more 
immediate and topical matters, Marxism-Leninism providing 
only the general framework. The Spravochnik declares: 
Political agitation will be militant, 
concrete and realistic only when the 
explanation of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism 
and the policies and decisions of the 
Communist Party is given, not in general 
terms, but with an organic connection with 
the concrete tasks before each oblast', 
raion, enterprise and collective and state 
farm, and when agitation instructs the
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masses in the resolution of these tasks 
on the basis of the experience of 
leading people.^-
This quotation suggests that the main function of agitation
is communication. The massive agitation campaigns that
accompany, for example, each Party Congress and Five Year
Plan are designed to explain to each collective and each
individual worker what is expected of them in the
fulfilment of the particular goals set by the Congress or
Plan. The explanation of these tasks should take account
of the general context in which the collective or
individual is situated and the immediate production
concerns of the collective. The party buro, when working
out the topics for agitation work, is expected to consult
with the "host" organisation's leadership to ensure that
2the most important production problems are covered.
What are the various forms of agitation and what 
role do PPO's play in them? The means of agitation include 
all the media and various forms of face-to-face communication, 
oral and visual. PPO's are involved only with the latter. 
Face-to-face communication consists primarily of meetings, 
smaller informal conversations, and visual agitation 
through the use of posters, placards, etc.
1 Spravoohnik, op. cit., p. 519.
2 ibid, p. 525.
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Meetings can be organised under party or non- 
party auspices. Other social organisations such as trade 
unions and the komsomol conduct mass meetings for their 
members to publicise recent events and policy announcements. 
While the PPO is not directly involved in such meetings it 
can be confidently stated that it controls these activities 
as closely as it controls all other activities of social 
organisations. The Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entisklopediia, 
quoted by Conquest, declares that the Central Committee 
of the CPSU "has charged Party organisations with conveni ng 
general meetings of the workers in all enterprises and 
collective farms to hear reports on current political 
events at least once every 1-15$ months".^ I have not found 
any specific mention of such regular general meetings for 
all workers organised by PPO’s. However trade union and 
komsomol meetings, combined with the usual PPO meetings, 
would certainly have the same effect as such meetings.
Many regular general PPO meetings are essentially 
exercises in agitation. The key-note addresses at these 
meetings are usually concerned with the tasks of the 
collective in the fulfilment of the latest economic and 
other policy goals of the party leadership. It is 
particularly evident that, after a Party Congress, the 
announcement of a new Five Year Plan or a particularly
1 Conquest, op. cit., p. 114.
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important Central Committee Plenum, party meetings are 
used as forums for explaining the role of the collective 
and its individual members in the fulfilment of national 
policy. The wide, and apparently increasing, use of open 
party meetings means that these forums are not closed to 
non-party members. Certainly there are occasions when 
party members will be informed of their own particular 
tasks in closed meetings. However party meetings concerned 
with publicising recent important announcements of the top 
leadership are usually open to non-party people. The 
Spravochnik says:
It is well known that the decisions of 
plenums of the Central Committee of the 
CPSU on questions of agriculture and industry 
are addressed not only to the party, but to 
the whole Soviet people. Primary party 
organisations, in considering these decisions, 
work out practical measures which they will 
be putting into effect with the cooperation 
of the non-party masses. It is understood 
that the enlisting of non-party people in the 
consideration of these questions can only help 
the party organisation more completely uncover 
shortcomings in work, take into account the advice 
of the non-party masses, and heighten their 
political and production activity (aktivnostf).^
1 Spravochnik, op. cit., p. 519.
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These general meetings are complemented by
closer contacts between agitators and smaller groups of
workers. Conquest quotes Lenin to the effect that "mass
meetings are not enough; what is needed is personal
agitation - 'every free day, every free hour of the
conscious worker must be used for personal agitation'."^
Conquest gives the best brief description of the style of
2such close forms of agitation. The "chats" (besedy) 
conducted by agitators are concerned with recent policy 
decisions, best illustrated by reading aloud from Soviet 
newspapers, so carefully portrayed in photographs in the 
Soviet press. However they also deal with more specific 
and immediate production problems and are expected to 
contribute to the mobilisation of workers towards greater 
efficiency and productivity.
While it is said that agitators should display
some initiative in the choice of the topics of chats, in
fact they are closely controlled by the PPO. Conquest
quotes a Soviet handbook to the effect that "usually a
model list of the most topical themes at a given moment
3is recommended to agitators every month". The PPO is also 
responsible for the appointment, organisation and training 
of agitators. Work as an agitator is one of the most common
1 Conquest, op. cit., p. 114.
2 ibid, pp. 114-117.
3 ibid, p. 116.
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ways for a party member to fulfil his obligations to do 
some party work in addition to his normal job. Conquest 
speaks of the agitkollektivy, the groups of agitators run 
by the PPO. While the group will not usually be headed 
by the party secretary, he must personally direct its work, 
"because he knows the concrete tasks of the enterprise or 
collective farm, and the raikom's or gorkom's instructions 
better than anyone else and can ensure that agitation is 
carried out not in an abstract manner, but closely linked 
to life".^ The formal head of the group will be one of 
the best-trained party activists. Presumably in PPO's big 
enough to have a deputy secretary for ideological affairs 
he will be directly responsible for agitation.
The training and preparation of agitators is also 
the responsibility of the PPO, with the party secretary 
again being directly involved. The Spravochnik declares: 
The quality of agitational work depends largely 
on how party organisations assist in expanding 
the political vision of agitators, how they 
arm them with concrete knowledge of industrial 
and agricultural production and teach them how 
to conduct explanatory work.
In seminars for agitators there must be
1 Conquest, op. cit., p. 116. The quotation is
from the Spravochnik, p. 504. It is a good 
illustration of the staff generalist qualities 
which must be possessed by a PPO secretary.
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presented general political reports, 
consultations must be arranged and 
exchange of experience conducted.
There should be sample illustrations 
(predmetnyi pokaz) of how to conduct 
a chat, how to best make some fact or 
other easy to understand.
But along with the whole range of 
reports and seminars no less significance 
for the training of agitators should be 
given to everyday contact between them and 
the party organisation secretary.'*'
Conversations between an agitator and one other
person are also common, particularly, it seems, in cases
where the subject of attention has persisted in holding
incorrect views. In these cases the control element
appears to be dominant over the communication function. The
party secretary will often be involved in such conversations.
The secretary of the party committee of the Mossovet Theatre
is praised for the fatherly attitude he has towards the
younger generation, particularly in the individual conversations
2he conducts as part of the PPO's agitation work. When the 
party buro of Kazan State University found out that one 
fourth year student in the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics
1 Spravochnik, op. cit., p. 520.
2 Teatralrnaia zhizn', 4/69, p. 9.
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had confused and inconsistent opinions on party policies 
and Soviet power, the party secretary set matters right 
by answering all the student's questions in a personal 
conversation.^
Some brief mention should be made of visual
agitation. Little need be added to Conquest's treatment 
2of the matter. All visitors to the Soviet Union will have 
seen the placards, posters, large photographs and stands 
for the display of newspapers that are found in the streets 
and on buildings. The messages conveyed are usually of a 
very general nature. They are complemented by further 
placards, charts, graphs, "boards of honour", wall newspapers, 
etc., inside working organisations. These displays usually 
carry a more concrete message for the working collective.
They are not necessarily arranged by the PPO; for example, 
charts on the progress of socialist competition are 
probably put up by the trade union. However the PPO has 
overall responsibility for visual agitation.
As Conquest makes clear, some Soviet writers are 
themselves aware of the inadequacies of most forms of visual 
agitation. It is impossible to measure their overall 
effectiveness. My own observations suggest that they are 
paid very little conscious attention. While the possibility
1 Kom., 7/57, p. 118.
2 Conquest, op. cit., p. 116.
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of a sub-conscious effect should not be entirely 
discounted, some considerable scepticism is justified.
How widespread and effective, then, is the work
of agitators? Conquest makes the interesting point that
agitation meetings provide one of the few forums available
to Soviet citizens for making complaints, not about the
system as a whole, but about specific grievances they might
have.'*' It is difficult to say just what advantage is taken
of such a forum. The fact that the Spravochnik finds it
necessary to devote several pages to the "explanation of
difficult (ostrye) questions" suggests that considerable
2advantage is taken. It is even more difficult to decide 
what effect the answers to the questions have. Do they 
contribute to the legitimation of the regime and the 
positive mobilisation of the masses, or do they serve to 
further alienate them? It must depend enormously on the 
quality of the particular agitator and the nature of 
particular questions. However the general tone of the 
Spravochnik's treatment of the matter is not reassuring.
If someone complains about living conditions the agitator 
must not express sympathy, but is to strengthen the person's 
confidence that life for the masses is improving. It goes 
on:
Of course, we meet some people who do not want
1 ibid, p. 115.
2 Spravochnik, op. cit., pp. 521-525.
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to take into account anything, who do not 
wish to see our great successes or achieve­
ments or the reasons for any shortcomings.
For them everything is bad. And there are 
others who see everything only from their 
own point of view (sudiat obo vsem so svoei 
kolokol'ni), who do not think about state 
interests ... One has to explain things 
patiently to those who .really do not under­
stand something and wish to satisfy them­
selves with the truth, but those who stir 
things up should receive a decisive rebuff.^"
Indeed other statements lead one to suspect that ideological 
control plays a prominent part in the minds of the 
authorities who have established the system of agitation.
The Spravoohnik declares that "party organisations must 
directly interest themselves in the questions that the masses 
put to agitators so that these questions can be generalised, 
conclusions can be derived from them and the agititor him­
self will consider it essential to go to the party organis­
ation to tell about how a conversation had gone and what
2matters of interest had arisen from it". Although the 
control function of agitation should not be stressed at the 
expense of its communication function the close and
1
2
ibid, pp. 522, 525. 
ibid, pp. 520-521.
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continuing contacts between agitator and the masses that 
characterise so many forms of agitation give it a great 
potential for contributing to that constant and pervasive 
observation of the everyday activities of the Soviet 
masses which is such an important part of rank-and-file 
party members' functions and is so important for maintaining 
the supremacy of the party's ideology.
Thus it appears that while propaganda activities 
make a very significant contribution to operational 
indoctrination, agitation activities could make their 
contribution to value indoctrination. But before we can 
confidently assert this we have to look at the actual 
extent of agitation activities in non-production institutions. 
There have been complaints in the Soviet press that PPO's 
neglect agitation because they consider "agitation (to be) 
work of minor importance, destined only for the backward 
strata of the population".'*' Such an attitude would 
presumably be most widespread in the PPO's of non-production 
institutions, with their virtual monopoly of the Soviet 
intelligentsia. Evidence of the unwillingness of communists 
in non-production insitutions to involve themselves in
2agitation work gives some limited support to this view. The
1 Kom. , 10/65, p. 51; quoted in Conquest, op. cit., 
p. 117.
2 In 1966 the secretary of the party committee of 
Moscow State University complained about the 
unwillingness of academic workers to become 
involved in party work. Kom., 10/66, p. 36. In 
1968 in the Obninsk branch of the Physical Chemistry 
Institute only seventeen of the 79 leading workers 
were involved in political work. Kom., 18/68, p. 43.
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fact that there is an almost total lack of detailed 
information on agitation activities in non-production 
institutions constitutes stronger evidence. Even 
articles by party secretaries on the ideological 
activities of their PPO's give few details on the type of 
agitation work described in this section. The emphasis is 
usually on the political indoctrination seminars already 
described. It is unlikely that non-production PPO's 
entirely ignore agitation work - .my own observations at 
Moscow State University suggest that they continue; 
visual agitation was very much in evidence, while large- 
scale meetings and smaller-scale chats appeared to be 
conducted in order to discuss current political events. 
However the evidence, circumstantial as it is, strongly 
suggests that the PPO's, and their party superiors, 
believe in the superiority of political indoctrination 
seminars for providing a combination of ideological control, 
communication and practical training in a form that 
intellectuals will not find totally ridiculous. The 
evidence suggests that of the types of agitation activities 
discussed in this section only party meetings, including 
open party meetings, are used to any significant degree for 
operational indoctrination.
4. Material and other forms of incentive
One important matter that none of the forms of
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indoctrination discussed so far have really touched on is 
mobilisation. Value indoctrination provides a passive 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the Soviet ideology and 
party power. However there is no evidence that it 
produces positive mobilisation of the working masses. 
Operational indoctrination, in the form of agitation, 
undoubtedly lays considerable stress on the material 
benefits, both long and short-term, to be gained from 
dedicated production performance.. However the effectiveness 
of such agitation seems to depend heavily on the workers 
being presented with actual evidence of those benefits, 
particularly the short-term ones. In effect agitation 
activities become little more than publicity for various 
systems of material incentive. It can hardly be said, in 
that case, that the agitation is providing the mobilisation.
When we speak of material incentive we mean 
mobilisation through the material reward of individual 
workers by their working collectives. Soviet theorists 
recognise that Soviet citizens, not yet living in a society 
that has reached the stage of full communism, do not 
see work as an "organic" need, but primarily as a necessary 
means to life. This makes it possible, and indeed necessary, 
to motivate people to work through material reward.'*' Wages
1 Ekonomicheskie nauki, 10/71, pp. 37-38.
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are the basic form of material reward, providing the 
essential means of life.1 However it is recognised that 
wages are of limited mobilising value. Because they are 
fixed at a certain level that will not be changed 
regardless of work done,short of promotion or dismissal, 
they motivate little more than minimum job fulfilment.
This fact has enabled, or required, the Soviet 
authorities to develop an extensive and complicated 
system of material incentive beyond the payment of a fixed 
wage. Using as justification the socialist principle of 
"to each according to his work", Soviet theorists and 
administrators have worked out a system in which material 
rewards to individual workers are tied to the degree of 
their fulfilment and their collective's fulfilment of 
set tasks.
In practice the range of different systems of 
material incentive is enormous. Even a brief survey of 
them is far beyond the scope of this thesis. However I 
will give some idea of the problems facing the systems, an 
indication of the extent of their use in the different 
categories of non-production institutions, and one relatively 
detailed example that shows PPO involvement in material 
incentive.
The main problem with systems of material
1 Voprosy ekonomiki, 5/71, p. 4.
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incentive is finding ways to effectively measure 
performance. This is particularly a problem in non­
production institutions where "output" is so rarely a 
physical object which can be either quantitatively or 
qualitatively measured. The Soviet authorities are well 
aware that material incentive depends on the worker being 
able to see that an increase in effort will lead quickly 
to a comparable increase in material benefit. This is 
difficult in a situation where output is such an intangible 
matter as the quality of education or administrative 
performance. Even in research institutes, where at least 
there are concrete results in terms of scientific dis­
coveries, there are enormous difficulties in measuring the 
value of discoveries. The problem is compounded by the 
difficulties of isolating one individual's or collective's 
performance from outside factors."*- The other reaction to 
this problem is to pay all workers exactly the same amount, 
with perhaps some allowance being made for the level of
1 This difficulty is best illustrated in
administrative institutions. The only way the 
quality of the performance of an administrative 
institution can be measured is by looking at 
the production performance of subordinate 
enterprises. Khozraschet accounting 
procedures mean that the financial situation 
of administrative institutions, and therefore 
the amounts of money they have available for 
material incentive is placed in dependence 
on the effectiveness of work of subordinate 
enterprises. Soviet writers on these matters 
give no idea of how it is possible to determine 
the degree of responsibility of administrative 
workers for an enterprise's performance. Vopr. 
ekonomiki, 12/68, p. 43; Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i 
pravo, 1/72, p. 79.
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position held and formal qualifications. Clearly the 
mobilising effect of such a system is minimal.^
The second problem is working out indicators
that do not allow for abuse. The system should be
designed so that in working for his own individual or
collective interests, the worker will automatically
fulfil the interests of society as a whole. This is not
always easily done. For example, many scientific
institutions have used the number of scientific articles
published as an indicator of research performance. This
has led to a great increase in the practice of leading
workers forcing their subordinates to add their names as
2co-authors of articles.
The third problem has been finding the right 
level of material benefit to provide maximum mobilisation. 
If bonus payments make up too small a percentage of total 
income, their mobilising effect will be slight; if they
1 It is also contrary to the fundamental socialist 
(as distinct from communist) principle of "to 
each according to his work". This principle is 
of enormous practical significance in that it 
justifies differential rates of material reward.
See Kom. Sov. Latvii, 6/72, p. 72.
2 Gvishiani, D.M: Voprosy teorii i praktiki
upravleniia i organizatsii nauki, Izd. "Nauka", 
Moscow, 1975, p. 213; Agursky, op. cit., p. 42; 
P.zh., 12/76, p. 41. On the broader scale there 
has been the problem of ministries and their 
enterprises raising profitability, since 1965 
the main indicator of performance, simply by 
raising prices rather than by improving product­
ivity. Sov.gos. i pravo, 11/71, p. 71. Scientific 
institutes have also been guilty of this practice. 
Sov.gos. i pravo, 12/71, p. 8.
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make up too-large a proportion, there are two possible 
effects. If total income varies too much, enough to 
affect the worker's life style, the effect on his sense of 
security could produce such discontent that a decline in 
productivity results, and a loss of the regime's 
legitimacy; if bonuses are artificually kept steady at 
such a level as to guarantee workers a predictable standard 
of living, they will come to regard the bonuses in the same 
light as wages - a guaranteed income for which no particular 
effort needs to be made. Soviet writers believe that they 
have found the right level at about 10 to 15% of total 
income."*- However the problem then becomes a more serious 
one of finding sufficient cash to be able to pay bonuses at 
such a level. Many non-production institutions cannot be 
expected to make a profit. Therefore they are unable to 
build up any sort of fund for material incentive. Fixed 
payments for material incentive from the state budget 
destroy one of the fundamental principles of material 
incentive - that it be financed by the efforts of 
individuals working together in a collective, who then 
share in the benefits of their efforts.
This problem is probably the main reason that 
systems of material incentive are virtually non-existent in
1 Zav'ialov, V.G: Problemy material ' nogo
stimulivovaniia truda rabotnikov nauehno- 
issledovatel1skikh organizatsii, synopsis of 
a dissertation for degree of Candidate of 
Economic Sciences, Leningrad State University, 
1971, p 12.
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educational and cultural institutions. Indicators, even 
if not entirely satisfactory, have been devised for 
socialist competition in these institutuions. If 
indicators, therefore, are not the main problem, the 
problem must be obtaining the financial resources to 
operate a system of material incentive.
Indicators appear to be the main problem in
administrative institutions. There have been problems
with building up funds for material incentive to an
effective level.'*" However as time passes this problem
2should be reduced.
For measurement of the quality of the performance
of the collective as a whole we have seen that administrative
institutions use the performance of subordinate enterprises
3measured in terms of profitability. But there is the 
is the further problem of determining the performance of
1 Sovetskaia Moldaviia, 22/9/73, p. 4.
2 Of course this refers only to institutions 
that have subordinate production enterprises. 
Their funds for material incentive are almost 
invariably financed through deductions from 
enterprise profits. Administrative institutions 
that supervise non-production organisations have 
no such source of funds. Thus in 1968 bonuses 
constituted only 2% of the incomes of the 
officials of the Latvian Ministry of Education, 
although in 1971 the percentage had reached 
3.38. Kom. Sov. Latvii, 6/72, p. 72.
Again administrative institutions which supervise 
non-production organisations have no such 
measure.
3
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individual administrative officials. They cannot be tied
individually to any physical output.^" But what little
information I have on the indicators actually used to
determine payments to individual administrative officials
suggests that they are determined by collective plan
fulfilment. Officials in the Latvian Ministry of Local
Industry are paid bonuses quarterly according to three
basic indicators of production plan fulfilment - the volume
of production, the assortment of products, and the level of
profitability of the branch as a whole - as well as other
variable indicators presumably like those described in a
1971 Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo article. They included
some sort of measurement of the quality of decisions made
and documentation prepared, the efficiency of work with
letters and grievances, and the fulfilment of orders and 
2other tasks. Whatever indicators are used, in administrative 
institutions with subordinate production enterprises systems
3of material incentive have been developed and widely applied.
1 Thus socialist competition in the Turnover
Department of the All-Union Ministry of Finance 
is based on the following rather extraordinary 
indicators: the improvement of relations between
workers, development of a feeling of collectivism, 
friendliness at and away from work and the help 
officials give to each other to foster better 
moral qualities in Soviet man! Figurin, T.A: 
Partiinye gruppy v sovetskikh uchrezhdeniiakh, Izd. 
"Sovetskaia Rosiia", Moscow, 1974, p. 10.
2 Sov. gos. i pravo, 4/71, p. 54.
3 For details on, for example, the system in the 
Ministry of Instrument Making, see Planovoe 
khoziaistvo, 11/71, p. 15; Pravda, 9/2/69, p. 2.
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In other institutions they are much rarer.^
Among non-production institutions only scientific 
research institutes have the objective conditions to allow 
reasonably effective operation of systems of material 
incentive. It is possible to devise indicators to measure 
the performance of both individual scientists and their 
collectives, and with institutes being increasingly involved 
in contract work, it is possible for them to build up funds 
for material incentive of an effective size. Therefore it 
is not surprising that it is in this category that material 
incentive has experienced its greatest development.
One of the pioneers of material incentive in 
research institutes is the Karpov Institute of Physical 
Chemistry. In 1976 Pavtiinaia zhizn' published an article 
by the director and party secretary of the institute on the 
system. From this article we can derive a good idea of 
a well-developed system of material incentive, and the part 
of the PPO in it.^
1 When I asked the head of a relatively
small, but republican level, administrative 
organisation whether his organisation had a 
system of material incentive, he said that it 
was impossible since there was no way to 
measure performance or provide bonuses. But 
he then went on to say that he, working with 
the party buro and trade union committees, 
was able to reduce the wages of officials not 
working adequately, and to give good workers 
free trips.
2 P.zh., 6/76, pp. 48-51.
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When the system was introduced in 1968,^ 
guaranteed wages were reduced by 25 to 30% and the 
director, in accordance with decisions of an attestation 
commission, was given the right to pay bonuses on the basis 
of the effectiveness of each individual's work. The bonuses 
are paid yearly. For scientific workers without academic 
degrees bonus payments cannot increase income more than 
40% over the pre-1968 level; for those with degrees the 
limit is 25%.^
The institute has four attestation commissions, 
three sectional and one central, made up of leading
3scientists and party, trade union and komsomol representatives. 
Attestation is done first by the head of the section in 
which the individual works, then by the sectional commission, 
the central commission, and is finally confirmed by the 
director. The following criteria are used in evaluation: 
the theoretical and experimental quality of research; the 
level of initiative and creative independence; the scientific 
and practical significance of the results of research; and
1 The system replaced one where the main way to 
get higher pay was to gain an academic degree.
2 Production workers, laboratory assistants and 
administrative workers are not covered by the 
system.
3 The membership of the central commission 
includes a secretary of the party buro, 
although not the first secretary, the chairman 
of the trade union committee, and the 
secretary of the komsomol organisation.
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participation in the implementation of research in 
production. Although bonuses are paid yearly, 
attestations take place once every two years. The results 
of all attestations are examined in a meeting of the party 
buro and then in a general party meeting.^
From the discussion so far it can be seen that
the PPO has a continuing role to play in the operations of
the material incentive system. There is party representation
on the attestation commission, although no firm conclusions
on the precise effect such representation might have are 
2possible. One could expect that workers who had caused 
any trouble of a political or ideological nature would meet 
problems from this quarter. The same could be said of the 
subsequent examination of the commissions' findings in the 
party buro and party meetings.
1 The article reports that the system has met 
with very few problems. After the first 
attestation there were only seven complaints.
There were 483 scientific workers examined 
on this occasion, of whom 256 retained their 
former level of pay, 126 had theirs raised, 
and 71 had theirs lowered. These last were 
mainly highly paid and qualified people.
2 Kommunist (Vilnius) speaks of the influence of 
the communists who are members of the commissions 
for the payment of scientific workers in 
Lithuanian research institutes. Kommunist 
(Vilnius), 6/72, p. 33. One book on the 
organisation of scientific research speaks of the 
role of the treugol’nik (triangle) of a laboratory 
or department in defining the coefficients used
to evaluate the work of individual workers. 
Treugol'nik usually refers to the head of the 
laboratory or department, its party secretary, 
and trade union chairman. Gvishiani, op. cit.,
p. 216.
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However in keeping with its staff generalist 
role the part the PPO played in the introduction of the 
system and in broad control of its continuing operations 
are particularly significant. When permission had been 
received from higher authorities for the introduction of 
the system the party buro held a meeting with invited 
guests, including the secretaries of subordinate party 
organisations and communist members of the Academic Council 
The meeting examined the matter of the formation and the 
memberships of the attestation commissions. The whole 
system was then examined in an open party meeting. Before 
the second attestation in 1970 the party buro established 
a special commission for examining suggestions put forward 
by workers on the conduct of the attestation.^- The article 
also refers to the importance of the institute's communists 
convincing the collective of the value of the system and 
ensuring that it is not implemented in an "administrative" 
way. This shows the role of the PPO in operational 
indoctrination, in this case persuading the members of the
1 For another account of such PPO involvement,
see Kom. Sov. Latvii, 1/71, p. 61. The PPO 
in the Latvian Ministry of Local Industry took 
an active part in working out the system of 
payments for officials. The PPO also has an 
influence over such matters through the trade 
union organisation. The establishment by 
institutional leaders of the procedures for 
the use of material incentive funds must be 
done with the agreement of the trade union 
organisation. Plan, khoziaistvo, 11/71, p. 15; 
Iampol'skaia, Ts.A: Obshchestvennye ovganizatsii
v SSSR, nekotorye politicheskie i organizatsionno 
pravovye aspekty, Izd. "Nauka", Moscow, 1972, 
p. 63.
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collective of the value of new operational procedures, 
and the links of such indoctrination with the staff 
generalist role.
We have seen that problems of defining indicators 
and obtaining funds have seriously limited the use of 
systems of material incentive in non-production institutions, 
particularly in cultural and educational institutions.
This has helped increase the emphasis on socialist 
competition and other forms of "moral" reward as a means 
of mobilisation. These have the advantage that because 
they lay the stress on "moral" considerations less concrete 
indicators can be used, and because they do not rely on 
material reward for any effect they might have they can be 
implemented in institutions without their own sources of 
income.^
1 In fact, however, many so-called "moral" rewards
have a very materialistic appearance. One book on 
moral incentive included among its list of moral 
rewards such things as valuable prizes, trips to 
rest homes, tourist trips, subscriptions and 
tickets to theatres, etc. Moral*noe stimulirovanie 
truda v usloviiakh khoziaistvennoi reformy, Institute 
of Economics of Industry of the Ukrainian Academy 
of Sciences and the Donets oblast* organisation of 
Znanie, Donets, 1971, p. 14. Even such apparently 
non-material rewards as Diplomas of Honour, Red 
Banners and signatures in the work book appear to 
have a material significance not generally public­
ised. After one book gave some data on the relative 
popularity of various forms of moral reward, the 
statement was made that "the least popular is the 
use of the work book as a means of encouragement, 
since this gives the worker practically no 
advantages with regard to transfers to other work, 
with regard to retirement onto a pension, or in the 
process of his work activity". Smol'kov, V.G:
Sotsialistioheskoe sorevnovanie v neproizvods tvennoi 
sphere, Profizdat, Moscow, 1975, p. 132.
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Therefore it is not surprising that educational 
institutions have well-developed systems of socialist 
competition. The most detailed account of one appears in 
a 1972 article in Vestnik vysshei shkoly on the Leningrad 
Polytechnical Institute.^ The competition was organised 
jointly by the institute's rectorate, party committee and 
trade union committee to determine the best faculty, 
department (kafedra) and academic group. The indicators 
for faculties and departments are in four sections.
Firstly, the quality of personnel is considered - the 
numbers of faculties or departments headed by professors 
or doctors and the qualifications of their teaching and 
scientific staff. Secondly, account is taken of research 
work undertaken - the volume of contractual work, the 
degree of fulfilment and its effectiveness, the fulfilment 
of projects allocated under the state plan, the participation 
of students in research work, links with and the introduction 
of the results of research into production. Thirdly, 
there is consideration of academic work - the publishing of 
textbooks and scientific manuals, the work of students on 
individual plans, and an evaluation of diploma projects and 
work. Finally, an evaluation is made of the work done 
outside class - the indoctrination work of teachers outside 
their class duties, the participation of students in social 
work, physical education and sport, and the "third semester"
1 Vestnik vysshei shkoly, 10/72, pp. 68-70.
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(work done, usually on farms or in construction, during 
the summer vacation), and a consideration of student 
discipline. For faculties there is a total of 29 
indicators, for departments, 25.
For the academic groups there are three sections 
with a total of 12 indicators. Firstly, there is the study 
process - the pass rate, work on individual study plans, 
and the monthly evaluation of progress made. Research work 
is again considered - the participation of students in 
scientific work, the level of scientific work in the 
educational process, and scientific discussions and seminars. 
The third section is concerned with work outside class and 
is identical to the fourth section described above.
Scores for all these indicators are determined 
by permanent all-institute and faculty commissions with 
representatives of the party, trade union, deans' offices 
and rectorate.
Successful sections are rewarded with various 
titles and diplomas, while lists of results and photographs 
of the leaders of the best sections are publicly displayed.
Administrative and scientific institutions also 
have well-developed socialist competitions. Usually the 
same sort of indicators, based on the fulfilment of 
production tasks, as were developed for the systems of
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material Stimulation are used, but with some less "material" 
indicators added.^
One would expect that PPO involvement in socialist 
competition would take much the same form as its involvement 
in material incentive, that is, influence over commissions 
responsible for setting indicators and evaluating performance 
and extensive agitation activities. Indeed the greater 
"moral" character of socialist competition and the setting 
of agitation work as a common task for people involved in 
competition could lead one to expect even greater PPO 
involvement. In fact there is no evidence of this greater 
involvement. Although reports such as that quoted above on 
the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute make it clear that 
PPO's do play a significant role in the organisation of 
socialist competition, there is some evidence to suggest 
that much of the work in this area is left to the trade 
union. Lakhtin declares that the conditions for socialist
1 For example, the section on "social indoctrin­
ation and ideological work" in the competition 
adopted by the Institute of Physical Chemistry 
of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences includes 
such indicators as work in the institute aktiv 
(work on the editorial board of the wall news­
paper or in people's control groups and various 
commissions), political study, participation in 
artistic activities, in the beautification of 
the institute's grounds, and in trips to the 
Young Pioneers' camp, and in sport, including 
consideration of successes gained in that area. 
Lakhtin, G.A: Sotsialisticheskoe sorevnovanie
v nauchnykh uchrezhdeniiakh, Profizdat, Moscow, 
1975, p. 50.
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competition could be determined by a specially formed 
commission of representatives from the administration, 
party committee, trade union and other social organisations, 
but feels that probably the trade union could do it by 
itself.^
Conclusions on the effectiveness of material and 
moral incentive are not easy, and are beyond the scope 
of this thesis. What is of concern to us is the involvement 
of the PPO. We have seen evidence of PPO agitation on 
behalf of these systems of mobilisation. Agitation about 
socialist competition tends to be more in terms of value 
indoctrination, with the emphasis on its "collective 
spirit", the importance attached to it by Lenin as a 
fundamental feature of socialism, etc. The authorities 
recognise the greater instrumental nature of material 
incentive, and agitation on its behalf is more in 
operational terms. Direct PPO involvement in the mobilisation 
process foreshadows their involvement in the "production" 
activities of "host" organisations - close day-to-day 
overseeing of operations, plus a broader staff generalist 
control.
1 Of course the trade union is closely 
supervised by the PPO, so this is not 
to reduce the importance of the PPO.
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5. The special role of the PPO
That completes the description of PPO involvement 
in general value and operational indoctrination. However 
examination of indoctrination in the special values inherent 
in the PPO's role in Soviet society and the special 
indoctrination of party members is required.
Indoctrination of the working population in the 
special role of PPO's in Soviet society is based on 
indoctrination in the leading role of the CPSU. This is 
one of the most important aspects of value indoctrination. 
However more specific indoctrination is required in the 
particular role of the PPO - what powers it has and what 
means it can use for what purpose. It is particularly 
important that such indoctrination take place among 
institutional leaders, who will feel the effect of PPO 
involvement most. Its need will be more severely felt at 
times of major changes in PPO powers, such as the 1971 
extension of the right of control.
Unfortunately we do not have a great deal of 
detail on the content of operational indoctrination work 
at lower levels. However we can presume that it takes its 
lead from the sort of material which appears in the Soviet 
press, particularly Pravda and the more politically 
specialised journals such as Partiinaia zhizn’, Kommunist 
and their republican equivalents. These journals are full
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of information on administrative and managerial procedures, 
including considerable detail on the role of PPO's.
Western students of the system rely almost entirely on 
such sources for their information. Although the journals 
are sometimes vague, contradictory and confusing, Western 
students are usually able to discern the current state of 
Soviet policies and procedures from them. Combined with 
other forms of communication and training available to 
those actually working in the system, the press should 
provide quite a good guide on the role of PPO's. Articles 
appearing in such journals form an important basis for a 
great deal of agitation work.^ They are also undoubtedly 
required reading for all leading workers.
In later sections of this thesis I will describe
various seminars and conferences run by higher level party
organs to explain to PPO secretaries and other party workers
2their roles in new policies and procedures. Very often
1 For example, in 1971 the party buro of
the Latvian Ministry of Local Industry 
decided to encourage the collective to 
look at a number of articles that had 
appeared in Pravda as the basis for 
the examination of a reorganisation of 
the ministry. The articles were studied 
in all party groups before the matter 
was considered in a general party meeting. 
Kom. Sov. Latvii, 1/71, p. 59.
2 See pp. 369-372, 493-395.
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institutional leaders also attend these conferences.^
Although we have few details on the content of such
conferences and seminars, undoubtedly the role of PPO' s
2receives considerable attention.
Letters and reports in the Soviet press suggest 
that institutional leaders have a good understanding of the 
proper role and procedures of PPO's, probably better than 
many PPO secretaries. This is not to say that they conduct
1 For example, the Tallin gorkom has 
permanent seminars for the directors and 
party secretaries of specialised secondary 
schools and the directors, their deputies 
and party secretaries of technical colleges. 
Korn. Estonii, 4/73, p. 13. The Kharkov 
obkom has permanent seminars for the 
rectors, pro-rectors and party secretaries 
of tertiary educational institutions and 
the directors and party secretaries of 
research and design institutes. Kommunist 
Ukvainy, 3/71, p. 92. In 1968 the Frunze 
raikom of Moscow ran a seminar to which
it invited a wide range of leading officials 
and party secretaries from a number of 
ministries and agencies. P.zh., 11/68,
pp. 20-21.
2 The fact that institutional leaders are 
almost invariably party members means that 
they are subject to the special value and 
operational indoctrination procedures that 
are applied to party members, including party 
discipline. We have seen that many institut­
ional leaders undertake propaganda and 
agitation work as part of their party duties. 
This means that they will probably be subject 
to special courses for propagandists and 
agitators run by Universities of Marxism- 
Leninism, Higher Party Schools, etc. For 
descriptions of these organisations, see 
Conquest, op. cit., pp. 109-113; Mickiewicz, 
op. cit.,
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their activities in accordance with their understanding. 
However this is a matter to be considered in a later 
chapter.
6. The special values of party members
The final matter to be considered in this chapter 
is the introduction to and maintenance of special values in 
party members. These values are basically a willingness 
to give unquestioning obedience to the party and at all 
times to behave in such a way that the party will not be 
brought into disrepute.^" Such values are important for a 
number of reasons. If the party is to maintain its 
legitimacy in the eyes of the people as the "vanguard of 
the socialist society" it is essential that its members 
be seen to behave in a way worthy of a vanguard. If the 
party is to be able to effectively implement its policies 
and maintain its position of power in Soviet society it is 
essential that all party members obey orders. This 
includes obeying orders in the most general sense of 
directing all their efforts to the implementation of the 
party's policies, and in its literal sense of obeying 
specific orders. In both situations it is required that 
party members put social interests, effectively party 
interests, above their own personal or sectional interests. 
We will see that this is particularly important in the case
1 These values can be seen expressed in the Party 
Rules. Ustav KPSS, Politizdat, Moscow, 1971, pp. 7-10.
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of PPO secretaries. Finally the party's control of the 
population relies to an undetermined, but probably quite 
heavy, degree on the willingness of all party members to 
maintain a close watch over their colleagues, to provide 
a continuous intelligence operation on the general mood 
of the population and the beliefs and activities of 
individual citizens.
The process of the indoctrination of party members 
in these special values begins long before the individual 
becomes a party member. It begins with his basic socialis­
ation and his continuing indoctrination as a non-party 
Soviet citizen. The leading role of the party is probably 
the most basic ideological tenet in the Soviet Union, one 
to which all citizens are subject from childhood. This 
means, according to the Soviet authorities, that simply 
being invited to become a party member should have an 
enormous effect on a citizen. It should put him in the 
right frame of mind for the process of preparation for 
becoming a party member.
The selection and preparation of new members is 
one of the most important tasks of PPO's. Although the 
highest party authorities are undoubtedly responsible for 
setting general membership policies, including setting the 
required proportions of party members according to 
occupation, sex and nationality, only the PPO's are in a
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position to know individual members of "host" organisations 
well enough to be able to recruit new members in 
accordance with these proportions and in order to achieve 
the best spread of communists through all sections of the 
"host" organisations.^
To satisfy the requirements of the categories is
1 In 1962 the PPO1s of Latvian tertiary educational
institutions were criticised in Kommunist 
Sovetskoi Latvii for not doing enough to get 
good people into the party. Some faculties in 
a number of institutions had too few communists. 
Korn. Sov. Latvii, 6/62, p. 57. The 1973 party 
conference at Tartu State University found that 
there were too few communists among the 
university's aspiranty. Sovetskaia Estoniia, 
7/12/73, p. 2. In 1958 it was considered that 
there were too few student party members in the 
Moscow Agricultural Academy. P.zh., 1/58, p. 15. 
In 1972 the party committee of the Tashkent 
Institute of Engineers for the Irrigation and 
Mechanisation of Agriculture took steps to 
improve the spread of communists by distributing 
the party members of the rectorate throughout 
the faculty party organisations, rather than 
grouping them all together with the party members 
working in the institute's administrative 
section. Pravda Vostoka, 1/4/72, p. 2. It 
appears that PPO's are held responsible for any 
problems that might arise from observing the 
quotas that are undoubtedly established by the 
higher party authorities. A 1976 Central 
Committee conference for heads of Party-Organis­
ational Departments of Union Republic Central 
Committees, kraikomy and obkomy declared: "The
activity of primary party organisations here 
and there is regulated by and tolerates elements 
of a mechanical regulation of the growth in the 
party ranks". P.zh., 16/76, p. 15. It appears 
that at times PPO's are virtually obliged to 
accept new party members. If the resulting 
membership is not of the desired quality, the PPO 
is criticised for its poor indoctrination work. 
P.zh.Kaz., 3/65, p. 7.
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not enough. The PPO's must ensure that the people 
selected for party membership become good communists. A 
1971 article in Kommunist Uzbekistana describes the work 
the party committee of the Tashkent Polytechnical Institute 
does with candidate and new party members.'*' The party
1 The conditions for the admission of party
members are set out in the Party Rules and 
are best summarised by Fainsod: "The applicant
must file a declaration of his desire to enter 
the Party, fill out a detailed questionnaire 
which includes a complete life history, 
and submit recommendations from three Party 
members of not less than three years' standing 
who have known and worked with the applicant 
for not less than one year. These recommendations 
must be verified by the secretary of the primary 
unit, and the applicant must serve a probationary 
period as a Party candidate for at least a year.
In Party organizations where bureaus exist, 
applications for membership are first subject 
to examination by the bureau, which then makes 
its recommendation through the secretary to a 
general membership meeting of the unit. If the 
meeting approves the applicant, his application is 
forwarded to the bureau of the next higher committee 
for ratification. Applicants for admission to 
the Party must be at least eighteen years old.
Young people up to twenty-one can join the Party 
only after affiliation with the Komsomol or Young 
Communist League. The recommendation of the 
district committee of the Komsomol organization is 
counted as the equivalent of the recommendation of 
one Party member". Fainsod, op. cit., p. 232. 
Although this appeared in the 1967 edition of 
Fainsod's book, some changes occurred in 1966.
Since then the party standing required of those 
giving recommendations on admission to the party 
has been increased to five years. Also, whereas 
previously a simple majority vote in a party 
meeting was required for admittance into the party, 
since 1966 a two-thirds majority vote has been 
required. Ustav KPSS, Politizdat, Moscow, 1966, 
pp. 24-25.
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committee conducts seminars for candidate members based 
on the theme "The candidate stage - an important step in 
the formation of a communist". Meetings for candidates 
and new members are organised with party veterans. (They 
are divided into three groups - lecturers, aspiranty and 
students.) Faculty party buro meetings examine their 
progress. The PPO is helped in its work by a part-time 
raikom commission concerned with the personal affairs of 
communists and admission into the CPSU.^
Once they have become established party members
rank-and-file communists are subjected to the continuing
indoctrination processes that have been described in this
chapter, including regular discussions of their particular
roles as party members in party meetings. Many of them,
particularly those occupying leading non-party positions,
will go on to higher level party courses in Universities of
2Marxism-Leninism and Party Schools.
What I have called the "mystique" of party 
membership is maintained by a close regulation of party 
members' social and working lives. This mystique is 
important in order to maintain the elite status of party 
membership, on which the legitimacy of the leading role of
1 Kom. Uzbekistana, 6/71, p. 41.
2 See Conquest, op. cit., pp. 109-113; 
Mickiewicz, op. cit.
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the party to a large extent depends, in the minds of 
both party and non-party members. It entails various 
little rituals to set the party member aside from the 
rest of the population, sacrifices of his time to party 
work, and the maintenance of strict rules of personal 
conduct.
Concern for care of party cards could be described
as a ritual. Party cards are invested with something
approaching a sacred nature and the member's responsibility
for care of his card is a heavy one. A school teacher
lost his party card on a Young Pioneers' outing. Since he
had no previous party reprimands, the PPO decided to be
lenient and not expel him from the party. Instead they
gave him a strong reprimand to be recorded on his party
card (the highest penalty short of expulsion).1 In 1969 a
party meeting in the Administration of Internal Affairs of
the Astrakhan oblispolkom agreed that it had been an
accident when a party member's wife had washed his party
card and therefore that it should be replaced without
penalty. However when the raikom buro learnt of the
decision it gave him a reprimand for carelessness. The
party organisation secretary complained to Partiinaia zhizn'
2but the journal supported the raikom.
1
2
Korn. Sov. Latvii, 11/69, p. 49. 
P.zh. , 14/69 , p. 75.
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A great deal of a party member's spare time is
taken up by various party duties. These include attending
party meetings and various indoctrination courses. But
this method of emphasising the responsibilities of being a
party member is best illustrated by the party tasks that all
party members should accept. Most of these entail conducting
propaganda and agitation work with the non-party masses.'*'
This type of work has the advantage of bringing the
responsibilities of party membership to the attention of
non-party members. It is considered important that all
party members have party tasks, PPO's being regularly
criticised for giving too many tasks to some communists,
2while others have none. Leading institutional officials 
are expected to have party tasks as well as rank-and-file 
communists.^
The correct standards of personal behaviour in 
the party member's social and working life are maintained 
through party discipline. In 1965 the PPO of the Central 
Planning Bureau Teplopvibov in Kazan decided to expel a 
candidate member from the party for immoral behaviour, 
although in this case the raikom reduced the penalty to a
1 Korn., 5/60, p. 80; P.zh., 13/73, p. 53; 
19/73, p. 40.
2 P.zh., 4/63, p. 80.
3 Kom. , 18/68, p. 43; P.zh., 13/73, p. 53; 
19/73, p. 40.
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strong reprimand to be recorded on his party card.
In 1974 the Committee for Party Control directed the party 
committee of the Ministry of Forestry and Woodworking 
Industry to examine the case of some ministerial officials 
who were getting drunk while they were away on business 
trips.1 2 3
PPO's are expected to be particularly vigilant
against examples of communist leading workers using their
official positions to gain special privileges. For
example, the PPO of the Institute of State and Law of the
All-Union Academy of Sciences took action over senior
researchers who insisted on being cited as co-authors of
articles and monographs towards which they had done no 
3work. When it was discovered that the head of a raiispolkom 
Department of Public Catering had used his official position 
to get himself illegally into the second category of war 
pension, there was an argument within the party organisation 
over the action to be taken. In this case a firm party 
reaction triumphed and it was decided to give him a strong
4party reprimand and to recommend his removal from his post.
1 P.zh., 18/65, p. 71.
2 P.zh., 2/74, p. 51.
3 P.zh., 16/63, p. 37; Gvishiani, op. cit., 
p. 213.
4 P.zh., 1/67, p. 36.
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Often party discipline is used in cases concerning 
production performance. Party "mystique” appears to be a 
minor consideration in these cases, although usually 
actual disciplinary action is only taken after the 
communist involved has failed to respond to an earlier 
party demand for action, at which stage it becomes a 
matter of a challenge to party authority. Thus in 1973 
Pavtiinaia zhizn ' reported that the party committee of the 
RSFSR Ministry of Rural Construction had received a letter 
from a construction trust complaining that glavk workers 
were not fulfilling ministerial instructions. The head of 
the glavk was directed (porucheno) to examine the matter and 
do something about it. However he did not even answer the 
letter. The party committee could only take this as a 
direct challenge to its authority and responded by giving 
the glavk head a party reprimand. Matters then allegedly 
improved greatly.^-
Finally in this section some mention should be 
made of "renewals of party cards". The most recent such 
renewal occurred in 1973-74. Although this renewal, the 
first since 1954, did not hold the terrors associated with 
those that accompanied the purges of the 1920's and 1930's, 
it was still the occasion for a campaign for the 
intensification of discipline within party organisations.
1 P. zh. , 8/64, p. 36.
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"To this end a whole series of preparatory measures
was conducted over a period of many months: special
seminars and information meetings, meetings of the primary
party organization at which each party member was obliged
to give account of himself, and - the culminating phase -
personal interviews of each member by a secretary or other
senior official of the city or district party committee."^
At the 25th Party Congress Brezhnev stated that 347,000
members and candidates, or 2.4% of the 1972 party membership,
"who had committed breaches of the norms of party life,
violated discipline or lost contact with their party
2organizations", had not received new party cards. Thus 
the process of the exchange and the possible result for 
individual party members were of considerable significance
3for the maintenance of party discipline.
1 Rigby, T.H: "Soviet Communist Party membership
under Brezhnev", Soviet Studies, vol. 28, no. 3, 
July, 1976, p. 321.
2 Quoted in ibid.
3 Another interesting feature of the exchange was
the opportunity it gave for further ritualisation 
of party cards. The exchange was the occasion 
for extravagant paeans of praise of party member­
ship and the importance of party cards, the well- 
publicised granting of the party card bearing
No. 00000001 to V .I. Lenin and No. 00000002 to 
Brezhnev, and reminders of the significance of 
displays in museums of the party cards of Soviet 
heroes. Zaria Vostoka, 2/3/73, p. 1. Baruch 
Hazan speaks of the ceremonial accompanying some 
presentations of new cards. Following the solemn 
presentation of new cards in the raikom or gorkom 
buildings to a group of communists, usually 
including some Old Bolsheviks and leading production 
workers, the recipients marched in procession to 
the central town square where they laid flowers at 
Lenin's memorial. Hazan, B: "Die sanfte Säuberung
der KPdSU. Mobilisierung durch Umtausch der 
Parteidokumente", Osteuropa, vol. 24, nos. 11-12, 
1974, pp. 797-800.
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One can only expect to find impressionistic 
data on the effectiveness of party indoctrination. A 
reasonable hypothesis would be that party membership is 
seen by many communists in a careerist light. Membership 
is a career necessity - its advantages should be accepted, 
but the responsibilities avoided if possible. The 
apparently widespread avoidance of party tasks gives 
support to the hypothesis. The degree of illegal and 
semi-legal behaviour of party members occupying leading 
official positions can be taken as further evidence of 
the failure of indoctrination in the values of party 
membership. There is also evidence that it has not worked 
even among party workers. This is more serious as far as 
we are concerned since it affects the performance of PPO's. 
Examples will be seen later in consideration of administration- 
PPO collusion.
7. Conclusion
The bulk of this chapter has been concerned with 
the role of PPO's in the two types of indoctrination. We 
have seen that they have little positive role in value 
indoctrination. The basic establishment of the legitimacy 
of the Soviet ideology in the minds of the Soviet population 
is achieved through socialisation processes and the 
provision of material benefits that are far beyond the 
capacity of the PPO's. However special mention has been
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made of the role of educational PPO's, which participate 
to some extent in the organisation, implementation and 
supervision of socialisation.
The role of PPO's in value indoctrination is 
primarily a maintenance one. They publicise the achieve­
ments of Soviet society and relate these to the ideology; 
but more importantly they work to prevent the appearance 
of any intellectual or practical opposition to the 
ideology through ideological control. If such opposition 
were allowed to go unchallenged it would destroy the 
carefully built-up sense of party infallibility and 
omnipotence, something that would strike at the very 
foundations of its legitimacy. Ideological control is 
probably the most important of all PPO ideological 
activities. It is the one which is of greatest importance 
for the continued existence of the Soviet system in its 
present form and the one which has the greatest effect on 
Soviet citizens.
Operational indoctrination is also very important. 
Working primarily through party meetings and indoctrination 
seminars PPO's are an indispensable part of the communication 
process which transmits to the leading and rank-and-file 
members of working collectives the current policies and 
procedures favoured by the leadership. The process includes 
relatively specific tasks to be fulfilled by single
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collectives and individuals, but also more general matters.
It is among these more general matters that we 
find one which introduces a completely new element to this 
chapter. Not only are PPO's important for indoctrination; 
indoctrination is also important for PPO's. The effective 
operations of PPO's depends on the members of "host" 
organisations, particularly the leading officials, under­
standing the role PPO's are to play in their organisations. 
Therefore a most important element of operational 
indoctrination is a concern for the staff generalist role 
of PPO's. In this chapter I have not examined in detail 
the sort of information which is given on the staff 
generalist role of PPO's. A detailed examination will 
appear in the next chapter. Here I have simply indicated 
the various means available for the communication of such 
information.
There are two ways of looking at the effectiveness 
of both value and operational indoctrination. Value 
indoctrination could be said to be effective to the extent 
that the majority of the population accept the Soviet 
ideology and its practical implementation as legitimate; 
however it is ineffective in that it has not produced 
positive mobilisation of the population. Similarly 
operational indoctrination, in the area of the staff 
generalist role of PPO's, could be said to be effective
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in that institutional leaders understand that role; but 
some doubt is justified about its effectiveness in 
producing a willingness among institutional leaders to act 
according to that understanding. However that is a question 
which will receive more attention in later chapters.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE MEANING OF CONTROL
Although a staff generalist element was evident 
in some aspects of PPO ideological activities, the staff 
generalist approach is most useful in a consideration of 
PPO "production" activities.'*' Since the approach is 
derived from line-staff relations in Western corporations 
it is most widely applicable in an examination of Soviet PPO 
administration relations. These tend to be concentrated in 
the "production" areas.
I have already described in the Introduction how 
the PPO can be seen as a closely integrated staff generalist 
element within the line hierarchy. The question then 
becomes what is the function of this staff generalist 
element. Sampson and Golembiewski, dealing with 
essentially theoretical models, do not go into specific 
detail on how their staff agencies would operate in practice 
However their general intentions are clear.
1 The word "production" is used somewhat
reluctantly to denote the "output" or 
"outcome" of the operational activities of 
an organisation. In non-production, partic­
ularly educational and administrative, 
organisations "production" can be of quite an 
abstract nature. However no one word entirely 
satisfactorily describes the enormous range of 
activities with which Soviet non-production 
institutions are concerned.
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Sampson lays his main stress on the general 
concern of his "staff representative" for improving the 
methods of work in the line organisation, "for developing 
an atmosphere in which executives will be stimulated, not 
forced, to change".^ The representative, with a general 
understanding of the operations of the organisation as a 
whole, goes from department to department examining 
structural organisation and procedures. If he finds 
particular problems he gives assistance in solving them.
But with his awareness of the wider implications of such 
problems he is in a position to work out and ensure that 
top executives become aware of and therefore implement 
broader measures to prevent their recurrence. Of course, 
he does not need to find a problem before taking action - 
he should be able to suggest measures that will prevent 
problems even occurring.
I have already described Sampson's concern to
keep the staff element out of the operational implementation
of the measures decided on. He says that the staff
generalist can participate in working out particular
decisions if necessary, but that he should not be responsible
for the final adoption of the decisions as organisational
2policy, nor be responsible for their implementation. I have
1 Sampson, op. cit., p. 98.
2 ibid, p. 148.
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already expressed doubt about the extent to which, despite 
the formal situation, the staff generalist would leave 
himself out of such operational concerns. The whole 
direction of Sampson's model suggests the impossibility of 
maintaining the "correct" distance of staff elements from 
line operations.
While in general terms Sampson sees it as undesir­
able that staff be involved in "control" and evaluation, 
he qualifies this by saying that it is inevitable that it 
involve itself in checking and inspecting procedures. He 
concludes rather weakly that the staff agency should not be 
involved in the evaluation of the information it gains, but 
that it should pass it on to the responsible line executives. 
This seems to make rather a nonsense of the whole role he 
has already given staff generalists.
Golembiewski recognises the impossibility of 
maintaining any "correct" division of line and staff 
responsibilities, particularly one based on denying staff 
operational power, and in reaction has developed a closely 
integrated line-staff unit with an apparently variable 
share in operational responsibility given to the staff 
element. His model is based on what he describes as the 
Colleague model, developed in the German Army, where direct 
representatives of headquarters were sent into critical
1 ibid, p. 200.
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battle areas, not as line commanders, but as chiefs of 
staff. These chiefs of staff participated in, and some­
times assumed command. Golembiewski claims that the 
exact nature and degree of staff power was indeterminate, 
depending on the situation and relations between the staff 
man and the field commander. He speaks also of the 
tendency of the staff man to have an overall view of 
policy and strategy, as against the narrower view of the 
field commander.^
In time the power of the German General Staff
and its officers became even more extensive and formalised.
The functions of planning, organisation and control became
the formal prerogatives of the policy-making staff group,
while the Chief of Staff was given the power to issue
2operational orders to carry out war plans.
Golembiewski, while maintaining a general 
distinction between line and staff functions (program and 
sustaining, in his terms), tries to avoid the formal 
definition of roles such as eventuated in the German Army. 
The sustaining officials are essentially responsible for 
such functions as control, inspection, development of work 
standards, maintenance and accounting, but whether a 
particular matter comes under these categories is decided
1 Golembiewski, op. cit., pp. 8-10.
2 ibid, p. 18.
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together by the program and sustaining officials, closely 
integrated in, and jointly responsible for the success of, 
their Colleague units.
The other aspect of his model is its decentralis­
ation. It is evident in the deliberate lack of definition 
of roles and relations. It is also evident in the proposed 
unwillingness of superior units to interfere in the 
operations of lower-level units, except when the members 
of a lower unit are unable to agree on the nature of a 
particular task and who should play what role in it. The 
functions of the higher levels are otherwise limited to 
policy determination and the establishment and monitoring 
of measures of performance.^
Sampson's model is the most useful for us in 
indicating the formal role of PPO's, while Golembiewski's 
is useful in drawing attention to those informal and 
decentralised elements of the Soviet system, of which, 
although not openly acknowledged, one suspects the auth­
orities are well aware and over which they exercise 
considerable control.
Although Sampson tries to say that staff general­
ists should not have a "controlling" role, much of what he 
says about their role bears a close resemblance to the 
control role of PPO's. The essential features of this role
1 ibid, p. 119.
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are threefold. Firstly, there are the limitations on 
the operational powers of PPO's - they are not empowered 
to issue operational orders, but must operate through 
"persuasion".^ Secondly, within this limitation, the 
range of their legitimate concerns is limitless. Finally, 
they are expected to be involved in specific problems, 
but with an overall approach hopefully leading to the 
removal of the basic cause of the problems, and if possible 
to prevent such problems even occurring.
A Soviet political dictionary has defined control
as "the verification of the fulfilment of decisions or
tasks which have been entrusted to a particular organisation,
2institution or individual". This definition is in 
essential agreement with D.J.R. Scott's description when 
he says that the word "has the sense of its French rather 
than its English near-homonym ... Kontrolj is particularly 
associated with the checking on the fulfilment of 
instructions by individuals or collective organs in the
1 I will use the Russian word podmena to 
describe occasions when PPO's encroach on the 
authority of "host" organisations. The word 
is used in two senses. Firstly, it describes 
occasions when a PPO issues operational orders 
directly to line workers. This is a rare 
occurrence. Secondly, it refers to PPO's 
concentrating attention on "production" 
affairs to the detriment of their ideological 
concerns. This is a common occurrence against 
which extensive campaigns are periodically 
directed.
2 Aleksandrov, G., V. Galianov and N. Rubinshtein: 
Politioheskii slovar', Politizdat, Moscow, 1940, 
p. 277.
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state machine, and synonymous with 'verification of 
fulfilment' (proverka ispolnenija) - another term in 
frequent use".^
In itself this is an extremely limited concept.
It appears to say that the PPO, in exercising control, will 
only check on the completion of a task, presumably at the 
end of the period that has been set aside for it. It also 
makes no mention of the measures to be taken by the PPO if 
the task is not completed.
Control, if it is to have any significance as an 
administrative concept, must go further than this. In those 
Western corporations that have control agencies the term 
means more than simple "verification of fulfilment". The 
control duties of the Control Section of the Koppers 
Company, reported by R.C. Davis, include:
(a) to review objectives, programmes and progress
1 Scott, D.J.R: Russian Political Institutions,
George Allen and Unwin, London, 1961, 2nd 
edition, p. 150. Such control is not unknown 
in the Western context. K. Davis lists four 
types of staff control: functional control, the
right to issue orders regarding some highly 
specialised part of someone else's job and to 
take appropriate action if he does not comply; 
agency control, the issuing of orders in the 
name of a line superior, even if that superior 
might never see the order; policy control, the 
verification of the implementation of a policy; 
and procedural control, the verification of the 
use of the correct procedures. Davis, K: Human
Relations at Work, McGraw-Hill, N.Y., 1962, 
pp. 212-214. The last two appear to be close to 
what Scott was describing.
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as execution proceeds, making the appropriate 
reports to top management;
(b) to provide the chief executive with analytical 
as well as statistical reports of results;
(c) to collect opinions and facts concerning the 
value of current programmes and to report 
the findings to the chief executive.'*"
The two further elements introduced into this concept of 
control are that the control agency concerns itself with 
the progress of fulfilment, not just the final result, and 
that it is entitled to report shortcomings in the progress 
of fulfilment to higher authorities. These are fundamental 
aspects of the duties of PPO's. Much of their control 
activity consists of examining the progress of the fulfilment 
of tasks, while reporting shortcomings to higher authorities 
is one of their most important weapons.
However Golembiewski has made the point that 
staff agencies will inevitably go further than this.
Certainly Soviet experience bears this out. Golembiewski 
considers that if staff agencies are to feel any responsib­
ility for the areas with which they are concerned, and that 
if top management is to be spared from continually acting on 
reports sent to it by staff agencies, then these agencies 
must be given some powers of their own to influence the 
activities of the line.
1 Davis, R.C., op. cit., p. 417.
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The Soviet concept of control has developed in
accordance with the situation foreseen by Golembiewski.
Firstly, it includes the prevention of the appearance of
shortcomings, not just the recording of their existence.
A Soviet textbook declares:
The task of control is not so much to
uncover breakdowns and lags as to prevent
and exclude the possibility of their 
1appearance.
If this is combined with the fact that the PPO's are given 
powers for the task, best summarised in terms of the formal 
right of control, which they can exercise on their own 
initiative, it can then be seen that they play a basic and 
continuing role in the organisation of the conduct of 
affairs in "host" organisations.
The basic principle underlying this continuing 
role is the "leading" position of the party in Soviet 
society. It is the task of the PPO to represent, protect 
and further the social interest against the narrow group 
interests of the "host" organisation. In practice this 
means ensuring that party policy is implemented. The 
degree of importance of PPO control for the system varies 
according to three possible situations derived from how 
well party policy is understood and accepted by line
1 Partiinoe stroitel 'stvo3 uchebnoe posobie ,
Politizdat, Moscow, 1972, p. 382.
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authorities. If party policy is well understood and 
accepted PPO control will be a routine "verification of 
fulfilment". If party policy is not well understood the 
policy-making significance of PPO' s becomes evident. The 
task of the PPO becomes most difficult and important when 
party policy is not accepted by line leadership.
The first situation should not be considered 
insignificant. It still means that the PPO should be 
involved in remedying shortcomings and preventing their 
occurrence, while always using an overall staff generalist 
approach. But the general agreement on "production" 
objectives and procedures means that the degree of 
decentralisation, and therefore possibility for PPO 
decision-making, is limited.
Decentralisation becomes most important in the 
second situation, where there is uncertainty about party 
policy. Generally such a situation arises when the party 
leadership deliberately encourages decentralisation by 
leaving the objectives and procedures to be pursued by line 
organisations undefined and ambiguous.^  Andrd Gunder 
Frank describes the decentralising effect of such lack of
1 The control by higher and middle level party
organs is probably sufficiently strong that 
uncertainty is unlikely to occur, or to last 
for long, simply as a result of communications 
problems. That is, PPO's only act in a 
decentralised way when they are allowed to by 
higher party authorities.
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definition in his theoretical study of goal ambiguity in
organisations.^ Ambiguity in the goals of the organisation
and conflict in the standards to be observed by the
organisation's members can be deliberately fostered by
organisational leaders. This contributes to decentralisation
and therefore organisational flexibility in three ways.
Firstly, organisational leaders can transmit changes in
objectives and, more importantly for PPO's, procedures
2without disrupting the system. The procedures that interest 
us the most are those that determine PPO-administration 
relations. The fact that I will describe these, for the 
sake of simplicity, primarily in terms of the formal right 
of control will not disguise the great amount of informal 
manipulation of these procedures. The degree and style of 
PPO involvement in "production" concerns can be changed 
quite quickly and dramatically without changing the formal 
status of the PPO and therefore without requiring any 
reconsideration of the essential place of the PPO or the 
party in the system.
The second contribution to organisational 
flexibility comes about because uncertainty about objectives
1 Frank, op. cit.
2 The degree of definition of the objectives 
of Soviet policy in terms of Marxist- 
Leninist ideology and the degree to which
they can be changed by subtle reinterpretations 
of the ideology is a very interesting matter 
that is completely beyond the scope of this 
thesis.
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and procedures forces subordinates themselves to take and 
adapt decisions to the specific conditions of their local 
circumstances. Frank writes:
The existence of conflict among standards 
prevents subordinates from following rules 
alone, forces them to handle and decide each 
issue individually, and thus turns all members 
of the system, subordinates as well as 
superiors, into policy-makers.^
The party authorities recognise that in some circumstances 
the people working on the spot are in a better position 
to make decisions than they are. In the Soviet case 
overall objectives are rarely left undefined. However 
ambiguity is left in the specific tasks and procedures 
needed to achieve the objectives. As long as the PPO's at 
all times work towards the objectives they are allowed to 
take advantage of the ambiguity over specific tasks and 
procedures to choose those that best suit local conditions. 
Jerry Hough describes this phenomenon in the Soviet context. 
He is primarily concerned with production enterprises and 
speaks of the broad definition of responsibilities of an 
enterprise director and the impossibility of all these 
responsibilities being met. Hough writes:
Because the manager has no precise set of 
rules and regulations to follow, he has much
1 Frank, op. cit., p. 11.
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more room for maneuver than might be 
expected for an official low in a very 
centralized hierarchy ... The nature of 
the Soviet planning system has not only 
left the manager with freedom of action 
vis-a-vis his superiors, it has also had a 
major impact on the nature of the kontrol 
exercised by the primary party organization. 
Because there is no precise plan or set of 
regulations, the kontrol cannot be a routine 
'verification of performance' in the usual 
sense of that phrase. If, as one Party 
secretary expressed it, regulations are broken 
continuously 'for the sake of production', the 
Party secretary cannot be an official who 
merely checks off regulations that have been 
violated. To be sure, he and his organization 
must be interested in machinations and law 
violations of a gross character, but their 
basic role must be much broader. In checking 
the overall performance of the enterprise, the 
organization inevitably becomes involved in 
policy-making, if for no other reason than that 
the mere choice of the indicator or regulation to 
emphasise constitutes a decision of significance.
1 Hough, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
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Although the significance of movements towards decentralis­
ation of Soviet economic administration since 1965, and 
indeed since the death of Stalin, should not be over­
emphasised, it is nevertheless the case that lower-level 
line organisations now have important formal powers, not 
to speak of informal powers, to determine the specific 
tasks they will undertake and the procedures they will 
follow. This gives their PPO's the opportunity to assume a 
considerable decision-making role in ensuring that the line 
organisations' choices are not outside the parameters of 
party objectives.
The third contribution conflicting standards and 
goal ambiguity make to organisational flexibility is in the 
greater initiative and willingness to criticise, innovate 
and improve that they allow subordinates. It is essential 
to the staff generalist role that PPO's take advantage of 
their decision-making powers to improve the performance of 
"host" organisations. Of course such criticisms and 
improvements can only be within the limits set by party 
policies.
It is evident that the second situation in which 
PPO's are likely to have to exercise their control functions, 
when line organisations' tasks are undefined or ambiguous, 
gives the PPO's the opportunity to be involved in considerable 
decision-making.
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The third situation which PPO's are likely to 
confront occurs when "host" organisations understand but 
are unwilling to accept party policies. Usually this 
situation involves specific cases of PPO-administration 
conflict over particular decisions or tasks. The PPO has 
specific powers it can use in such cases, the ultimate 
being an appeal to higher party authorities. However the 
situation is particularly interesting when it involves more 
fundamental line opposition to basic party policies. The 
importance of PPO's will be greatly enhanced if it can be 
shown that they are involved in the implementation of basic 
party policies against line opposition. I will attempt to 
show this in one particular case - the case of the post- 
Khrushchev administrative and economic reforms. Chapter 
Four will be devoted to an examination of the role of 
ministerial PPO's in implementing those reforms against the 
opposition of the state apparatus.
But before becoming involved in a detailed 
discussion of such matters it is necessary to look at the 
powers PPO's have available for the exercise of their 
control function, remembering that direct intervention in 
decision-making and the giving of orders to administrators 
is forbidden.
The most important weapon at the disposal of the 
PPO is the right of control, as described in Paragraph 60
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of the Party Rules.'*' Although the right of control is not 
essential to the PPO's exercise of control, it is most 
easily understood in terms of the right, the right giving 
formal expression to powers that are already available.
PPO's were certainly expected to exercise control
before the formal right was introduced at the Eighteenth
2Party Congress in 1939. Although the introduction and 
extension of the right of control undoubtedly widened the 
powers exercised by many of the affected PPO's, this was 
more because once they had gained the formal right of 
control those powers which had already existed could no 
longer be misunderstood or ignored by PPO officials or 
institutional leaders. An article in Bol'shevik in 1939 
claimed that the right of control in effect already existed 
before the Eighteenth Party Congress:
In the Rules it is necessary to have clearly 
set out what party administrators are 
already using: control of the administration
of enterprises and collective and state farms.
1 Ustav KPSS, 1971, op. cit., pp. 53-55.
2 Pravda, 4/4/39, p. 2. The same applies 
to non-production PPO's before they 
were given the right in 1971. The 
situation with regard to the 1971 changes 
will be examined in more detail later in 
this chapter, pp. 203-209.
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The right in fact already exists.'*'
Remembering then that the right of control is 
the formal expression of the powers involved in party 
control we will now look at what is entailed. The two 
basic elements involved are the right to receive and 
examine information on the state of affairs in the 
institution and then the right to take certain action once 
an understanding of the situation has been gained. A 
Partiinaia zhizn' article of 1973 summarises the powers 
entailed in the right of control as follows:
(1) to hear reports (otchety) from leaders 
when necessary;
(2) to establish permanent and temporary 
commissions;
(3) to study affairs on the spot and acquaint 
oneself with relevant information;
(4) to express suggestions and recommendations
in accordance with party decisions and Soviet
2laws and strive for their implementation.
1 Bol*shevik, 4/39, pp. 46-47 . An article in
Pavtiinoe stvottel 'stvo in the same year said 
that it was necessary to make clear through the 
right of control that PPO's now must concern 
themselves with economic matters. Partiinoe 
stroitel 'stvo, 4/39, p. 26. Cheplakov, a party 
official from Azerbaidzhan, said at the Eighteenth 
Party Congress that the right of control was a 
necessary weapon to be used against administrators 
who previously claimed that PPO's had no control 
over them because the Party Rules said nothing 
about it. Pravda, 21/3/39, p. 6.
2 P.zh., 7/73, p. 5.
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Points (1), (2) and (3) are concerned with obtaining
information, while point (4) outlines the powers of action 
available to the PPO. I will now look at each of these 
points in some detail. Although authoritative statements 
are in substantial agreement with this list, in interpret­
ation and practice considerable differences appear.
A consideration of point (1) brings these
differences out well. There appears to be a difference
between categories of PPO regarding the hearing of reports
from the heads of "host" organisations. Authoritative
statements stress that any leading official is obliged to
give reports before the PPO.'*' It appears that the directors
of schools and the rectors of tertiary educational
2institutions do so regularly. However lists of leading 
officials in administrative and research institutions that 
do so always exclude the head of the institution. For 
example, Pravda reported in 1971 that the party committee 
of the Ministry of Chemical and Oil Machine Construction 
heard reports (otchety and doklady) from communists working 
in the ministerial apparatus right up to the deputy
3ministers. Research institute party committees hear 
reports (otch'dty) from deputy directors, laboratory heads
1 P.zh., 14/65, p. 24; 10/68, pp. 41-42.
2 P.zh., 23/66, p. 61; 24/71, pp. 37-38;
Turkmenskaia iskra, 12/9/72, p. 2; 
Kazakhs tanskaia pravda, 4/8/72, pp. 2-3.
3 Pravda, 29/11/71, p. 2.
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and department heads.
The other feature of the coverage given to the 
hearing of reports in the Soviet press is that it usually 
refers to the hearing of reports from "communist leaders". 
Most leaders of Soviet institutions are party members and 
are therefore bound by party discipline to account for 
their behaviour before their PPO's. Presumably this is an 
indication of some controversy over the hearing of reports. 
Party officials prefer to avoid any possible difficulties 
by reference to the requirements of party discipline.
Another important matter to be noted is a diff­
erence in language that disappears in translation. There 
are three Russian words all translated into English as 
"report". Soobshchenie and doklad tend to have the sense
1 Kom. Estonii, 8/13, p. 2. At times the
uncertainty has been in the opposite 
direction. Thus in 1939, at the time of the 
public discussion of the coming introduction of 
the right of control, Pravda was asked whether 
the right involved hearing reports (otoh'dty) 
from directors only or from shop heads as well. 
Pravda, 19/2/39, p. 4. In 1972 the secretary 
of the party buro of the Ukrainian Institute 
of Mechanics reported that with the granting 
of the right of control the party buro hears 
reports {otoh'dty) from aspirant (post-graduate 
student) supervisors, not just from the communist 
deputy director as before. Pravda Ukrainy, 
26/1/72, p. 2. What is interesting about these 
two cases is that the PPO's were interested in 
gaining access to lower-level workers.
Presumably it is these lower-level leaders who 
are directly involved in whatever it is the 
PPO's wish to examine.
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of reports primarily for information purposes. The speaker 
simply reports on the state of affairs in his section of 
the institution or even on some very general matter. These 
words do not imply accountability. However the word otch'dt 
has the sense of accounting for one's behaviour. It would 
appear that an otchet is a more serious matter. A case 
could be made that administrators that are not party members, 
or who are not appearing as party members, are more likely 
to give doklady. That is, administrators try to avoid 
giving otchety unless party discipline forces it on them.
For example, in 1971 the secretary of the party committee 
of the State Committee for Science and Technology wrote 
that meetings of the party organisations, party buros and 
party committee of the State Committee, in order to influence 
the work of all its sub-divisions, hear doklady from sub­
division leaders and otchety from communists.^
However this linguistic difference does not fully
explain the confusion in Soviet commentaries and practice.
The list of powers entailed in the right of control given
above uses the word otchet and makes no mention of communist
leaders. Also we can see that many of the examples I have
given refer to hearing otchety without any mention that the
2person giving the report is a party member.
1 Mosk. pravda, 17/9/71, p. 2.
2 I have found three examples of reports being 
heard from individuals specifically recognised 
as not being party members. One refers to
soohshcheniia, one to doklady and soobshcheniia , 
and one to an otchet. P.zh., .4/65, p. 24;
20/67, pp. 56-57; Kom. Estonii, 11/71, p. 34.
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Although the right of control strictly speaking 
refers to hearing reports from institutional leaders, 
particularly in recent years there has been considerable 
emphasis on the desirability of PPO's hearing reports from 
rank-and-file workers on their fulfilment of their official 
tasks. Usually the people giving such reports are party 
members subject to party discipline.
It appears that formally speaking all PPO's have 
always had the right to hear reports of all kinds from 
anyone. In practice, reports, particularly those implying 
accountability, are usually limited to those leaders below 
the top level of the institution and spoken of in terms of 
a report from a party member as much as an organisational 
leader. The extent to which reports are heard and the degree 
of their significance depends primarily on the general policy 
on such practices established by the top authorities at the 
time.
The second element of the right of control listed 
is the right to establish permanent and temporary 
commissions. The most formally defined of these are the 
permanent commissions for the exercise of the right of 
control, established by a Central Committee decree of June, 
1959.^ The decree declared that there was a need for
Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Sovetskogo Souiuza v 
rezoliutsiiakh i vesheniiakh s ,rezdov3 konfeventsii 
i plenumov TsK, Politizdat, Moscow, 7th edition, 
vo1. 4, 1953-60, pp. 525-530.
1
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systematic control of the prompt completion by enterprises 
of their tasks. The commissions were specifically designed 
to provide an institutional means of control, to end the 
practice of party control being limited to hearing reports 
from institutional leaders on figures of plan fulfilment.
It was stressed that the commissions were not to work 
parallel to the PPO's, but were to work within them and 
under the control of the party buro or committee and its 
secretary. Throughout the period of their existence it 
has been stressed that the commissions are not to be used 
for general control of all the activities of "host" 
organisations, but are to be used for examining particular 
important areas? The areas covered by typical party control 
commissions can be seen in the three commissions operated 
by the PPO of the Tashkent Institute of Rail Transport 
Engineers. One controls scientific work, one the organis­
ation of the academic and indoctrination process, and one
2the managerial and financial activity of the institute.
Commission members are elected by open vote at
general party meetings, although changes can be made by the
party buro or committee. Commissions do not make decisions
themselves, but send their recommendations to the party
3committee or sometimes direct to a party meeting. The
1 P . zh. , 24/65, p. 30
2 Pravda Vostoka, 1/4/72,
3 ibid.
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chairman of a commission is usually a deputy secretary
of the PPO.^  The opinion is usually expressed that there
is no need for permanent commissions in small PPO's, since
in them all necessary control can be exercised by the party
2organisation as a whole. Control commissions have the 
power to investigate anything within their area of concern. 
Detailed accounts of their operations can be seen in later 
chapters.
Some doubts are expressed by PPO members as to
the value of permanent control commissions, primarily
because in competing with other information-gathering
organisations, they have been left with the consideration
3of long-term, perspektivnye matters. Given that control of 
perspektivnye matters is a rather nebulous concept, 
particularly when it has to be distinguished from control 
of specific, day-to-day situations, it is not surprising 
that preference is shown for other bodies.
Among these other bodies are temporary and special- 
purpose party commissions. It appears that the main function 
of these commissions is obtaining on-the-spot information. 
Apparently PPO's find ad hoc groups to be most useful for 
this. They are also used for "verifying the fulfilment" of
1 Kom., 13/64, p. 124.
2 Kom. Ukrainy, 2/72, p. 67; P.zh., 17/71, p. 18.
P.zh., 6/64, pp. 40-41; 15/70, p. 24; 24/71,
p. 39.
3
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measures decided on by the PPO as a result of their 
investigations. The style and importance of their 
operations will become evident in later chapters.
The third element of the right of control, the 
right "to study affairs on the spot and acquaint oneself 
with relevant information", is a summary of the whole 
information element of the right of control, of which 
points (1) and (2) are the institutional expression.
However its inclusion as a separate point indicates that 
the formal hearing of reports and establishment of 
commissions are not the only ways of obtaining information.
Although I do not have any specific statements
to the effect that administration leaders are obliged to
furnish PPO's with all draft decisions on a routine basis,
there are sufficient reports of this occurring in practice
to suggest that it is at least an informal rule. It
appears to apply particularly in personnel and planning
matters.'*" However statements to the effect that "nothing is
done in the collective without the approval of the PPO"
2suggest that it applies to all areas.
Another important source of information is 
informal contacts between party officials, particularly
1 See pp. 236, 269-274.
2 Kom. Sov. Latvii, 7.70, p. 79.
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the party secretary, and institutional leaders. The 
Soviet press often mentions the need for party business to 
be conducted whenever suitable outside constraining and 
time-consuming meetings. An obkom instructor wrote in 
1972 that the right of control raises the role of the PPO 
secretary in that people will more often come to him so 
that he, together with the director and other responsible 
people, might decide production, cultural and welfare 
(bytovye) matters in the course of work (v rabochem poriadke), 
without scheduling a meeting of the PPO or its committee or 
buro. He declares that "this personal contact, this exchange 
of opinions, undoubtedly is a form of control and has its 
uses".^  However it is unlikely that any institutional 
leader is under a formal obligation to engage in such 
conversations.
Finally we should not forget that rank-and-file 
party members are expected to closely observe the everyday 
work of the "host" organisation and report any possible 
shortcomings to the PPO.
Point (4), allowing the PPO to make suggestions 
and recommendations, introduces a fundamentally different 
element into the right of control. Points (1), (2), and
(3) gave the PPO unlimited access to information. The only
1 Turkmenskaia iskra, 12/9/72, p. 2.
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matter over which it was suggested in Soviet sources there 
were significant differences of opinion or practice was 
reports by organisational leaders to party organs and 
organisations. However these differences occur as a result 
of the unwillingness of organisational leaders to be put 
in a position where they are forced to account for their 
behaviour before the PPO. To this extent the disagreement 
is more closely connected with the essence of point (4), 
that is, what powers does the PPO have to act on the 
information it receives and analyses. This is an exceedingly 
complex and obviously sensitive question. It is a question 
the answers to which are often contradictory both in theory 
and practice, and one on which authoritative commentators 
are often loath to commit themselves. I will try to set 
out the different opinions I have come across, try to 
explain some of these differences, and then give a brief 
summary of what happens in practice.
Any list of the powers contained in the right of 
control, such as the one I have given above, goes no 
further than to say that the PPO has the right to give 
recommendations, although most add that the organisational 
leader must consider these recommendations (the usual phrase 
is ne mozhet ne s chi, tat ' sia) . ^ But to simply consider a 
recommendation is not to do very much - the important thing
1 P.zh., 19/66, p. 21; Kom., 11/72, p. 57.
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is whether the organisational leader is under any oblig­
ation, in theory or practice, to act on the recommendation.
The great majority of the cases appearing in the 
Soviet press assert that recommendations have in fact been 
accepted and acted upon, and many give the impression that 
the organisational leader had little choice in the matter. 
However these reports are concerned with cases where the PPO 
has successfully dealt with the situation and where, as far 
as we can tell, the leadership has simply accepted its 
recommendations. There could be many reasons for such 
acceptance, none of them necessarily implying any obligation 
on the part of the leadership.
There is no formal obligation on leadership to 
accept recommendations, since that would constitute podmena. 
Thus Fartiinaia zhizn' wrote in 1955:
The primary party organisation does not have 
the right to change the orders of the 
administration or to give any type of orders 
concerning production work, to demand (trebovat') 
that the director, the fully-empowered master 
(khoziain) of the enterprise, submit his orders 
for the party organisation's approval; nor 
may it remove, appoint or recommend workers in 
production. These are the functions of the 
administration,^
1 P.zh., 1/55, pp. 67-70.
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and in 1971:
May a primary party organisation, having 
the right of control, bring to account the 
leader of an institution? May it oblige 
him to do this or that? Is that what 
control means? Of course not.^
However Soviet reports do refer to the right of
PPO's to give obligatory orders in exceptional circumstances.
In 1972 the party committee of a hospital was reported to
have obliged the office head and the deputy chief doctor
for medical services to improve the organisational-
methodological and medical-consultative assistance to
hospitals, ambulance stations and medical assistance points
2in the countryside. In 1972 the secretary of the party 
committee of the Omsk Institute of Rail Transport Engineers 
claimed that since gaining the right of control the party 
committee's decisions have obliged the rectorate and the 
deans' offices to remove shortcomings, rather than simply
3informing them of their existence as before. Hough reports 
the case of the party committee of the Elektrosila plant 
which in 1952 obliged the plant director "to be more attentive
1 P.zh., 12/71, p. 36.
2 P.zh., 12/65, p. 53.
Pravda, 11/2/72, p. 2. He also commented that 
there had been deep conflict in the institute 
over the meaning of the right of control.
3
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to the workers, to have more contact with them, to take
into account criticism which comes from below".^
However the decisions in these cases are couched in very
general terms. One report that suggests the PPO's
might have the right to oblige institutional leaders to
take specific action appeared in Partiinaia zhizn ' in
1965. The report is concerned only with a hypothetical
situation, but says that the right of control includes
the right of the PPO "in exceptional circumstances to
oblige the director of a state farm to introduce into
practice particular measures, naturally in strict compliance
2with party documents and Soviet laws". However this 
report is too vague to cause the rejection of the rule 
that the PPO’s formal power of obligation does not extend
1 Hough, op. cit., p. 92.
2 P.zh., 14/65, pp. 24-25.
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beyond the most general demands.
This conforms with the idea of control as not 
extending as far as giving direct orders on specific 
matters to institutional leaders. The decisions are not 
specific orders but rather official notification to the 
leader that the PPO is dissatisfied with the state of
1 There are a number of words that are used
by PPO's in their decisions requiring action 
from institutional leaders. The strongest 
is "to oblige" (obiazat'); the weakest "to 
ask" {prosit'). Somewhere in between are 
"to suggest" {predlozhit ') and "to demand" 
{trebovaf or poruchit’). Soviet commentators 
are often at pains to point out that the right 
of control should not be understood in terms 
of the different words PPO's can use in their 
decisions. Uchitel ’ skaia gazeta complained 
in 1973 that some people had the wrong idea 
of the right of control. They believe that 
it gives the party organisation the right to 
"suggest" measures to the director, whereas 
before they could only "ask". Without 
actually saying that this view is incorrect, 
the paper stresses that the basic question is 
not the form of decisions, but the content, the 
essence. Uchitel ’skaia gazeta, 13/1/73, p. 1. 
However the essence would appear to be in 
these words. When I asked the former 
secretary of a ministerial PPO what the right 
of control meant, he replied that it meant 
that a PPO could now "suggest", as against 
"ask" an institutional leader to take action. 
When I asked the difference between the words, 
he replied that a "suggestion" meant that a 
certain period of time would be set aside 
for fulfilment of the PPO's recommendation.
If the "suggestion" was not fulfilled in this 
time, the institutional leader could have 
party disciplinary action taken against him.
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affairs and that some remedial action is expected.
The next question we have to ask ourselves is 
what can be done if remedial action is not forthcoming.
Does the PPO have the power to discipline any institutional 
leader?
The PPO does not have the power to directly
discipline anyone in his administrative or production
capacity. However the easiest way around this is to rely
on party discipline. Kommunist speaks in general terms
of the use of the right of control to maintain state
discipline, the ability of PPO's to use reports from
individual communists to prevent breaches of state
discipline, and the close links between party and state
discipline to bring institutional leaders to account
2before the party.
The same journal gave a more concrete example 
in 1973. The party committee of the RSFSR Ministry of 
Rural Construction received a letter from a construction 
trust complaining that glavk workers were not implementing 
ministerial instructions. The head of the glavk was
1 This does not mean that recommendations cannot
be in specific terms. We will see in future 
chapters many examples of quite specific 
recommendations being given by PPO's. How much 
notice institutional leaders take of them depends 
very much on the particular situation.
Korn., 10/68, pp. 41-42.2
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directed (poruoheno) to examine the matter and do something 
about it. However he did not even answer the letter. The 
party committee then gave him a party reprimand and matters 
apparently improved greatly.^" The same journal reported 
the case of the engineer in the Central Genetics Laboratory 
who was given a strong party reprimand by the party buro 
for unsatisfactory fulfilment of construction-planning 
tasks.^
It can be seen that neither of these cases involve 
the head of the "host" organisation. I have not found any 
examples of PPO's giving orders or reprimands to the 
institutional leader in the name of party discipline.
Another problem arises in the case of non-party 
members. In these cases it appears that the PPO is able 
to examine their behaviour, but clearly cannot take any 
disciplinary action. It has to rely on making recommendations 
to the relevant non-party bodies. For example, the party 
buro of the Irkutsk oblast* branch of Gosbank criticised the 
head of the main office although he was not a party member, 
but because of this put the matter of shortcomings in the
1 P.zh. , 8/7 3, p . 39 .
2 P.2/2., 10/70, p. 34. This raises the question 
of whether or why a party reprimand is an 
effective sanction. I have no information that 
can provide a confident answer to this question. 
However party reprimands are often accompanied by 
party recommendations to institutional leaders 
that the disciplined individual be demoted or 
dismissed from his post. Serious party reprimands, 
particularly those arising from poor "production" 
performance, probably affect promotion prospects.
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work of the office before the manager of the branch.^
Partiinaia zhizn ' explains the matter more fully
in its reply to a letter from a combine party secretary
who asked if his party organisation had the right to
examine and come to a decision on the behaviour of a non-
party worker. The party members had done so in an open
party meeting and suggested to the administration that it
give him a reprimand and a final warning. However the
deputy secretary of the party committee of the local
production committee (the PPO's immediate superior in 1964,
the equivalent of today's raikom) said that they did not
have the right to do so and that the matter should have
been dealt with in the trade union committee. The secretary
declared that the trade union committee had not shown
sufficient initiative. Partiinaia zhizn' answered that
although the party organisation does not have the right to
discipline a non-party worker it can talk to him about his
behaviour. However, the journal continued, it is better
that the party organisation not deal with the matter, but
that it should help develop the initiative of the trade
2union committee or the people's court. The answer 
indicated that the official attitude is that the PPO should 
be able to manage affairs, using its "leading" role in
1
2
P.zh.t 10/61, pp. 55-56. 
P.2/2., 20/64 , pp. 45-46 .
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social organisations, without involving itself directly, 
although if it becomes essential it can do so.
It should be remembered that once the situation 
becomes so serious that some radical action is required, 
particularly applying party discipline to institutional 
leaders, the nature of the system ensures that higher party 
authorities become involved. The system is deliberately 
organised so that higher authorities will immediately know 
if the state of affairs in any institution becomes serious.
The consequences of an error are so severe that no PPO 
secretary would be willing to risk a full-scale assault 
on an institutional leader without at least being strongly 
confident of support from higher party authorities. The 
Soviet press is full of complaints from PPO secretaries who 
feel that they are not getting the necessary support from 
their raikom or gorkom.
Therefore means have been developed of attracting 
the attention of higher party bodies. One is failure to 
elect an institutional leader to the party committee or 
buro. This is probably not a common example of the use of 
party membership to influence the behaviour of an institutional 
leader, but it is one that is highly effective. It is 
unheard of for the head of an institution not to be a member 
of the party committee or buro for any period of time;^
1 It appears that ministers are probably an
exception to this rule. See below, pp.578-581
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the organisation could not act in anything like the 
proper way in such a situation and the vaikom or gorkom 
would have to take quick action if such a situation arose.
A case reported in Pavtiinaia zhizn' in 1955 illustrates 
this well. The PPO of a research institute failed to 
elect the director of the institute to the party buro.
The vaikom investigated and found serious shortcomings in 
his work. The vaikom sent the information to the relevant 
ministry, upon which the collegium of the ministry dismissed 
him.^ In 1963 the party members of the Moscow Design- 
Construction Office Glavsantekhmontazh of the State 
Production Committee for Assembly and Special Construction 
Work was dissatisfied with the head of the office. At the 
election-report meeting he was nominated for election as 
a member of the party buro. He refused the nomination, but 
the party members rejected his refusal, placed him on the 
the ballot, but then failed to elect him. The consequences 
are not recorded.^
Another means of attracting the attention of 
higher authorities is to use party meetings to criticise 
institutional leaders when it is certain that the authorities 
will become aware of the proceedings of the meetings. For 
example, at the election-report meeting of the PPO of the 
Ukrainian Institute for the Design of Heavy Machine
1
2
P.zh. , 5/55 , p . 80.
P.zh. , 13/63, p. 52.
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Construction Factories the director and chief engineer 
were criticised for poorly organising and planning the 
production process. This was probably for the benefit 
of the raikom first secretary who was present at the 
meeting.^
The reliance on higher party bodies must play an
enormous role in the informal relations between PPO's and
"host" organisations. But higher party bodies figure largely
even in the formal expressions of PPO powers. Many of the
statements regarding laying party charges against
institutional leaders add that this can be done only after
2application to higher party bodies. This therefore is a
3formal as well as practical necessity.
PPO's have the right to make recommendations to 
institutional leaders, recommendations that should carry 
some weight. It appears that in some circumstances they are 
able to oblige the institutional leaders to act, but even
1 P.zh., 22/74, pp. 45-46. Although in any case 
such as this we cannot be certain that the 
criticisms were not made at the instigation of
the raikom.
2 P.zh., 10/68, pp. 41-42.
3 There is some confusion over who must appeal to 
higher authorities in the case of dispute. Some 
reports make PPO decisions obligatory for 
institutional leaders, it being up to the latter 
to appeal if there is disagreement. P.zh. , 
23/65, p. 34. However most make it the respons­
ibility of the PPO to appeal. P.zh., 4/68,
pp. 40-41. This is what one would expect, given 
the PPO's place in the system.
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then they are not able themselves to make the decision 
on what is actually to be done. The directives can only 
be generally-worded demands for action.
It is difficult to say how seriously an 
institutional leader has to take these generally-worded 
orders. The fact that Soviet sources stress that such 
orders can be given only in exceptional circumstances and 
that there are in fact few examples of them being given 
suggest that on those rare occasions an institutional 
leader would do well to take notice of the PPO. A PPO 
driven to such extremes, if it had not already conferred 
with higher party representatives, would at least be 
confident of their support. In such cases some rapid 
improvement in the situation is expected and probably 
gained.
The situation with regard to PPO recommendations 
is even more uncertain. The vast majority of reports in 
the Soviet press declare that recommendations were accepted 
without disagreement. However cases where recommendations 
were rejected are perhaps less likely to be reported. A 
number of other factors also have to be mentioned. Firstly, 
there is a strong possibility that recommendations have 
already been agreed on by the PPO and institutional leaders. 
Institutional leaders are almost always members of the party 
buro or committee, the organs where final decisions, 
including the recommendations to be presented by general
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party meetings, are made. In normal circumstances any 
differences of opinion are presumably worked out in the 
meetings of these organs. Our knowledge of what happens 
in these meetings is extremely limited. Complaints about 
institutional leaders using party meetings simply as forums 
for giving operational orders suggest that party recommend­
ations could often be little more than party support for 
such orders.'*'
At times when the role of PPO's in "production" 
control is being particularly emphasised, at which times 
the PPO's are more likely to receive support, and 
even suggestions on what recommendations should be made, 
from higher party authorities, it is probable that recomm­
endations often are not arrived at in collusion with 
institutional leaders. In such a situation the general 
state of party-state relations and support for the PPO 
from higher authorities make it probable that recommendations 
will be accepted.
It can be seen that the powers of the right of 
control are of great potential in the hands of PPO's. The
1 In 1954 a party group organiser in
the Administration for Bridge Construction 
complained that the decisions of party 
meetings in the administration were 
written with the cooperation of the 
administration leaders and were usually 
taken from their own administrative 
orders and decisions. P.zh., 5/54, p. 57.
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degree to which that potential is realised depends on the 
general state of party-state relations at the time and 
specific local relationships between local party 
authorities, PPO leadership and "host" organisation 
leadership. The unlimited access to information and the 
right to make recommendations give PPO*s sufficient power 
to play a staff generalist role.
The PPO does have other means at its disposal for 
the exercise of control, usually used in close conjunction 
with the right of control. One of these is the use of 
party influence over the various organs of collective 
leadership that exist in Soviet institutions. Ministries 
have collegiums, while other types of non-production 
institutions have the various Academic, Teaching, 
Scientific-Technical and Artistic Councils. The situation 
with regard to the collegiums and councils is rather 
different and must be considered separately.
The councils have very extensive, if only 
advisory, powers within their institutions. Their main 
concerns are in the areas of planning - academic plans, 
research plans and artistic repertoires, but they also 
involve themselves in personnel matters and other matters
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of current concern.
Collective organs, being part of the administration 
of the institution, are subject to the PPO's right of 
control. The secretary of the party organisation of the 
Moscow Technical College writes:
Obviously the party organisation of the 
educational institution or faculty cannot 
directly influence the activity of the 
Academic Council in such matters as, 
for example, the granting of academic 
degrees and the defence of dissertations.
But to control the organisation of this 
work, to control the activity in general 
of the Academic Council is, in our view,
2the primary duty of the party organisation.
1 For the legal position and functions of the
councils of tertiary educational institutions, 
see Vysshaia shkolaosnovnye postanovleniia3 
prikazy i instvuktsii, Izd. "Sovetskaia nauka", 
Moscow, pp. 36-37; of schools, Narodnoe 
obvazovanie v SSSR3 obshcheobrazovatel'naia 
shkola3 sbornik dokumentov3 1917-73gg., Izd. 
"Pedagogika", Moscow, 1974, p. 208; of research 
institutes, Zaleski, E. (ed.): Science Policy
in the USSR, OECD, Paris, 1969, pp. 219-220; 
of cultural organisations, Iampol'skaia, Ts. A. 
(ed.): Tvorcheskie soiuzy v SSSR, Iuridizdat, 
Moscow, 1970, pp. 165-168.
2 P.zh.Kaz., 8/69, p. 21.
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Thus PPO's hear reports from the council chairmen, usually
the heads of the institutions,'*' and offer recommendations
2for the removal of shortcomings. PPO's also form control
commissions that interest themselves in the work of the 
3councils. PPO's also participate in the planning of the
1 The party committee of the Saratov Poly-
technical Institute hears reports 
(soobshcheniia) from the chairmen of the 
institute's Council and faculty councils. 
Usually before any conclusions are reached 
on the reports the committee consults with 
the communist members of the councils. 
Pravda, 15/2/72, p. 2. The party committee 
of the All-Union Electrotechnical Institute 
hears reports (doklady) from the institute 
director on the work of the Scientific- 
Technical Council. P.zh., 16/63, p. 34.
The party buro of the Moscow Conservatorim 
hears reports (otch'dty) from the rector in 
his capacity as chairman of the Artistic 
Council. Sov.kul ’ tura, 1/7/72, p. 2.
2 A party meeting was held in the All-Union
Research Institute of Grain Growing to 
examine the work of the communist members 
of the Scientific Council. Shortcomings 
were found and the meetings gave the 
director detailed recommendations for 
corrective action. P.zh.Kaz., 6/67, p. 44.
3 The commission for the control of scientific
work of the Central Research and Design- 
Construction Institute for the Organisation 
and Technique of Administration examined the 
activity of the Scientific-Technical Council 
and its sections. Kom.Belorussii, 8/70, p. 21. 
The chairman of the commission for the control 
of scientific work of the Geological Institute 
of the Far East Scientific Centre attends 
meetings of the Scientific Council. Pravda, 
24/2/72, p. 21.
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the councils' activities.^"
The most common form of control is through the
party membership of the councils. It appears probable
that party members always form a majority of their 
2memberships. At least in the case of the councils of
tertiary educational institutions party representatives
3are formally guaranteed a place on the councils. There 
is some evidence that the councils' party members are 
formally organised as party groups. These groups, consisting
1 The administration, party secretary and trade 
union leaders of a Groky secondary school 
draw up the work plan of the Teaching Council 
together. P.zh., 12/73, p. 60. The PPO of
a Moscow school has often advised the 
director to include questions of study and 
teaching practice on the agendas of meetings 
of the Teaching Council. P.zh., 6/56, p. 60.
2 Over half the members of the councils of the 
educational and scientific institutions of
the Cheremushki raion of Moscow are communists.
Kom.(Vilnius), 2/70, p. 58. Seventy-nine 
percent of the members of the Academic Council 
of the Tashkent Polytechnical Institute are 
party members, as are the majority of the 
members of the Scientific Council of the 
Institute of Elementary Organic Formations of 
the All-Union Academy of Sciences. Pravda Vostoka, 
1/4/72, p.2; Kom., 6/72, p. 94. It is surely 
no accident that 16 of the 31 members of the 
Artistic Council of the Kirov Ballet in Leningrad 
are communists. P.zh., 19/70, p. 55. It should 
also be noted that PPO's participate in the 
selection of the membership of the councils by 
having positions on them on their nomenklatury. 
Mosk.pravda, 10/9/71, p. 2; Kom.Ukrainy, 2/72, 
p. 66; Pravda Vostoka, 1/4/72, p. 2.
3 Vysshaia shkola, op. cit., p. 36.
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of all the party members in an elected non-party organ, 
provide a unified party approach in the organs' 
deliberations. One report declares that before any 
decisions are made by a council a meeting of communist 
council members is usually held.^ Another article, 
speaking of the importance of party influence over 
councils, says:
In this matter a big role is played by the
party groups of Scientific Councils, which
are important instruments of party influence
on the scientific-production activity of 
2the institute.
It is not easy to come to a decision on the
significance of party groups, if they exist. I have not
found any description of formal procedures for councils.
There is some evidence that decisions are made on the
3basis of a vote. Whether PPO's attempt to or are able to
1 Pvavda, 15/5/72, p. 2.
2 Kom.(Vilnius), 2/70, pp. 57-58. Whether party
groups are formally organised or not, PPO's 
closely control the work of communist council 
members. Party buros and committees hear 
reports (otchety) from them and examine their 
work. P.zh., 16/63, pp. 38-39; 19/70, p. 55.
3 I.A. Mel'chuk declares in open letter to his 
colleagues that, following the publication of a 
letter by him in "The New York Times" disassociat­
ing himself from the campaign against Sakharov and 
the jailing of Kovalev, the Council of the Institute 
of Linguistics of the All-Union Academy of Sciences 
voted in a "secret" ballot 19 to 2 ( with three 
abstentions) against his reappointment to his post.
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gain party bloc voting is unknown - it probably depends 
on the issue and the situation in the particular 
institution.
There is considerable evidence that PPO's make 
great use of councils for putting forward the party point 
of view and for exercising control of operations.
Kommunist Ukrainy, without being specific, claims that 
organs of collective leadership, such as Academic Councils, 
modify the operation of the right of control, since PPO's 
are able to act through them.'*' PPO's regularly refer 
matters to councils, including sensitive political matters. 
Relations in the Physics-Energy Institute are close enough 
that combined meetings of the party committee and the 
Scientific-Technical Council were held to consider problems 
that had arisen in setting up a number of atomic power 
stations.^
1 Korn.Ukrainy, 2/72, p. 66. The secretary of the 
party buro of the Institute of Elementary Organic 
Formations also claims that the right of control 
produces the need for greater party influence on 
the institute's council. Korn., 6/72, p. 94.
2 The communists of the Institute of Language and 
Literature of the Moldavian Academy of Sciences 
referred an article suspected of taking a "non- 
Marxist" position to a combined meeting of the 
Councils of the institute and the Institute of 
History. The councils confirmed the non-Marxist 
point of view of the article and expressed regret 
that the journal Kul'tura Moldovei had published 
the article without consulting experts.
Kom.Moldavii, 2/63, pp. 78-79.
3 P. zh. , 2/74, p. 32.
180.
More examples of the use made of councils by 
PPO's will be seen in the next chapter. However it should 
already be evident that they are significant weapons.
Because the councils do not have final power of decision, 
control over them does not give the PPO's total control 
of the "host" organisations. However PPO's do use them as 
a means of putting forward their own points of view in such 
a form that institutional leaders find them hard to ignore.
The evidence does not give ministerial collegiums
such an important role. Like the councils they are
advisory bodies, with responsibility for examining matters
in all areas of a ministry's concern.'*' They are under the
close control of the minister. Membership, although
confirmed by the Council of Ministers, is recommended by
the minister and changed on his orders; agendas are
decided by the minister; if the collegium disagrees with
the minister his opinion becomes law anyway; and a decree
of the collegium can be put into effect only by order of the 
2minister. However the collegium should not be underestimated.
1 The most detailed source of information
on collegiums is Davitnidze, I.L: Kollegii
minis terstv3 pravovoe polozhenie i organizatsiia 
raboty, Iuridizdat, Moscow, 1972 . For a discuss­
ion of their functions, see pp. 81-99. For a 
briefer description of their powers and 
functions, see Kom.Sov.Latvii, 10/72, pp. 55-59.
2 Davitnidze, op. cit., pp. 60-62; Shabanov,
Iu.V: Leninskie printsipy raboty gosudars tvennogo
apparata, Izd. "Vysheishaia shkola", Minsk,
1971, p. 189. Sov.gos. i pravo, 3/67, p. 18.
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If it is seen as an organ for collective discussion,
rather than an organ for collective leadership, its role
can be seen as significant. If the minister wishes to
gain the support of his subordinates it becomes an
important forum for consensus-building. It is also useful
as a collective means of checking on the implementation of
important policies and decisions."*" In recent years there
has been particular emphasis on the importance of collegiums,
2including calls to give them more- than advisory status. 
Nevertheless there have been no changes in their formal 
powers. However one should not exclude the possibility, 
depending perhaps above all on the style of work of the 
particular minister and the nature of the problems facing 
him, of collegiums playing an important role in the long 
and short-term operations of ministries.
The question that particularly concerns us is the 
use that PPO's are able to make of collegiums. We saw that 
PPO1 2s relied on party membership and party control of 
councils to exercise their influence over them. Can 
ministerial PPO's exercise the same influence over collegiums?
I do not have any data on party membership of 
collegiums. One would expect, given the high-level positions
1 A ktivnye pomoshchniki partiinykh komitetov3 iz 
opyta raboty partiinykh komissii, Politizdat, 
Moscow, 1974, p. 203.
2 Sov.gos. i pravo, 1/66, p. 11; 3/67, p. 17;
Lunev, A.E. (ed.): Organizatsiia raboty
ministers tv v usloviiakh ekonomicheskoi reformy,
Izd. "Nauka", Moscow, 1972, pp. 22 , 33-36 .
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of most collegium members, that communists would be a 
large majority. However I have not found any examples 
of PPO's exerting party influence over communist members, 
and certainly no suggestions of the existence of formal 
party groups.^
There is some doubt about whether PPO secretaries
are members of collegiums. Particularly in recent years
the formal statutes for some ministries have required
representatives of social organisations to be given places
in collegiums. However PPO representatives are not included
2in any lists of collegium memberships. There are reports
referring to the presence of the PPO secretary at collegium 
3meetings. However there is no suggestion that he is a 
member of the collegium or participates in its discussions.
There are some reports of close cooperation 
between ministerial PPO's and collegiums. The party
1 There is even some doubt as to whether a party 
bloc would be given the opportunity to vote in 
a collegium meeting. Whereas Shabanov declares 
that decisions are passed by a simple majority 
vote, Davitnidze claims that since the minister's 
opinion always prevails, collegiums do not 
usually put matters to a vote, but rather try to 
build up a consensus opinion. Shabanov, Iu.V: 
op. cit., p. 184; Davitnidze, op. cit., p. 146.
2 Davitnidze, op. cit., pp. 64066; Iampol'skaia:
Obshohestvennye organizatsii v SSSR, op. cit., p. 131.
3 For example, Pravda, 10/3/69, p. 2. See also 
reports of PPO secretaries attending meetings of 
the administration of Tsentrsoiuz and the councils 
of two sovnarkhozy. P.zh., 6/58, p. 65.
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committee of the Ministry of Chemical and Oil Machine
Construction works with the collegium on personnel matters.^
A case in the All-Union Ministry of Electrotechnical
Industry suggests that the collegium is in some respects
of inferior status to the PPO. When a glavk head had not
reacted in the necessary way to criticism in the collegium,
the matter was considered by the party committee and a full
2investigation followed. A statement by the secretary of 
the party buro of the Kazakh Ministry of Light Industry 
suggests that PPO's might use collegiums in the same way 
as they use councils, as forums for presenting their point 
of view:
Between the party buro and the collegium 
there have been established close contacts.
Some members of the buro are also members 
of the collegium. This allows the party 
buro to widely place before the leadership 
vital questions of the life of the
3collective and party organisations.
While these examples suggest that collegiums are 
used by PPO's in the same way as the councils, as a forum 
for the authoritative presentation of party views, there is 
not the supporting evidence of PPO influence over collegiums.
1
2
3
Pravda, 29/11/71, p. 2.
Aktivnye pomoshohniki, op. cit., p. 210. 
P.zh.Kaz., 8/69, p. 21.
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There is no evidence of PPO control over communist members 
of collegiums or of PPO control over the collegiums them­
selves through the powers of the right of control. This 
suggests that the collegiums are not used to the extent 
that the councils are.
Similar, but not identical, to organs of 
collective leadership are the various specialised commissions 
that operate, particularly in educational and research 
institutions. Because they often fulfil important functions 
they are of interest to PPO's; because they are collective 
bodies they are particularly open to PPO influence. Just 
two examples are sufficient here as a preview of the more 
detailed discussion in the next chapter. The secretary of 
the party organisation of the Moscow Technical College 
speaks of the party organisation's control of the formation 
and operation of expert, scientific-technical, methodological, 
staffing, admission and examination commissions.^ Kommunist 
(Vilnius) talks of the party committee members that are on 
a school's "authoritative" commission for vocational 
guidance.^
The final weapon available to PPO's is the use 
they can make of social {obshchestvennye) organisations. At
1
2
Mosk.pravda, 10/9/71, p. 2. 
Kom.(Vilnius), 9/71, p. 3.
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the level with which we are concerned social organisations 
are situated, like the PPO's themselves, within working 
institutions. I have included in the category of social 
organisations all "mass" organisations, ranging from those 
with politically significant administrative duties, 
primarily the trade unions, the komsomol and the "people's 
control" system, through other mass organisations with 
All-Union hierarchies, such as Znanie, an organisation for 
managing public lectures by scientific experts and 
administrators, to locally-organised groups such as school 
parents' committees.
There are two features of social organisations 
that make them of value to PPO's. Firstly, they have 
functions to fulfil that are not directly accessible to 
primary party organisations. For example, trade unions 
have powers in the area of workers' discipline, safety 
regulations, and in the payment of wages and bonuses.^
In recent years there has been much discussion of extending 
the administrative functions undertaken by social organis­
ations, as part of the movement towards citizen self­
administration. The practical effect of such a movement is 
dubious. However, to the extent that social organisations 
have these functions, the way is open to PPO's, through 
their control of the organisations, to have a significant
1 Iampol'skaia: Obshchestvennye organizatsii v
SSSR, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
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influence on the exercise of their functions. Some idea 
of the possibilities open to PPO's in this area can be 
gained from the report of the party organisation of the 
Perm oblast' office of Gosbank that worked through the 
trade union to give its recommendations on the transfer 
of the office to a seven-hour working day.^
The other feature of social organisations is
their mass nature. If the PPO has control of them it has
at its disposal a far larger number of people than it
has in its own membership. For example, all Soviet workers
belong to a trade union and 80-90% of tertiary students
2are members of the komsomol. We could see the sort of use
made of this mass membership in the work of komsomol
students in the virgin lands. In "For the Good of the
Cause" Solzhenitsyn describes the efforts of komsomol
students, inspired by a teacher attached to the komsomol
by the party buro, in the building of their new school 
3buildings. The party organisation of the All-Union 
Institute for Ferrous Metallurgy relies largely on the 
institute's Znanie organisation for publicising the
4institute's technical achievements.
1 P.zh., 3/61, p. 46.
2 P. zh. , 22/56, p. 6.
3 Solzhenitsyn, op. cit., p. 49.
4 P.zh.Kaz., 6/67, p. 43.
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The system of "people's control" is a good
example of this feature of social organisations.-^- Like
other social organisations they enable PPO's to use non-
party members in the exercise of their functions. The
primary task of control groups is information-gathering
and in this they are very like the party commissions
2described above.
The control groups can be established in all 
collectives, production and non-production, and they have 
the right to examine documents and information, to hear 
figures, reports and explanations, from the director and
1 The people's control system is not an easy
one to classify. Some idea of its long and 
complicated history can be gained from 
Hodnett's article. Hodnett. G: "Khrushchev
and Party-State Control" in Dallin, A. and 
A.F. Westin (eds.): Politics in the Soviet
Union3 seven cases, Harcourt, Brace and 
World, N.Y., 1966, chapter 4. The system is 
organised as a hierarchy, the lowest level of 
which is the control group. The fact that 
the people's control hierarchy is subordinate 
to the central and republican Councils of 
Ministers suggests that the control groups 
are state organisations; however Soviet 
commentators often describe them as.social 
organisations, this definition arising from the 
mass nature of their membership. P.2/2., 19/64, 
p. 7; 9/65, p. 20. I have chosen to place them
in the latter category, primarily because in 
being situated within a "host" organisation 
they closely resemble other social organisations.
2 See above, pp. 156-159.
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his subordinates, and to issue directions (ukazaniia)
on the removal of shortcomings.^ Although it would appear
that some of these powers are rarely used fully, they
are clearly important powers that could be very useful to 
2a PPO. The whole process is summed up well in the 
following quotation from Pavtiinaia zhizn' (note that this 
quotation comes from the time when the party and people's 
control apparatuses were combined):
The action groups under the committees 
of party-state control have become the 
organising centre of all social control.
With the establishment of action groups and 
posts the significance of primary party 
organisations in controlling the implement­
ation of the party's directives has become 
even greater. The party organisation leads 
the formation and work of the group; the 
chairman of the latter is a deputy secretary 
of the party buro; the committee or party buro 
examines the plans of the action group, and 
acquaints its leaders and members with the
1 P.zh., 2/69, p. 14; P.zh.Kaz., 5/63, p. 26; 
10/65, p. 72.
2 It would appear to be rare for a control 
group to examine the activity of the head 
of the institution, while the groups' 
directions (ukazaniia) appear to have only 
the force of recommendations.
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most important directions and decisions 
of the party and state. In this way 
the influence of the primary party 
organisation on control has been greatly 
strengthened, especially in administrative 
apparatuses and educational establishments 
which may not exercise the right of direct 
control of the activity of the administration. ^
Some idea of the activities of control groups can
be gained from a report on the activity of the group in
2the institute Gidroaliuminiia in 1963. The group checked 
how the most recent technical achievements were being 
used in new designs and equipment. It uncovered many 
shortcomings in design among enterprises concerned with 
electrical production. The chairman of the group sent the 
results of the investigation to the party organisation of 
the institute. The institute director and the party buro 
then had a conference with department heads and chief 
specialists to work out what to do. This appears to be 
typical of the groups' activities. They conduct an 
investigation and find shortcomings which they report 
to the party organisation which then takes the necessary 
action.
1
2
P. zh. , 9.65, p. 20. 
P. zh. , 9/63, p. 19.
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I am not specifically concerned with control 
groups; so this treatment has been somewhat oversimplified. 
Although I have mentioned that the people's control system 
has its own hierarchy, I have ignored the fact that the 
control groups can turn to this hierarchy, possibly at the 
expense of the PPO secretary. This is illustrated by the 
following story, although one should note that the story 
comes from the time when the party and state control 
apparatuses were combined. The combined hierarchy was 
more powerful than the present people's control hierarchy. 
This means that although the story is still valuable in 
showing us the way "politics" works even at the lowest 
levels of a bureaucratic state, it is unlikely that the 
people's control apparatus of the present day would be 
used in the same way as the combined apparatus was in 1964.^
The story began in a reasonably straightforward 
way with a letter from the secretary of the party 
organisation of the Institute of Toys, declaring that the 
institute party organisation had dismissed a deputy 
secretary after he, as chairman of the control group, had 
opposed the party buro. Apparently the chairman had made 
a report to the city committee of the party-state control 
apparatus, as a result of which the chairman of the city 
committee criticised the PPO secretary for political
1 P.zh., 22/64, pp. 45-47.
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immaturity and misunderstanding the role and functions 
of the control organs. The secretary declared in his 
letter that raising the authority of the control organs, 
the subject of something of a campaign at the time, did 
not mean ignoring the opinion of the PPO.
Partiinaia zhizn ' began by replying in the same 
relatively straightforward way. It disagreed with the 
secretary and filled in some of the details of the story. 
The control group had found some shortcomings in the 
institute. Recommendations were made to the administration 
of the institute which issued the necessary orders.
However nothing was done about implementation of the 
orders. Eventually the chairman of the group published 
an article on the situation in the city newspaper. The 
article was examined in a party meeting where it was 
attacked by the secretary, who at this stage had the 
chairman removed from his post.
But then a characteristically Soviet element 
came out. Partiinaia zhizn’ revealed that actually the 
secretary had another reason for removing the chairman.
The secretary had been denied a new flat by the trade union 
committee and therefore decided to attack the trade union 
activists. He called a meeting of the party buro and had 
it pass a resolution requiring the trade union committee to 
change its position. Only the deputy secretary/chairman 
complained about this, insisting that it was a breach of
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trade union democracy. At this point the secretary 
decided to get rid of the chairman.
This story should be enough to show the dangers 
of ever generalising about the power of party organisations 
and secretaries over trade unions and other social 
organisations. It also shows the danger of looking for 
easy institutional explanations of events.
However, despite this warning, I feel that we
can say that generally PPO's have tight control over social
organisations. Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution,
expressing one of the most fundamental Leninist principles,
assures PPO's a leading role over social organisations.
Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii wrote in 1961 that giving state
functions to social organisations required changing their
methods of self-administration if any true democratisation
was to occur. One change needed was to strengthen the
control of the organisations "from below".^ Soviet
commentaries often describe the control exercised by PPO's
2as control "from below".
The first weapon PPO's have over social 
organisations is the use of party discipline over the
1 Korn. Sov. Latvii, 10/61, pp. 27-28.
Bugaev, E.I. and B.M. Leibson: Besedy ob Ustave
KPSS, Politizdat, Moscow, 1964, p. 201; P.zh., 
10/68, p. 42.
2
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communist leaders of the organisations. The leaders of
trade union and komsomol organisations are to a large degree
party members. In 1974 in Zaporozhye oblast' 68.7% of the
secretaries of komsomol primary organisations were party
members and this proportion is increasing.^ Somewhat
surprisingly the percentage among trade union leaders is
slightly lower. Pravda Ukrainy reported in 1976 that
64% of 124,000 enterprise-level trade union committee
2chairmen were communists. Nevertheless the leadership 
of a trade union or komsomol committee is considered as 
little different from a regular party post. Work in 
lower-level trade union or komsomol organisations is a 
common beginning to a party career.
As with state organisations PPO's do not have 
the power to give direct orders to social organisations.
Nor does there appear to be any formal definition of their 
powers over social organisations such as the right of 
control in the case of state organisations. However in 
general terms the powers appear to be the same. A PPO has 
access to any information or officials of the particular 
social organisation, can make recommendations on any matter,
1 Pravda, 9/9/70; 5/4/74. The All-Union
percentage for 1974 was 44.1%. The very rapid 
increase over the last few years can be seen 
in the following data: in 1958 the percentage
was 9.5; in 1966, 14.7; and 1970, 31.2 The 
upward trend apparently began in 1965. Apresian, 
Z.G. and V.A. Sulemov: Partiinoe iadro v
komomole, Izd. "Znanie", Moscow, 1975, pp. 40-49.
2 Pravda Ukrainy, 13/2/76.
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and in exceptional circumstances can demand a change in 
the state of affairs.
In practice, in fact, a PPO's control of a social 
organisation is much tighter than of a state organisation. 
In 1972 a reader asked Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii whether 
the PPO secretary should attend trade union committee 
meetings. The letter was answered by the deputy head of 
the party-organisational department of the republican 
Central Committee. He declared that it was up to the 
secretary to decide but that it would be a good thing, even 
if there were members of the party buro on the committee 
(the trade union committee chairman is usually a member of 
the party buro). In response to the question whether all 
matters considered in trade union committee meetings should 
be checked with the party organisation secretary first, he 
replied that usually matters are worked out in advance in 
order to prevent duplication, and that if a matter comes 
up suddenly it would not be superfluous to consult with the 
party secretary.^
I have already cited an example to show the 
opposite, yet this would appear to show that generally the 
PPO has fairly complete control of the social organisations
1 Kom.Sov.Latvii, 4/72, p. 66. For concrete
examples of the importance of PPO control 
over and support for the trade union committee, 
see Sazonov, N.A: Partiinoe biuro i profsoiuznaia
organizatsiia, Rostov Publishing Office, Rostov- 
on-the-Don, 1958.
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in its institution.
The discussion of the powers available to PPO's 
in their relations with their "host" organisations should 
have given some idea of the nature of their leadership of 
these organisations. Control does not mean that the PPO 
runs the institution - it cannot give orders to any 
administrative or production worker. In the case of real 
difficulties in the operation of the institution the PPO has 
the power to demand corrective action, although not in 
specific terms. However quite specific recommendations 
can be made, and these will usually be given serious consid­
eration by the institutional leadership.
But control means more than simply ensuring that 
the institution and its leaders fulfil specific demands made 
of them and even more than reacting to difficulties as they 
occur. It means further that the PPO is to ensure that the 
"host" organisation is at all times running as efficiently 
and productively as possible, and as part of this it can 
suggest positive initiatives. The extent to which such 
initiatives are taken notice of depends on a number of 
empirical factors, particularly relations between the 
individuals concerned and the attitudes of higher authorities. 
This is the essence of the "staff generalist" role - a real 
enough concern with specific problems, but with sufficient 
detachment from everyday operations and a sufficiently
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general view of the operations of the institution that 
even specific actions will have long-term beneficial 
results.
Before examining in detail the extent to which 
PPO's actually fulfil this function, I would like to 
briefly outline in historical terms the variations in the 
powers of PPO's. I have said often enough already that 
the tasks and means of PPO's vary considerably over time, 
that in their efforts to maintain a balance between 
excessive party-state conflict and collusion the top 
authorities make variable demands of PPO's. The detailed 
discussion of PPO activities in the next chapter is in 
functional, not historical terms. Therefore some broad 
knowledge of historical developments is required. I will 
devote some particular attention to the changes since the 
fall of Khrushchev, including the 1971 extension of the 
applicability of the right of control, since these changes 
have affected non-production PPO's more than any others.
Survey of party-state relations since 1955
The general changes in the nature of party-state 
relations are not necessarily reflected in the activities 
of all non-production PPO's. There are two main reasons for 
this, closely related to each other. At those times 
recognised as times of increased power for the party
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apparatus, the main, almost the sole, concern of middle- 
level party organs is production, in the narrowest sense 
of the word. Therefore they tend to ignore non-production 
institutions and their PPO's. The other side of the coin 
is that at times of decreased party involvement in 
economic affairs, the emphasis will often turn to 
ideological control. Such control is of particular 
importance in non-production institutions. Therefore these 
periods can see an increase in the importance of non­
production PPO's. Of course these arguments do not apply 
to the PPO's of administrative, and to some extent, research 
institutions, since they are more closely connected with 
production. They, therefore, follow more closely the general 
trends in party-state relations.
In the mid-1950's, there was a major factional 
struggle in progress. In very general terms the struggle 
was between Khrushchev, with the support of the party 
apparatus, and Malenkov, with his support based in the state 
administrative apparatus. Khrushchev prevailed and with 
him the party apparatus. Even before the struggle had 
concluded there was evidence of strong party activity, 
including among PPO's. This was particularly evident with 
regard to ministerial PPO's, perhaps engaged in struggle 
with the enemy from within. However it was reflected in 
all non-production institutions - I have given one example
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above of the involvement of the PPO of a research 
institute in a dispute with clear factional implications.^
The triumph of Khrushchev brought the abolition
of the central branch ministries and the establishment of
the sovnarkhozy, dispersing the power of the state
apparatus and increasing enormously the role of the party
apparatus in administrative and economic affairs. This
power of the party was reflected in the PPO's of the 
2sovnarkhozy. However it seems probable that this increase 
in the power of the party apparatus was not particularly 
reflected in the activities of other non-production PPO's. 
What information there is on their activities does not 
suggest any significant increase in power or importance.
The climax in the power of the party apparatus 
could be seen at the end of the 1950's and early in the 
1960's. As far as PPO's were concerned a major development 
was the Central Committee decree of June, 1959 establishing
1 See pp. 71-72.
2 Partiinaia zhizn', for example, declared in 
mid-1957 that sovnarkhoz PPO's were able to 
work better than the old ministerial party 
organisations. Being closer to production 
they were allegedly better able to understand 
the administrative process and what had to be 
done in different circumstances. P.zh., 11/57, 
p. 28. I have information on one sovnarkhoz 
party secretary which supports the view that 
they were an important source of party 
influence. Smirnov, the party secretary in the 
Kemerovo sovnarkhoz in 1957, was the former first 
secretary of a city raikom. P.zh., 18/57, p. 21. 
Ministerial PPO secretaries with such backgrounds 
have appeared at other times of great administrat­
ive PPO activity. See below, pp. 437-441.
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commissions in the PPO's for the implementation of the 
right of control. Oddly enough, considering that they 
had never been given the right of control, the PPO's of
4
planning organisations, construction bureaus and research 
institutes fulfilling orders for production enterprises 
were given permission to establish these commissions.'*' It 
was considered that the party organisations would benefit
2from them because they were situated so close to production.
However in 1961, at the same time as the research
PPO's fulfilling orders for production enterprises were
3finally given the right of control, there were several 
calls in the Soviet press for the granting of the right of
4control to administrative party organisations. The requests
were not granted, although at the same time the press
was emphasising that the lack of the right of control did
not mean that PPO's were not to involve themselves in
5administrative and organisational matters.
of the party apparatus. The following year Khrushchev 
divided the apparatus into industrial and agricultural wings,
However this marked the highpoint of the power
1 KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 917.
2 P.zh., 15/59, p. 37.
3 Ustav KPSS, Politizdat, Moscow, 1961, paragraph 59.
4 P.zh., 18/61, p. 49; 20/61, pp. 49-50; Kom. ,
13/61, p. 90.
5 For example, see P.zh., 10/61, p. 54.
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particularly disastrous for the non-production PPO's, 
which found themselves in no-man's land. At the same time, 
although the sovnarkhozy continued in existence, they were 
being consolidated so that they no longer so neatly fitted 
into party territorial boundaries and an increasing number 
of centralised agencies were being formed. Khrushchev was 
not deliberately attacking the party apparatus. Indeed 
the division of the party apparatus should be seen as an 
attempt to increase party control of operational production 
affairs. Khrushchev felt that more specialised party 
organs would be better able to control these areas of 
concern.
However Khrushchev's reorganisations were 
becoming increasingly unpopular among party officials, 
probably more because of their economic than their 
political implications. Eventually this unpopularity 
contributed to the party apparatus' removal of support 
from Khrushchev. The state apparatus still had no reason 
to support him and at the end of 1964 he was removed from 
power. The immediate introduction of a strong anti-podmena 
campaign would suggest that the developments of 1962 had not 
reduced the degree of involvement of the party apparatus in 
operational affairs. It also suggests some sort of agreement 
between the party and state apparatuses to maintain a 
reasonable balance between the functions and powers of the
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party and state apparatuses in the future.^" However, 
strangely, this very strong campaign was not strongly 
reflected in the activities of non-production PPO's.
Firstly, administrative, and particularly ministerial, PPO's 
very quickly found themselves involved in the economic 
reforms of 1965, involving the re-establishment of the 
central administrative structure and some decentralising 
administrative procedures. Although the reforms showed 
considerable concessions to the interests of the state 
administrators, they were still not popular with them, 
and the ministerial party organisations were assigned an 
important part in ensuring their implementation.
The period of the anti-podmena campaign was 
marked by an increasing emphasis on ideological control. 
Partly a reaction to the excessively independent attitudes 
of the intellectuals under Khrushchev, partly a reaction 
to the party's neglect of ideology during the period of 
podmena, a harder ideological line appeared in the press 
and there was a stepping up of police activity against 
dissenters and increased attention to indoctrination within 
the party. This was reflected in the relative reactivation
1 The agreement had its most "public", if
never officially announced, manifestation 
in the separation of the posts of Party 
General Secretary and the Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers.
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of educational, research and cultural PPO's.^
Thus in the first years of the Brezhnev era
educational, research and cultural PPO's were becoming a
significant force. While the emphasis was on ideology,
at the expense of production, in the party apparatus as
a whole, the effect, if anything, on party organisations
of institutions the large part of whose "production"
activities was ideologically oriented was positive. It
is doubtful that ministerial PPO's gained any power over
their sovnarkhoz predecessors. There may have been some
restrictions on their methods of operation. However any
2loss of power was probably negligible.
By 1967 the right balance of party-state relations 
had apparently been reached and so the anti-podmena campaign
1 L.L. Greenberg writes that before 1965 
research PPO's had little say in the activities 
of institutes* (She is speaking primarily of 
the theoretically oriented institutes of the 
Academies. The earlier reactivation of the 
production-oriented branch institutes' party 
organisations has already been mentioned.)
However after 1966 their role became greater, 
particularly through the new emphasis on 
party-mindedness {partiinost ') in science.
L.L. Greenberg: "Soviet Science Policy and
the Scientific Establishment", Survey, vol. 17, 
no. 4, Autumn, 1971, pp. 51-63.
2 As evidence that the main attack was on methods 
of operation there is a 1966 Kommunist article 
in which the journal was unable to deny the need 
for a ministerial PPO to be involved in "prod­
uction" matters, in this case solving a factory's 
supply problem, but could criticise its style
of involvement. Korn., 16/66, pp. 57-58.
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was wound down. The Czechoslovak events the next year 
ensured a new emphasis on the "leading" role of the 
party. However the continuing agreement between the 
party and state factions, and possibly a recognition of 
the shortcomings of podmena by the party faction, ensured 
that Khrushchev style party operations were not resumed.
The party apparatus was not to become involved in the petty 
details of day-to-day operations, was not to neglect its 
ideological duties, and not to neglect non-production 
institutions. The effect was an even greater emphasis on 
the role of non-production PPO's.^
Therefore it was no suprise that the 24th Party 
Congress in 1971 granted the right of control to non­
production PPO's. This was only the consolidation of a 
trend that had been evident to some degree since 1965 and 
particularly since 1967. The precise significance of the 
granting of the right of control is difficult to determine. 
I have said that it was only a consolidation of an already 
existing trend, and there is ample evidence from before 
1971 of non-production PPO's using the powers of the right
1 One could also make the rather general
point that the new emphasis on non­
production institutions was a sign of 
the "modernisation" of the Soviet 
economy. An adequate productive base 
had been developed; further significant 
improvements in output would be based on 
improvements in "service" industries.
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of control.^" However reports suggesting that the granting 
of the right of control did change the activities of PPO's, 
both in the areas of their concern and the means used, are 
equally numerous. Partiinaia zhizn1 wrote, perhaps rather 
misleadingly, in 1971:
If in the recent past party organisations
1 For example, in 1973 the secretary of the
party buro of the Kalinin ob last’clinical 
hospital said that his party organisation had 
had no trouble in handling the right of control, 
since it had exercised control of the activity 
of the administration before 1971. General 
party meetings and party buro meetings had 
regularly heard reports (otchety and soobshcheniia) 
from the chief doctor and his deputy, department 
heads and other leading personnel; commissions 
had been established to investigate conditions, 
the findings of which were examined in party 
meetings; and personnel matters were decided 
with the participation of the party organisation. 
Kom. , 4/73, pp. 26-30. In 1961 Partiinaia zhizn’ 
Kazakhs tana received a letter asking whether 
an educational PPO had the right of control of 
the director and whether it could hear reports 
(otohety) from him in party meetings. The jour­
nal replied that the party organisation did not 
have the right of control, but continued: "The
party organisation may hear a report (doklad) 
from the school director in a meeting on the 
results of the school year or quarter and 
examine in connection with this the tasks for 
improvement in the education and training of 
students. The director must concern himself with 
this if he is to be supported in his work by the 
party organisation." P.zh.Kaz., 5/61, pp. 68-69 . 
For similar accounts in research PPO's, see 
P.zh., 16/63, p. 36. It will also be evident in 
the detailed discussion in the next chapter that 
many of the examples of PPO control, using all 
the powers of the right of control, date from 
before 1971.
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of research institutes that did not have 
the right of control of the activity of the 
administration in party meetings examined, 
as a rule, questions of ideological work and 
intra-party life, now in discussions 
communists often concern themselves with 
current problems of research work, its 
planning, the distribution of scientific 
resources and specialists, progress in the 
fulfilment of plans, the working through of 
the most important projects and the intro­
duction into production of the achievements 
of science.
Since gaining the right of control these PPO's have listened 
to reports from institutional leaders and now there is 
no shifting of personnel without consideration of the 
opinion of the PPO's.^ The account of the effects on the 
party organisation of the Magadan institute Dal 'stroiproekt 
is not as extreme. Before the party organisation gained the 
right of control it was involved in control of the adminis­
tration. However this control was of an episodic nature 
without having the necessary sense of direction. This was 
because the party organisation had limited possibilities for
holding workers accountable for the condition of production 
2affairs.
1
2
P.zh., 22/71, pp. 28-30. 
Barkusov, op. cit., p. 98.
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In the category of educational PPO's there is 
an enormous number of reports. Most of them are concerned 
with personnel matters.^
However there are reports speaking of other
areas. A 1971 book on the Khaborovsk raikom claimed that
before 1971 school PPO's were not involved in personnel
work, nor in the activities of Pedagogical and Academic
Councils and that they could hear reports {otchttty) only
from communists and not from leading officials. Now they
2can hear reports from anyone. An editorial in
Uchitel 1 skaia gazeta declared that the party organisations
had displayed a greater interest in the pedagogical activities
3of the school since 1971.
1 The secretary of the party organisation of a
secondary school in Vladimir declared in 
October, 1971 that before the right of control 
the director did not always consult with the 
party organisation on personnel matters, but 
since 1971 they have always been decided 
together. P.zh., 17/71, p. 14. The secretary 
of the party organisation of a school in 
Kuibyshev similarly claimed that the party 
organisation had been more actively involved 
in personnel work since the 24th Party Congress. 
P.zh., 16/72, p. 50. In 1973 the PPO's of 
the tertiary institutions in Tomsk were said 
to have exercised a greater influence over 
personnel business since receiving the right 
of control. P.zh., 6/73, p. 32. In the 
Riazan Teacher's College it has become common 
that the selection of departmental heads and 
deans takes place with the participation and 
agreement of the party committee. Pravda 
Ukrainy, 26/1/72, p. 2.
Dubkov, op. cit., p. 42.
Uchitel 'skaia gazeta, 13/1/73, p. 1.
2
3
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These reports have emphasised the change in
the areas of involvement. Others are more concerned with
the means available. The secretary of the party committee
of the Omsk Institute of Rail Transport Engineers wrote
to Pravda to say that before gaining the right of control
the PPO was interested in everything that happened in the
institute. However in some areas it had been unable to make
its influence felt. This had led to the situation where
some communists started to say that there were some things
they could not change and were therefore no concern of
theirs. He hoped that the situation would now change.^
The secretary of the party committee of the Tashkent
Polytechnical Institute wrote that in general the duties
of the PPO had not changed with the granting of the right
of control. However it was now able to work with greater
effectiveness since the right of control had changed the
methods and form of its work. He mentioned specifically
that whereas previously the communists had heard reports
from and given recommendations to institutional leaders
as communists, they could now deal with them as administrat- 
2ors. The secretary of the party committee of the Saratov 
Polytechnical Institute wrote in 1972 that using the right 
of control the party committee had begun to regularly hear 
reports (otchety) on the work of the deans, department
1
2
Pravda, 11/2/72, p. 2.
Pravda Vostoka, 1/4/72, p. 2.
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heads, the rector and pro-rectors.'*'
One cannot ignore all these reports and so must
come to the conclusion that the 1971 change did have a
significant effect on non-production PPO's, despite the
equally overwhelming evidence that many such organisations
used all the powers of the right of control before 1971.
Why then did the 1971 change have such an effect on some
PPO's? The main reason is that the formal right of control,
officially expressed in the Party Rules, now made it
impossible for reluctant institutional leaders, and PPO
secretaries, to deny that non-production party organisations
were entitled to control the activity of the administration.
The secretary of the party buro of the Institute of
Mechanics of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences wrote in
1972 that the right of control had great "moral" meaning,
that it produced changes in the "psychology" of
2institutional leaders. In 1966 the secretary of the party 
committee of Moscow State University complained about 
misunderstandings of the significance of the lack of the 
right of control which had led to limitations on the content
3of discussions in party meetings. Giving the party 
organisation the right of control would make such misunder-
1 Pravda, 15/2/72, p. 2.
2 Pravda Ukrainy, 26/1/73, p. 2.
3 Kom. , 10/66, p. 35.
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Standings impossible. A school PPO secretary also 
speaks of the "psychological" effects, the right of 
control having raised the authority of the party 
organisation in the eyes of the teaching collective.^
Therefore the granting of the right of control 
has apparently strengthened the role of non-production 
PPOs. It has been particularly important in that it has 
made it possible for all PPO's, even against opposition 
from institutional leaderships, to hold individual members 
of working collectives accountable for production 
performance. Perhaps its main significance was in showing 
up the degree of opposition to PPO activities, opposition 
which one suspects still exists. However that is a matter 
for further consideration. This short and oversimplified 
survey of developments since 1955 should provide some 
historical background for the detailed discussion of the 
activities of non-production PPO's in the next chapter.
Since little attempt will be made to distinguish the 
different degrees of PPO involvement at different times, it 
should be kept in mind that in general the party apparatus 
as a whole was closely involved in production affairs 
throughout the Khrushchev era and, in a more controlled way, 
since about 1967. Administrative and production-oriented
1 P.zh., 16/72, p. 46.
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research PPO's follow this general pattern. Other non­
production party organisations have only become well 
established as significant forces since 1965 and more so
since 1967.
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CHAPTER THREE 
"PRODUCTION" CONCERNS
When discussing a PPO's "production" control 
functions, it is crucial to have some understanding 
of the functions of the "host" organisation. The degree 
of involvement of the PPO in "production" concerns clearly 
depends to an enormous degree on whether the "host" 
organisation itself has some independent, initiating 
function in a particular area of "production" activity.
A full description of the powers and functions of "host" 
organisations would amount to a multi-volume encyclopaedia 
of Soviet institutions and obviously it would be out of 
place to attempt it here. Even to establish the formal, 
legal functions of "host" organistions is difficult. If 
the informal activities that are endemic in Soviet 
institutions were to be included the task would become 
impossible. However some understanding of these formal 
and informal activities is essential if we are to attempt 
an analysis of the PPO's "production" control function, 
particularly any policy-making role that PPO's might play 
as part of that function. Even if there is no possibility 
of undertaking a full exposition here, I will describe the
1 For a description of my use of the word 
"production", see p. 136.
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situation to the extent that is necessary for an under­
standing of PPO control.
There are roughly three categories of PPO 
production concern. The first relates to the structure 
and organisation of the "host" organisation, the second 
to the closely connected question of personnel, and the 
third to the operational activity and performance of the 
"host" organisation.
1. Structure and organisation
The least controversial control function of PPO's 
is in the area of structure and organisation. This category 
includes the concern of the PPO in ensuring that the "host" 
organisation is structured and operating smoothly cind 
efficiently, but excludes consideration of the actual content 
of "production" activity. The distinction is an important 
one, since the latter consideration introduces an element 
of controversy into the proper concerns of PPO's, partic­
ularly administrative PPO's, that is not present in the 
former concern.
One of the main reasons for the lack of controversy 
over the concern of PPO's for structure and organisation is 
the lack of independence of "host" organisations in these 
areas. The structures, overall personnel levels and wage 
funds (which largely determine the possible mix of different
types and levels of personnel) are usually fixed by 
higher authorities.
The Statutes establishing the various institutions 
with which we are concerned are invariably issued by superior 
authorities.^" The statutes themselves rarely give specific
1 The statutes for ministries are approved by the
Council of Ministers. Union and Autonomous 
Republic Constitutions define which departments 
and administrations should be formed in local 
ispolkomy. While they are actually formed by the 
ispolkomy themselves, their formation must be con­
firmed by the Union Republic Council of Ministers. 
Kozlov, Iu. M: Pravovoe polozhenie ministers tv SSSR, 
Iuridizdat, Moscow, 1971, pp. 100-101. Academy 
research institutes are established and have their 
statutes confirmed by the Presidium of the relevant 
All-Union or republican Academy of Sciences.
Administrativnoe pravo, Iuridizdat, Moscow, 1967, 
pp. 411-412. Branch institutes are formed by the 
relevant Council of Ministers on the suggestion of 
other relevant bodies and with the agreement of the 
All-Union scientific co-ordinating body, presently 
the State Committee for Science and Technology.
(See, for example, the decree of the RSFSR Council 
of Ministers establishing the All-Russian Research 
Institute for the Organisation and Payment of Agric­
ultural Labour. Sistematicheskoe sobranie zakonov 
RSFSR, ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR
i reshenii Pravitel 'stva RSFSR, Iuridizdat, Moscow, 
1969, vol. 12, p. 487). Tertiary educational 
establishments are formed and dissolved by the All- 
Union Council of Ministers, except teachers' coll­
eges which are the responsibility of Union Republic 
Councils. Specialist secondary schools are formed 
by the Ministry of Tertiary and Specialised Second­
ary Education. Kozlov, op. cit., p. 99. The most 
recent General Law (Ustav) for schools was confirmed 
by the All-Union Council of Ministers in 1970 for 
general secondary schools. It declared that schools 
are formed and dissolved by the Union Republic 
Councils of Ministers. Narodnoe obrazovanie, op. cit., 
pp. 228-229. The fact that the old eight-year schools 
were opened on the decision of the raion or city 
ispolkom with the agreement of the Ministry of Educ­
ation of an autonomous republic or the krai or oblast * 1
Department of Education suggests that primary schools 
are probably also established by lower-level author­
ities than are secondary schools. ibid, pp. 197-198.
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details on the structure or staff levels of institutes,
but usually give at least powers of confirmation in these
areas to higher authorities. Thus the total outlay of
funds, including wages funds, for Academy institutes is
established by higher authorities - presumably the State
Committee for Science and Technology, working with Gosplan,
the Ministry of Finance and the Academy of Sciences.^ The
State Committee, again together with Gosplan and the
Ministry of Finance, defines the overall number of workers
2in branch research institutes throughout the country, but
within this limitation individual ministries establish the
general totals of expenditure on research work, including
3wages, within the branch. In 1970 all research institutes 
were granted by a decree of the Council of Ministers the 
same rights of relative independence that enterprises had
4been granted in 1965. This means that within the limits 
of the wages fund established by an institute's centrally- 
confirmed yearly plan, it can determine its own structure,
5staffing, and average wage.
1 Zaleski, op. cit., p. 223.
2 Administrativnoe pravo, op. cit., p. 408 .
3 Kozlov, op. cit., p. 211.
4 Resheniia pavtii i pravitel'stva po khoziaistvennym 
voprosam, vol. 8, 1970-72, Politizdat, Moscow,
1972, p. 54.
See the Polozhenie o sotsialisticheskikh 
gosudarstvennykh predpriiatiiakh, para. 82 in 
Ekonomioheskaia gazeta, 20/10/65, p. 28;
Zaleski, op. cit., p. 223.
5
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Within tertiary educational institutions faculties
and departments can be formed and dissolved only by a
decision of the Ministry of Tertiary and Specialised
Secondary Education,"^ while staff levels are also determined
2by the Ministry.
The 1970 Rule (Ustav) for general secondary
schools defines the number of classes and other services
to be provided, but gives no details on structure and staff
levels. It mentions the formation of the Teaching Council,
but refers to the Statute for Teaching Councils for details
on its activities (to which I unfortunately do not have 
3access). The 1959 Statute for eight-year schools gives
1 Vysshaia shkola, op. cit., p. 333. A 1938 
example Rule (tipovoi ustav') for tertiary 
institutions gave details on the formation of 
faculties and departments and the membership 
and general functions of Academic Councils. 
Vysshaia shkola, op. cit., pp. 35-37; see also, 
Sistematicheskoe sobranie, op. cit., p. 333.
2 Vysshaia shkola, op. cit., pp. 34-35. This 
includes specialised tertiary institutions that 
are subordinate to other branch ministries, 
although in 1974 the All-Union Council of 
Ministers directed Union Republic Councils and 
the Ministry to examine and come to a decision on 
the question of transferring specialised secondary 
schools from local subordination to subordination 
to the ministries for which they produce special­
ists. Sobraniepostanovlenii Pravitel ' stva SSSR, 
Iuridizdat, Moscow, 18/74, art. 103.
3 Narodnoe obrazovanie, op. cit., p. 234.
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details on the Council's membership and general functions.
It also says that "the staff of the eight-year school
(administrative, pedagogical, study-indoctrination and
service personnel) is defined in the established manner
according to the staff establishment". No details are
2given on who defines the staff establishment.
Lower-level administrative apparatuses appear to
have little control over their structures and personnel
levels. While the organisational establishments of local
ispolkom departments and administrations are confirmed by
the ispolkom, their structures and personnel levels must be
3confirmed by higher authorities.
The greatest degree of independence is given to 
ministries. Ministerial statutes declare that while the 
structure and number of apparatus officials must be con­
firmed by the Council of Ministers, the minister has the 
right to confirm the organisational establishment of the 
central apparatus and the statutes of the glavki, adminis-
4trations and departments. All-Union industry associations
1 ibid, pp. 201-202.
2 ibid, p. 200.
3 Kozlov, op. cit., pp. 100-101.
See, for example, the Statute for the All-Union
Ministry of Agricultural Construction,
Sobranie postanovlenii, 1/72, art. 2, 
para 13.
4
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are formed by the relevant All-Union ministry with the
agreement of the relevant republican Councils of Ministers,
while republican associations are formed by the republican
Councils with the agreement of the relevant All-Union
ministry. Their structures and staff levels are confirmed
by their superior ministry.'*' It is left up to the minister
to transfer glavki, administrations and departments onto
2
khozraschet procedures, an important matter indeed.
Iu. M. Kozlov goes further than the formal
statutes, claiming that ministries are also able to decide
themselves what the general structure of the ministerial
system will be - whether it will be the two-level ministry-
production association (combine) system, the three-level
ministry-industry association-production association
3(combine) system, or some other possibility. This suggests 
that an individual ministry has a considerable degree of 
freedom in the structural implementation of the recent
1 Sobranie postanovlenii, 7/73, art. 32, paras. 9, 22.
2 Sobranie postanovlenii, 11/73, art. 57, para. 13.
3 Kozlov, op. cit., pp. 97-98. The production 
associations or combines are made up of a number 
of enterprises. The administrative section of
the head enterprise usually provides administrative 
services for the whole association. The 
associations are essentially production organis­
ations and so receive no particular attention 
in this thesis. Industry associations replace 
the old ministerial Chief Administrations (glavki) . 
They are, therefore, administrative organisations 
and will receive some specific attention, unfort­
unately seriously limited by a lack of information.
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economic reforms. This is particularly important for 
the consideration of the role of ministerial PPO's in 
these reforms to be considered in Chapter Four.
Kozlov also claims that although the structure 
and number of officials of the central apparatus is 
established by the Council of Ministers, the minister has 
the right to change the levels set by the Council. He 
says that ministers use this right quite often. After the 
Council had confirmed the structure of the central apparatus 
of the All-Union Ministry of Special Construction and 
Assembly Work, the minister made some changes and many 
functional administrations and departments were reorganised 
into glavki and administrations respectively.^
Kozlov's claims are supported by the many examples
of PPO involvement in these types of changes. As far back
as 1925 it was considered essential that administrative
party cells take part in the working-out of plans concerning
2the organisation of administrative apparatuses. The 
mechanics of the process in more recent times were described 
by the secretary of the PPO of the Latvian Ministry of 
Local Industry in a 1971 Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii article.
1 ibid, pp. 96-97.
2 Petrovichev, N .A. and Ia.V. Storozhev (eds.):
Pervichnaia partiinaia organizatsiia3 dokumenty 
KPSSj, posleoktiabrskii period, Politizdat, 
Moscow, 1970, pp. 92-93.
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His party buro had decided to have the collective examine 
the structure of the apparatus in the light of a number 
of articles that had appeared in Pravda on the new economic 
reforms. As preparation for a general party meeting the 
articles were studied in all party groups. A number of 
suggestions were made, some concerned with a narrower 
definition of the functions of the Departments of Production 
Management, Planning and Finance, and Material Incentive.
A commission was appointed by the party buro to look at 
the suggestions. Together with the leadership of the 
ministry the commission worked out a number of measures. 
These were examined in a party meeting which recommended 
that the minister issue an order on the matter. This was 
done and the party buro took control of the fulfilment of 
the measures. As a result the tasks of each department 
and administration and of individual officials were 
allegedly better defined. Also there was a reduction in 
the number of meetings and conferences.^ Similarly the 
party committee of the Ministry of Instrument Making 
considered the question of raising the role of department 
and administration party organisations in perfecting the 
administrative apparatus. It established a permanent group 
of communists headed by a deputy minister to examine and 
act on any suggestions received. As a result it was 
claimed measures were worked out for improving the structure
1 Kom. Sov. Latvii, 1/71, p. 59.
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of the apparatus, for removing superfluous units and 
raising the organisational role of the glavki. The 
measures were put into effect by the collegium.^
The relative freedom of ministries in the area 
of establishing apparatus structures gives PPO's the 
opportunity to become closely involved in such matters.
There is no suggestion in these examples that there was 
any controversy over the involvement of the PPO's. The 
details available are such that only speculation is possible 
on the precise nature or significance of the PPO role. 
However if we can believe the reports, the activities of 
the PPO's, through their investigations of the situation, 
broad examination and discussion of any findings and 
subsequent recommendations, had a beneficial effect on the 
"host"organisations. This is the ideal mode of operation 
of a staff generalist agency.
In these cases the recommendations suggested by 
the PPO's were able to be implemented by the "host" 
organisation itself. However ministries appear to have 
greater powers to decide their own structures than do 
other non-production institutions. This has not prevented 
PPO's in these other institutions involving themselves in 
matters of organisation and structure. There are numerous 
examples of PPO's being involved in matters of structure
1 Khaldeev, op. cit., p. 375.
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that are apparently, formally at least, beyond the 
control of the "host" organisation. In 1971 a meeting of 
the party committee of the Moscow Technical College examined 
the question of the rational combination of teaching and 
research activities. In some faculties scientific research 
had been interfering with teaching. After examination by 
experts and consideration in the party committee it was 
decided to establish a separate research institute and new 
scientific structural sub-divisions. The same report 
mentions that on the recommendation of the party committee 
one branch {filial) of the college was closed down.  ^ To 
undertake such major structural changes is beyond the 
formal power of scientific institutions. On what basis, 
therefore, are the PPO's involved and to whom do they make 
their recommendations?
One possibility is that educational and scientific 
institutions are given informal powers to undertake their 
own structural reorganisations. Such a view is supported 
to some extent by the case of the Rostov Research Institute 
for the Technology of Machine Construction. It had seemed
1 Mosk. pravda, 10/9/71, p. 2. In the same year
on the recommendation of the party buro a new 
laboratory was set up in the State Institute of 
Glass. Mosk. pravda, 15/9/71, p. 2. In 1972 
the party buro of the Kazakh Energy Research 
Institute established a special commission to 
examine all aspects of the introduction of the 
results of scientific work into practice.
After consultation with the commission the 
party buro suggested the unification of a number 
of separate laboratories. P.zh.Kaz., S/12, 
p. 31.
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a good idea to establish laboratories for the long-term 
prediction of scientific-technical developments in the 
institute. However some (unspecified) elements opposed 
the laboratories on the grounds that they were simply an 
excuse to increase the institute's staff. Thus it was 
left to the party organisation to explain the necessity 
of the laboratories and the right results were said to have 
been achieved.^ The report does not suggest that the 
institute has the power to establish the laboratories by 
itself. But it does suggest that the decision is effectively 
made in the institute, at least to the extent that opposition 
within the institute apparently jeopardised the establish­
ment of the laboratories sufficiently that the PPO had to 
use its powers of "persuasion".
Some other examples suggest another interesting 
possibility, that PPO's use their influence with higher 
authorities to gain decisions on structural matters that 
are advantageous for their "host" organisations. In 1961 
a school in Pavlodar had only recently been converted into 
a technical school. The communists were concerned about 
the administration's leadership of production education.
The director of the school was a "responsible worker", but 
he had little knowledge of production affairs. Therefore, 
working through the gorkom and the city Education Office,
1 Kom., 5/73, pp. 54-55.
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the party members succeeded in having a position for a
head teacher (zavuch) for production studies added to the
establishment.^" Similarly in 1969 the directorate and PPO
of the Institute of Fruit, Vegetable and Potato Growing in
Minsk suggested to the raikom that the institute's production
base be re-located. The raikom supported the suggestion and
with the help of higher authorities one of the state farms
2in the oblast’ became the new base.
In these cases the power of final decision 
certainly did not lie with the "host" organisation.
Therefore it became necessary for the PPO to present the 
interests of the "host" organisation to the decision-making 
bodies. While this should not necessarily be seen as PPO- 
administration collusion, neither can it strictly speaking 
be called control.
However control was evident in those cases where 
the "host" organisation had independent powers, whether 
formal or informal. It cannot be ascertained from the 
evidence available whether the control took on the policy­
making aspect it gains in a situation of decentralised 
decision-making. In the case of the Rostov Research Institute 
for the Technology of Machine Construction the PPO was 
certainly responsible for defusing opposition to the official
1
2
P.zh.Kaz., 5/61, p. 62. 
Kom., 15/69, p. 54.
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policy. Unfortunately the report does not make clear 
who provided the opposition. Neither in this case, nor in 
the other cases cited, can it be positively claimed that 
the PPO was responsible, in a situation of decentralised 
decision-making, for deciding what the official policy 
should be. It is more than possible that in these cases, 
as in the cases where the PPO's were making representations 
to higher authorities, the PPO was simply following the line 
suggested by the institutional leadership. There is no 
evidence of PPO's opposing institutional leaders on 
structural matters.
Of course control does not necessarily mean 
opposition to institutional leadership. The Soviet 
authorities consider that control involves conflict only 
in abnormal situations. The examples could be seen as 
evidence that PPO's play a positive staff generalist role 
in structural matters. They investigate the current 
situation, consider within themselves and with expert 
advice their findings, and on that basis make both 
specific and wide-ranging recommendations to the relevant 
authorities.
This examination of the first category of PPO 
production concerns has suggested that PPO's might undertake 
staff generalist functions. There has not been sufficient 
evidence to determine how beneficial these functions in 
fact are or how much the PPO's present independent view-
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points that go beyond supporting the narrow sectional 
interests of institutional leaderships. The interesting 
possibility has also been raised that PPO's act as the 
representatives of "host" organisation interests, although 
not necessarily in a collusive way, in higher-level party 
policy-making circles.
The next two categories of PPO concerns, 
dealing with matters of more fundamental importance and in 
which "host" organisations have greater opportunities for 
independent action, should shed more conclusive light on 
these important questions.
2. Personnel
A personnel concern that is closely connected 
with structure and organisation is the definition of the 
functions of individual workers. The functions of leading 
institutional officials are usually defined in Council of 
Ministers' decrees/ but institutional leaders, particularly
1 For example, the 1939 Rule (Ustav) for tertiary
educational institutions lists the functions of the 
director, deputy director for academic and scientific 
work, the director's administrative assistant and 
faculty deans. Vysshaia shkola, op. cit., pp. 35-36. 
The 1970 school Rule defines the functions of the 
director, deputy director for study-indoctrination 
work, class leaders, the organiser of extra-curricular 
indoctrination work, the Young Pioneers' leader, the 
person in charge of military affairs and the director's 
administrative assistant. Narodnoe obvazovanie, 
op. cit., pp. 232-234. Kozlov writes that the basic 
rights and duties of ministers, their deputies, the 
heads of independent structural sub-divisions of the 
central apparatus and the heads of enterprises and 
organisations are defined by acts of the government, 
that is, decrees of the Council of Ministers.
Kozlov, op. cit., p. 114.
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ministers, have powers of definition of the functions of
lower-level officials.^" This is an area where one would
expect some decentralisation. Once this decentralisation
occurs one might expect greater PPO involvement. Thus when
a Lvov secondary school party organisation was unhappy
with the distribution of information on intra-school
affairs and the number of meetings that were being held
in the school, a party meeting was held. The director
gave a report (doklad), after which the communists offered
recommendations on a better division of responsibilities
between the director and head teacher (zavuch) . The
2recommendations were accepted.
Another less important aspect of personnel 
policies, but nevertheless one which provides some interest­
ing insight into the role of PPO's, is the concern with 
sovmestitel 1stvo. This means taking two jobs at the same 
time. At times, particularly in the years 1957 and 1958, 
there have been campaigns against sovmestitel rstvo, with
1 The minister has the right to distribute
functions among his deputy ministers, while 
ministerial acts distribute functions among 
the individual officials of the central 
apparatus and subordinate organisations, 
confirm nomenklatury (both the positions on 
the nomenklatura and the organisation 
responsible for the listed positions), and 
define positions requiring special qualific­
ations. Sobranie postanovlenii, 1/72, art. 2, 
para. 7; Kozlov, op. cit., p. 113.
2 P.zh. , 23/66, p. 54.
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PPO's expected to lead the way. In 1958 the PPO of
Perm State University was expected to ensure that
teachers did not interfere with their teaching duties by
taking other jobs.^ At one stage in the mid-50's nearly
50% of the scientific workers in the Ukraine worked in two
or more institutions. The director of the Institute of
Machine Management of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences
only managed to visit the institute a couple of times
weekly. PPO's were criticised for doing nothing about the 
2situation.
However sovmestitel ’stvo is not something to be 
banned altogether. Particularly with the emphasis in 
recent years on research in educational institutions, the 
Soviet authorities have realised the need to in fact 
encourage lecturers to undertake research work and vice 
versa. Since 1956 the rectors of tertiary institutions have 
had the right to authorise faculty members to supplement
3their regular work with work in other institutions. 
Presumably the campaign just mentioned was a reaction 
against excesses following the granting of this right.
Since that time the process has been increasingly subject 
to regulation. In 1972 the Council of Ministers issued a 
decree in which scientific workers were encouraged to
1 P.zh., 1/58, p . 20.
2 Kom. Ukrainy, 8/55, pp. 48-49.
Zaleski, op. cit.,3 p. 331.
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undertake sovmestitel’stvo in educational institutions.
However they were to receive only a half to a quarter of
a regular lecturer's salary, and no more than 2% of the
positions in an institution could be occupied by people
from other institutions.'*' The increasing regulation of
the practice would seem to have reduced the role of PPO's
in this area. There has been no mention of it in recent
years, despite the fact that sovmestitel ' stvo is still very 
2common.
It is interesting that PPO involvement appears 
to have been reduced as the practice of sovmestitel ' stvo 
became increasingly subject to regulation. The explanation 
for this might simply be that with the authorities' more 
positive attitude towards it, PPO control is no longer 
as necessary. However, one would expect that the regulations 
would be very much open to abuse, leaving the PPO the simple 
but significant task of ensuring the observance of specific 
regulations. The fact that there is no evidence of PPO's 
undertaking this task emphasises the generalist nature of 
their functions. They are not agencies suitable or intended 
for close examination of specialised, routine areas. While 
generalism does not exclude involvement in specific problem 
areas, such involvement is not routine, nor is it limited to 
simply registering the breaking of regulations.
1 Sobranie postanovlenii, 14/72, art. 73, para. 15.
2 Conversations in Moscow made it clear that most 
university lecturers undertake some paid research 
work. I spoke to one person doing an aspirantura
in architecture. He claimed to have four other jobs 
and to be earning a total of about 700 roubles per 
month!
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A far more important aspect of personnel policy 
is the selection, distribution and dismissal of personnel.
The power of decision over who fills particular posts is of 
fundamental importance for control of the implementation of 
policies and the general control of the working collective.
The role of the PPO in this area is very complicated. Again 
it is greatly affected by the powers of the "host" organis­
ation - if the "host" organisation has no power over selection 
to and dismissal from a particular position, the PPO's 
influence is limited.
Formally speaking institutional leaders appear to 
have full powers of selection and dismissal of all but the 
top positions in their institutions.1 However there are some
1 While the minister and his deputies are appointed
to their positions by the Council of Ministers, the 
minister has the right to appoint and dismiss the 
staff of the apparatus. Sobranie postanovlenii, 7/72, 
art. 36, paras 7 and 10. Ministries are also respons­
ible for the confirmation of the appointments of 
rectors, deputy rectors and faculty deans of subord­
inate tertiary educational institutions and directors 
of subordinate research institutes. Zaleski, op. cit., 
p. 303. The directors of Academy institutes are elected 
by the General Assembly of the relevant Academy 
Division with the approval of the General Assembly of 
the Academy and the confirmation of the Academy's 
Presidium. The assistant directors and the Chief 
Academic Secretary are appointed by the Presidium 
on the nomination of the director. ibid, p. 219.
The directors of general secondary schools are 
appointed by the Union Republic Ministry of Education 
in republics without oblast' sub-divisions, by the 
Ministry of Education of autonomous republics, by 
krai, oblast' or okrug Departments of Education, or 
in the case of Moscow and Leningrad, by the city 
Department. Narodnoe obrazovanie, op. cit., p. 229.
The deputy director for study-indoctrination work is 
appointed by the city or raion Department of Education 
on the suggestion of the director, ibid, p. 233. The 
directors of primary schools are appointed by the 
city or raion Department. ibid, pp. 232-233.
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limitations on these formal powers in some institutions. 
School directors have the right to appoint teachers and 
assign them to particular posts, but only with the agreement 
of the local Department of Education.^ The rectors of 
tertiary educational institutions and the directors of 
research institutes are also subject to the decisions of
tthe special councils of the All-Union Attestation Commission
{VAK). These councils are established in leading scientific
and tertiary educational institutions and recommend to VAK
the appointments of individuals to positions as dotsenty
and senior scientific workers in the institutions in which
they are situated as well as surrounding institutions.
Confirmation to the positions of assistant and junior
scientific worker is made through an order (prikaz) of the
institutional leader on the basis of the decision of the
council, on the suggestion of the relevant department or
laboratory. These positions do not have to be considered 
2by VAK. The councils have only recently been established 
and exactly how they influence the personnel powers of the 
rector or director is not yet clear. Similarly there is 
no information on party influence over them.
A major informal limitation on the personnel 
powers of institutional leaders, and of PPO's, are the
1 Narodnoe ohvazovanie, op. cit., pp. 232-233.
2 Sobranie postanovlenii, 14/75, art. 81, para. 3; 
3/76, art. 14, para. 99.
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nomenklatury of higher party organs. The nomenklatura
lists the positions appointments to which must be confirmed 
by the higher party organ. If the higher party organ 
exercises this right, something of which we cannot be 
certain/ it complicates the institutional leaders' task 
of making appointments and dismissals. However the effect 
on the PPO is even greater, presumably taking away its 
influence altogether. Unfortunately information on the 
nomenklatury of higher party organs is extremely hard to 
find, especially on any non-production posts that might be 
listed. In 1966 the Riga gorkom had 662 positions on its
nomenklatura, divided up as follows:
Workers in party and soviet organs 253
Workers in ideological organs 83
Managerial personnel (primarily 
enterprise directors, chief 
engineers, personnel heads) 107
Workers in construction and local
services 61
Workers in administrative, trade
and financial organs 85
Workers in educational institutions 71
660
1 In 1954 the head of a raikom Organisational 
Department informed Partiinaia zhizn 1 that 
there were too many positions on the raikom's 
nomenklatura (the number quoted was 450) and 
that most appointments were dealt with
"formalistically", without any details been 
given on what this means. P.zh., 10/54, p. 65; 
see also, 1/56, p. 7.
2 Korn., 1/66, p. 36. As is often the case with 
Soviet statistics, the sub-totals given do not 
add up to the total claimed.
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Most positions on raikom, gorkom and obkom nomenklatury
are the heads of local institutions.^ One would not expect
PPO's to have power over appointments to these positions.
What is interesting is the degree to which the nomenklatury
include workers other than the institutional head. The
lists change according to the situation at the time and the
2importance of the institution. However it appears that the
most important leading positions in an institution are on a
3raikom or gorkom nomenklatura.
1 See the list given in P.zh., 10/54, p. 65 and 
the nomenklatury in the Smolensk Archive,
WKP33, 1928; WKP215, 1929.
2 P.zh. , 10/54, p. 65.
3 Deputy directors, chief engineers and the heads
of personnel departments of enterprises and the 
deputy chairmen of collective farms and rural 
Soviets are listed. Korn. , 1/66, p. 36; P.zh. , 
3/55, p. 57; 10/54, p. 65. There is confusion
over the heads of structural sub-divisions of 
enterprises and institutions. A 1954 Partiinaia 
zhizn1 article claimed that brigade leaders and 
farm heads on collective farms were on raikom 
nomenklatury. A later article in the same 
journal agreed that this was the formal situation, 
but claimed that in fact raikomy showed little 
concern for such positions. P.zh., 10/54, p. 65; 
1/56, p. 7. Partiinaia zhizn’ Kazakhstana in 
1969 claimed that these positions were on raikom 
nomenklatury. P.zh.Kaz., 9/69, p. 28.
However it appears that positions as shop heads 
in industrial enterprises are dealt with by the 
PPO. P.zh., 3/55, p. 57. These details are 
unfortunately of little use in deciding on the 
situation in non-production organisations.
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The direct information available on positions in 
non-production institutions is very slight. One report 
says that 20% of the workers of the Belorussian Design- 
Technical Institute Belbyttekhproekt are on the raikom's 
uchetnaia nomenklatura (this refers to the list of positions 
notification of appointments to which must be sent to the 
raikom, although the raikom itself is not involved in 
confirming the actual appointment itself).^" There is also 
a complaint from the secretary of the PPO of the Kazakh 
branch of the All-Union Academy of Construction and 
Architecture about communists who think too highly of them­
selves, considering that once they are on an obkom or
Central Committee nomenklatura they are beyond raikom 
2control. Unfortunately in neither case is any idea given
of what positions might be on these lists. A 1954
Partiinaia zhizn ’ report lists some non-production positions
on raikom nomenklatury in the Altai krai - newspaper and
printing officials, accountants of raion offices of the
Ministry of Supply and instructors of raion departments of
3the Central Statistical Administration. A 1929
nomenklatura in the Smolensk Archive makes the obkom 
responsible for confirming the appointment of the deans 
of the Pedagogical and Medical Faculties and the pro-rector
1 Kom.Belorussii, 6/69, p. 63.
2 P.zh.Kaz., 9/61, p. 34.
3 P.zh., 10/54, p. 65.
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and vice rector of Smolensk University. The chief 
accountants of the guberniia offices of Gosbank, the 
Agricultural Bank and the Communal Bank were on the gubkom's 
nomenklatura, while the department heads of the guberniia 
Insurance Office, the financial controllers, inspectors 
and the chief cashier of the guberniia Finance Department 
and Gosbank office, the head of the Inspectors' Department 
of the Agricultural Bank, and the members of the administ­
ration of the Yartsevsk Mill Union were all on the 
nomenklatura of the ukom (uezdnyi komitet; roughly 
equivalent to a raikom) or raikom.^
This information is both very old and very scattered. 
It is fortunate that there is considerably more information 
on the nomenklatury of the PPO's themselves, although none 
is available on the nomenklatury of administrative PPO's.
This should not be taken to mean that nomenklatury do not 
exist in this category, or that these PPO's are not involved 
in personnel affairs. There are numerous references to 
show that they are closely involved in this area of concern.
The nomenklatury for educational and research institutions 
include all leading personnel with the exception of the head
1 ibid, WKP33.
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of the institution himself."*"
Nomenklatury refer to positions appointments to 
and removals from which must be confirmed by the relevant 
party organisation. However many reports suggest that 
such formally defined lists of positions are somewhat 
redundant. The vast majority of reports express the view
1 The nomenklatura of the PPO of the Tashkent
Institute for Engineers for the Irrigation 
and Mechanisation of Agriculture lists the 
members of the Academic Council, the selection 
(konkursnaia), admission and subject 
commissions, the pro-rectors, department heads 
and the leaders of social organisations.
Pravda Ukrainy, 1/4/72, p. 2. In the Kiev 
Teachers' College department heads and deans 
are chosen with the participation and agreement 
of the party committee. Pravda Ukrainy,
26/1/72, p. 2. The party committee of the 
Kalinin Polytechnical Institute also examines 
applicants for the positions of department 
head and dean, while the faculty party buros 
do the same for senior lecturers, assistants 
and research workers. P.zh., 24/71, p. 38.
The nomenklatura of the party committee of 
the Moscow Engineering-Economics Institute 
includes the pro-rectors, the faculty deans 
and sub-deans, the heads of all ancillary services 
serving the institute as a whole, department 
heads, teachers in the Social Science 
departments, all professorships and the heads 
of research laboratories and departments. All 
other positions are listed on the nomenklatury 
of subordinate party buros. Samsonov, N:
Partkom vuza, Izd. "Moskovskii rabochii",
Moscow, 1973, p. 10. Nomenklatury of research 
PPO's usually include such positions as deputy 
directors, heads, deputy heads and academic 
secretaries of sectors and heads of departments. 
Korn., 11/72, p. 62; Kom. Ukrainy, 6/71, p. 88.
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that PPO's should confirm all appointments, transfers and 
dismissals.^
Confirmation means that once a decision has been 
made by the relevant authorities a general party meeting, 
or more usually a party buro or committee meeting, must 
approve the appointment. Partiinaia zhizn' gives a 
rather confusing idea of the process in reply to a 1973 
letter from a member of the party buro of a research 
institute about the role of the party organisation in the 
konkurs method of making appointments. (In many academic 
and scientific institutions a number of positions, usually 
the heads of structural sub-divisions, are filled by 
competition {konkurs) , that is, the director names someone 
to the position only after a majority of members of the 
Academic or Scientific Council or special selection 
(konkursnaia) commission have voted for the candidate in a 
secret ballot). He asks specifically whether the PPO has
1 Such statements are made for all categories of
institutions. Among the research institutes 
of the Leninskii raikom in Moscow there is 
no shifting of scientific personnel without 
the institute PPO's giving their opinions. P.zh., 
22/71, p. 30. Similar statements are made 
about such educational institutions as the 
Tashkent Polytechnical Institute and Moscow 
State University. Pravda Vostoka, 1/4/72, p. 2; 
P.zh., 20/76, p. 36; hospitals such as the 
Podol Central raion hospital and the Kalinin 
oblast’ clinical hospital. P.zh., 12/72, p. 52; 
Kom., 4/73, p. 30; and ministries like the 
All-Union Ministry of Railways and the RSFSR 
Ministries of Agriculture and Procurements.
P.zh., 4/66, p. 44; 9/69, p. 52; 12/73, p. 20.
Pravda Vostoka declared in 1972 that school 
party organisations must confirm the appoint­
ments of all new teachers. Pravda Vostoka, 
1/4/72, p. 2.
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to confirm the candidate after his election. The journal 
concludes a long reply rather confusingly with the 
statement that there is no necessity for the party organis­
ation to confirm the appointment of the selected candidate. 
This is strange considering that the positions usually 
decided by konkurs are listed on the nomenklatury of 
research PPO's.
However there is much about the journal's reply 
that suggests that confirmation would be rather redundant 
anyway, since the PPO would have had ample opportunity to 
express its point of view on any particular appointment 
long before it came to the confirmation stage. The 
journal says that mistakes are unlikely to be made in the 
selection process if the institute's leadership confers 
with the party organisation, presumably before the event.1
Other reports, while never being specific, make 
it clear that communist members of councils and commissions 
responsible for making appointments act as representatives
1 P. zh. , 12/73, pp. 42-43.
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of the PPO during the selection process.
In ministries the collegiums have considerable
personnel powers. As a rule personnel appointments and
dismissals can be made by a minister only after examination
of the matter by the collegium. Collegiums also have
nomenklatury of positions for which they are specifically 
2responsible. The role of collegiums in this area could
1 The article just cited states that occasionally 
the party organisation can recommend someone 
for appointment itself, the recommendation 
being presented by the communist members of the 
council or commission conducting the konkurs.
P.zh., 12/73, pp. 42-43. The party organisation 
of the Arkhangel Medical Institute has 
representatives who take an active part in the 
work of the commission for the filling of teaching 
positions and the granting of academic ranks. 
Barkusov, op. cit., p. 69. The party committee
of the Tashkent Institute of Rail Transport 
Engineers influences the work of the selection 
commission through its communist membership.
Pravda Vostoka, 1/4/72, p. 2. Kommunist (Vilnius) 
speaks of the role of the party members in the 
work of the Scientific Council and the selection 
commission for the appointment of new workers 
in the Lithuanian Institute of Economics. Korn. 
(Vilnius), 6/72, p. 33. Party representatives 
actively influence the work of the personnel 
commission of the Institute of Mathematics. 
Ianovskii, op. cit., p. 102.
2 However the nomenklatury are defined by the 
minister. They usually include such positions as 
glavk, administration and department heads, 
deputy heads and chief engineers, the head of the 
ministerial office, the chief accountant of the 
ministry, the directors and chief engineers of 
the biggest enterprises and the directors of 
research institutes. In the case of the Lithuanian 
Ministry of Construction the collegium decides its 
nomeyiklatura for itself. Details are not available 
on the procedure with regard to these positions; 
almost certainly the ministers have at least the 
right of confirmation. Davitnidze, op. cit.,
pp. 99-103.
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be an important one. Therefore a report that the party
committee of the Ministry of Chemical and Oil Machine
Construction works together with the collegium is worthy
of note.^  Another report goes into more detail. After the
Moldavian Central Committee had criticised the personnel
situation in the Moldavian Ministry of Food Industry the
ministry's PPO had a meeting to consider the criticism.
The matter was then considered in a widened collegium
meeting, after which measures were taken to improve the 
2situation. The implication is strong that the party 
organisation had some direct influence over the collegium.
PPO's also use the usual powers of the right of
control in personnel matters. They can hear reports from
3institutional leaders on personnel matters. The information 
gained from such reports is supplemented by the 
investigations of various party commissions established 
for personnel purposes. Educational PPO's, such as that 
in Tartu State University, have control commissions for
1 Pravda, 29/11/71, p. 2.
2 Kom.Moldavii, S/61, pp. 60-61.
3 In 1961 the party buro of the Irkutsk oblast' 
office of Gosbank heard a report (doklad) from 
the head of the Personnel Department. P.zh., 
10/61, p. 56. A Pravda editorial in 1967 
declared that ministerial PPO's could hear from
(zaslushivali) glavk and department heads on how 
they select, assign and use personnel and how 
they prepare reserves for promotion. Pravda, 
16/6/67, p. 2.
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the selection and distribution of personnel, as do those, 
such as that of the Institute of Mathematics of the All- 
Union Academy of Sciences, in research institutes.^-
The PPO's are then able to make formal recommend­
ations. Thus when the party members in one school noticed 
the keen attitude of one non-party teacher, they recommended
to the administration, with good effect, that she be 
2promoted. The party organisation of the All-Union Research
Institute for the Application of Polymer Materials to
Irrigation and Water Use goes further. Sometimes the
administration changes its mind on the appointment and
transfer of scientific personnel on the party organisation's
3insistence (po nastoianiiu) .
What is it that PPO's are concerned with in their 
involvement in the appointment of personnel? Soviet 
sources stress their responsibility for ensuring that people
1 Ianovskii, op. cit., p. 102; Kom.Estonii,
9/71, p. 9.
2 P.zh., 20/63, p. 51. A Soviet book on PPO's 
declares that since they are in a good position 
to know the capabilities of workers down to the 
lowest levels, they should take the initiative 
in suggesting people for promotion. It also 
claims that voluntary social work keenly under­
taken is a positive factor that will be taken 
into account by PPO's in recommending people for 
promotion. Khaldeev, op. cit., p. 234.
3 Korn.Sov.Latvii, 9/73, p. 52.
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are of high quality and suitable for the positions to which 
they have been appointed. For example, bureaucratic PPO's 
are expected to ensure that administrative officials have 
high levels of education, technical ability and experience; 
that the type of work suits their experience and qualific­
ations; and that as much as possible younger people are 
introduced into positions of responsibility.'*' Particular 
emphasis is laid on the importance of using trained
2personnel in jobs suitable to their qualifications.
So far the discussion has been concerned with the 
appointment and transfer of personnel. However the PPO's 
concern does not stop there. It is expected to continue 
after appointments have been made. Firstly, PPO's are 
expected to be concerned with raising the qualifications of 
leading rank-and-file workers. We have already described 
the extensive party indoctrination networks, with their
1 P.zh., 14/54, p. 21; 19/63, pp. 40-41;
4/66, pp. 43-44.
2 The PPO of the Riazan oblast' library advised 
the administration not to use administrative 
workers in library positions. Barkusov, op. cit., 
pp. 95-96. It is also considered the responsib­
ility of research PPO's to get specialists out
of bureaucratic jobs. P.zh., 1/56, p. 21. The 
party committee of the Tashkent Polytechnical 
Institute opposed the appointment of a teacher 
with a background in applied economics as head 
of the Department of Political Economy. Apparently 
in this case support for the party committee from 
higher party authorities was the deciding factor. 
Pravda Vostoka, 1/4/72, p. 2. Ideological consid­
erations were presumably of considerable signif­
icance in this case.
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involvement in administrative, technical and scientific, 
as well as ideological training. However PPO's are not 
limited to party indoctrination; they are also able to 
involve themselves in a more indirect way in the formal 
professional training and qualifications of workers. Thus 
in 1961 Pavtiinaia zhizn' reported that school PPO's were 
more and more often looking at questions of the professional 
qualifications of teachers.^ In 1958 the same journal 
criticised research PPO's that pay insufficient attention 
to the preparation and qualifications of scientific 
personnel.^
PPO's have the usual means available to them 
for undertaking these tasks. They hold institutional 
leaders responsible for their performance in this area.
In 1974 at a party meeting in the North Donets branch 
of the All-Union Research and Construction Institute of 
Chemical Machine Construction communists severely criticised
1 P.zh., 2/61, p. 38.
2 P.zh., 11/58, p. 15. Pavtiinaia zhizn’
Kazakhs tana considers that a low number of 
candidates and doctors of science in an institute 
is a sign of a lack of concern on the part of the 
institute's PPO for the qualifications of scientif­
ic workers. P.zh.Kaz., 3/62, p. 8. The party 
buro of the Mossovet Academic Theatre is said to 
keep all questions of the professional training of 
actors at the centre of its attention, while in 1961 
the editorial board and the party organisation of 
the West Kazakh oblast' newspaper were criticised 
for paying insufficient attention to the journal­
istic professionalism of journalists. Sov. 
Kirgiziia, 8/2/73, p. 4; P.zh.Kaz., 2/61,
pp. 111-112.
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the director and his deputy for scientific work for the 
unsatisfactory preparation of scientific personnel.'*' In 
1972 the party committee of the Kuibyshev Aviation Institute 
heard a report (otohet) from the pro-rector for scientific 
work on the fulfilment of plans for the preparation of 
scientific-teaching personnel. This party organisation 
also has a control commission for raising the effectiveness 
of scientific work and the preparation of scientific 
personnel.^
One of the most important means available is the
exercise of party influence over the deliberations of non-
party commissions concerned with qualifications. The most
important organisation as far as academic qualifications
are concerned is the All-Union Attestation Commission {VAX) .
I have already made some mention of its involvement in
recommending appointments. It is also responsible for the
granting of academic degrees. In the past Academic and
Scientific Councils were the immediately responsible organs,
3although subject to the control of VAK. However attestation 
councils were then established specifically for the examin­
ation of applicants for degrees. They were established for
1 P.zh., 24/74, p. 72.
2 Vestnik Vysshei shkoly, 10/72, p. 64. In 1968 
all the institutes of the Ukrainian Academy of 
Sciences had control groups which examined the 
preparation of scientific personnel. Kom.
1/68, p. 8.
3 Vysshaia shkola, op. cit., p. 326.
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single disciplines and were expected to provide a more
specialised, and therefore more knowledgeable, examination.
However there were considerable difficulties resulting
from a shortage of qualified people to become members of
the commissions. VAK issued detailed instructions on the
minimum numbers of doctors and candidates of science in
the particular discipline that were required to be members
of the councils. However with the great proliferation of
councils it proved impossible to find sufficient people.^
Therefore in 1975 and 1976 new procedures were announced,
by which the councils were concentrated in the largest
and most important academic and scientific centres. They
are formed on the petition of the Academy of Sciences or
the relevant ministry. Doctors' degrees are granted by the
Presidium of VAK on the basis of a recommendation from the
special attestation council and the conclusions of an
expert council set up within VAK and made up of specialists
working in VAK on a part-time basis. A candidate's degree
is granted by decision of the special council. VAK has the
right to control the granting of a candidate's degree and
2can change the special council's decision.
1 In 1974 Rostov State University had 15
councils, of which almost half did not meet 
the minimum membership requirements.
Literaturnaia gazeta, 12/6/74, p. 12.
2 Sobranie postanovlenii, 14/75, art. 81; 
3/76, art. 14.
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One would expect to find evidence of considerable 
PPO influence over the activities of the councils. The 
granting of degrees is a process which suffers from con­
siderable abuse. The case most publicised in the Soviet 
Union concerned the chairman of the Council for Economic 
Sciences of the Yakutsk State University. His numerous 
misdeeds included taking the thesis of an aspirant from the 
Moscow Teachers' College for which he had been appointed 
examiner, giving it to one of his students for transcription, 
and then arranging for the "new" thesis to be accepted 
by his council.^ One would expect PPO's to be involved in 
preventing such abuse. The granting of degrees can also be 
politically sensitive. One person I spoke to in Moscow was
1 Literaturnaia gazeta, 5/6/74, p. 11; P.zh.,
19/73, pp. 50-51. A. Pravdin, in his interview 
with M. Matthews, claims that senior party 
workers often arrange to have someone write 
dissertations for them. To have a degree can 
provide insurance against future political 
problems, since with a degree one can always 
find an academic position. Pravdin, A., inter­
viewed by M. Matthews: "Inside the CPSU Central
Committee", Survey, vol. 12, no. 4, Autumn,
1974, p. 102. In 1964 Partiinaia zhizn' Kazakhstana 
reported, without any criticism, that one K.D. 
Diiarov had been granted a Candidate of Agric­
ultural Sciences degree by an expanded meeting 
of the Academic Council of the Alma-Ata Zoological 
Institute. Although he did not work in any 
institute, had never done an aspirantura or even 
written a dissertation, he had worked in agric­
ulture for many years as an obkom and ministerial 
official. P.zh.Kaz., 2/64, p. 66. Agursky 
claims that abuse is particularly common in the 
defence industry, since the secrecy surrounding 
that industry means that VAK has no right to 
examine applicants for degrees. Agursky, op. cit., 
p. 24 .
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of the opinion that the reason one of his students was 
finding it difficult to have her excellent candidate's 
dissertation accepted was that she was Jewish. This should 
increase the likelihood of PPO involvement.
However there is not overwhelming evidence of 
PPO involvement. It is true that the Council of Ministers' 
Statute on attestation councils declares:
In the membership of the council with a 
deciding vote, according to established 
procedures, are included representatives 
of the party and trade union organisations,^
and that "socio-political" references from the party
buro of the Moscow Economics-Engineering Institute are
required before a dissertation can even be submitted
2for examination. One must assume that PPO's exercise 
influence over the work of the councils through the members 
of the councils who are communists. However I have no 
positive statements to that effect. When the case of the 
Council for the Economic Sciences in Yakutsk State 
University was considered by the Committee for Party 
Control, the lack of control exercised by the university's 
party committee, and local party organs, was mentioned, but
1
2
Sobranie postanovlenii, 3/76, art. 14, para. 14. 
Samsonov, op. cit., p. 10.
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no party workers were specifically criticised or 
reprimanded.^
One complication for PPO's in their control of 
the councils is that they are situated only in leading 
institutions. Is the "host" PPO responsible for control 
of the council even when it is working in another 
institution, or does the PPO of the institution where the 
council is working at the time assume responsibility? It 
is not clear whether the council's members are drawn only 
from the "parent" institution. However membership is 
derived, is each communist member of a council under the 
control of his own PPO, or the PPO of the institution in 
which the council is working at the time? Even with the 
great increase in contacts between PPO's in recent years 
these problems of overlapping jursidiction probably lead 
to a decreasing involvement of the work of PPO's in the 
work of the councils and the increasing involvement of 
higher party organs. This would be in keeping with the
1 In a similar, if much earlier case, the party's
role was quite inadequate. In 1955 the Council 
of the Agronomic Faculties of the Omsk Agric­
ultural Institute rejected a candidate's 
dissertation. But the director of the institute 
was the aspirant's supervisor. He arranged for 
the head of the obkom Department of Science and 
Culture to support the dissertation at its second 
defence, the result being that it was accepted. 
The institute's party buro was criticised for 
doing nothing about this illegal behaviour, and 
for ignoring the lack of qualification of the 
council to examine dissertations in some branches 
of science. P.zh., 17/55, pp. 62-65.
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apparent centralisation of control that is implicit in 
the formation of the special councils. However the new 
arrangements are very recent. Before any definite 
conclusions can be reached some further empirical evidence 
is required.
The final area of PPO involvement in personnel 
is an on-going evaluation of the work of individuals.
Academic and scientific organisations have formally 
established organisations and procedures for the periodic 
examination of performance which can result in dismissal.
It appears that usually an individual's performance is 
evaluated every three (for junior workers) or five (for 
senior workers) years by a special "attestation" commission 
(presumably different from the council responsible for 
academic degrees, but also sometimes known as a konkurs 
commission, presumably the same as is responsible for 
recommending new appointments). Final confirmation of 
the commission's decision is made by the head of the 
organisation or its Council. A 1974 Decree of the Council 
of Ministers describes the formation of commissions for the 
attestation of teachers from general secondary schools. They 
are formed under the Ministries of Education of Union and 
Autonomous Republics not having oblast' divisions or other­
wise under krai, oblast' and capital city Education 
Departments. The commissions must have representatives of 
party, trade union and komsomol organisations in their
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membership. They make recommendations to the heads of the 
organisations which formed them on the granting of honorific 
titles or dismissal depending on the individual teacher's 
performance.^" Evidently in schools formal evaluation by 
attestation commissions is quite highly centralised.
Although the decree specifies party representation, there 
is presumably little room for the direct involvement of 
school PPO's.
However tertiary educational institutions have 
their own attestation commissions. In 1954 the All-Union 
Ministry of Culture issued an instruction on how to 
conduct the attestation of senior laboratory workers in 
tertiary educational institutions. The attestation takes 
place once every three years and is to be undertaken by a 
commission consisting of the deputy director of the 
institution for academic and scientific work, the dean of 
the faculty, the head of the department, the head of the 
institution's Personnel Department, and representatives of 
the party and trade union organisations. The commission takes 
into account such factors as academic work completed, 
participation in scientific work, assistance given to 
students, work done to improve one's own qualifications, 
the raising of one's ideo-political level, and social work 
done. The commission can recommend promotion, demotion or
1 Sobranie postanovlenii, 11/74, art. 53.
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dismissal, its recommendation being decided by a majority 
vote and then confirmed by the director of the institution.^"
There are cases of individuals failing to be
re-appointed to their positions for apparently "technical"
reasons. Although Literaturnaia gazeta complained loudly
about the procedure used in adopting the 1972 decision of
the Scientific Council of the Leningrad Institute of
Oncology not to re-appoint the head of the Laboratory of
the Physiopathology of Tumerous Growths to his post, it
appears that the decision was made on the grounds that for
fifteen years the scientist's work had produced no
practical results, not because of any internal "political"
2considerations. However clearly the opportunity exists
for the process to be used for "political" reasons. Thus,
when the Academic Council of the Institute of Linguistics
of the All-Union Academy of Sciences considered the
re-appointment of I.A. Mel'chuk to his post, it voted 19
to 2 (with 3 abstentions) against. This was following the
publication in "The New York Times" of a letter by him
disassociating himself from the campaign against Sakharov
<1 3and protesting about the gaoling of Kovalev.
1 Vysshaia shkola, op. cit., pp. 306-308.
Apparently some time since 1954 the power of 
confirmation has been given to the Academic Council.
2 Literaturnaia gazeta, 16/8/72, p. 12; 1/11/72,
p . 11.
3 An unpublished "Open Letter" to his colleagues by 
I.A. Mel'chuk.
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The PPO exercises the same sort of influence over
the commissions and the councils in this process as in any
similar processes. Just as the communist members of
Councils influence their work, so the communist members of
attestation commissions are said to actively influence
their work.^ The secretary of the party buro of the Magadan
institute Dal ' stroiproekt considers that simply having
representation on the commissions is not enough. He says:
Obviously the party buro must take upon
itself, together with the directorate, the
formation of the attestation commissions
and the day-to-day control of the
objectivity of the approach to the
2attestation of workers.
As with new appointments, so with re-appointments the PPO 
has the right to make apparently binding recommendations in 
its own right. A book on the Moscow Engineering-Economics 
Institute says:
Transfers in the faculties, research sub­
divisions and other service divisions of the 
institute, re-appointment to positions, and 
also the granting of academic degrees to the 
institute's workers can only take place with
1
2
Ianovskii, op. cit., p. 102. 
Khaldeev, op. cit., p. 108.
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the granting of a positive social- 
political reference from the party 
committee or party buro. Without a 
social-political reference the 
documents for the participation 
of lecturers and scientific 
workers in the konkurs process 
will not be accepted.'*'
One of Literaturnaia gazeta's complaints about the 
dismissal in the Institute of Oncology was that the 
vote went against re-appointment despite the fact that 
a positive reference had been given by the institute's 
treugol’nik (director, PPO secretary and trade union
1 Samsonov, op. cit., p. 10.
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chairman)
1
1
Literaturnaia gazeta, 16/8/72, p. 12. Allen 
Kroncher has written an interesting article on 
socialist competition in the Plekhanov Institute 
of Economics in which such references play a part. 
Kroncher, A: "Socialist Competition at the Plek­
hanov Institute", Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, 
480/76, Nov. 23, 1976. Basing his analysis on an 
article by B. Mochalov, the director of the 
institute, in Voprosy ekonomiki, he claims that 
a negative evaluation of an individual's perform­
ance in socialist competition can result in 
failure to be re-appointed to his position. He 
stresses that it is the party buros of the institute's 
faculties and departments which make these evaluat­
ions. In fact Mochalov says that only in the 
Departments of the Social Sciences is the evaluation 
of the work of lecturers made by faculty party 
buros, in the form of references which are still 
only granted with the agreement of the deans of the 
faculties. Voprosy ekonomiki, 2/73, pp. 60-61.
I have already made the point in Chapter One that 
the Departments of the Social Sciences are under 
much closer party control than others. Also, 
while it is true that Mochalov expresses doubt 
about the effectiveness of the usual konkurs 
system, his main objection being that it takes 
place only once every five years, and speaks 
vaguely of the new system of socialist competition 
providing the opportunity for "a change in the 
system of re-election of professors and lecturers", 
the details he gives on the new system differ little 
from the old. Evaluation is apparently still made 
every five years by faculties and their konkurs 
commissions, which can recommend to the Academic 
Council not to re-appoint. ibid, pp. 59-61. The 
only apparent difference from the old system is 
that definite indicators for socialist competition, 
of the type described in Chapter One, are used in 
evaluation. The old system could be used no less 
than the new, as I.A. Mel'chuk found to his cost, 
for removing politically unacceptable individuals. 
Therefore the points made by Kroncher about the new 
system leading to tighter party control in the 
institute should be considered with some caution.
This is not to deny the basic point that Soviet 
institutions have the opportunity to remove indiv­
iduals unacceptable for either "technical" or 
political reasons, and that PPO's play an important 
part in this.
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It is impossible to determine whether the PPO 
influences the actual voting in the councils once it has 
given its reference. The voting is supposed to be secret. 
However it is admitted even in Soviet sources that the 
ballot often shows signs of having been manipulated.^
However no details are given on how this might occur.
This makes it impossible to determine the role of the PPO.
Nevertheless there are ample opportunities for
PPO influence over the re-appointment process. That the
process is used for politically motivated job discrimination
2can be seen in the case of Mel'chuk.
The re-appointment process gives the best 
opportunity for the removal of undesirable personnel.
However it is rather formal and does not occur often.
PPO's have far more flexible means at their disposal for 
at least evaluating the work performance of individuals.
The most popular in recent times has been the hearing of 
reports from individual party members in party buro, comm­
ittee and general party meetings. In the last chapter, in 
describing the right of control, I concentrated on the
1 Literaturnaia gazeta, 16/8/72, p. 12.
2 For further evidence of politically-motivated 
job discrimination, against Jews in the defence 
industry and overseas appointments, see 
Agursky, op. cit., pp. 26-27 and Myagkov, A:
Inside the KGB, an expose by an officer of the 
Third Directorate, Foreign Affairs Publishing Co., 
Richmond, Surrey, 1976, p. 38.
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hearing of reports from institutional leaders. However 
in recent years, with the increased emphasis on the 
"party style of work" and the personal accountab.ility of 
individuals, great use has been made of hearing reports 
from rank-and-file communists on their production 
performance.^
PPO's also use the other powers of the right of 
control, to establish investigative commissions and to 
offer recommendations to the administration, in their control 
of individuals' production performance. Thus when a 
number of complaints started coming in about the state of 
work and behaviour of one of the leading workers of the 
Institute of Gold and Rare Metals, the party buro recommended 
that the administration talk to him. When he did not 
react, the party buro established a commission and directed 
it to look into the matter. It uncovered serious short­
comings. The party buro considered the commission's
findings and made certain unspecified recommendations to the 
2directorate. The recommendations probably included some
1 The two communists who gave reports (otchety) 
on their administrative performances to a 
party meeting of the Uritsky raipotvebsoiuz
(raion Consumers' Union) were asked many 
questions by their fellow communists, including 
how they were working to improve themselves and 
how they were influencing non-party people.
P.2/2. , 9/69 , p. 49 .
2 Pvavda, 9/2/72, p. 2.
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administrative penalty, perhaps even dismissal. After a 
rather obscure dispute in the Odessa Polytechnical Institute 
between a professor and an engineer over the engineer's 
new invention, the institute's party committee blamed the 
professor, upon which the rector dismissed him from his 
post as head of the Research Department. Similarly, after 
another dispute between two professors over plagiarism, the 
party committee examined the matter and as a result one of 
the professors was dismissed from his post as a department 
head.^
Involvement in personnel matters appears to be 
one of the bellweathers of PPO power. The evidence suggests 
that it has increased considerably since 1965 and particularly 
since 1971.
1 Literaturnaia gazeta, 28/3/73, p. 12;
Sotsialisticheskaia industriia, 29/5/74, p. 3.
As mentioned in Chapter One party discipline can 
also be used in such cases. The gtavk head in 
the RSFSR Ministry of Rural Construction who 
failed to respond to the party committee's demands 
to improve the work of the glavk was given a party 
reprimand. P.zh., 8/73, p. 39. If the PPO feels 
that the individual to be attacked is too powerful 
for it, it will turn to higher authorities for 
assistance. When the PPO of the All-Union State 
Committee for Construction (Gosstroi) considered 
that a deputy chairman of the State Committee 
was behaving badly towards his subordinates, he 
was warned by the party committee. When there was 
no improvement, he was reported to and warned by 
the Moscow gorkom. Eventually he was given a party 
reprimand by the Committee for Party Control and 
removed from his post. P.zh., 3/69, p. 46.
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How compatible is this power with the staff 
generalist role? The Western line-staff models on which 
the staff generalist model is based curiously ignore 
personnel matters. Personnel policy is of fundamental 
importance for the staff generalist role, since a concern 
with the overall and long-term efficient operation of the 
line organisation presupposes a concern with the quality 
of personnel. However the tone of especially Sampson's 
and even Golembiewski's prescriptions on staff power 
suggest that they would be of the opinion that the powers 
of PPO's in the personnel area are too extensive. The 
right to vet all personnel appointments before they are 
made, indeed even to prevent the consideration of applicants 
for positions, the right to influence the granting of 
qualifications and titles, and to initiate the dismissal 
of personnel involves the PPO very closely in the "operational" 
activities of the line organisation. Sampson would probably 
see the proper staff role in personnel matters going no 
further than a general concern for recruitment policy and 
the training of workers and the ability to draw general 
conclusions on the success or otherwise of general policies 
and training from the specific problems of individual 
workers. While he might grant the staff agency the right 
to participate in defining the general type of person that 
should be recruited into the organisation, he certainly 
would not give it the right to decide on the suitability of 
each and every applicant for a position.
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However it could be said that PPO involvement 
in personnel matters is in the spirit, if not the strict 
form of the staff generalist role, if it were used to 
achieve staff generalist aims, if it were used for the 
general improvement of the operations of the "host" 
organisation.
The Western orientation of the staff generalist 
models on which the methodological orientation of this 
thesis has been based makes it difficult to adequately 
analyse the significance of the more politically-oriented 
involvement of PPO's in personnel matters. Whether this 
sort of involvement could be said to contribute to the 
achievement of staff generalist aims depends on subject­
ively held organisational values. The top party authorities, 
and their PPO representatives, are presumably of the 
opinion that politically-motivated job discrimination 
contributes to the more effective operation of individual 
institutions and the Soviet system as a whole. Most Western 
observers would be of the opposite opinion.
These difficulties do not apply in cases where 
PPO involvement is apparently motivated by "technical" 
considerations, the ability of individuals to function 
successfully in their operational roles. Of course this in 
itself does not constitute a staff generalist involvement.
It should be the responsibility of the line hierarchy to
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ensure that individual workers are able and willing to 
undertake their operational tasks. The staff generalist 
agency should be interested in individual cases only to 
the extent that they provide an insight into the general 
problems in personnel policy and the implementation of 
organisational goals.
There has been little in this section to suggest 
that this is the concern of the PPO's. There were some 
brief and vague reports on their general concern for the 
qualifications of workers, but the great bulk of the 
powers and concerns described are directed towards the 
close control of specific workers in specific situations 
with little long-term perspective evident. If, as it 
appears, one of the main aims of the 1971 widened application 
of the right of control was to give PPO's the power to hold 
all workers individually accountable for operational 
performance, this tendency is increasing under official 
sponsorship. This raises serious questions about the staff 
generalist role of PPO's, since it appears that non-staff 
generalist methods of operation are being encouraged in one 
of the most important areas of PPO activity.^
1 It could be said that close control of personnel
is necessary for the successful implementation of 
long-term policies, that it is therefore a necessary 
foundation for a staff generalist role. This will be 
discussed in more detail in the chapter on ministerial 
PPO's. There we will find particular emphasis placed 
on the accountability of each worker before the PPO 
for his role in the implementation of the economic 
reforms. However I come to the conclusion in that 
chapter that although the PPO's might have staff 
generalist aims, their means, such as this control of 
individuals' performance, are not staff generalist 
and could well lead to their lack of success.
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Thus, while this section has made evident the major 
importance of the PPO in the operations of the "host" 
organisation, it has cast some doubts on its staff 
generalist role, the central theme of this thesis.
3. Operational performance
The final category of PPO production concern is 
the operational performance of the "host" organisation.
This does not mean the simple measuring of the effectiveness 
of performance, but includes providing the setting for 
performance. Thus we have to consider the planning process 
and the material conditions in which production takes place. 
We then have to consider the concern of PPO's with the 
actual operations of the "production" process, including 
the links of the "host" organisation with outside 
organisations. This is particularly important in the case 
of administrative institutions, since they themselves 
are not directly involved in "production". There is the 
relatively limited matter of the internal administrative 
procedures of the institutions themselves to be considered, 
but most of their "production" concerns are centred in 
subordinate production enterprises.
(a) Planning
Centralised planning is probably the most funda­
mental feature of the Soviet administrative and economic
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system. It is an enormously complicated matter, and one 
that appears to become more complicated as time goes by. 
However for the purposes of the present discussion we can 
ignore most of the complexities and speak in simple terms 
of a highly centralised system in which all production 
and all financial and material expenditure are determined 
and directed by a centrally established plan.'*'
Zaleski describes the general stages of the
planning process in the following terms. It begins with
the transmission of centrally determined general directives
to lower-level organisations. As the general directives
pass down through the hierarchies they are broken down into
more and more specific tasks for each lower-level
organisation. These lower-level organisations then draw
up detailed plans for the sections of the general directives
for which they are responsible. These detailed plans go up
through the hierarchy, being consolidated into a combined
plan which is approved at the top level and then transmitted
back through the hierarchies to the "producing" organisations
2as obligatory production tasks.
1 In the chapter on ministerial PPO's I will
go into some detail on recent changes in the 
planning process. While these are of enormous 
political, administrative and economic signif­
icance, they do not change the essential nature 
of the centrally planned system and so will not 
be discussed here.
2 Zaleski, op. cit., p. 82.
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All the organisations with which we are concerned 
are subject to higher planning authorities. Educational, 
research, hospital and cultural institutions will usually 
be at the bottom of the hierarchy. This does not mean 
that they have no role to play in the planning process - 
they are largely responsible for drawing up the detailed 
plans setting out how they will fulfil their section of the 
tasks set out in the general directives. They will be 
helped and closely supervised in this by their ministries. 
Ministries have a particularly important role to play in 
planning, because they are responsible for working up 
entire plans for the development of their branch, in keeping 
with the rather general centrally determined directives. 
However these directives still come to the ministries from 
above, and there are agencies standing above the ministries 
in the planning process with considerable powers in the 
detail of branch planning.
Zaleski goes on to make a crucial statement about 
the nature of the planning process. He is speaking 
specifically about science planning, but sees the statement 
as being generally applicable:
As is the case for general planning, the 
distinctions or stages represent only a 
first approximation. In fact, planning 
done by higher and lower organs is 
generally simultaneous, and the directives
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and approvals are often replaced by 
bargaining and mutual agreement.
It appears that through this bargaining 
process, less important projects are 
often included in the Plan, since 
these require fewer targets and are 
relatively easy to execute.'*'
At other places in his book he makes clear what has been 
said by many different writers, that the planning process 
is by no means as centralised as one might at first think. 
Speaking of the institutes of the Academies of Science, 
he says that it appears that they have substantial freedom 
in determining their activities. It appears that there 
is no really comprehensive centralised planning, that the 
central plan is little more than a simple sum of all the
1 ibid.
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different projects suggested by different institutes.^-
The freedom appears to continue into the plan
fulfilment stage. Adjustments to plans during the period
of their fulfilment are a perennial feature of the Soviet
system. Often these adjustments are determined from above
to the detriment of the efficiency of the producing 
2organisation. However the producing organisations them-
1 ibid, p. 271. Agursky's statement about
planning in the Research Institute of Machine 
Building Technology (NIITM) supports Zaleski's 
view. He writes: "The list of projects
(tematika) of NIITM was formed spontaneously, 
not according to a plan. It reflected the 
combined results of the activities of individ­
ual workers, the orders of enterprises and only 
partly planned projects, set by decisions of 
the All-Union Council of Ministers, by 
coordinated plans, etc." Agursky, op. cit., 
p. 47. Raymond Hutchings, writing of the 
All-Union Research Institute for the Technology 
of Aesthetics (VNIITE) says: "VNIITE is
apparently its own master in the choice of 
projects to be included in its plan. If that 
is so, the word 'plan' in a Soviet context is 
even a misnomer. Rather, VNIITE is drawing up 
its programme of work for the coming year, as 
any Western business firm would do". Hutchings,
R: Soviet Science 3 Technology, Design, interaction
and convergence, Oxford University Press, London, 
1976, p. 167. Both these writers stress the 
importance of the predominance of contract work 
in the institutes' work in contributing to this 
state of affairs. Contract work also makes up 
a major proportion of the research work of the 
faculties and departments of Moscow State 
University, which are criticised by the uni­
versity's party secretary for their almost 
complete freedom in deciding research projects.
P.zh., 20/76, p. 34.
2 Kozlov, op. cit., p. 192.
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selves appear to have some opportunities for adjusting 
plans. Zaleski makes the point that the sheer detail 
and number of tasks contained in plans give some degree 
of freedom to producing organisations. He describes and 
criticises the over-bureaucratisation of the scientific 
process, the paperwork and delays involved in getting 
research projects approved, and the tight financial control, 
but concludes by saying that the detail expected by 
higher authorities in fact makes real control and planning 
impossible. Because plans are essentially over-detailed 
aggregations of individual projects with little attempt 
to either indicate or encourage priority areas, once an 
institute director has received his funds he is relatively 
free to decide on the priorities for himself.^
Zaleski also implies that research institutes 
have the power to initiate formal adjustments to plans 
during the process of their implementation. In citing the 
report that 25% of planned research projects in the RSFSR 
are changed during the course of the year, he wonders
1 Zaleski, op. cit., pp. 280-281. The Institute
of Experimental Biology of the Armenian 
Academy of Sciences provides a good illustration 
of the freedom research institutes have in 
deciding the direction of their research 
concerns. In 1974 the institute's adminis­
tration and party buro were criticised because 
since its foundation in 1966 the institute 
had consistently avoided concentrating on 
molecular biology, for which it had been 
established, and instead worked in areas that 
were better left to other institutes. Pravda, 
11/2/74, p. 2.
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how binding these projects are on institutes.^ He does 
not present any evidence that it is the institutes them­
selves, rather than higher authorities, that initiate these 
adjustments. However some of the examples given immediately 
below of PPO involvement in planning support Zaleski's 
implication that the institutes themselves can initiate 
adj ustments.^
The degree of decentralisation in planning
permitted by these factors should not be over-emphasised.
Plan fulfilment is still the most important task facing
an institution's leadership. While these factors give him
some flexibility in deciding what will be in the plan, the
plan must still be fulfilled. Developments since 1965
have probably even decreased the amount of de facto
decentralisation to some extent. The reduction in plan
indicators reduces enterprise freedom to make priority
decisions of its own, while the actual increase in the
number of priority indicators further reduces enterprise
freedom. Whereas previously volume of output was the only
priority indicator now there is a wide range of them such
3as profit, profitability, sales and labour productivity.
1 Zaleski, op. cit., p. 470.
2 See the examples of the Institute of Plastics 
and the All-Union Electrotechnical Institute, 
pp. 272-273.
3 Schroeder, G.E: "The Soviet Economic Reform at
an Impasse", Problems of Communism, vol. 2, no. 4, 
July-August, 1970, p. 42.
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It is true that this greater control through 
planning indicators is somewhat offset by the greater use 
of contractual relations between buyers and suppliers. 
Although contracts are subject to considerable regulation 
from above,  ^ they are, as Zaleski says, a decentralising
device:
As well as directing part of the activity 
of research establishments towards projects 
which are of immediate practical importance, 
it also provides the research institute with 
an important element of flexibility. The 
director of a research institute is much 
less subject to the control of superior 
authorities in contract work than in work 
financed by budgetary allocations, both in 
the choice of research projects and in the 
use of funds. Some of the complaints published 
about the contract system - for instance, that 
contracts are insufficiently planned, or that 
research workers have to devote valuable time 
to seeking out contract money for projects 
and to persuading enterprises of their value - 
unwittingly admit some of the advantages stemming 
from these arrangements.^
1
2
Zaleski, op. cit., pp. 465-469; Igitov, V . I s  
"Legal organisation of economic-contractual 
scientific-research work in vuz y", Vestnik 
Moskovskogo universiteta, Seriia 12, Pravo, 
5/68, pp/ 8-11.
Zaleski, op. cit., p. 469.
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The overall effect on enterprise freedom of the 
changes since 1965 is very difficult to evaluate, and 
certainly impossible from the overly simple description 
just given. However it appears probable that there is still 
sufficient freedom to give PPO's a policy-making role in 
determining priorities from among the numerous incompatible 
planned tasks.
What we have to try to discover is whether in fact 
PPO's take advantage of this opportunity and if so, what 
policies they pursue. Although Western observers like 
Zaleski are aware of the advantages of de facto decentralis­
ation, it can and often does lead to undesirable consequences 
as far as the "social interest" is concerned. Zaleski him­
self refers to the bargaining side of the planning process 
leading to some less important research projects being 
included in research plans. Once the plans have been 
finalised the freedom still available to enterprises can 
be used in a way that benefits the group interest at the 
expense of the social interest. One of the most difficult 
problems in this regard since 1965 has been the manipulation 
of prices to increase profits. The greater complexity of 
pricing regulations has made this possible.^ The emphasis
on profit also seems to have contributed to the serious
2quality problems experienced in Soviet production.
1
2
Schroeder, op. cit., pp. 42-43. 
Kom.Belorussii, 11/73, p. 39.
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The Soviet authorities, therefore, require PPO's 
to ensure that de facto decentralisation is not used to the 
detriment of the social interest. Clearly "host1' 
organisations hope that they can gain party organisation 
support for their more selfishly determined activities.
This is a crucial test of the effectiveness of PPO's and 
indeed of all low-level, integrated staff generalist 
organisations.
There is considerable evidence of PPO involvement
in the planning process. The best description is provided
in a 1966 Vestnik vysshei shkoly article on the evolution
of the five-year plan at Moscow State University.
Commissions were established to work out the first draft.
The draft was sent out to all the faculties and then
considered in a conference called by the rector. The
second draft was then sent back to the faculties. This
draft was also examined in an expanded meeting (that is,
one with invited guests) of the party committee. A final
draft was then drawn up and confirmed by the rector and
the buro of the party committee. It was then sent to the
RSFSR Ministry of Tertiary and Specialised Secondary 
1Education.
This report illustrates well the possibilities 
that both the members of the "host" organisation, but more
1 Vestnik vysshei shkoly, 2/66, pp. 19-20.
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particularly, the PPO have for influencing the content
of the plan.^ ~ To what ends do PPO's influence the
content of plans? Firstly, they must ensure that the plans
are drawn up in accordance with party policies of the time.
This type of control becomes particularly important at
times of major changes of policies. Thus in early 1959,
not long after Khrushchev's educational reforms, the
tertiary educational institutions of Kharkov, on the
initiative of their PPO's, re-examined study plans and
programmes with the aim of ensuring that all educational
2planning was in accordance with the recent changes. The 
majority of the party buros in research institutes in the 
Leninskii vaion of Moscow are said to study the requirements 
and define the general principles of the composition of
1 There is further information on the style of PPO 
involvement. When the communists of a Lvov 
secondary school became dissatisfied with the 
planning of the educational process, they 
considered the matter in a party meeting and 
offered detailed recommendations that were 
accepted by the director. P.zh., 23/66, p. 61.
In the Institute of Cybernetics of the Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences draft perspective plans for 
research are worked out by the directorate 
together with the party committee. After the 
drafts have been drawn up they are examined in 
meetings of the party committee and the Scientific 
Council. Kom. Ukrainy, 6/71, p. 85.
2 P.zh., 4/59, p. 21. This report is particularly 
interesting in that it suggests that the same 
sort of evaluation of the role of PPO's at times 
of important policy changes that I intend under­
taking in connection with ministerial PPO's and 
recent economic and administrative changes could 
be undertaken in connection with the 1958 educ­
ational reforms. Unfortunately it is not something 
I will be able to examine in any detail.
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plans in terms of current party policies.
It is not always clear whether reports on PPO 
involvement in determining educational and research 
priorities are speaking of involvement before, during or 
after the plan has been drawn up. The information just 
given should indicate that the PPO has ample opportunity 
for exercising its influence before or during the formul­
ation of draft plans. However we have already seen that 
Soviet plans leave considerable room for enterprise choice 
of which planned tasks should be given priority. This is a 
process in which PPO's should be heavily involved.
The 1960 Partiinaia zhizn1 claim that PPO's in
tertiary educational institutions in Tomsk were expected
to ensure that plans directed professors and lecturers to
the most important educational areas appears to be concerned
2with influence before or during the formulation of plans.
This is certainly the case with the PPO of the Institute of
Acoustics, on the initiative of which a perspective plan
determining the road of development for the science of
3acoustics in the following years was worked out.
1 Mosk.pravda, 18/2/71, p. 2.
2 P.zh., 6/60, p. 34 .
3 Mosk.pravda, 18/2/71, p. 2.
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Cases where influence was apparently exercised 
after the formulation of the plan include that of the 
Institute of Plastics in 1958. After the May, 1958 
Central Committee Plenum it became clear that the 
institute was working on too many research projects. 
Therefore at the suggestion of the PPO the institute's 
list of research projects was re-examined. The PPO is 
said to have ensured that all projects were connected 
with the current needs of Soviet production.^ The 
secretary of the PPO of the All-Union Electrotechnical 
Institute writes:
Sometimes the leaders of the institute 
themselves develop suggestions for 
changes in the character and direction 
of individual aspects of work, and in 
such cases they by no means consider 
it superfluous to consult with the 
party organisation about their 
intentions.
When the deputy director had an idea about reducing the 
number of indicators for the development of mercury 
transformers, he took it to the party organisation of the 
relevant department. A widened party buro meeting
1 P.zh., 10/58, pp. 26-27.
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considered the matter and made a recommendation.
These reports show the close involvement of PPO's 
in the planning process. However they have all been
1 Barkusov, op. cit., pp. 63-64. One of the best
illustrations of the PPO's involvement in 
determining research priorities comes from 
the Skochinskii Institute of Mining Affairs, 
although unfortunately the report does not make 
clear at what stage of the planning process the 
PPO became involved. Within the institute 
there were two views on the sort of projects 
that should be adopted in connection with the 
development of the Norilsk Mining-Metallurgical 
Combine. The first view was that first priority 
should be given to research into the pressures 
in ore deposits and to an examination of the 
widest possible use of purifying plants and the 
introduction into production of vibrating 
machines; the second view was that all attention 
should be turned to the development of new 
technology, leaving aside an examination of the 
ore deposits. Many organisational decisions 
depended on which view was adopted. The party 
buro took an active part in discussions, until 
eventually a meeting of the buro was held to 
which the communist members of the Scientific 
Council were invited. The meeting decided that 
the first view should be adopted as institute 
policy and directed {poruohilo) the communist 
members of the Council to convey to it the party 
buro's opinion. The Council supported the party 
buro's view, a decision which the report claims 
was proved correct in the light of the tasks set 
by the 25th Party Congress. P.zh., 14/76, p. 46. 
There are many other examples of the involvement 
of PPO's in determining research priorities. Under 
the influence of the PPO of the Institute of 
Physics work is said to be concentrated on the most 
important areas of concern. P.zh., 1/70, p. 52.
In 1971 the secretary of the PPO of the Institute of 
Geology and the Use of Fuel Minerals considered that 
the most important task of his party organisation 
was the choice of the best long-term directions of 
research. Mosk.pravda, 18/2/71, p. 2. In the All- 
Union Electrotechnical Institute in 1963 there was 
a party control commission for particularly important 
areas of work. P.zh., 16/63, p. 36. Presumably 
the party committee decided which were the most 
important areas.
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concentrated in the area of education and research, 
particularly the latter. The apparent lack of involvement 
of administrative, particularly ministerial, PPO's in 
the planning process is most curious.'*' Given the 
importance of ministries in the planning process and the 
involvement of their PPO's in their other activities it is 
a strange phenomenon, and one for which I have no convincing 
explanation. Certainly the formulation of plans for branch 
development is a matter of far too great importance to be 
left entirely to PPO's. The Central Committee apparatus 
is directly involved. However, as we will see later, 
relations between Central Committee workers and ministerial 
PPO's are very close and in other areas the Central 
Committee is apparently willing to use the PPO's to 
implement its policies. Its apparent lack of willingness 
to do so in this area of concern is inexplicable. If it 
is true that ministerial PPO's have little involvement in 
planning matters, it is a serious limitation on their 
powers and importance and their staff generalist role.
For planning is inherent in the staff generalist 
role. Although Western staff generalist theorists do not
1 The only case I have found of Soviet
authorities demanding control of planning 
by ministerial PPO's occurred in the 1976 
discussion by the Belorussian Central 
Committee of the activities of the Repub­
lican Gosplan. As well as the expected 
criticism of Gosplan's PPO, the Central 
Committee also suggested that the PPO's of 
ministries, governmental agencies and enter­
prises strengthen their control of planning 
sectors and departments. Pravda, 2/9/76, p. 2.
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prescribe the highly centralised Soviet-type planning 
for Western organisations, it is usually relevant in 
their structural sub-divisions.^ But even at this level 
centralised planning, if it is to work within a staff 
generalist framework, must take into account long-term 
developmental considerations. Therefore, while it is 
disturbing to find no evidence of ministerial PPO 
involvement in planning, it is reassuring to find that 
educational and research PPO's are apparently deeply 
involved. This involvement, particularly in the research 
category, includes making policy decisions on long-term 
directions of development based on the general objectives 
of the national leadership and the needs and objectives 
of the particular branch of the economy in which the 
institution is situated. This corresponds very closely 
with the staff generalist role.
(b) Material conditions
Concern with the material conditions of work is 
curious in that the available information is almost entirely 
concentrated in educational institutions with some little 
information on cultural institutions. It is perhaps not 
surprising that administrative apparatuses are excluded.
Strictly speaking, since we have described 
the Soviet system as mono-organisational, 
it is these sub-divisions which are analogous 
to independent Soviet institutions.
1
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While office space, equipment, etc., are obviously essential 
for an administrative institution, they are not a suffic­
iently basic aspect of the institutions' operational 
activity to warrant specific mention in the Soviet press. 
However the omission in the case of research institutions 
is more curious. While concern with setting up new labor­
atories, departments and sectors described in the section 
on structural organisation presumably includes the 
equipping of the new units, the lack of any specific accounts 
of party organisation interest in scientific supplies and 
equipment is inexplicable, particularly considering that 
the concern of educational PPO's is so evident.
In this regard schools are not so significant. 
However the information concerning them is of some interest.
A 1960 report on a secondary school in Gorky said that the 
party organisation had done a great deal to mobilise 
parents and the teaching collective to provide laboratories, 
workshops, etc., for the school.^ This suggests that the 
school itself has some responsibility, rather like schools 
in Australia, to provide some of its own equipment. Although 
information is hard to find, accounts of the obligations of 
schools do not bear this out. One textbook on the 
operations of schools goes no further than to say that the
1 P.zh., 9/60, p. 27.
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school finances such things as help to the needy and
extra-curricular activities."*" Presumably as part of
extra-curricular activities, the book devotes some
attention to the construction by students of sporting 
2facilities. Thus after a party meeting had discussed
shortcomings in physical education in a school in Bataisk
(Rostov oblast’) the communists recommended to the director
3that certain sports facilities were required.
The vagaries of the Soviet construction process 
also lead to administration and PPO involvement in the 
construction process, although they have no formal rights 
or obligations in this area. Whenever there were problems 
with construction work at the Gorky school just mentioned 
the director worked out a solution together with the party
4secretary. Solzhenitsyn, in "For the Good of the Cause",
illustrates well the school's involvement in construction,
5but also its lack of rights in this area.
The most interesting and extensive report concerns 
a tertiary institution, the Moscow Engineering-Economics 
Institute. The party committee of the institute was closely
1 Volkovskii, A .N. (ed.): Voprosy shkolovedeniia,
Izd. Akademii pedagogicheskikh nauk RSFSR,
Moscow, 1955, p. 128.
2 ibid, p. 158.
3 P.zh., 20/63, pp. 50-51.
4 P.zh., 9/60, p . 27.
5 Solzhenitsyn, op. cit.
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involved in getting a new building for the institute, in 
order to overcome the problems of having buildings scattered 
throughout Moscow. The party committee had a special 
commission for construction matters headed by one of the 
members of the committee's production sector. The committee 
and the commission were concerned with solving the problems 
involved in construction. The party committee suggested 
that the institute's faculties and departments assist in 
construction planning. It obliged the party organisation 
of the Faculty of Construction and Urban Affairs and the 
institute's komsomol committee to give permanent shefskaia 
assistance for contracted work through voluntary Saturday 
work, the sending of student construction brigades and the 
strengthening of agitation-propaganda work and visual 
agitation.^ In March, 1972, on the initiative and under 
the permanent leadership of the party committee, there was 
signed with the 20th Moscow Construction Trust a "contract 
for creative cooperation". The institute's obligations 
included the organisation of managerial training for trust 
workers, the sending of students to the construction site, 
the conduct of mass-cultural and propaganda work, and the 
organisation of research work on a contractual basis and
1 The noun shefstvo, from which the adjective
shefskaia is derived, is usually translated 
as "patronage". Soviet institutions, 
particularly schools, accept other institut­
ions as their "patrons", receiving from them 
material assistance. In this case the relation­
ship seems to have worked in both directions.
For further accounts of shefstvo work, see 
P.zh.Kaz., 5/61, pp. 61-64; 12/64, p. 22.
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according to the trust's instructions. The trust under­
took to pay maximum attention to the early completion of 
the institute's building and to effectively use the 
students sent to it, including using them in work useful 
to their courses. Not less than once a semester the party 
committee would hear a report (otchet) from the rectorate 
on progress in the preparation of the building. The committee, 
in hearing the report, would utilise information from the 
special commission.^
This account is particularly interesting in that 
it shows the close connection between indoctrination, 
academic and organisational activities. It also suggests 
the possibility of special agreements being reached, with 
close party participation, to ensure favoured treatment 
for one's own institution. This parallels the use of 
party influence to gain special attention from higher 
authorities that was discussed in the section on structure 
and organisation.
In all there is not a great deal of evidence
of PPO involvement in these matters of material
conditions, even in educational institutions. But what
2evidence there is is quite strong. It appears probable
1 Samsonov, op. cit., pp. 6-8.
2 The single piece of information I have in this 
area for cultural institutions does little more 
than indicate party involvement. In 1973 the 
party committee and Artistic Council of the film 
studio Mosfil'm examined such matters as the 
reconstruction of studios and the introduction of 
electronics and automation. Sov.kul'tuva,
6/3/73, p. 2.
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therefore, that it is not an everyday, continuing concern, 
but one that arises at times of particular difficulty. It 
is unfortunate that information is so difficult to find 
on the precise procedures for the construction and equipping 
of educational and research institutions. One would 
imagine that in normal circumstances it would not be the 
responsibility of the institution which will be using the 
buildings to construct and equip them. There are special­
ised construction organisations for this purpose. However 
the Soviet construction industry is notoriously unable to 
supply all requirements. Low priority institutions are 
therefore likely to find their requirements seriously 
neglected. At this stage it becomes necessary for the 
higher-levels of the party apparatus to step in to determine 
priorities and PPO1s as much as possible to work for the 
interests of their "host" organisations. Thus in 
Solzhenitsyn's "For the Good of the Cause" the obkom decided 
that the technical college's new building would have to go 
to a higher-priority research institute.'*' There was strong 
implied criticism of the college's party secretary for doing
1 Not entirely for reasons of state
interest. The obkom secretary 
was also interested in building up 
the status of his own region by 
having a high-status institute 
situated there.
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nothing about the situation.''" We have seen that the
party organisation of the Moscow Engineering-Economics
Institute made its own arrangements. The reason,
therefore, that there is no information available on
such activities by the PPO's of research institutes is
probably that research has higher priority and therefore
research institutes are less likely to have to concern
2themselves with construction problems.
If PPO's become involved in construction and 
equipment concerns only in exceptional circumstances, it 
becomes very difficult for such involvement to be put into 
a staff generalist context. By definition it is a short­
term involvement in specific problems, with any long-term 
improvement in it being beyond the powers of the PPO. 
However it is interesting that the PPO of the Moscow
1 The party secretary refused to allow the
issue to be discussed in the college, defending 
the right of the institute to the building with 
the words: "In fact you can get away without
explaining any of it. Just say: 'The institute
is vital to the state and it's not up to us to 
question its suitability.'" Solzhenitsyn, op. cit., 
p. 90. Of course it cannot be claimed that 
Solzhenitsyn was representing the official 
Soviet view. However this story was published 
in the Soviet Union, as were letters praising 
Solzhenitsyn's criticisms of the party secretary.
See the Pall Mall edition, London, 1964, p. 101.
2 Although another factor to be considered is 
that research institutes are not in as good a 
position for making their own arrangements. They 
do not have students available for "voluntary" 
labour. A construction organisation is more 
likely to make arrangements with an institution 
that can provide its own labour.
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Engineering-Economics Institute appeared to be willing to 
use its essentially short-term construction problem in a 
much wider indoctrination and educational context. Within 
the limits of the situation the PPO played a staff 
generalist role.
(c) Content of work process
Concern with the content of the actual work done 
by the "host" organisation is such a diverse matter that it 
will have to be dealt with according to the different 
categories of non-production institution. Although some 
concerns, such as that for quality, are evident in all 
categories, the nature of the output of the different 
categories means that not only the types of concerns vary, 
but also to some extent the relative importance of 
different concerns. Thus research PPO's, working in 
institutions often closely connected with production, 
control the performance of their "host" organisations in 
such production-oriented terms as plan fulfilment and over­
fulfilment and economic effectiveness. Educational and 
cultural PPO's do not see their concerns in such production- 
oriented terms. Administrative PPO's are quite different 
again. Because administrative institutions do not themselves 
"produce" anything material, the discussion in this section 
will be limited to the style of bureaucratic procedures.
It will become evident that a concern with the style of
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bureaucratic procedures inevitably leads to a concern with 
the content of bureaucratic work. Since this content is 
usually the production activities of subordinate enter­
prises, the next topic for discussion, namely relations with 
outside organisations, becomes of fundamental importance for 
administrative PPO's.
(i) educational institutions
In the chapter on ideology I discussed the 
involvement of educational PPO's in the socialisation of 
students, through their control of their extra-curricular 
activities, and in the ideological control of the content 
of education. In this section I will discuss the involvement 
of the PPO's in more purely academic matters, although it 
will be seen that ideological or "political" considerations 
can never be entirely excluded.
The first of these matters is student admissions. 
Admissions to Soviet tertiary institutions are determined 
by quite strict and severe entrance requirements and 
competitive examinations.^ The final decision on admission
1 According to the 1956 rules for admission to
tertiary education, students who have graduated 
from school with a gold medal "For excellent 
results and exemplary behaviour" can enter a 
tertiary institution without doing an entrance 
examination. Others have to do entrance 
examinations in a number of subjects depending 
on the faculty they are entering. However the 
lists of subjects always include Russian language 
and literature. The examinations are conducted 
by a special examination commission established 
by the rector or director. Vysshaia shkola, 
op. cit., pp. 39-42. For the Statute of the 
examination commissions, see pp. 45-46.
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is made by an admissions commission, under the chairmanship 
of the rector and having as members the pro-rector for 
academic and scientific work, the deans of the faculties, 
two professors, and representatives of social organisations. 
The PPO's exercise their influence over the admissions
2commissions through the party members on the commissions.
The extent of their powers is not certain. However a 1973 
article on tertiary institutions in Tomsk declares that 
although the institutions have competitive systems to 
decide admissions, party organisations must still involve
3themselves in making recommendations for admittance.
The methods of influence are clear, but for what 
purposes is influence exercised? Admission to tertiary 
education in the Soviet Union is held, undoubtedly 
correctly, to be of enormous importance for any young 
person's future. The regulations covering admission are
1 ibid, p. 42.
2 Pravda Vostoka, 1/4/72, p. 2.
3 P.zh., 6/73, p. 36. The importance and apparent 
effectiveness of party control of admissions 
commissions can be seen in statements that 
educational PPO's do not need control commissions 
on admissions since there are non-party bodies 
with party, as well as administration, Academic 
Council, komsomol and trade union representatives, 
that can do the work. Kom.Ukrainy, 2/72, p. 66.
It is interesting to note that members of the 
admissions commission of the Tashkent Institute 
for Engineers for the Irrigation and Mechanisation 
of Agriculture are on the nomenklatura of the party 
committee. Pravda Vostoka, 1/4/72, p. 2.
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extensive and require a considerable amount of administrative 
supervision. This means that the motivation and the opport­
unity exist for abuse of the regulations. It is an area 
where the use of influence and bribes is probable. It 
would be part of the PPO's task to prevent such abuses.
In fact I have found no reports of the involvement of 
educational PPO's in such activities. This could simply 
be because I have not found the available information, 
because the presence of the PPO as a "watchdog" is so 
successful that nobody tries anything illegal, or that the 
PPO allows abuses to go unhindered.^
PPO's probably also influence student admissions 
for more positive and politically motivated reasons. A 
1969 article in Kommunist speaks of the recommendations of 
party, soviet and komsomol organisations on sending students 
for tertiary studies with the aim of getting more industrial
1 In the early 1970's the head of the Chief
Administration for Schools of the Armenian 
Ministry of Education was allegedly arranging 
that some school leavers receive gold medals, 
giving them automatic admission to tertiary 
education, on the basis of artificially 
raised results for written examinations. In 
this case the chairman of the people's control 
group of the ministry reported the glavk head's 
behaviour to the 1972 election-report meeting 
of the ministry's PPO. Ministerial officials 
responded by opposing the chairman's election 
as secretary of the party buro and fabricating 
incriminating evidence against him, leading to 
his appearance in court. At no stage in the 
report on the case were any educational 
institutions or their PPO's mentioned.
Pravda, 5/5/76, p. 3.
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and agricultural workers into tertiary institutions.^"
This is a clear case of party involvement in the implement­
ation of a policy which is almost certainly regarded with 
disfavour by educational administrators. One also suspects 
party involvement in present discrimination against Jewish
applicants for tertiary education, although not surprisingly
2it is not something spoken of in the Soviet press.
Once a student has been admitted to an educational 
organisation PPO interest in him continues. PPO1 234s are 
concerned with the organisation and conduct of examinations. 
The party committee of the Voroshilov State Medical 
Institute heard a report (otchHt) from the pro-rector on 
.progress in the preparation for examinations. The party 
committee had a special commission help the pro-rector
3to prepare his report. The PPO of the Moscow Technical 
College controls the formation of the college's examination
4commission. These reports suggest no more than a
1 Kom., 11/69, p. 65.
2 D. Ogen speaks of this discrimination in the 
case of the Leningrad Conservatorium. Informants 
in Moscow assured me that the practice is wide­
spread. Jewish applicants for places in tertiary 
institutions usually fail entrance tests in 
Russian language! Neither Ogen nor my own 
informants spoke specifically of PPO involvement; 
however it is highly likely. Ogen, D. (pseud.); 
The Leningrad Branch of the RSFSR Union of 
Composers, Soviet Institutions Series, No. 2, 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1975 , pp. 57-59.
3 P.zh. , 5/74, p. 41.
4 Mosk.pravda, 10/9/71, p. 2.
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"technical" concern with the conduct of examinations.
However one cannot exclude the possibility of more 
politically motivated influence over examination commissions.
There is a strong probability that there is a
link between control of examination commissions and concern
with pass rates. While I have no evidence of PPO involvement
in the matter, it seems probable that pass rates in Soviet
educational establishments are kept artificially high.^ "
Because they affect the evaluation of a teacher's performance
and scores in various socialist competitions, pass rates of
2over 90% are the norm. Whether they manipulate them or 
not, PPO's are certainly concerned with the pass rates. In 
1974 the PPO of a boarding school in Nizhnii Tagil had a 
party meeting which considered the question "The struggle 
of communists for a high quality of knowledge and discipline 
among students". At the meeting there was an analysis of
3pass rates in the school. A secondary school had an open 
party meeting to consider how the party organisation was 
leading the struggle of the collective to raise the pass
4rate in the school.
1 In Solzhenitsyn's "For the Good of the Cause" it 
is mentioned that the director of the technical 
college always does everything the obkom secretary 
wants, including raising the pass rate. 
Solzhenitsyn, op. cit., p. 98.
2 It is for this reason that a troika (three out of 
five), while officially a pass,can be considered 
an unsatisfactory mark.
3 P.zh., 2/74, p. 58.
4 P.zh., 18/74, p. 68.
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In the chapter on ideology we saw the concern of
PPO's with the behaviour of students outside class. They
are also interested in their behaviour inside class.
Educational PPO’s are responsible for the efficient and
effective operation of the educational process. This
implies a concern for discipline. In 1963 Partiinaia zhizn1 2
Kazakhstana declared that the PPO's of educational
institutions must be concerned with producing the right
attitude to study among students.^- A considerable amount
of indoctrination work is directed to this end, but PPO's
also take more direct and specific action when problems
2arise. The PPO discusses the situation itself, but it 
will also work through other organisations, usually the 
komsomol, to bring about changes. For example, in Moscow 
State University each faculty komsomol organisation keeps a 
book on every komsomol member in the faculty (usually about
1 P.zh.Kaz., 1/63, p. 20.
2 In 1955 a party meeting in a Primorsko- 
Akhtar secondary school considered the 
state of discipline in the school. P.zh.,
8/55, pp. 78-79. In 1973 another school had 
an open party meeting to discuss its difficult 
students. Uchitel ' skaia gazeta, 12/1/73, p. 2. 
When a school in the Gagarin raion of Moscow 
had a discipline problem, the raikom recommended 
that the school's communists meet and consider 
the topic "The work of the school party 
organisation in raising the responsibility of 
communists for the state of affairs in the 
collective in the light of the decisions of the 
24th Party Congress". They heard a report
(otchet) from the school director on improving 
the system of leadership of the school. Korn., 
16/73, pp. 86-87.
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90% of the student body) recording all social and academic 
activities. The book is examined yearly and if progress is 
unsatisfactory an explanation is required. If unsatisfactory 
for two years running expulsion from the komsomol, apparently 
the precursor of expulsion from the university, is likely. 
Party involvement is obvious when it is seen that the books 
have sections for signature by the faculty dean, the 
komsomol secretary and party secretary. It can also be 
seen in the 1972 recommendation of the party committee of 
the Omsk Institute of Rail Transport Engineers that all 
cases of expulsion should go from the dean to a komsomol 
meeting before going to the rector.^"
PPO's often directly involve themselves in solving
specific discipline problems by sending party members to see
the parents of misbehaving children. When a pupil in a
Pavlodar school had been consistently misbehaving some
communists from the school and his teacher went to the
Pavlodar oblast' Prosecutor's Office where his father
worked. There they spoke to the father in the presence
of the office's party secretary. The talk was said to have
2had the desired effect.
1 Pravda, 11/2/72, p. 2.
2 P.zh.Kaz., 5/61, p. 64. When two students 
in a Moscow school were not coming to 
school the PPO contacted the PPO's and 
trade unions of their fathers' places
of work. P.zh., 6/56, p. 64.
290 .
A concern for quality is something which will 
run through the discussion in all categories of non­
production institutions. Particularly since the 25th 
Party Congress "quality" has become the subject of a 
considerable campaign, so we can expect to see PPO concern 
with it increase.
Quality, of course, is a somewhat subjective 
matter. Thus some people might disagree that the PPO of 
Kishinev State University raised the quality of education 
when in 1965 it brought about the re-introduction of 
compulsory attendance at lectures in one faculty.^
Ideology is likely to have a very prominent place
in a concern with the quality of lectures and lecturers
in the minds of PPO leaders. Those cases where ideology
2is clearly dominant have already been described.
However there is evidence of a genuine concern with 
"technical" quality. The case of the party committee of 
Moscow State University providing the initiative for an 
examination of the texts of lectures to check on whether 
they were up-to-date in terms of presenting the most recent
1 After the party committee and faculty party
buro had examined the effect of allowing 
voluntary attendance they found that it had 
weakened discipline, attendance and results. 
The party buro therefore recommended that 
the practice be discontinued. Later the 
party buro heard a report from the chairman 
of the control group on the implementation of 
the decision. Kom. Moldavii, 5/65, p. 37.
2 See above, pp. 76-80.
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achievements of Soviet science can be considered ambiguous. 
Other cases seem to show an unambiguous orientation towards 
the "technical". Very often the PPO's concern with the 
quality of the educational process is stimulated by 
problems in a particular subject. Problem-solving is an 
important part of the staff generalist role, as long as it 
is conducted within a long-term and broad perspective.
The examples available on PPO problem-solving do
not allow firm conclusions on whether PPO's approach the
matter with a staff generalist outlook. However they
certainly are not incompatible with staff generalism.
Thus the Moscow Institute for Electronic Technology has a
special department for the preparation of new students.
Some of the lecturers in the institute doubted the ability
of people passing through the department to cope with their
courses. The party group of the department asked the party
committee to examine the matter. The party committee heard
reports (soobshcheniia) from faculty heads on work with
2the department's graduates. In the mid-60's the party 
organisation of the Moscow Conservatorium became concerned 
at the appearance of laureatomaniia among teachers and 
students. Their concern was only with winning prizes in 
prestigious national and international competitions. The 
result was that teachers concentrated all their efforts on
1
2
P.zh., 1/68, p . 49. 
P.zh.f \1/14, p. 56.
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potential prize winners, and that reduced demands were 
made on these students in non-musical subjects, especially 
the social science disciplines. Therefore in 1965, on the 
initiative of the conservatorium's social organisations 
and rectorate, the collegium of the All-Union Ministry of 
Culture adopted a decision to reduce the number of 
students competing for international prizes and to allow 
only those students to compete who had fulfilled all 
musical and non-musical obligations.^
When the evidence of PPO involvement in specific 
problems is combined with examples of their concern with 
long-term directions of educational policy it is possible 
to speak of staff generalism with some degree of confidence
1 Bol’shoi p u t op. cit., pp. 109-110.
The PPO of Leningrad State University examines 
teaching practice in each subject and works 
out suggestions for consideration by the 
faculties and the Academic Council, while in 
1973 the party buro of a secondary school 
recommended to communist leaders of the 
school's subject committees that they analyse 
the condition of the teaching of subjects 
and give their suggestions. Uchitel'skaia gazeta 
13/1/73, p. 2. School PPO's in Bender in 
Moldavia organise conferences for the 
spreading of leading teaching experience.
Kom.Moldavii, 11/64, p. 25. The party buro 
of a Kazakh school was worried about poor 
results in physics. The buro received advice 
from a party meeting and recommended that a 
Ten Day Period (Dekada) of Assistance be 
conducted for physics teachers. The results 
were examined by the director, the party 
secretary and zavuch. One physics teacher 
declared at a party meeting that one of the 
reasons for the difficulties was that the 
students were backward in mathematics. When 
the mathematics teacher disagreed the 
communists suggested that there be a combined 
physics-mathematics class. The experiment 
was reported to have worked well. P.zh.Kaz., 
1/67, pp. 25-26.
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In recent years it has been claimed, for example, that
school PPO's have taken the initiative in the introduction
of the "cabinet" system in schools.^ Of course the cabinet
system is a matter of party policy, so the initiative of
PPO's in its implementation must be limited. Nevertheless
an ability to apply general policies in specific local
conditions is an essential element of the staff generalist
role. Thus when there were problems in the introduction of
the system in a secondary school in Cheliabinsk oblast' the
school's party members decided to hear the school director
speak on the matter in a party meeting. As a preparation
for the meeting the party members consulted with all the
teachers in the school and gained their opinions.
Following the director's statement the meeting worked out
a plan of action which was said to have met with great 
2success.
Another aspect of the concern for the quality 
of education is ensuring the right balance is maintained 
between teaching and research. In 1976 the secretary of 
the party committee of the Belorussian Economics Institute 
declared that the PPO had taken corrective action after 
discovering that the head of the Department of Higher
1 The "cabinet" system entails each classroom 
being set up for the teaching of a particular 
subject. Students move from room to room 
according to the subject they are studying in
a particular period, rather than remaining always 
in the same room.
2 P.zh., 12/76, p. 53. See also Literaturnaia 
gazeta, 13/1/72, p. 2.
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Mathematics was damaging educational work by over­
emphasising research.^ The report in no way suggests that 
the PPO was responsible for determining the correct mix 
of academic and research work. However one would expect 
it to have a considerable degree of independence in at 
least assessing the effect research work has on academic 
standards. This would give it considerable influence 
over any deliberations at higher levels. It is a question 
which will become of increasing importance as the present 
campaign for the rapid development of research in 
educational institutions takes effect.
Educational PPO's continue their concern with
students right up to the time they have finished their
courses. Vocational guidance is considered to be of great
importance in the Soviet Union. It might have been
discussed in the chapter on ideology since it is often seen
2in terms of ideological indoctrination. However it is
1 Pravda, 22/5/76, p. 2.
2 The party organisation of a school situated within 
a collective farm works closely with the farm's 
administration and party committee in vocational 
guidance work, being concerned to "foster a love of 
agricultural labour" among students both inside and 
outside class. P.zh., 12/76, p. 52. See also Kom. 
Estonii, 3/12, pp. 42-44 . Partiinaia zhizn' declared 
in 1958 that indoctrination work includes explaining 
to students of economics at Leningrad State University 
why they have to go to work in raion planning offices 
in the country when they have finished their courses. 
P.zh., 1/58, p. 17. That this means persuading 
students that the interests of the individual are to 
be subordinated to the interests of the state can be 
seen in the statement in Kommunist that the vocat­
ional guidance given to students should be in 
accordance with the needs of the city or raion.
Kom., 16/73, p. 82.
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more appropriate to treat vocational guidance in this
present context because there is evidence that the means
of "production1 2'control are used, and probably to greater
effect.’*' Thus a secretary of the Lithuanian Central
Committee speaks of a secondary school which has an
authoritative commission, which each year consults with
senior students to help them make the right career
decisions. The report does not make clear what "authoritative" 
2means.
Perhaps the most significant point that can be 
made about this discussion of the concern of educational 
PPO's with the content of the academic process is the number 
of times I have surmised that PPO's exercised a political 
influence, but without having evidence. It is almost
1 A school PPO in Vinnitsa ob last’ heard in one 
of its party meetings a report (soobshcheniie) 
from the director on the condition of work in 
vocational guidance and the labour indoctrination 
of students. Pravda Ukrainy, 19/3/72, p. 2.
The party buro of a school in Kuibyshev included 
on the agenda of one of its meetings consideration 
of the problems of an improvement in vocational 
guidance work. Barkusov, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
2 Kom. (Vilnius), 9/71, p. 3. I have no evidence 
of PPO involvement in the raspvedelenie 
(distribution) of students who have finished 
their courses. The raspredelenie is the 
process by which tertiary graduates are sent to 
work for at least two years anywhere the state 
cares to send them. Although it is probably 
decided outside the educational institution 
itself, one would still expect the PPO to be 
involved to some degree.
296 .
certain that PPO's introduce considerations of political 
and ideological control into student admissions, and 
probably do so also into the conduct of examinations and 
the application of discipline. However I have not found 
any evidence of them doing so. This is largely explained 
by the natural reluctance of the Soviet authorities to 
openly admit that political discrimination is practised in 
Soviet education.
"Political" considerations of another sort are 
evident in the concern of PPO's with pass rates and 
vocational guidance. In these areas PPO's must react to 
special policy considerations not necessarily linked with 
educational quality. With regard to vocational guidance 
they are expected to defend social interests in a way which 
might seem slightly repugnant to Western observers, but 
which cannot be seen as incompatible with the functions 
expected of them by the Soviet leadership. (There was 
one similar case cited with regard to student admissions.) 
If they are engaged in the manipulation of pass rates, 
that is a "policy" that is determined by local interests, 
regional and internal, and in the eyes of the Soviet 
leadership would be dysfunctional.
PPO's appear to show some genuine commitment 
to education itself only in the admittedly amorphous area 
of the "quality of education", primarily of teaching.
Only in this area do they show any commitment to staff
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generalist principles. The most interesting thing about 
the examples given is the degree to which the PPO's are 
involved in solving problems in particular areas. They 
take measures to correct the immediate problems, but in 
some cases also appear to be aware of the wider implications 
of the particular problem. They are concerned with general 
examinations of teaching practice and the propagation of 
the best techniques. The ability to use specific problems 
to arrive at general conclusions is one of the fundamental 
features of the staff generalist role. More details of 
this type of work should come to light in our consideration 
of the two categories of non-production institutions most 
closely connected with production.
(ii) research institutions
Before presenting information on the involvement 
of research PPO's in the operational activities of their 
"host" organisations some discussion on the possible 
differences between branch and Academy institutes is 
necessary. The discussion is necessarily brief and 
speculative since little information is available.
There are two main reasons that one might expect 
the PPO's of Academy institutes to be given less opportunity 
to involve themselves in the research activities of their 
"host" organisations. Firstly, the Academies themselves 
are strong and independent groups perhaps well able to
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resist party interference in scientific affairs; secondly, 
the more theoretically oriented research undertaken in the 
Academies is less susceptible to close party control.
The apparatuses of the Academies of Science have
considerable powers of coordination and control of research
undertaken in their institutes."*" They constitute powerful
bureaucratic organisations presumably well able to exert
their independence in bureaucratic politics. They also
have very high prestige in scientific matters. This
prestige not only contributes to the unwillingness of outside
groups to oppose the Academies on scientific matters, but
also strengthens the internal solidarity of the Academies,
a solidarity that could well affect PPO secretaries.
These factors are enough to cause one to ask how much
authority does the party, at any level, exert over the
Academies. There are examples of party-sponsored
2organisational demands failing to be accepted. These 
suggest that the party would be less willing and even less 
likely to succeed in influencing scientific policy-making. 
However one cannot entirely discount party influence.
We have already seen in Chapter One the influence the 
party, using ideological justifications and working through 
PPO's, has exerted over scientific policy, including within
1 Zaleski, op. cit., pp. 191-287.
2 Medvedev, op. cit.», pp. 214-215.
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the Academies. It could be said that the more theoretical 
nature of Academy research increases its susceptibility to 
this type of interference. One must assume some degree of 
party involvement in scientific decision-making, even in 
Academy research. The question then becomes at what level 
is this involvement evident. The Academies are organised 
at All-Union and republic level. One would therefore 
expect considerable links between the Academies and the 
party Central Committees. But this question is greatly 
complicated by the uncertainty about the precise role of 
the Academy party committees. In Appendix A, although I 
am unable to determine the formal place and powers of these 
party committees, I present evidence that they exercise 
some influence over scientific decision-making, working 
through institute PPO's. If that evidence reflects the 
normal means of party communication in matters concerned 
with Academy research, presumably the party committees have 
close links with Central Committees. The institute PPO's 
are not excluded from this process.
Even if that is the normal means of party 
communication, and that is by no means certain, it still 
remains to be asked how important it is for the operational 
control of Academy research. We have seen the reasons that 
the Academies might be in a position to resist party 
pressure in general policy-making. We must also consider 
the susceptibility of Academy research institutes to PPO
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pressure in their everyday operational activities. I will 
examine the involvement of research PPO's in general in 
terms of three main aspects - control of plan fulfilment, 
quality and effectiveness. Most of the information I 
have concerns branch institutes. This is not surprising 
since these aspects of concern, which as we will see 
immediately below are not well-suited to any type of 
research, are particularly unsuited to the theoretically 
oriented research undertaken in Academy institutes.
The evidence suggests that the PPO's of Academy 
institutes are expected to involve themselves in controlling 
the implementation of centrally determined scientific 
policies. These policies are transmitted to them from the 
All-Union and republican Central Committees, perhaps 
through the Academy party committees. However at all 
levels of this process one could expect strong opposition 
to party involvement. At the institute level the commitment 
that even PPO secretaries have to the independence of the 
Academies could make this opposition even more effective.
The nature of the research undertaken makes PPO 
involvement in everyday operational control difficult.
However this is a problem that afflicts branch research as 
well, and can be best understood in terms of an examination 
of the concern of branch institute PPO's with the operational 
activities of their "host" organisations in terms of the 
three aspects already mentioned. Plan fulfilment has
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traditionally been the top priority task in Soviet 
production, but also considered important, and increasingly 
so in recent years, have been the quality and effectiveness 
of production.
There are two sides to plan fulfilment - that 
the tasks set by the plan be completed, and that they be 
completed on time. There are considerable problems facing 
research institutions on both counts. Clearly few 
scientists can be certain at the time they undertake a 
project that it will ever meet with success. By its very 
nature research requires a great deal of failure and non- 
fulfilment of projects. Further, even if a project continues 
to promise success, there is no way that final success can 
be tied to a timetable. Research does not involve predet­
ermined and regular procedures such as occur in industrial 
production. The whole concept of plan fulfilment is one that 
is largely incompatible with scientific research. The 
considerable "slack" in Soviet research planning suggests 
at least de facto recognition of this fact. Nevertheless 
research PPO's are still expected to ensure that plans are 
fulfilled on time. Thus at the 1974 election-report 
meeting of the PPO of the Ukrainian Institute for the 
Design of Heavy Machine Construction Factories the communist 
director and chief engineer were criticised for doing 
nothing about the breaking of deadlines in the institute.
The party buro was also criticised for showing little
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interest in the activity of the control commission concerned
with deadlines.^- In 1954 Kommunist criticised the party
buro of the Sverdlovsk oblastr branch of the All-Union
Academy of Sciences for failing to instil in scientific
workers the feeling of their responsibility for finishing
2projects quickly. It is interesting that in both these 
cases the PPO's were criticised for failing to control the 
fulfilment of plans. Could it be that the scientist- 
secretaries of research PPO's are unwilling to work for
3something which they feel is both impossible and undesirable? 
There is no other indication in these reports that PPO's or 
their party superiors are aware of the difficulties in 
fulfilment of research plans.
1 Kom.Estonii, 8/73, p. 54.
2 Korn., 18/54, p. 60.
3 Of course there are examples of research PPO's 
taking positive action for plan fulfilment.
In 1963 the party buro of the Institute of State 
and Law had an expanded meeting where the matter 
of overdue projects was examined. Many research 
workers were questioned on their work. P.zh., 
16/63, p. 37. The party organisation of the 
Department of Civil Construction of the Magadan 
institute Dal ’ stroiproekt heard a report 
(otchet) from the head of the department on the 
work results of the previous six months.
Barkusov, op. cit., p. 101. The PPO of the All- 
Union Electrotechnical Institute has two permanent 
control commissions, one for progress in the ful­
filment of important research and construction 
work, and the other to observe progress in and 
the quality of capital investment. P.zh. , 10/72, 
p. 40. The party buro of the State Institute of 
Glass has a scientific production sector respon­
sible for control of the fulfilment of planned 
work. Mosk.pravda, 15/9/71, p. 2.
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Plan fulfilment and the quality of scientific 
work are not always compatible, and this provides the PPO 
with a perfect opportunity to become involved in control 
at a policy level, where a decision has to be made in 
the "host" organisation because demands on it are ambiguous 
or conflicting. It is probable that in general plan 
fulfilment receives the higher priority and PPO's make 
the decision in its favour. However, as the following 
report shows, this is not necessarily so. In fact it is 
possible that with the increasing emphasis on and use of 
bonus payments, for which plan fulfilment is still a major 
indicator, that PPO's have had to redress the balance 
against a desire to fulfil plans with undue haste.
Brezhnev's emphasis on quality at the 25th Party Congress 
will presumably strengthen this trend. Evidence of this 
can be seen in the case of a design sent by the Kaunas 
department of the Kursk branch of the Institute of Electronic 
Control Equipment to the Vilnius Special Construction 
Bureau for Organisational Technology. The communists of 
the Bureau were of the opinion that the design was out of 
date and needed more work done on it. General opinion was 
divided - some considered that it was too risky to 
endanger fulfilment of the plan; others considered it 
shameful to work with backward technology. In this case 
the latter view prevailed and in an open party meeting the
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engineers and workers decided to rework the design.
A disturbing thing about reports of PPO concern 
with quality is the lack of account they take of the 
problems involved in deciding indicators for the evaluation 
of the quality of scientific work. One could be justified 
in wondering how significant or useful the involvement of 
PPO's is if they are unconcerned with these problems.
The same can be said of the evaluation of the
effectiveness {effektivnost ') of scientific work. Soviet
writers show themselves increasingly aware of the importance
of and difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of
research and have produced some quite sophisticated work 
2in this area. However there is not a great deal of
1 Kom.(Vilnius), 1/11, p. 2. Other reports 
are more straightforward. In 1973 the
party organisation of the Department of Machine 
Construction Technology in the institute 
attached to the Tallin electrotechnical 
factory heardffin an open party meeting 
reports (otchety) from the head of the 
department and from laboratory heads on the 
quality of hard alloy dies. The resulting work 
plan was examined in a meeting of the 
institute's party buro. Kom.Estonii, 8/73, 
p. 55. In 1969 Kommunist Ukrainy declared 
that it was pointless for research PPO's to 
achieve an improvement in the organisation of 
the work of designers without improving the 
technological content of the designs as well.
Kom.Ukrainy, 5/69, p. 70.
2 Zaleski, op. cit., pp. 458-464; Gvishiani, 
op. cit., Chapters 3-12; Amirov, Iu.D:
Organizatsiia i effektivnost ' nauchno-issledovatel'- 
skikh i opytno-konstruktorskikh rabot, Izd. 
"Ekonomika", Moscow, 1974, pp. 169-223.
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evidence that PPO1 2s are aware of such matters. True, 
there is one case on record from the All-Union Electro­
technical Institute. The heads of a department and a 
laboratory had presented a suggestion to the directorate 
that the institute undertake the whole process of production 
of new types of insulators for high powered turbo- and 
hydrogenerators, rather than farm some parts of the process 
out to other organistions. The leadership was inclined 
to accept the suggestion. However the party committee did 
not agree, on the grounds that such a method would use too 
much time and resources. With the help of qualified 
workers the party committee investigated the matter and 
opposed the suggestion. Its conclusion was accepted.^"
It is quite possible in this case that the PPO was doing 
no more than blindly obeying a directive from above; it 
it also quite possible that it was using quite rational 
methods of evaluation to come to an independent conclusion. 
However there is no other evidence to support the latter 
possibility. One must doubt whether research PPO's have 
the personnel available to make the sophisticated analyses
2required for rational decisions on research effectiveness.
1 P.z h., 1/67, p. 29.
2 Research party secretaries are usually 
research scientists. This does not imply 
any ability to evaluate the value of their 
research. However in view of the special 
training apparently being given to party 
workers in new administrative techniques it 
is possible that research party secretaries 
receive some training in evaluation techniques 
at the seminars and conferences run for them 
by higher authorities.
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In discussing educational institutions I mentioned 
some reports of PPO's being involved in solving problems 
that arose in the educational process. The work of PPO's 
in research institutes in this area is even more noticeable.
We saw in the Introduction that this is expected of staff 
generalist agencies although in doing so they are not to 
assume operational command, nor are they to ignore the 
long-term significance and solutions to problems that arise.
Some of the information allows us to say no more 
than that PPO's are involved in problem-solving. Thus when 
the party buro of the institute Dal 'stroiproekt examined 
work in the Mining Concentrates Department and heard a 
report (otchet) from its head, it found serious shortcomings.
It then demanded (potrebovalo) that the directorate bring 
about an improvement.^ There is nothing in this report to 
suggest a concern for or awareness of long-term considerat­
ions. However when a laboratory in the Institute of Metal 
Physics was having problems with its experiments the PPO 
examined the work of the whole laboratory and had discussions
with the leaders of other scientific institutions and big 
2factories. Although it gives no idea of the outcome of the 
party organisation's involvement, the report does suggest thatk 
the party organisation was interested in examining the problem 
in a wider perspective.
1 Barkusov, op. cit., p. 101.
2 Kom., 18/54, p. 64.
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The same concern with an examination of problems
in a wider perspective can be seen in the All-Union
Research Institute for Grain Growing in 1967. The party
committee drew the attention of the directorate to a
weakening of work in the area of grass seed growing.
The party committee decided to have an open party meeting
on the subject. It was revealed that the weakest sector
was feed production, and so it was suggested in the meeting
that the production of cheap feed be increased. The
workers of the institute and its experimental farm noted
a number of measures that would allow realisation of the
communists' suggestions.^ This type of activity suggests
precisely the sort of role that Sampson gave his staff
generalists. It can also be seen, but on a much smaller
scale, in the case of the Kazakh Institute of Chemical
Science. In 1963 the head of one of the institute's
laboratories reported to a party buro meeting on progress
in one project. He declared that all was going well except
that there was a lack of dolomite in Kazakhstan. The
participants of the meeting suggested that astergranite
2could be a substitute. The suggestion was accepted.
In both these cases the importance of a sound 
knowledge of the particular area of research is great, 
but, particularly in the former case, within an overall
1
2
P.zh.Kaz., 6/67, pp. 43-44. 
P.zh.Kaz., 12/63, p. 34.
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understanding of the needs of the general area of research.
Again the best examples of the staff generalist 
role have come from those areas where PPO's are trying to 
solve specific problems, in areas where the party members, 
and presumably the party secretary in particular, being 
scientists themselves, are able to examine these problems 
and apparently offer useful solutions. The combined 
experience of the party members is such that recommendations 
are likely to be offered that will be of general benefit to 
the institute, branch and society as a whole.
However in other areas the PPO's are not in such 
a happy situation. In their control of plan fulfilment, 
quality and effectiveness they are frustrated in playing a 
staff generalist role by the general situation and their 
own shortcomings in qualifications and experience. They 
are expected to commit themselves to plan fulfilment, 
largely incompatible with scientific research, and therefore 
there is some evidence that they are unwilling to accept 
the commitment. Questions of quality and effectiveness are 
too complex and specialised for the average scientific 
researcher. Thus the PPO's show themselves unaware of the 
complexities.
Nevertheless on balance the evidence presented in 
this section suggests that research PPO's are willing to
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play a staff generalist role.
(iii) administrative institutions
As mentioned in the introduction to this section 
the discussion of administrative PPO's will be limited here to 
a concern with the style of bureaucratic work. Soon we 
will see claims by some Soviet commentators, both before 
and since 1971, that administrative PPO's are entitled to 
be involved only with such matters. It is undoubtedly an 
important part of their work, but the brief discussion here 
should suffice to show that it is impossible to maintain 
the distinction between a concern with the style and the 
content of bureaucratic work. This provides the 
introduction to the last section of this chapter, dealing 
with relations with outside organisations.
The first matter of bureaucratic style and
procedure to be examined, efforts to reduce the amount of
paperwork involved, might appear to be straightforward. In
1966 a party meeting of the Moldavian Ministry of Light
Industry considered the excessive paperwork in the
Administration for Production and Technology and the
2Department of Material Incentive. In 1954 the communists
1 There is further discussion of problem-solving 
in the later account of research PPO's work with 
outside organisations.
2 Kom.Moldavii, 7/66, p. 36.
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of the Department of Technical Services of the Ministry
of Electrical Machine Construction tried to reduce the
amount of paperwork involved in ministry-enterprise
relations. Their concern was prompted by the 1,638
messages that had been sent to a single enterprise in one
year by ministry officials.^ Neither case suggests any
concern with anything beyond simple bureaucratic procedure.
However when we read that ministerial PPO's are entrusted
with the task of preventing the sending of trivial {melochny e)
directives from ministries to enterprises, the need for them
to decide which directives are trivial could well give them
some significant influence over the content, not just the
2style of bureaucratic activities.
PPO's to reduce the number of business trips undertaken by 
administrative officials. Keeping the number of trips to 
a minimum cannot simply mean banning trips without having 
any interest in their purpose and likely outcome. This 
was the approach adopted by the party committee of the 
Moscow oblast' sovnarkhoz when it recommended to the leader­
ship that the calling of leading enterprise workers to the
3
sovnarkhoz more than once monthly be banned. Partiinaia
The same problem can be seen in the concern of
1 P.zh. , 2/54, pp. 56-57 .
2 P.zh. , 8/64, p. 36.
3 P.zh., 2/62, pp. 13-14.
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zhizn ' was apparently aware of the problem of such a 
"formalistic" approach when in 1967 it criticised the party 
committee of the All-Union Ministry of Geology for not 
being interested in the effectiveness of business trips.^
The efficiency of the administrative apparatus in
dealing with letters and grievances from subordinate
enterprises, customers of the institution and the public is
another matter than can be dealt with from a narrow point of
view, but hardly successfully. Nevertheless in 1954
Partiinaia zhizn' declared that while ministerial PPO's
should make sure that letters are answered quickly, they
should not interest themselves in the contents of the
2letters or the replies. Nor surprisingly many PPO's 
apparently find it impossible to ensure that their "host" 
organisations are dealing properly with letters and 
grievances without being interested in their content. Thus 
in 1964 the head of the Department of Road Construction 
Machines of the Rostov Administration for the Supply and 
Sales of Heavy Machinery of the State Committee for 
Transport Construction was removed from his post by the head 
of the administration after members of the party-state 
control brigade, under the leadership of the party organis­
ation, found that he had been "sitting on" about 400 documents
1
2
P.zh. , 4/67, p . 22. 
P.zh., 5/54, p. 6.
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requiring urgent attention. Presumably the PPO was
sufficiently interested in the content of the documents
2to know that they were urgent.
It can be seen that the matters considered here, 
paperwork, trips and correspondence, eventually go beyond 
controlling simple bureaucratic procedures. It appears 
inevitable that any effective concern with bureaucratic 
procedures will come to involve a concern with the content 
of those procedures.
4. Relations with outside organisations
The content is almost always the work of production 
enterprises subordinate to the administrative institution. 
Nevertheless administrative PPO's are still formally denied
1 P.zh., 8/64, p. 36.
2 There is one report which does not make clear 
whether the PPO was interested in the content 
of correspondence, but gives sufficient detail 
on the way PPO's work that it is worth quoting.
In 1962 the party committee of the State 
Committee for Labour and Wages was strongly 
criticised at a plenum of the Bauman raikom in 
Moscow for doing nothing about poor work with 
grievances in the State Committee's apparatus.
The party committee acknowledged the criticism 
and selected a group of communists to look into 
the matter. The group produced statistical data 
and a number of concrete suggestions which were 
examined by the leadership of the State Committee. 
The chairman of the State Committee issued an 
order (prikaz) on the need for improvement, the 
implementation of which the party committee took 
under its direct control. P.zh., 2/62, p. 14.
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the right to involve themselves in the work of subordinate 
enterprises. The denial of the right has often been 
confusingly linked to the denial of the right of control to 
administrative PPO's. When the right of control was given 
to production PPO's at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 
1939, the PPO's of the People's Commissariats were 
specifically excluded "as a consequence of specific 
conditions". The Party Rules limited their role to improving 
the work of the apparatuses in which they were situated and 
their power to signalling the existence of shortcomings in 
the working of the apparatuses to higher authorities.'*'
The specific conditions were detailed by Partiinaia
zhizn' in 1954. The journal pointed out that a ministry, and
any other administrative institution, has many institutions
and enterprises subordinate to it with their own PPO's, often
in other localities and so subordinate to different raikomy
or gorkomy. For the ministerial PPO to concern itself with
the activities of the subordinate organisations would involve
2usurping the rights of those superior party organs.
1 KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, op. cit., vol. 2, 1925-53, 
p. 917.
2 P.zh., 5/54, p. 8. The journal gave a concrete 
example in 1958. The raion inspectorates of the 
Kashka-Daria oblastr Statistics Administration 
often received instructions from the administration 
signed by its head and the secretary of its PPO.
One such order said that a party meeting had 
"examined in detail the shortcomings in the work
of the administration in general and also in each 
inspectorate". The inspectors were instructed to 
discuss the matter of the shortcomings in their 
work with the communists and send the results to the 
administration. Partiinaia zhizn' declared that the 
administration's PPO was assuming the functions of 
the obkom in directing raion organisations. P.zh., 
6/58, p. 62.
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This argument has been used to justify limiting 
the functions of administrative PPO's strictly to the style 
of bureaucratic procedures. Since the content of those 
procedures is almost invariably connected with the work 
of production enterprises, the administrative PPO's must 
not involve themselves in it lest they usurp the rights 
of superior party organs.'*"
Clearly the right of control should have no 
direct application to this argument. The right of control 
defines a number of powers a PPO can use in its relations 
with the leadership of its own "host" organisation, and in 
itself implies no powers over outside organisations.
Nevertheless when in 1971 administrative PPO's were 
granted the right of control it was considered necessary to 
ensure that it was not interpreted as meaning that the PPO's 
were gaining any right of control over subordinate enter­
prises by limiting their control to "the work of the 
apparatus in the fulfilment of the directives of the party 
and state and the observance of Soviet laws", and describing 
their functions in terms similar to the 1939 description,
"to actively work for the perfecting of the work of the
1 Thus when a factory complained to the party
committee of the Ministry of Electrotechnical 
Industry that two glavki were making conflict­
ing demands of it, the party secretary 
claimed that the PPO, not having the right 
of control, could not act on such a matter. 
P.2/2., 13/55, pp. 52-53.
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apparatus, to foster in officials a spirit of high resp­
onsibility for assigned tasks, to take measures for the 
strengthening of state discipline and improving services 
for the population, to conduct a resolute struggle against 
bureaucratism and red-tape, and to promptly inform 
responsible party organs of shortcomings in the work of 
institutions and individual officials, regardless of their 
positions".^
The 1971 Rules are still misleading to the extent 
that they fail to recognise the opportunities that adminis­
trative PPO's have long had and exercised, regardless of 
the right of control, for influencing the work of subordinate 
enterprises. An administrative PPO is easily able to 
justify some degree of involvement in subordinate enter­
prises simply by expressing it in terms of the performance 
of administrative officials in their dealings with enter­
prises. Thus in 1958, long before administrative PPO's 
received the right of control, Partiinaia zhizn1 wrote:
Of course the primary party organisation 
(of an administrative apparatus) may not 
directly lead the periphery. But it is 
clear that it cannot remain indifferent 
to work there. If necessary, if subordinate 
enterprises are not fulfilling production
1 Ustav KPSS, 1971, op. cit., pp. 54-55.
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plans, the party organisation is obliged 
to concern itself with the shortcomings 
in the work of the apparatus that have 
created the conditions for this, and to 
take all measures available to it to remove 
them.^
In the same journal in 1972, after the granting of the
right of control, the following statement appeared:
The party organisations of administrative 
institutions, as everyone knows, cannot 
directly influence the activity of subord­
inate enterprises. But, all the same, in 
controlling the work of the apparatus, they 
give concrete assistance to the collectives 
of factories, construction sites and coll­
ective and state farms in the mobilisation
of reserves and in the fulfilment of plans
2and socialist obligations.
1 P.zh., 15/58, p. 18.
2 P.zh. , 21/72, p. 5. In 1973 Partiinaia zhizn1 2
declared that although a gorispolkom PPO cannot 
hear a report from the head of the Consumer Trade 
Department on the condition of consumer trade in 
the city because this is the concern of the 
gorispolkom itself or the gorkom buro or plenum, 
it can consider the question "The tasks of the 
communists in the gorispolkom apparatus in improving 
control of the condition of consumer trade in the 
city". The journal considered that "this is 
permissible, since the primary party organisation 
of the ispolkom influences the state of affairs in 
subordinate enterprises and institutions through 
the apparatus officials, primarily the communists, 
connected with this or that branch of the economy". 
P.zh., 12/73, pp. 51-52.
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Thus the right of control is not strictly 
speaking relevant to the permissible relations of 
administrative PPO's with subordinate enterprises. 
Examples of administrative PPO involvement in the 
affairs of subordinate enterprises date both before and 
after 1971. The degree of involvement permitted has 
always depended on official policy of the time on the 
role of the party apparatus in production affairs.
Thus examples of administrative PPO involvement in 
production affairs abound in the late 1950's, a time 
when the party apparatus as a whole was heavily 
involved in production affairs.
This is not to deny entirely the significance 
of the 1971 granting of the right of control. As with 
other categories of non-production institutions the 
right of control has had considerable significance in 
showing all affected people that the role of the PPO's 
was to be strengthened and in making it impossible for 
both institutional leaders and PPO officials themselves 
to avoid the implications of the strengthened role of
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the PPO's. Nevertheless from the concrete examples I 
will give it is evident that these types of activities 
have been undertaken by administrative PPO's well before 
1971.
The least controversial aspect of administrative 
PPO's involvement in the activities of subordinate enter­
prises is control of the behaviour of administrative 
officials in their dealing with them. This is uncontrov- 
ersial because it need not imply any concern with the 
actual activities of the enterprise. The PPO of the Kazakh 
Ministry of State Control was criticised in 1956 for not 
showing any concern over the fact that when senior ministry 
officials visited factories they showed no interest in
1 A member of the party buro of the Irkutsk
sovnarkhoz was aware of this when he wrote 
to Kommunist in 1961: "Can the party
organisation of the sovnarkhoz really stand 
aside when, through the fault of sovnarkhoz 
officials, many subordinate enterprises 
cannot cope with their production plans, and 
when bad management is allowed? In the 
existing situation party organisations are 
limited to passing 'delicate', non-obligatory 
decisions regarding administrative leaders: 
to 'ask', 'direct attention to', 'recommend', 
etc. Not considering themselves responsible 
before the party organisation some leaders of 
administrations exclude it from a close study 
of conditions and reasons for shortcomings in 
work, considering that this would diminish 
their authority. Therefore it is considered 
that it is necessary to give the party organ­
isations of sovnarkhozy, agencies, local 
soviet and administrative institutions the 
right of control of the activities of 
communist administrative leaders." Korn., 
13/61, p. 90.
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talking to the workers or in reporting to their meetings.'*' 
This is no more than a concern with the style of bureau­
cratic operations, only in this case it is operations
2taking place outside the central apparatus.
However administrative PPO's are expected to be
more vitally concerned with production than this. There
is evidence to suggest that ministerial PPO's are held
responsible to some degree for the fulfilment of branch 
3plans. The concern for fulfilment of production plans is 
primary. If plan fulfilment is at stake administrative
1 P.zh., 6/56, p. 32.
2 However the greater significance such a 
concern can have can be seen in more recent 
reports. In 1967 the party buro of the 
Latvian Ministry of Local Industry was 
reported to be concerned, in the light of the 
economic reforms, to make party members active 
innovators not only in the ministerial 
apparatus, but also in the enterprises they 
periodically visit. Kom.Sov.Latvii, 7/67,
p. 54. This could suggest that the ministerial 
PPO's are expected to ensure that ministerial 
officials implement the economic reforms in 
production enterprises. For further discussion 
of this matter, see Chapter Four.
3 A Pavtiinaia zhizn f article of 1964 stressed 
that the lack of the right of control did not 
reduce the responsibility of the PPO of the 
North Caucasus sovnarkhoz for the fulfilment 
of production plans and tasks. P.zh. , 17/64, 
p. 37. The party buro of the Kazakh Ministry 
of Construction was criticised in the same 
year because the party buro had not mentioned 
in its meetings that the ministry was not 
fulfilling its production plans. P.zh.Kaz., 
5/64, pp. 60-61.
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PPO's are expected to take any action necessary, even 
of dubious legality. Thus in 1966 when a Ukrainian 
factory had run out of some essential materials and one 
shop had lain idle for three months it sent representatives 
to the party committee of the All-Union Ministry of 
Construction Materials. The party committee quickly got 
in touch with the responsible organisations and the 
necessary materials were sent to the factory. While 
Kommunist criticised the party committee for the style of 
its response, it admitted that some action had been necessary.'*'
This case indicates that enterprise managers are
aware of the fact that ministerial PPO's are ultimately
responsible for the fulfilment of production plans, and so
will turn to them in crisis situations. This must mean
that PPO's become involved in the everyday operations of
the ministries and their enterprises. In 1954 the director
of a factory could not get an urgent order dealt with by
the relevant glavk of the Ministry of Agriculture. He
wrote to the party committee of the ministry, which sent it
to the party buro of the glavk. However the buro considered
the matter for a month before sending it back to the
committee, saying that the officials of another glavk were
2to blame. The party buro was criticised for this.
1 Korn., 16/66, pp. 57-58.
2 P.zh., 4/54, pp. 65-69.
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Sometimes party contacts are used to solve production 
problems. When there was a problem in the Ministry of 
Chemical Industry over the dispatch of some insulating 
materials, the party buro of the Transport Administration 
contacted the party committee of the Ministry of Electro­
technical Industry. This was reported to have improved the 
situation greatly.^-
Administrative PPO's appear to be willing to
become involved in removing shortcomings in subordinate
enterprises on their own initiative. For example, the
.party organisation of the Gas Administration of the State
Committee for Labour and Wages conducted technical and
managerial conferences on the work of its apparatus. One
of these, with the title "The conditions of research work
and the role of the apparatus in it", is said to have
uncovered serious shortcomings in the work of subordinate
research institutes, as well as in the leadership given
2them by the glavk. At the election-report meeting of the 
PPO of the RSFSR Ministry of the River Fleet "the partic­
ipants of the meeting turned particular attention to the 
removal of the existing shortcomings in the activity of the
apparatus of the ministry and subordinate shipping enter-
3prises {parokhodstva)."
1 P.zh., 7/56, p. 76.
2 P.zh., 2/62, p. 14.
3 P.zh., 24/73, p. 33.
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Neither of these reports gives any idea of how 
administrative PPO's might change the situation in 
subordinate enterprises. Their information-gathering 
rights appear to be relatively uncontroversial, although 
considerable.'*' More important is what action the PPO can 
take once shortcomings have been uncovered. It is not 
permitted to exercise even the recommendatory powers of the 
right of control over subordinate enterprises or their 
PPO's. However the PPO does have the full powers of the 
right of control over all administrative officials and of 
party discipline over those of them who are party members.
Thus the PPO can hear reports from administrative 
officials on their work with subordinate enterprises and
1 In the wine-making industry in Moldavia
there was considerable delay in the 
utilisation (osvoenie) of capital invest­
ment resources. On the recommendation of 
the party committee of the republican 
Ministry of Food Industry it was decided 
to find out why. A group of ministry 
specialists were sent out to the construction 
sites. The group, of unspecified total 
number, included eleven communists recommended 
by the party committee. Kom.Moldavii, 8/67, 
p. 58. The party buro of the Kirgiz Ministry 
of Health organised a commission to look into 
medical services in the villages. Pravda, 
7/10/71, p. 2. That these commissions sent to 
subordinate enterprises, even if they are not 
party commissions, are under the direct control 
of the PPO can be seen in the statement in one 
Soviet book that it is permissible to establish 
a party group among a delegation of officials 
travelling from a central apparatus. Figurin, 
op. cit., p. 6.
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make recommendations to them. In some circumstances 
it can take party disciplinary action against recalcitrant 
leaders.^
What is so important about these powers is that 
they give the administrative PPO the opportunity to 
influence the activities of subordinate enterprises.
While the PPO does not have the right to exercise control 
directly over them, it does have the right of control over 
the administrative officials who, after all, give enterprises 
direct orders. There appears to be no reason that the PPO 
cannot give recommendations, with the usual force of PPO
1 In 1973 the party committee of the RSFSR 
Ministry of Rural Construction heard a 
report (otchet) from a glavk head on 
shortcomings in construction. There was a 
wastage of capital on many projects. The 
party committee recognised the need to 
change the planning of capital investments
and to give resources to those enterprises that 
were in a position to utilise them best. The 
party committee suggested that the glavk head 
put things in order and informed the minister 
of the shortcomings and asked him to take the 
necessary measures. P.zh., 8/73, p. 37.
This indicates that the PPO played some policy­
making role, in that it at least participated 
in deciding which enterprises deserved capital 
investment priority.
2 See the case already quoted of the glavk head 
who was given a party reprimand by the party 
committee of the RSFSR Ministry of Rural 
Construction after failing to take any action, 
as directed by the party committee, on a 
complaint from a construction trust that glavk 
workers were not acting according to ministerial 
instructions. P.zh., 6/73, p. 36.
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recommendations, to administrative officials on the action 
they should take in subordinate enterprises. Thus we 
find administrative PPO's apparently directly influencing 
the work of subordinate enterprises through their control 
over administrative officials. In the Kuibyshev sovnarkhoz 
in 1958 a subordinate factory which had been given 
responsibility for producing some parts for tractor 
hydraulic systems failed to fill its orders and send the 
parts on to the next factory in the production chain. The sov­
narkhoz PPO decided that some action was necessary and so 
examined how each communist in the apparatus "defended state 
interests".^ No details are given on the results of its 
examination, but it was directly motivated by a problem in 
a production enterprise and it presumably resulted in some 
positive action to remove that problem.
Another case from the same report gives an
example of the sovnarkhoz positively changing production
procedures in a subordinate enterprise. The communists
in the sovnarkhoz apparatus had learnt from a letter sent
to the sovnarkhoz by a factory that it needed its supplies
of cable earlier than was possible when the cable was
produced at the end of the quarter. The communists spoke
to the people concerned in the Construction Materials
Administration and ensured that the cable was produced at
2the beginning of the quarter.
1 P.zh. , 11/58, pp. 16-17.
2 ibid.
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The widespread use by administrative PPO's of 
such powers must be of enormous significance. However 
there is also evidence of more direct involvement. One 
statement even suggests that administrative PPO's can 
make recommendations to the party organisations of sub­
ordinate enterprises. In 1971 the secretary of the party 
buro of the Orel department of the Moscow railway said:
It is well known that the party organisation 
of the department's apparatus cannot 
influence the work of enterprises and org­
anisations situated in other raiony. The 
interests of business demand that the actions 
of all the collectives, and above all the 
communists in them, should be agreed upon.
This means that it is necessary to have 
permanent communications with these 
party organisations, to inform them about 
our affairs, and at times to suggest 
something (naturally with the agreement of 
the relevant party organs).^
The qualification about the agreement of the relevant party 
organs, that is the vaikom or gorkom, is an important one. 
Nevertheless the suggestion that the PPO can make 
reocmmendations to the party organisations of subordinate 
enterprises, the recommendations presumably carrying with
1 P.zh., 2/71, p. 39.
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them some authority, is an interesting one.
Few reports go as far as this. However in 
recent years there has been an enormous increase in 
emphasis on the utility of cooperation between PPO's.
We should remember when discussing the involvement of 
administrative PPO's in production matters and subordinate 
enterprises that often they are the only party organisations 
with access to the whole of a particular area of concern. 
Enterprise PPO's are not in a position to examine affairs 
within the bureaucratic apparatus, which is where many of 
the operational decisions affecting production are made, 
while raikomy and gorkomy, even those that have a pre­
ponderance of administrative institutions on their 
territory and therefore specialise in administrative 
management, are not in a position to investigate the 
situation at lower levels of the administrative hierarchy, 
especially if subordinate enterprises, as they very often 
are, are situated in different raiony or cities. The 
administrative PPO's therefore occupy an important strategic 
position.
Combined meetings and commissions of ministries 
and enterprise workers, under the direct supervision of the 
administrative PPO, are becoming increasingly popular. The
1 Also interesting is the inference that when
the subordinate organisations are in the 
same raion, the department's party buro 
can influence their work.
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party committee and subordinate party organisations of
the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry organise meetings
of apparatus officials with the leaders of enterprises,^
while to facilitate the working of the new administrative
system the party buro of the Latvian Ministry of Local
2Industry conducts similar meetings. In 1969 one of the 
factories of the Kazakh Ministry of Light Industry was 
working poorly. An engineer-technician from one of 
the glavki went to the factory and decided that its 
technology was out of date. He returned to the glavk and 
turned to the party buro for advice. The buro and the 
glavk leadership suggested the formation of a brigade of 
factory and glavk specialists to be sent to the leading 
factories in Moscow and Leningrad. The party organisation 
of the North Kazakh sovnarkhoz had a number of brigades, 
with enterprise representatives, concerned with technical 
progress. One brigade was responsible for working out
1 P.zh., 24/66, p. 27.
2 Kom.Sov.Latvii, 7/67, p. 54. The secretary 
of the party buro also mentions that 
enterprise PPO's ask the party buro to help 
them in the managerial training of their 
personnel.
3 P.zh.Kaz., 8/69, pp. 20-21.
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and putting into effect measures for raising the 
productivity of labour in industrial transport.^
One would expect that in any cooperation between 
administrative and enterprise PPO's the administrative PPO's
1 P.zh.Kaz., 7/60, p. 37. The strategic position
of ministerial PPO's can also be seen in the 
increasing use made of direct contacts between 
them. In 1972 the secretary of the PPO of the 
All-Union Ministry of the Oil Industry spoke of 
the consideration of key problems of technical 
progress in combined meetings of the party 
committees of his and related ministries. He 
gave as an example the combined meeting of 
the party committees of his ministry and the 
Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, in which the 
leaders of both ministries participated. The 
meeting considered the question of the 
improvement of the quality of pipes for oil 
grading and what the party organisations could 
do about it. Sotsialisticheskaia industviia,
27/10, 72. In 1971 Moskovskaia pravda published 
quite a long article on the subject, written 
by the secretary of the PPO of the State 
Committee for Science and Technology. The PPO 
had held a conference of its party aktiv in 
order to consider the forms and methods 
available to establish control of the work of 
the apparatus. The secretaries of the depart­
ment and administration party organisations 
had supported the further development of contacts 
with party organisations in other ministries and 
agencies. There then took place a combined 
meeting of the communists of the Department of 
Energy of the State Committee and the Technical 
Administration of the Ministry of Electrotechnical 
Industry. The meeting examined the question of 
raising the effectiveness of the work of research 
organisations and speeding up the introduction 
of scientific discoveries into production. The 
party conference in the State Committee had also 
raised the possibility of the formation of special 
commissions for the control of important inter­
branch problems of technical progress. The pro­
posal was still being examined, there being problems 
deciding who would head the combined commissions.
It was thought it would probably vary according to 
each individual situation. Mosk.pravda, 17/9/71, p. 2.
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would occupy the dominant position. Their "host" 
organisations are superior to the "host" organisations of 
enterprise PPO's and the matters discussed will usually 
be put into practice by means of administrative orders to 
the enterprises. In the case of ministerial PPO's, 
relations between them and the Central Committee apparatus 
are apparently very close, which suggests that they could 
be in a position not only to exert their authority over the 
enterprise PPO's, but also over the vaikomy and govkomy in 
the territory of which the enterprises are situated.
The general impression to be gained from the 
evidence in this section is that the powers of administrative, 
particularly ministerial PPO's, over subordinate enter­
prises are considerable. Although they are formally 
denied the right to directly control subordinate enter­
prises, their exercise of control over administrative 
officials even when they are carrying out assignments in 
the enterprises gives them the opportunity to significantly 
influence the administrative supervision the enterprises 
receive and therefore their production operations. Such 
powers have been increasingly complemented by direct 
contacts between the party members of different PPO's, 
contacts presumably dominated by the administrative PPO's.
Administrative PPO's have taken considerable 
advantage of the opportunities offered them. They have
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often taken the initiative in changing procedures in 
subordinate enterprises in order to remove shortcomings; 
perhaps even more often they have reacted to appeals 
from enterprises to change the procedures of administrative 
officials or other enterprises.
These activites are of considerable significance 
for short-term problem-solving, but are they relevant to 
the staff generalist role? None of the examples given in 
this section have suggested any awareness of the long-term 
implications of particular problems. Even the cases 
dealing with problems of capital investment appear to go no 
further than the immediate difficulties in the use of 
capital resources, not the long-term needs of the branch 
(with the possible exception of the case of the RSFSR 
Ministry of Rural Construction, where the PPO made decisions 
on investment priorities). The problem is well illustrated 
in the case already mentioned of the party committee of 
the All-Union Ministry of Construction Materials which 
contacted the responsible organisations to ensure that a 
Ukrainian factory that had been short of supplies received 
what it needed. In reporting the case Kommunist admitted 
that the situation was a serious one and that some action 
had had to be taken. However the journal criticised the 
party committee on two counts. Firstly, in such a situation 
it is not the task of the party committee to contact the
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responsible organisations, that is, the party committee 
was usurping the functions of other organisations.
Secondly, and more interesting for us at this stage, the 
journal claimed that the party committee did nothing to 
uncover the underlying causes of the problem and to remove 
them.'*' The party committee was happy to have solved the 
immediate problem, but was unable to see that its staff 
generalist responsibilities required it to take much 
broader, longer-term action. The other cases reported in 
this section suggest that Kommunist's criticisms could be 
applied to most other administrative PPO's. While 
their operational powers should not be underestimated, 
they are used in the way warned against by Sampson, to 
solve short-term problems by interfering in day-to-day 
operations, leading to a situation where the PPO becomes 
a "problem-fixing" agency which is appealed to in all cases 
of difficulty. It will probably be able to solve the 
problem through various informal and perhaps disruptive means, 
but will eventually come to be relied upon to permanently 
play this role. Meanwhile the causes of the problems are 
ignored and so the situation never improves. In such a 
case it could be concluded that the PPO is failing in its 
task.^
1 Korn., 16/66, pp. 57-58.
In the special chapter on ministerial PPO's 
there is greater evidence of PPO's acting with 
staff generalist aims in mind. Nevertheless 
the conclusion is reached that they do not act 
in a staff generalist style and so again they 
fail.
2
332 .
We have already seen that research PPO's play 
a considerable problem-solving role and often apparently 
with a staff generalist outlook. One of the great 
problems of Soviet science is the introduction of 
scientific discoveries into production.'*' PPO's are closely 
involved in attempts to solve this problem.
Their involvement begins with such "social"
activities as ensuring close and "friendly" relations
2between scientists and producers. Such efforts are not 
solely directed towards improving brotherly relations.
They are designed to ensure greater technical understanding 
among producers and understanding of production requirements 
among scientists, with the aim of easing the difficulties 
of introducing scientific discoveries into production.
Relations between scientists and producers can 
be organised on quite a formal basis, as can the involvement 
of research PPO's in questions of the introduction of 
scientific discoveries into production. Thus in the
1 See Zaleski, op. cit., pp. 425-486.
2 Party meetings in the Urals branch of the 
All-Union Academy of Sciences looked on 
the development of "friendly" relations 
between scientists and production workers 
as one of their fundamental tasks. Kom. , 
18/54, pp. 63-64. The party committee of 
the All-Union Electrotechnical Institute 
considers that it is its task to foster the 
"strengthening of the friendly cooperation 
[s odruzhestvo) of scientists with 
production". P. zh. , 1/67, p. 26.
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Cheliabinsk Research Institute of Metallurgy there are 
combined brigades of workers from the institute and 
factories. The institute has a combined Technical Council 
with one factory with which the institute works particularly 
closely. The council was formed on the initiative of the 
vaikom and is controlled by the two PPO's, its activities 
being discussed in party meetings and in meetings of the 
factory's party committee and the institute's party buro.'*"
Often these combined meetings, councils and
brigades, still under the control of research PPO's, are
involved in solving particular problems. Thus the
brigades organised by the PPO of the Institute of
Catalysis, combining specialists from the institute, other
institutes and factories, as well as helping foster a sense
of the collective spirit in the scientists, are also said to
help solve current problems in important areas of the
2chemical and oil-chemical industry.
1 Kom., 9/70, pp. 16-17. The party committee of
the All-Union Electrotechnical Institute has a 
permanent control commission specifically concerned 
with the introduction of scientific developments 
into production, while its department party 
organisations have links with factory PPO's. P.zh., 
16/63, p. 36; Barkusov, op. cit., p. 64. The 
party buro of the Kazakh Research Institute of 
Energy set up a special commission to look at all 
aspects of the introduction of its work into 
production. P.zh.Kaz., 5/72, p, 31. In 1965, on 
the initiative of the PPO of the institute 
Karagandagiproshakht, communist scientists went 
to party meetings in the mines. P.zh.Kaz., 10/65, p. 32.
2 Ianovskii, op. cit., pp. 92-93.
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A most interesting case concerns the Rostov 
Research Institute of Machine Construction Technology. In 
1959 the party buro of the institute suggested the study of 
the group method of detailing work used in two factories.
The leadership of the institute sent two groups of specialists 
to the factories. They found that the orders given by the 
sovnarkhoz on the process were inadequate. The specialists 
informed the party and trade union organisations of the 
factories and they decided on measures to be taken. The 
party buro of the institute gave the results of the invest­
igation, including conclusions and suggestions, to the 
sovnarkhoz's Machine Construction Administration.^" In this
case the institute's party buro appeared willing to attempt
2to influence the sovnarkhoz as well as the factories.
1 P.zh., 20/59, p. 45.
2 There are numerous other examples. The All-Union 
Design-Technical Institute for Electrical 
Appliances and Instruments has a control commission 
for the introduction of progressive developments
(razrahotki) into production. Following complaints 
from factories the commission investigated the use 
of non-standardised machinery designed by the 
institute in the factories. It required 
information from the factories and so recommended 
that the administration obtain information from 
the factory managers, while communists check the 
situation during inspection tours through the 
factories. The commission collected data on the 
reasons for delays in the use of machinery and 
uncovered deficiencies in the technical document­
ation for the machines. It offered practical 
recommendations to the party buro. A party meeting 
was then held at which the institute's chief 
engineer gave a report {otch&t) . After the meeting 
the administration issued an order. P.zh., 24/75, 
p. 46. In 1963 the party committee of the All-Union 
Electrotechnical Institute sent a commission to a 
Tallin factory to look at problems involved in the 
introduction of new technology. It found that some 
new techniques were being misused, but with the help 
of republican party organisations things were put 
right. P.zh., 16/63, p. 35.
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This type of activity has a lot in common with 
the activities of administrative PPO's in subordinate 
enterprises. They appear to be usually limited to the 
solving of short-term problems, although there are some 
suggestions that there is a longer-term concern with the 
implementation of new technology. Nevertheless there is 
not the same degree of staff generalist concern as was 
evident in the earlier section on research PPO problem­
solving. This is presumably a consequence of limitations 
in the power that research PPO's have to influence customer 
enterprises. While the evidence suggests that they have 
adequate powers of investigation and recommendation with 
regard to specific problems, these powers do not extend 
to the expression of general policy inherent in a staff 
generalist role. Given the general position of research 
PPO's in the Soviet system this cannot be considered 
surprising.
Tertiary educational establishments are also 
involved in the introduction of scientific discoveries into
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production. However the relations of educational
institutions with production enterprises are not only
for research purposes. They are also important for the
educational process itself. Kommunist says:
The party organisations of educational
institutions and industrial enterprises
examine together many questions of the
improvement of the practical and
theoretical training of students ...
The party organisation of the
Cheliabinsk Polytechnical Institute
supports relations with the enterprises
where the institute's first-year 
2students work.
1 A secretary of the Leningrad gorkom said
in 1958, in a discussion of Khrushchev's 
speech at the 21st Party Congress, that the 
party organisations of tertiary institutions 
had begun more closely to involve themselves 
in the introduction of the achievements of 
science into production. Korn., 18/58, p. 31.
The party committee of the Tomsk Polytechnical 
Institute recommended to the institute's 
leadership that contracts be drawn up with the 
association Tomlesprom to speed up scientific- 
technological progress. P.zh. , 6/73, p. 34.
The PPO of the Lvov Polytechnical Institute 
used the "voluntary" work of the institute staff 
to establish a scientific-technical faculty in 
the institute with branches in large industrial 
enterprises. P.zh., 4/60, pp. 78-79. The 
Moscow Engineering-Economics Institute has a 
special party commission concerned with "creative 
links with production". Samsonov, op. cit., p. 6.
2 Korn., 5/60, p. 74.
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A 1963 article in Partiinaia zhizn ' describes the concern 
of school PPO's with the shortcomings not only of their 
directors, but also of the leaders of the enterprises with 
which their schools have relations, especially those 
enterprises where their students work. For example, an 
open party meeting in a Leningrad eleven-year school 
criticised the administration of the enterprise where the 
school's students worked, for failing to establish training 
work-shops. The meeting recommended to the enterprise 
leaders that the situation be changed. The enterprise PPO's 
gave assistance to their school counterpart.'*' This report 
goes very much further in giving non-production PPO's the 
right to influence the activity of outside organisations 
than any other I have found.
Conclusion
The overall impression to be gained from this 
chapter is that non-production PPO's do not fulfil staff 
generalist functions. Although they make significant use 
of their control powers, both in routine "verification of 
fulfilment" and in the decision-making made possible by the 
ambiguity left in the tasks of "host" organisations, they 
do not usually use them in a staff generalist way, in a 
way that exhibits a concern with the broad understanding of
1 P.zh., 5/63, pp. 49-50.
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the "host" organisations' functions or with a long-term 
improvement in their fulfilment. There are exceptions 
to this generalisation. By definition a concern with 
planning is a concern with the long-term. All categories 
of non-production PPO's, with the exception of those in 
administrative institutions, apparently play an important 
part in the formulation of plans. Although formally 
speaking the planning process is highly centralised there 
is in fact a considerable degree of de facto decentralisation, 
particularly in the research category. This gives PPO's 
the opportunity to participate in the determination of the 
long-term objectives of "host" organisations.
Again particularly in the research area there is 
evidence of PPO's concerning themselves with short-term 
problem-solving within a staff generalist context. Research 
PPO's have been shown to place a particular research 
problem within the broad context of the general research 
objectives of the branch and system as a whole. Although 
the evidence is not as strong, the possibility cannot be 
excluded that educational PPO's are involved in the same 
way in solving problems that arise in the educational 
process.
However the great bulk of the involvement of the 
PPO's of all categories in problem-solving appears to take 
a form that is fundamentally opposed to staff generalism.
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PPO's are able to use apparently quite effectively the 
powers of the right of control and their contacts with 
higher party authorities and other PPO's to solve short­
term operational problems that have arisen both within their 
own "host" organisation and in other institutions. Although 
in such activities they do not use any formal powers of 
operational command, they are nevertheless closely 
involved in operational decision-making. Such activities 
are not necessarily incompatible with the staff generalist 
role. Sampson admits that such involvement can be both 
necessary and useful. However they should not be allowed 
to displace the true staff generalist concern, which is to 
use short-term problem-solving to provide the impetus 
and access to a broad understanding and removal of basic 
shortcomings in the "host" organisation. If this latter 
concern is neglected the short-term problems simply 
continue to occur; the PPO continues to solve the problems, 
but without ever doing anything to remove the basic 
difficulty. This is disruptive for the organisation not 
simply because it means that problems are continually 
re-arising, but also because it means that the PPO is 
continually involved in operational concerns outside the 
normal channels of command and communication. If these 
informal channels come to be relied on, and there is some 
evidence that enterprise managers might rely to some 
extent on administrative PPO's, the normal channels atrophy,
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while the party organisations find it increasingly 
difficult to get back to their staff generalist and other 
political-ideological functions. This problem, very 
evident among higher-level party organs, is one which, 
despite the periodic campaigns conducted against it, 
is continually reappearing. It seems that it could also 
be a problem among non-production PPO's.
The other aspect of PPO functions that appeared 
in this chapter and is quite outside the framework of the 
staff generalist model is the use of the operational 
powers of the right of control for political purposes.
This was most evident in the case of educational PPO's, 
where ideological control and indoctrination is such a 
fundamental party of the "host"organisations' activities. 
However political and ideological concerns probably have 
an important part in the involvement of all PPO's in 
personnel policies. These concerns are best understood in 
terms of the legitimisation considerations discussed in 
the chapter on ideology. It cannot be said that such 
concerns are inherently opposed to staff generalism. 
However political manipulation of personnel policies and 
other ideological concerns can hardly lead to long-term 
improvements in operational performance.
Two factors contribute most strongly to the 
involvement of PPO's in short-term problem-solving and
341.
their neglect of staff generalist concerns. Firstly, 
there is their responsibility for plan fulfilment. If 
plan fulfilment is threatened the PPO must take any 
measures necessary to solve that essentially short-term 
problem. Secondly, there is the fact that PPO's are in 
such a good position to become involved in such activities. 
They are so closely integrated into their "host” organis­
ations and they are able to develop such extensive party 
contacts, including with higher authorities, that they are 
in an ideal position to provide the alternative means of 
command and communication that is so useful for drawing 
attention to and solving short-term problems. These two 
factors complement and contribute to an image of party 
work best summed up in the phrase "get the job done".
The party apparatus is seen as an agency able to solve all 
problems - this is a necessary part of the image required 
for its legitimacy; it is also an image that has arisen 
through the experiences of the most difficult periods of 
Soviet development. Much of the activity of non-production 
PPO's described in this chapter suggests that they partake of 
this image. If it is one that has caused the PPO's pre­
occupation with short-term problem-solving, it is in the 
long-term a dysfunctional one.
Later chapters will contribute more information 
on these questions. The next chapter examines a particular
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case-study, the role of ministerial PPO's in the 
implementation of the post-1964 economic and administrative 
reforms. That role is in itself a staff generalist one. 
Therefore in the chapter we will see more evidence than 
has been given in this chapter of ministerial PPO's under­
taking staff generalist functions. Nevertheless the 
conclusion will be reached that their style of work in the 
role is not a staff generalist one; it is rather the 
traditional style of party work. The chapter following 
that will present biographical data on PPO secretaries to 
test two largely opposing hypotheses - one, that PPO 
secretaries display the training, experience and expectations 
that would encourage them to behave in either a staff 
generalist or the traditional party style; and two, that 
their training, experience and expectations would encourage 
them to neglect state interests in order to collude with 
institutional leaders in the furtherance of narrow sectional 
interests. In earlier chapters I suggested that the close 
integration of a staff agency in a line organisation would 
cause serious problems of collusion. This chapter has not 
been concerned with this problem. However the final 
chapter before the Conclusion will devote considerable
attention to it.
CHAPTER FOUR
MINISTERIAL PRIMARY PARTY ORGANISATIONS AND THE 
POST-KHRUSHCHEV REFORMS
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
role of the primary party organisations of ministries and 
other central bureaucratic agencies in the implementation 
of the economic and administrative reforms that have been 
introduced into the Soviet system since the fall of 
Khrushchev. It is still too early to come to any con­
clusions on how significant these reforms are in the long­
term. While they certainly do not have the radical 
appearance of Khrushchev's reforms, indeed in some ways they 
could be seen as reversions to the system in force before 
Khrushchev, the present leadership appears to have somewhat 
more determined and clear-headed objectives than 
Khrushchev ever had. One might suspect, therefore, that 
the long-term significance of its reforms will be greater 
than that of many of Khrushchev's.
One can expect to find one of two motivations 
behind almost any government reform, and often a combina­
tion of the two. Firstly, there are political 
considerations - these can include factors connected with 
factional politics among the top leadership and factors 
concerned with general political control of the population. 
Secondly, there are economic and administrative
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considerations - genuine efforts to improve the working 
of the economic system.
Both these considerations are evident in the 
post-1964 reforms, although perhaps the feature which 
helps give these reforms their "serious" appearance is 
that political features seem to have been largely stabilised 
and restrained, while the greatest attention is being 
paid to economic considerations.
There are a number of factors that are basic to 
an analysis of the post-Khrushchev reforms. I will now 
briefly describe them:
(1) The top leadership appears to have come to some
agreement within itself that top-level factional conflict 
will be kept to a minimum. While the "party" has remained 
supreme, and that means essentially those top leaders who 
base their power in the party apparatus, above all Brezhnev, 
a slightly uneven balance with the top leaders basing their 
power in the administrative apparatus has been maintained. 
This can be seen best in the continuing separation of the 
posts of General Party Secretary and Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers, and the relative balance maintained 
between the two sides in membership of the Politburo.^
1 Rigby, T.H. and R.F. Miller: Political and
Administrative Aspects of the Scientific and 
Technical Revolution in the USSR, Occasional 
Paper No. 11 of the Department of Political 
Science, R.S.S.S., A.N.U., Canberra, 1976, 
pp. 38-39.
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At lower levels this agreement can also be seen in the concern 
to maintain the "proper" division of labour between party 
and state officials - the party apparatus is to establish 
strong control over state bodies, but is not to engage in
podmena.
(2) The population must be kept under strict control. 
Party and police influence on the intellectual and social 
life of individuals has been generally more evident. We 
will see that this has had its effect in the economic and 
administrative sphere.
(3) Genuine efforts are being made to improve economic 
and administrative performance. While the above factors 
remain in force, relatively radical measures will be adopted 
to streamline administrative procedures, to stimulate 
labour productivity and science and technology, and to 
improve the quality of production.
(4) The efforts made to improve economic and 
administrative performance are likely to affect the 
interests of various sectional groups in the economic and 
administrative system. The main groups are the party appara­
tus, the ministerial apparatus, the enterprise-level managers, 
and the central functional agencies such as Gosplan. All 
these groups have particular interests that will be 
affected by the reforms and all occupy such strategic 
positions in the system that their attitudes can influence 
the success or failure of the reforms. There are two
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fundamental questions to be asked in connection with 
this factor. Firstly, at what stage do the interests 
of these sectional groups become significant for the balance 
described in point (1), for example, at what stage would 
the dissatisfaction of ministerial officials over some 
policy become so great that their representatives in the 
Politburo would feel it necessary to make it a point 
affecting the party-state balance? Secondly, there is 
what is in the general context perhaps a minor question, 
but for my purposes a major one - what role do 
ministerial PPO's play in ensuring that these sectional 
considerations do not adversely affect the reforms?
What are the reforms of which I am speaking?
The first change after the fall of Khrushchev was the re­
organisation of the party, and then the state apparatuses 
into more or less the same structures they had had before 
Khrushchev's changes. Such a change was consistent with 
all the points listed above. Certainly it appeared to be 
a pre-condition for any serious improvements in economic and 
administrative performance. The administrative chaos and 
confusion, probably even more than the rampant regionalism, 
of the sovnarkhoz system, had had disastrous consequences 
for economic performance. While the re-establishment of 
a centralised branch system narrowed the powers and 
responsibilities of the party apparatus, particularly 
when combined with the anti-podmena campaign that began
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at the same time, party officials still gave every 
indication of being glad to be again in a reasonably 
predictable situation. Also the party apparatus was 
presumably confident it would soon find itself again in 
a strong position, in that it could again play an 
"anti-departmentalism" and coordinating role in regions 
now without regional industrial organs. This was made 
even more likely by the re-unification of the party apparatus. 
The coordinating role of the party had been seriously 
hindered by Khrushchev's bifurcation of the apparatus.
The joy of former ministerial officials need not be 
explained - just getting back to Moscow was probably 
enough for most of them!
However the re-establishment of the branch 
system could hardly be described as a reform. Something a 
great deal more positive was required to stimulate the 
economy. The first moves were in the direction of the 
increased enterprise freedoms that had long been the object 
of attention from a number of economists, the best known 
of whom is Evsey Liberman. The same September, 1965 
Central Committee which decided on the re-establishment 
of the branch system also decided on a number of measures 
designed to increase enterprise freedom and accountability.
A detailed analysis of the changes is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. However a general impression of the aims 
and practical effects of the changes is essential for an 
understanding of the attitudes of the various sectional
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groups towards the changes.^" Essentially the changes
involved reducing the number of planning indicators
omade obligatory for enterprises, allowing enterprise 
management to dispose of a larger proportion of profit for 
material incentive and technological development, and 
increasing the accountability of enterprises by reducing 
their dependence on direct budgetary allocations and 
subsidies for investment and operating capital and increasing 
the use of bank credit and direct financing out of net 
profits and amortisation funds.
The changes were hailed by some observers in the 
West as the first steps on the road to "market socialism" 
and convergence with the West. It is doubtful that the 
Soviet authorities ever had such developments in mind; 
certainly they have never appeared in practice. The 
effect of the changes on enterprise freedom and on the 
general character of the Soviet economic and administrative 
system has been minimal. What is difficult to decide is 
the precise reason for this. The attitudes of the different
1 For accounts of the 1965 reforms and developments
since then, see Keizer, W.: The Soviet Quest
for Economic Rationality 3 the conflict of economic 
and political aims in the Soviet economy 3 1953-
1968, Rotterdam U.P., Rotterdam, 1971; Katz, A: 
The Politics of Economic Reform in the Soviet 
Union, Praeger, N.Y., 1972; Rigby and Miller, 
op. cit.
2 With doubtful effect on their flexibility.
See the section on planning, p. 266.
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sectional groups in the system cannot be stated with 
complete certainty. One would expect that organisations 
involved in day-to-day administration would have been 
opposed to the changes, if they gave producing 
organisations greater freedom and strengthened the role of 
"economic", as against "administrative" methods of 
management.^ The ministerial apparatuses had been closely
1 The division between "economic" and "administra­
tive" methods is often insufficiently precise 
for more specialised discussions of Soviet 
economic administration. However it is very 
commonly used in Soviet sources and adequately, 
for our purposes, distinguishes between 
traditional "administrative" methods, based on 
obligatory planning indicators, covering all 
aspects of the enterprise's activities, and set 
and enforced by superior administrative bodies; 
and "economic" methods such as khozraschet 
accounting procedures and systems of material 
incentive. Material incentive has been described 
in Chapter One. Khozraschet is more complicated. 
However its essential meaning can be gained from 
V. Shtunbiuk's description of its application to 
ministries: "The transfer of ministries onto
khozraschet means that all expenditure of the 
branch connected with production is covered by 
its receipts." Voprosy ekonomiki, 12/68, p. 43. 
Afanas'ev sees it as meaning that the operations 
of an organisation "are based on trade relations 
(with a new socialist content) and the use of 
value categories as regulating instruments and 
levers." Afanas'ev, V.G. and others:
Upravlenie sot statisticheskim proizvodstvom 3 
voprosy teorii i praktiki, Izd. "Ekonomika", 
Moscow, 1975, 2nd edition, p. 304. Although the 
output of the organisation is still determined 
by a central plan, the use of such indicators 
as profit, profitability and sales give the 
organisation some degree of freedom in the methods 
of its operations. Thus "economic" methods imply 
some degree of decentralisation.
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involved in day-to-day administration, and a lack of 
enthusiasm for the new system has always been evident, 
often taking the form of active and presumably deliberate 
violations of its principles.
But party organisations have also traditionally 
been involved in day-to-day administration. The emphasis 
on economic methods, in which there appeared to be no 
direct role for the party apparatus, particularly when 
accompanied by an anti-podmena campaign, could not have 
been favourably regarded by party officials.
One would expect that if anyone would have
welcomed the changes, it would have been the enterprise
managers. The changes had been preceded by complaints
from work-place managers of the lack of freedom available
to them.^ " However there have been suggestions in Western
sources that in fact they did not welcome the changes, or
at least failed to take advantage of the opportunities 
2they offered. There is Soviet evidence to support this 
3view. Conversely, as R.F. Miller points out, many 
managers appeared to take excessive advantage of the 
changes. Many used the increased flexibility to narrow
1 Rigby and Miller, op. cit., pp. 87-89.
2 ibid, p. 81.
Ekonomicheskie nauki, 10/71, p. 28; Sov.gos.i 
pravo, 3/70, p. 137; Korn., 3/66, p. 84; Lunev, 
op. cit., p. 82; Pravda, 6/4/69.
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product assortments, neglect improvements in labour 
productivity, and to manipulate prices and plans so as to 
maximise their own profits at the expense of the social 
interest.^ What is interesting is that on occasions
management was assisted in such activity by ministerial
2officials. It would appear that while ministerial 
officials might not have considered the new system as 
ideal, it was felt to be better than the one it replaced 
and they were able to adapt themselves to it.
In general, support for enterprise freedom appears 
to have been unenthusiastic at the lower levels. However 
one must wonder how much the relative ineffectiveness of 
the 1965 changes should be attributed to the lack of 
enthusiasm of the lower levels or the lack of enthusiasm 
of the top authorities. The original changes themselves 
were very limited in scope and the top authorities showed 
little interest in forcing their implementation even within 
these limitations. The relative lack of involvement of 
the party apparatus in encouraging the full implementation 
of the changes cannot be explained entirely in terms of 
its own lack of enthusiasm - the freedom of the party 
apparatus goes only so far.
1 Rigby and Miller, op. cit., p. 81. For some 
Soviet evidence, see Korn.Belorussii, 11/73, 
p. 39; Kom.Moldavii , 3/72, p. 57.
2 Sotsialisticheskaia industriia, 20/3/74, p. 2; 
Kom.Moldavii, 5/69, pp. 56-57; Sov.gos.i pravo,
11/71, p. 71.
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One suspects that the top authorities' lack of 
enthusiasm can be quite adequately explained by their general 
fear of the consequences of allowing too great a degree of 
freedom to the lowest levels of the system. I mentioned 
above that the need to fully control the social and 
intellectual life of the population carries over into the 
economic sphere - this is evident here.
Eventually the worst fears of the top leaders 
were fully realised in Czechoslovakia. Here the full logic 
of the freedom of enterprises and the extensive use of 
economic methods seemed to have developed. T.H. Rigby 
says:
For the rationale of the party 'Reform 
Programme' in Czechoslovakia was that a 
socialist economic system relying primarily 
on 'economic' rather than bureaucratic 
mechanisms could only work if the 
traditional character and role of the party 
were also sharply modified, and the primary 
thrust of the changes in Czechoslovakia 
during 1968, complex and contradictory 
though they were, was towards emancipating 
social and economic collectivities from 
systematic party direction and supervision 
and the coordination of their activities 
through processes of autonomous interaction.'*"
1 Rigby and Miller, op. cit., p. 19.
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The Soviet authorities had no intention of allowing such 
developments, either in Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union. 
The tanks entered Prague and in the Soviet Union the anti- 
podmena campaign came to final halt^ and the emphasis 
of the reform turned even more resolutely away from 
enterprise freedom to increased and improved central 
planning.
It is perhaps a sign of the hollowness of the 
claims of "enterprise freedom" under the 1965 reforms, that 
the emphasis could change without any significant changes 
in formal organisation and procedure. Indeed any changes 
that have taken place since 1968 have been largely in the 
area of developing and extending the use of the "economic" 
methods first introduced in 1965. It would be quite wrong 
to believe that the 1965 changes were done away with in 
1968 - quite the reverse. What in fact happened was that 
it was made clear, to those within and outside the country, 
that the 1965 changes were not what they were probably never 
intended to be - a movement towards "market socialism".
Thus since 1968 the stress has been on a combination 
of strong centralised planning and "economic" methods.
The verbal and theoretical stress has been very much on
Which is not to say that podmena was now 
permitted - the end of the campaign signalled 
only that closer party control of the economy 
and administration was expected.
1
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the planning side. The loud commitment to central 
planning by the ideologists is accompanied by the impressive, 
but still essentially theoretical development of models 
involving the massive injection of computer technology and 
mathematical techniques and the transformation of planning 
and production operations into largely automatic and computer 
controlled responses to centrally determined objectives 
and priorities.
Theoretical developments in planning techniques 
should not be disregarded altogether. If the Soviet 
authorities are as serious about them as they appear to be, 
they could be among the most significant developments of 
the future, and not only for the Soviet Union. However 
actual developments to the present day have largely been in 
the area of "economic" methods. While the already limited 
freedom of enterprises has been further reduced, efforts 
are being made to maintain "economic" methods and to further 
encourage the decentralisation of administration through 
the establishment of industry associations [ob ’ ' edineniia) 
operating on kho zraschät principles and situated between 
the ministries and enterprises.^
What are the attitudes of the different sections 
of the system to these new directions? The party apparatus 
seems quite satisfied. It is difficult to gauge what its
1 For a brief description of industry and
production associations, see above, p. 217.
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attitude to a fully developed computerised system might 
be. At first glance it might appear that such a system 
would remove all mid- and lower-level administrative 
decision-making and thereby take away the party's main 
field of operation. However as R.F. Miller says:
Party officials throughout the system would 
have an important supervisory role in 
seeing to it that economic and social 
functionaries conformed to the clear 
organizational and procedural require­
ments of 'systemness'.^
However in a fully operational computerised system this
would still entail a considerable curtailment of their
2present power and relative freedom.
1 Rigby and Miller, op. cit., p. 83.
2 Another point to be considered is the extent 
to which training in the new techniques is 
being concentrated among party officials.
At the 1971 conference of the Bauman raion 
party organisation the secretary of the 
party committee of the All-Union Ministry 
of the Gas Industry declared that it is 
essential that all administrative workers 
have special training in the area of automated 
systems of management. He particularly 
stressed the importance of such training for 
party cadres, since only through this would 
they "be able to place themselves in the 
vanguard of the implementation of scientific 
methods of management". Mosk.pravda, 29/1/71, 
p. 2. See also Rigby and Miller, op. cit., 
p. 27. Could this be a sign that the party 
apparatus will be directly involved in the 
establishment and operation of a computerised 
system, beyond a simply "controlling" role?
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The main point, however, about the fully 
computerised system is how far into the future it lies.
The consequences of its establishment are sufficiently 
uncertain, probably as much to the party apparatus as to 
Western observers, and, more importantly, sufficiently 
far into the future that party officials probably pay them 
little attention.
They are more concerned with the present 
situation. Although there must be some matters causing them 
concern at the moment, such as the spread of all-Union and 
republican industry associations, which because of their 
territorial dispositions escape the control of middle- 
level party organisation, in general they are allowed, 
indeed expected, to provide close control over all 
operations of the administrative and economic system and 
to involve themselves in coordination. Although the top 
leadership consistently stresses the importance of main­
taining the "correct style of leadership", that is, podmena 
is still frowned upon, the present time must still be 
considered as one of great, and perhaps increasing party 
activism. The party apparatus shows every sign of 
appreciating it.
Enterprise management is less appreciative of 
recent developments. Although "economic" methods of 
management have been maintained, the limited degree of 
freedom which such methods entail has been largely taken
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away from the enterprise level. The administration of the 
economic methods has been concentrated in the production 
and industry associations. Usually these are very large 
organisations and the influence of enterprise-level 
management on their operations is not great.
However one must not overestimate the signifi­
cance of the attitudes of enterprise management in the 
thinking of the Soviet policy-makers. It is not a suffi­
ciently important sectional interest to greatly influence 
top-level policy-making. This is in contrast to the 
ministerial apparatuses. Because the attitudes of 
ministerial officials can become a factor in the top-level 
party-state balance, considerable efforts have been made 
to gain ministerial support for the reforms. Great 
emphasis has been put on the central role of the ministries 
in developing their branches. Brezhnev's speech at the 
24th Party Congress emphasised that the new system of 
administration raised the role and widened the independence
1 Pravda speaks in 1972 of the psychological
barrier to associations among enterprise 
leaders, who fear losing their independence.
Pravda, 24/1/72, p. 2. See also 27/3/72, p. 2. 
Ryavec sees the associations as being negations 
of the rights of enterprises, since the 
independence that had apparently been granted 
them is now being taken by the associations.
Ryavec, K.W.: "Soviet Industrial Managers,
their superiors and the economic reform: a
study of an attempt at planned behavioural change", 
Soviet Studies, vol. 21, no. 2, October, 1969, 
p. 219.
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of ministries.'*' Kosygin, also at the Congress,
emphasised their role in developing unified policies for
2technological development within their branches. We 
have already seen the considerable operational powers they 
still have.
Whether this stress on the continuing role of 
ministries is the result of a genuine feeling among 
policy-makers that the ministerial system is the best one, 
or the result of top-level political considerations, that 
is, such a policy is necessary to maintain the top-level 
party-state balance, is difficult to say.
Whatever the reason the ministries show them­
selves rather sceptical. It must be obvious to 
ministerial leaders that they lose much through the 
reforms. Firstly, functional central agencies tend to 
monopolise the policy-making in the most important areas
1 Mosk.pvavda, 31/3/71, p. 7.
2 Mosk.pravda, 7/4/71, p. 5.
359.
of the economic and administrative system.^" At the
other end of the scale the continued use of "economic
methods" and the establishment of the industry associations
are designed to remove much of the day-to-day operational
power of the ministries. The ministries are expected to
welcome this loss of operational power, since it enables
them to concentrate their attention on their larger
2analytical and policy-making tasks. They show no signs 
of being impressed by the argument.
1 See the 1970 conference in the Academy of 
Sciences on "The organisation of work of 
ministries in the conditions of the economic 
reform", especially the declaration by
Iu.V.Subotskii of the Institute of Economics 
that ministries are not designed for high- 
level specialised functions such as supply, 
communication and coordination, etc. Sov.gos. 
i pravo, 3/70, pp. 136-141. Gosplan main­
tains its traditionally considerable powers 
in planning, while gaining responsibility 
for developments in the area of computer 
technology. Tubol'tsev, M.N. (ed.): 
Organizatsiia upravleniia, Izd. "Ekonomika", 
Moscow, 1975, p. 40. The State Committee for 
Science and Technology has enormous powers in 
the direction and coordination of scientific 
research, while Gossnab has taken over many 
of the ministries' supply functions. Kozlov, 
op. cit., pp. 128, 241. Ryavec speaks of the 
conflict between Gossnab and the ministries 
over supply rights. Ryavec, op. cit., p. 223. 
The functions of Gosbank, Gosstroi and the 
State Committee for Labour and Wages must also 
be considered. Kozlov, op. cit., pp. 128, 254.
2 See the conference referred to above, 
especially the statement of M.I. Piskotin, 
Sov.gos. i pravo, 3/70, p. 137.
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Indeed signs of ministerial obstruction of the
reforms are considerable. At the 24th Party Congress
Kosygin criticised some ministries for failing to
implement the new methods of administration with any
enthusiasm, for supplanting economic with administrative
methods and for undermining the khozraschet rights of
enterprises.^ Before the general introduction of the new
structures based on industry and production associations in
1973 there were obvious difficulties in the various
experimental and pilot schemes operating around the country.
There were regular complaints that the formation of the
associations and the extension of khozraschet relations
2were proceeding slowly, and that even when introduced 
they were not being used in the intended way.
1 Mosk.pravda, 7/4/71, p. 5.
2 P.zh., 6/71, p. 17. See Masherov's speech at 
the 24th Party Congress, Pravda, 1/4/71, p. 5.
3 Sov.gos.i pravo, 2/70, p. 55; Kom., 10/66,
p. 12; 3/70, p. 90. The lack of enthusiasm for 
the new systems was also evident in the words, 
as well as the actions of ministerial officials. 
In a 1970 issue of Kommunist (Vilnius) the 
chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers 
could write a whole article on the administration 
of the economy with a single mention of associa­
tions and no mention at all of economic methods, 
including khozraschet. Kom. (Vilnius), 1/70, 
pp. 39-45. In 1971 Kommunist Moldavii inter­
viewed the Moldavian Minister of Construction. 
Twice he was asked direct questions on the new 
system of planning and economic incentive.
Both times his answers were distinctly evasive, 
vague and unenthusiastic. Kom.Moldavii,
2/71, pp. 27-29.
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In March-April 1973 the two- and three-level 
structures of ministries became general policy for all 
industrial ministries. This led to an enormous increase 
in the number of production and industry associations 
operating in the Soviet Union. By early 1976 25% of 
industrial production of the Soviet Union was being 
produced under the new systems.'*' Nevertheless 
ministerial obstruction continues. There are still com­
plaints that the implementation of the new systems is
2proceeding slowly, and that the formation of associations
3has had no practical significance. There are also
continuing complaints of excessive ministerial involve­
ment in day-to-day operational decision-making and petty 
supervision of subordinate enterprises.^
1 Pravda, 12/4/76, p. 1.
2 P.zh., 7/74/ p. 12; Pravda, 12/4/76, p. 1.
3 Pravda, 31/7/74, p. 1. A 1976 Pravda editorial 
complained that some ministries have formed 
unnecessarily small and powerless production 
associations. This is presumably to ensure that 
the associations do not become sufficiently 
powerful that they can exert some degree of 
independence from or pressure on the ministries. 
Pravda, 12/4/76, p. 1.
4 Katz quotes a 1966 Izvestia editorial to the 
effect that 20-30% of the time of top-level 
enterprise management was still taken up with 
paperwork imposed by their bureaucratic 
superiors. Katz, A; op. cit., p. 161. For 
complaints about continuing ministerial involve­
ment in planning and operational activities that 
are now the rights and responsibilities of the 
enterprises themselves, see Lunev, op. cit.,
pp. 13, 80.
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It should not be thought that such behaviour is 
not altogether unexpected of ministries. They have been 
left considerable formal powers in this area and lack of 
involvement will be criticised.^ The maintenance of 
such ministerial powers and involvement can presumably be 
explained by the natural conservatism of the Soviet leader­
ship and its desire to ensure that the party-state balance 
is not unduly upset.
However the changes in ministerial-enterprise
relations are neither irrelevant nor insignificant. The
powers of the industry associations in particular are not
to be lightly dismissed, and it appears that the leadership
2is serious about the associations asserting these powers. 
The associations must be seen as considerable threats to
1 In 1973 the chairman of the Moldavian Council 
of Ministers could criticise ministries which 
did not "thoroughly examine the state of 
affairs in every enterprise, in order to 
mobilise all their reserves". Kom.Moldavii,
12/73, p. 22.
2 If the apparent commitment of the leadership to 
inter-branch associations comes to fruition,
their role in reducing the powers of the ministries 
will presumably become even greater. Brezhnev 
declared at the 24th Party Congress that adminis­
trative boundaries and branch subordinations 
must not be allowed to interfere with the estab­
lishment of associations. Mosk.pravda, 31/3/71, 
p. 7. However in 1974 a leading official in 
Gosplan complained that associations were still 
confined to single ministries, when there was a 
need to construct them across ministerial 
boundaries. Sots.industriia, 26/6/74, p. 1.
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the power of the ministries. They appear to be the main 
weapons for the implementation of the new economic and 
administrative reforms which, although with long-term 
aims of a fully computerised, centrally directed economy, 
have the short-term aim of administrative decentralisation, 
no longer directed at the enterprise level, but nonetheless 
directed at a level below the ministerial. These develop­
ments are clearly unpopular within the ministries.
This is hopefully a situation, therefore, where 
we can test the strength and effectiveness of PPO's.
There is ample evidence that the party apparatus in 
general, and the ministerial PPO’s in particular, have been 
entrusted with the task of achieving the implementation of 
the new reforms in the unenthusiastic ministries.
I have already described the anti-podmena campaign 
immediately following the fall of Khrushchev. By 1967 
the campaign had come to an end, probably both because the 
campaign had achieved its goal of establishing the proper 
division of responsibilities between party and state, and 
because the leadership was already becoming disturbed by 
trends in Czechoslovakia. Since then, while the stress 
has been consistently on the need to maintain the proper 
division of responsibilities, party involvement in economic 
and administrative activities has been close and perhaps 
increasing.
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I am primarily interested in the increased role
of ministerial PPO's. However it should be mentioned that
there are other means for the assertion of greater party
influence over the central state apparatuses. T.H. Rigby
assumes that Central Committee secretaries, briefed by their
departmental personnel, have their say about the operation
of government agencies at Politburo meetings.'*" Brezhnev
has used Central Committee meetings as the forum for attacks
on the work of ministries, particularly in December, 1969
and December, 1973, while formal party decisions are passed
on the work of ministries and their subordinate enterprises,
decisions which can include quite specific instructions
2on particular measures to be taken by ministries.
But to return to PPO's. Their first task, a 
traditional one which quickly became again evident at the 
time of the reestablishment of the ministerial system in 
1965, is to combat "sectionalism" {vedomstvennost ') .
This phenomenon, institutions concerned with a particular 
section of the economy protecting their interests even at
1 Rigby and Miller, op. cit. , pp. 39-40.
2 See Rigby and Miller, op. cit., footnote 60, 
pp. 55-56. The latest Central Committee 
decision on a ministry was in June, 1976, "On 
the work of the Ministry of Construction of 
Enterprises of Heavy Industry for raising the 
productivity of labour, reducing periods and 
raising the quality of construction in the light 
of the instructions of the 25th Party Congress". 
Pravda, 13/6/76, p. 1.
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the expense of the social interest, inevitably 
accompanies a ministerial system of administration, since 
such a system provides a ready-made institutional 
structure for it. There is ample evidence of its 
resurgence since 1965.^ One point that should be made 
about industry associations is that they tend to contri­
bute to "sectional" behaviour perhaps even more than 
ministries. They have the same sort of sectional solidarity, 
but are often established across the usual administrative
1 Dzhabadov complains of the tendency for
ministries to neglect the financing of inter­
branch projects. Tubol'tsev, op. cit., p. 11.
At the 24th Party Congress the first secretary 
of the Sverdlovsk obkom, probably exhibiting 
more a concern for his region than proper party 
indignation at sectionalism, said:
"Unfortunately we often meet with cases when 
different ministries and agencies orient 
themselves to the development of their branches, 
not taking into account the real material and 
labour resources of the local regions or the 
development of local industry . . .  In 
developing production on the branch principle, 
it is necessary to take into account territorial 
peculiarities and conditions." Pravda, 2/4/71, 
p. 5. In 1975 Pravda related a typical case of 
the Ukrainian Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy 
refusing to construct the necessary industrial 
plant to build the equipment for new furnace 
techniques to be utilised by other ministries. 
Pravdat 19/9/75, p. 2. An article in 
Sotsialistioheskaia industriia attacks the 
sectionalism inherent in having the production 
of a single range of products, in this case 
clothing items, scattered throughout a large 
number of ministries. The suggestion is that 
the production of such items would be better 
concentrated under one authority, such as the 
Ministry of Light Industry. Sots.industriia, 
23/9/75, p. 2.
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boundaries. This, combined with their supposed increased 
operational independence, reduces both party and state 
control over them.-*- One would therefore expect to see 
considerable evidence of efforts on the part of PPO's 
to work against "sectionalism". Actually such evidence 
exists in surprisingly small quantities. Neither general 
statements on the need, nor accounts of them actually doing 
so are common. As exceptions, in 1966 a Pravda editorial 
declared that ministerial PPO's must "not tolerate 
sectional narrow-mindedness or localism", while in 1968
1 In 1973 Sotsialistiche skiia industriia
described the case of the All-Union 
Scientific-Technical Association in the 
Ministry of Food Industry which forbade the use 
of one particular innovation outside the 
boundaries of the ministry. Sots.industriia, 
11/9/73, p. 2. One can sense a certain degree 
of cautiousness in the comments of a secretary 
of the Yaroslavl obkom about factories joining 
all-Union associations. He feels that under 
such an arrangement little changes as far as the 
essentially sectional character of the associa­
tions is concerned, and suggests that more 
decentralised territorial groupings might bear 
better fruit. Pravda, 27/3/72, p. 2. The 
common ground of regional party and state 
officials, usually with rather "regionalist" 
leanings, can be seen when we compare the obkom 
secretary's comments with those of the deputy 
chairman of the Estonian Council of Ministers.
He also complains of larger-scale associations 
allowing their subordinate enterprises to avoid 
control by local party and state organs and so 
to neglect the fulfilment of local production 
targets. He claims that true economic develop­
ment comes with the correct combination of 
territorial and branch principles. Sov.Estoniia, 
19/12/73, p. 2. This is an area on which far 
more has been written about production associa­
tions, but since they are not strictly speaking 
administrative organs, they will not be included 
in this discussion.
2 Pravda, 30/12/66, p. 1.
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Kommunist declared in general terms that a ministerial 
worker placing his departmental interest before the 
general interest was "committing a crude violation of 
party principles" and should be dealt with by the party. ^
One can also look to the increasing activities
of ministerial PPO's in the area of coordination as a sign
of their involvement in opposing sectionalism. Combined
meetings of the party committee of the Ministry of the Oil
Industry with the party committees of related ministries
are said to help in overcoming a sectional approach and to
give general state interests the prime place in the
2development of production. Efforts such as those of
the party committee of the Ministry of Chemical and Oil
Machine Construction to strengthen links with the party
organisations of ministries using their ministry's 
3products, and the combined meetings of the communists 
of the Energy Department of the State Committee of Science 
and Technology and the Technical Administration of the 
Ministry of Electrotechnical Industry designed to improve 
the work of research organisations must also contribute to 
such a goal.^
1 Korn., 7/68, p. 8 .
2 Sotsialisticheskaia industriia, 20/2/73.
3 Pravda, 29/11/71, p. 2.
Mosk.pravda, 17/9/71, p. 2.4
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However the paucity of evidence of PPO involvement 
in activity specifically directed against sectionalism 
is somewhat surprising. What is particularly surprising 
is the apparent lack of demands from higher authorities 
that ministerial PPO's be involved in such activities.
Although both middle and top-level party workers appear to 
be disturbed by the existence of sectionalism, they appear 
to give ministerial PPO's little role in combating it.
The reasons for this are not obvious. While it is under­
standable that the larger policy issues of deciding priorities 
and assigning tasks to different branches such as would be 
involved in the reorganisation of the clothing industry 
mentioned above would be considered beyond the functions 
of PPO's, the case referred to of the Ukrainian Ministry 
of Ferrous Metallurgy would seem to provide a good 
opportunity for PPO involvement.'*'
Whatever the reasons for this apparent lack of 
involvement, sectionalism is a traditional evil of the 
branch system of administration and need not be seen as 
peculiar to the new reforms. In the specific area of 
these reforms the role of ministerial PPO's is more evident. 
Efforts to ensure that ministerial PPO's play a strong 
role can be seen from 1965 onwards. One important feature
1 See above, p. 365.
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has been the direct involvement of the Central Committee 
and the close involvement of the raikomy and gorkomy of 
the capital cities, particularly Moscow, in the supervision 
of ministerial PPO's.
The first sign of the concern of higher
authorities to give ministerial PPO's a significant place
in the new system came as early as October, 1965 when
N. Egorychev, the first secretary of the Moscow gorkom
wrote in Pravda that as a result of the September Central
Committee plenum the gorkom had fully realised the need
for militant (boevye) party organisations, headed by
experienced party workers, in the newly reconstituted
ministries. He made it understood that the work of these
party organisations would be at the centre of the attention
of the gorkom. 1 Since then the gorkom has run various
seminars and conferences for ministerial party workers,
2and plenums for the consideration of their work. The 
Moscow raikomy have been even more heavily involved in this 
type of work. For example, in November, 1966 a plenum of 
the Frunze raikom examined the work of the party 
organisation of the Ministry of Instrument-Making, since 
the ministry was such a vital one for the new administrative
3system. In 1968 the raikom ran a seminar to which a wide
1 Pravda, 4/10/65, p. 2.
2 Pravda, 10/3/69, p. 2; Mosk.pravda, 19/6/71, p. 2.
3 P.zh., 21/66, p. 28.
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circle of leading workers and party committee secretaries
from a number of ministries and agencies was invited.^-
The gorkomy in republican capitals are also expected to
engage in such activities. Even before the September, 1965
Plenum, in July, 1965 the Kishinev gorkom had run a seminar
2for ministerial party secretaries. However in 1969 
the secretary of the party buro of the Kazakh Ministry 
of Light Industry was still able to criticise the Alma 
Ata gorkom and raikomy for their lack of seminars for
3ministerial party workers.
Perhaps more significant is the closeness of 
direct Central Committee involvement with ministerial PPO's. 
At the end of 1966 a seminar was convened in the Central 
Committee for the secretaries of the party organisations 
of All-Union and RSFSR Ministries and agencies. The seminar 
was addressed by the Central Committee secretary for organi­
sation and personnel and by several Central Committee 
department heads. The seminar appeared to aim both to 
encourage greater activity on the part of the party
1 P.zh., 11/68, pp. 20-21.
2 Kom.Moldavii, 7/65, p. 39. It is interesting 
that the next month the Moldavian Central 
Committee ran a conference on questions of party- 
organisational work at which all the secretaries 
of ministerial party organisations whose speeches 
at the gorkom.' s seminar had been reported 
without criticism were quite severely criticised, 
primarily for podmena. Kom.Moldavii, 8/65, pp. 3940.
3 P.zh.Kaz., 8/69, p. 21.
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organisations, particularly for the wider implementation 
of the economic reform in 1967, and to warn ministerial 
leaders that the PPO's could no longer be taken lightly. 
Specific mention was made of particular problem areas - 
the overly bureaucratic supervision of enterprises and 
shortcomings in planning, organisation of the apparatus 
and material-technical supplies. It was stressed that 
at party meetings controversial matters were not to be 
avoided, while ministerial leaders were not to treat criti­
cism of them as a sign of lack of discipline or as 
personal attacks. The seminar stressed the obligation of 
the PPO's to report shortcomings to higher party 
authorities, including the Central Committee.^ The.
Central Committee has continued to conduct meetings for 
party secretaries, often for particular sections of the 
economy, such as the 1974 meeting for those from agricultural 
agencies and ministries.^
The first signs of republican Central Committees' 
interest in the new ministerial PPO's was the criticism, 
early in 1965, by the Presidium of the Uzbek Central 
Committee of the party organisations of some ministries 
and agencies for podmena, but also for not being sufficiently 
strong in their fight against bureaucratic methods and for
1 P.2/2., 24/66, pp. 25-36; Pravda, 30/12/66,
p. 1.
2 Pravda, 11/2/74, p. 1.
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not informing higher authorities of shortcomings. The
Central Committee passed a decision directing the
attention of the Tashkent gorkom and raikomy and the Central
Committee departments to these problems.^ Early in 1967
the Moldavian Central Committee ran a seminar for the
secretaries of the party organisations of ministries and
agencies at which the emphasis was on the new system of
2planning and material incentive, while the Seventh 
Plenum of the Moldavian Central Committee, later in 1967, 
devoted considerable attention to the shortcomings of 
ministries and their party organisations in the conditions
3of the new system. Following the 24th Party Congress 
and the granting of the right of control to ministerial 
PPO's the Moldavian Central Committee ran another
4conference for their secretaries. Since the 24th Congress 
there have been a number of meetings for the secretaries 
of the party organisations of Estonian ministries and 
agencies, in which secretaries and department heads of
5the republican Central Committee took part.
1 P.zh., 1/65, pp. 79-80.
2 Kom.Moldavii, 1/67, p. 47.
3 Kom.Moldavii, 12/67, p. 5.
4 Kom.Moldavii, 2/73, p. 57. 
Kom.Estonii, 9/72, p. 30.5
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The Central Committees do not rely solely
on such seminars, conferences and plenums to convey to
ministerial party organisations their tasks. Central
Committees in recent years have shown themselves very
willing to involve themselves in the work of individual
PPO's. In the years 1967 to 1971 the Büro and
Secretariat of the Uzbek Central Committee heard
reports (otoh&ty) on 21 PPO's, including that of the
Ministry of Motor Transport.  ^ In 1974 the Büro of the
Turkmen Central Committee examined the activity of the
2party organisation of the Ministry of Culture. At 
the 25th Party Congress Brezhnev said that in the years 
since the 24th Congress the Central Committee had dis­
cussed reports {otch&ty) on the work of the party organi-
3sations of a number of institutions, including ministries. 
There are two All-Union Central Committee decisions on 
ministerial PPO's that serve as guides for all such party 
organisations, the 1970 decision on the party committee 
of the Ministry of Meat and Dairying Industry and the 
1974 decision on the party committee of the Ministry of
1 Kom. Uzbekistana, 7/71, p. 26.
2 P.zh., 10/74, p. 61.
3 Pravda, 25/2/76, p. 7.
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Communications.1
1 P.zh-r 4/70, pp. 3-6; 23/74, p. 4. See the
article by the secretary of the party committee 
of the State Committee of Science and Technology 
claiming the Meat and Dairying Industry decision 
as the guide for his PPO in working out the 
Five Year Plan for the development of science 
and technology. Mosk.pravda, 17/9/71, p. 2.
He does not give any details on how the decision 
might have been a guide. Only summaries of 
both decisions are available to us. In both 
cases points are made in very general terms, 
areas needing urgent action not even being made 
particularly clear. The 1970 decision, the 
summary of which is far longer than that of the 
1974 one, is generally more critical. It is 
interesting that this decision is critical of the 
PPO for its failure to adequately use reports 
from individual communist officials, while the 
1974 decision expresses satisfaction on this 
point. The 1970 decision is also critical of 
the PPO for its failure to make adequate use of 
social organisations, while the 1974 decision 
makes no mention of them. Both decisions are 
critical of the PPO's for their failures to take 
action against shortcomings that arise in the 
work of the ministries. Both decisions devote 
considerable attention to the failure of the 
ministerial apparatuses to adequately lead and 
supervise the work of subordinate enterprises.
It is interesting that the 1970 decision puts 
this in the framework of the implementation of 
the economic reform, while the 1974 decision 
fails to mention the reform. (This can be partly 
explained by the non-production nature of the 
Ministry of Communications.) Both decisions 
are sufficiently wide-ranging and general in 
their criticisms to provide Central Committee, 
gorkom or raikom instructors with ample 
opportunity to criticise ministerial PPO's in 
any aspect of their work in the name of the 
Central Committee.
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Finally there are the informal contacts between 
higher authorities and ministerial PPO's. I have been 
assured in conversations in Moscow with a former ministerial 
party secretary that contacts between ministerial party 
secretaries and Central Committee officials are very 
common, including informal telephone conversations on a 
completely ad hoc basis.1 Such contacts should probably 
be seen as much as a means of upward communication as the 
reverse.
1 When I asked what consideration was given to
the raikom or gorkom in these contacts, I was 
told that they would naturally be informed of 
the outcome of more important discussions.
However there was no need for their participa­
tion in these informal contacts. A former Central 
Committee worker, in a 1974 interview in Survey, 
claims that traditionally Central Committee 
officials would not deal directly with PPO's, 
but relied on the reports (spravki) coming up 
through the party hierarchy. This meant that the 
information received was subject to considerable 
distortion. To counteract this a special 
Information Sector was established, initially 
in 1956 with re-organisations in 1962 and 1966.
While being responsible for collecting and analysing 
information received through traditional channels, 
the sector was also given the right to collect 
information directly itself. However the inter­
viewee claims that the sector met with con­
siderable opposition, resulting in significant 
curtailment of its powers and reduction of its 
role to a largely symbolic one. Pravdin, op. 
cit., p. 97. Nevertheless my conversations, 
the number of seminars and conferences run by 
the Central Committee for ministerial PPO 
secretaries, and the stress in the Soviet press 
on the need for ministerial PPO's to report 
shortcomings directly to the Central Committee 
all suggest that normal party channels are 
often bypassed.
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It would be interesting to know what percentage 
of contacts are connected with the economic reforms and 
what percentage with more routine administrative activities. 
Perhaps the evidence would show above all that it is not 
easy to distinguish the two. However there are some matters 
specifically concerned with the reforms that one would expect 
to have been the subject of some contacts. Firstly, the 
PPO's seem to have been quite closely involved in the 
actual implementation of the organisational measures set 
out by the reform. The PPO of the Ministry of Instrument 
Making was said to be closely involved in the implementation 
of the rather radical re-organisation in that ministry.
The proposals put forward by the collegium were closely 
examined in the party committee and meetings of the party 
aktiv of the ministry and its glavki. In 1969 the party 
buro and party meetings of the Kazakh Ministry of Light 
Industry also considered the introduction of khozrasch&t 
relations into the ministerial system. The party committee 
of the All-Union Ministry of the Chemical Industry was 
reported to have been of great assistance in the formation 
of associations. The party committee was also responsible 
for the decision that the old system of material-technical 
supply was no longer adequate. There had been argument 
over whether the old decentralised system was adequate or
1 P.zh., 11/68, p. 17.
2 P.zh.Kaz., 8/69, p. 17.
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whether a specialised department was required. After the 
party committee had sent specialists into the localities 
and to other ministries, it became evident that the system 
must be changed. The party committee offered its opinion, 
along with concrete proposals based on the suggestions of 
the communists, to the leadership of the ministry. These 
proposals were taken into consideration when the matter was 
examined in a meeting of the collegium and when the forma­
tion of the Chief Supply Administration began.^ The 
party organisation of the Latvian Ministry of Local Industry 
took an active part in the formation of a central fund for
material incentive and in working out a system of bonus
2payments for apparatus workers.
One of the most important factors affecting the
implementation of administrative changes is the personnel
who will be responsible for it. The Central Committee has
shown its awareness of the importance of personnel. In
1967 it passed a decision on personnel work in central
administrative organs, critical of a number of ministers
and their deputies for a "liberal attitude" to established
officials and for failure to prepare younger, well-qualified
3people for responsible positions. The All-Union Central
1
2
3
Pravda, 10/3/69, p. 2.
Kom.Sov.Latvii , 1/71, p. 61. 
Pravda, 16/6/67, p. 1.
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Committee decision was quickly followed by similar 
republican Central Committee activities. For example, in 
mid-67 a plenum of the Moldavian Central Committee 
criticised personnel work in administrative agencies.1
In 1973 Pravda, commenting on the recent combined 
Central Committee and Council of Ministers resolution on 
measures for the perfecting of the administration of 
industry, specifically the general introduction of industrial 
and production associations, wrote an editorial on the 
special responsibility of ministerial PPO's in the manage­
ment of personnel. Party organisations were called upon 
"to move into leading work those who to the fullest degree 
possess a sense of the new, who exhibit initiative and who 
skilfully realise the possibilities uncovered by scientific-
technical progress and the perfecting of the methods of
2administration."
The suggestion of the Central Committee decision 
and Pravda editorial is that ministerial party organisations 
are expected to ensure that personnel receptive to the new 
economic reforms are moved into leading positions. There 
is evidence that PPO's are able to do this. For example, 
the secretary of the party buro of the Latvian Ministry 
of Local Industry wrote an article immediately after the
1 Kom. Moldavii, 8/67, pp. 60-61.
2 Pravda, 4/4/73, p. 1.
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Central Committee's 1967 decision on ministerial 
personnel which declared that the first matter that had been 
considered by the party organisation after the formation 
of the ministry in 1965 had been the staffing of the 
ministry's apparatus.  ^ About the same time the party 
committee of the Moldavian Ministry of the Food Industry 
reacted to the republican Central Committee's consideration 
of the matter by discussing its findings in a meeting and 
recognising the validity of the Central Committee's 
criticisms. The matter was also considered in a widened 
meeting of the collegium and measures were decided on to 
improve personnel work. ^
The secretary of the party committee of the
Ministry of Electrotechnical Industry showed his reliance
on the 1973 Pravda editorial by using the exact words
quoted above in his description of the party organisation's
personnel tasks. He also described the activities of a
commission appointed by the party committee which had
examined the personnel work of a glavk head who had failed
to react to criticism of him in the collegium. The
commission found evidence of "subjectivism" in his
selection of personnel, that is, he had not paid attention
3to the guidelines set down by higher authorities.
1 Kom.Sov.Latvii, 7/67, p. 53.
2 Kom.Moldavii, 8/67, pp. 60-61.
Aktivnye pomoshchniki partiinykh komitetov,
op. cit., p. 210.
3
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But probably the most important development in 
this area has been the power ministerial PPO's have 
gained to vet personnel appointments, movements and 
dismissals before they take place. I have already listed 
considerable evidence of powers such as that of the party 
committee and administration party buros of the All-Union 
Ministry of Energy and Electrification. They are to be 
consulted by ministerial leaders on all appointments and 
dismissals of ministerial workers and are to have their 
recommendations seriously considered.^
1 See p. 236. One point of interest in this area,
although it cannot be considered evidence of any 
kind, is the party background that several 
ministerial personnel officials have. In 1964 
Novikov, the secretary of the party buro of the 
Kazakh Ministry of Construction, was 
simultaneously head of the Personnel 
Administration. P.zh.Kaz., 5/64, p. 62.
In 1966 V.V. Pavlovskii was deputy secretary 
of the party committee of the Ministry of 
Railways, and in 1971 the deputy head of the 
Personnel Administration. A 1966 article by 
him, in his capacity as deputy party secretary, 
speaks at length about personnel. P.zh., 3/66, 
pp. 43-44; Zhelezno-dorozhnyi transport, 11/71, 
p. 26. V.N. Iagodkin, presently deputy minister 
in charge of personnel in the All-Union Ministry 
of Education, was once secretary of the party 
organisation of Moscow State University and 
then Moscow gorkom secretary for ideological 
affairs. P.zh., 1/68, p. 49; Oktiabrr, 9/70, 
p. 3; Sobranie postanovlenii, 5/76, p. 26.
In 1973 A.A. Pomortsev was secretary of the party 
committee of the All-Union Ministry of Agriculture. 
The next year he became deputy minister for 
personnel. P.zh., 12/73, p. 17; Sobranie 
postanovlenii, 10/74, art.48. Data of this type 
are not easily accessible. One relies above all 
on the random collection of information over 
long periods of time, rather than exhaustive 
research specifically directed at this point.
The evidence given here could almost certainly 
be supplemented given time.
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PPO involvement does not cease once appointments 
have been made. The Pravda editorial based on the 1967 
Central Committee decision on personnel declared that 
ministerial party committees must take under their 
unremitting control the ideo-political indoctrination of 
apparatus workers.'1 2' I have already described in some 
detail the indoctrination activities of ministerial party 
committees. It was seen that much of this activity is 
specifically aimed at the political and administrative
2knowledge required for the implementation of the reforms.
I have also previously referred to the widespread
practice of hearing reports in PPO meetings from individual
communists on their fulfilment of their operational tasks.
This practice is most common in ministerial PPO's. Since
1965 there has been great and increasing emphasis on the
need for ministerial PPO's "to raise the sense of
responsibility of administrative personnel for the state
of affairs in production" and to foster "the party style
3of work" among administrative officials. This is done 
by systematically hearing reports from administrative 
officials.
1 Pravda, 16/6/67, p. 1.
2 See above, pp. 61-62.
3 Pravda, 4/4/73, p. 1, Kom.Moldavii,7/65,p. 11.
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The reports are a particularly valuable weapon 
in ministerial PPO's because in ministries such a high 
proportion of officials are party members.1 Although 
evidence to be presented in the next chapter suggests that 
PPO secretaries are sufficiently independent of normal 
bureaucratic career patterns not to be bound to sectional 
bureaucratic interests, the same cannot be said of rank- 
and-file party members who are making their careers in the 
state apparatus. It is these people who are directly 
involved in the implementation of the reforms. If the PPO 
were able to closely control the bureaucratic behaviour and 
performance of all communists in the apparatus through the 
systematic hearing of reports and, if necessary, the use 
of party discipline, it could be confident of success in 
ensuring the implementation of the reforms.
The most notable thing about the content of these 
reports, and indeed about all the activities of ministerial 
PPO's since 1965, is the concentration of attention on 
ministerial relations with subordinate enterprises. In 
the last chapter I described the restraints that have often 
been placed on administrative PPO's in their relations 
with production enterprises. There has been little evidence 
of such restraint since 1965. When the importance of
1 See below, p. 577.
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ministry-enterprise relations for the success of the 
reforms is considered, it is not surprising to see such 
restraints removed.
By far, a majority of the reports on the role 
of ministerial PPO's in the conditions of the reform 
concentrate on this matter. The 1966 seminar of the 
Moldavian Central Committee mentioned above was the forum 
for considerable discussion by ministerial party 
secretaries of questions relating to the transfer of 
enterprises to the new system of planning and material 
incentive.^ In November, 1966 the secretary of the party 
committee of the Ministry of Instrument-Making described 
its activities in the following terms:
The party organisation of the ministry does 
much for the implementation of measures 
connected with the transfer of factories 
to the new system of planning and economic 
incentive. These questions have more 
than once been raised for discussion in 
the party committee and party meetings in 
the glavki. The communists have given a 
personal example in the working out of 
methodological indicators, standard 
(tipovye) regulations and basic economic
1 Kom.Moldavii, 1/67, p. 47.
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indicators for the first factories
transferred to the new system. 1
The communists of the Latvian Ministry of Local Industry 
actively participated in the preparation of enterprises 
for transfer to the new methods of work, including 
arranging meetings between apparatus workers and enter­
prise managers and sending communist ministerial workers
to give reports (doklady) and training courses for enter-
2prise personnel. The secretary of the party committee
of the Moldavian Ministry of the Food Industry sees the
change in character of ministry-enterprise relations, a
direct result of the greater role of "economic methods"
in administrative leadership, as contributing to raising
the role of his party organisation. As part of this new
role the party committee has considered the work of the
communists of the Chief Administration for the Wine Industry
in helping the transfer of enterprises to the new conditions 
3of work. The party buro of the Kazakh Ministry of 
Light Industry has considered the identical question. It 
has heard reports from the leaders of the Chief 
Administrations for the Textile Industry and for the Foot­
wear Industry and strongly criticised them for breakdowns 
in the preparation of plans for the transfer of enterprises
1 P.zh• r 21/66, p. 29.
2 Kom.Sov.Latvii, 7/67, pp. 54-55.
3 Kom.Moldavii, S/61, pp. 57-58.
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to the new style of work.'1' The party committee of the 
Ministry of Instrument-Making similarly criticised the 
leaders of the Chief Administration for Analytical 
Instruments for being too slow to decide questions concerned 
with the transfer of its enterprises to the new system.
The secretary also tells us that the communists of the 
Planning-Economic, Production, Financial and other 
administrations had been given the task of designating the 
first group of factories best prepared for transfer to 
the new system.^
More detailed descriptions of the activities of 
ministerial PPO's, including their involvement with subordinate 
enterprises, can be seen in the previous chapter. These 
descriptions, combined with the above reports, give a good 
impression of the role of ministerial PPO's. The reports 
just cited suggest that the PPO's were at the forefront of 
the transfer of enterprises to the new system, and some of 
them imply that they were working against opposition from 
leading ministerial officials. This would suggest that 
the party organisations had a real concern for the 
principles of the reform, with granting enterprises some 
degree of freedom from bureaucratic interference. However 
the more detailed descriptions in the previous chapter 
contain little indication of this. Indeed their involvement
1
2
P.zh.Kaz., 8/69, pp. 17-18. 
P.zh.r 11/68, p. 19.
386.
in the affairs of subordinate enterprises through the 
numerous commissions, meetings, etc suggest that the 
ministerial PPO's are among the most important contri­
butors to the maintenance of close bureaucratic control 
over enterprises. For example, I have just cited criticism 
by the secretary of the party committee of the Ministry 
of Instrument Making of ministerial officials who are slow 
to make decisions on the transfer of enterprises to the 
new system. In the same report the secretary, working 
in a ministry considered to be at the forefront of the 
implementation of the reforms, speaks, apparently 
approvingly, of the daily reports received by the ministry 
from enterprises on plan fulfilment and of the party 
committee's directives to ministerial communists to examine 
the operations of factories under the new system and control 
their observance of economic indicators.^ There is little 
about the reports of ministerial party organisations' 
involvement in the affairs of subordinate enterprises to 
suggest that it is anything but routine interference in 
their day-to-day operations. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, there is little to suggest a "staff generalist" 
approach.
Another interesting point in this regard is the 
relative lack of involvement of ministerial PPO's in the 
formation of industry associations. The associations
1 P.zh., 11/68, pp. 17-19.
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can be seen as the main focus of the reform at this stage 
and we have seen that their introduction has been 
progressing rather slowly. I have quoted one report on the 
good work done by the party committee of the Ministry of 
Chemical Industry in the formation of associations. But 
even here the report goes on to say that the party committee 
does not always work as well in matters concerning associa­
tions as in other matters.^-
Information concerning the work of the party 
organisations of industry associations (as distinct from 
production associations) is almost nonexistent. What 
information there is suggests that they are subordinate 
to the party organisations of the ministries, and that 
they are used as a means for even closer ministerial 
involvement in the affairs of enterprises. In 1972 the 
party buro of the Ministry of Construction, Road and 
Domestic Machine Construction organised a combined 
meeting of the communists of some glavki and an all-Union 
industry association to examine the question of the
1 Pravda, 10/3/69, p. 2.
2 In 1974 the Committee of Party Control 
directed the party committee of the 
Ministry of Forestry and Woodworking 
Industry to examine the question of the 
improper behaviour of the deputy head of 
an all-Union industry association.
P.sh.i 2/74, p. 51.
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failure of factories to fulfil export orders.^
Conclusions on the role of ministerial PPO's 
in the implementation of the economic and administrative 
changes since 1964 are not easily made. The basic 
assumption is that the PPO's are expected to make a major 
contribution to the implementation of the central authority's 
new economic and administrative policies. The first 
difficulty lies in deciding just what these policies are 
and how seriously the top authorities are pursuing them. 
Ignoring for the moment the long-term policies of integrated 
systems management and computerisation, since the opera­
tional significance of these policies at the moment seems 
limited, the basic thrust of the new policies seems to be 
towards a degree of decentralisation and reduction in the 
scope of administrative decision-making. It is hoped that 
the general productive performance of the economy will 
improve if units in the economy are allowed a greater degree 
of initiative, are freed from petty administrative regula­
tion, and are given the means to accurately assess their 
performance and to gain rewards directly for improved 
performance. The main organisational methods to be used 
are the "economic" methods of performance assessment and 
reward, and the decentralised administrative units, the
Korn., 1/72, pp. 54-55. Note that industry 
associations are formally given the right 
to organise their own exporting through 
specialised export agencies independently of 
their superior ministries.
1
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industry associations. Doubts were expressed in the earlier 
chapters about the effectiveness of Soviet methods of 
performance assessment and reward,^ while earlier in 
this chapter we saw evidence of the slow progress being 
made in the formation of industry associations, 
particularly associations with a true degree of decentralised 
authority. The more general comment could also be made 
that there is no evidence that the Soviet administrative 
system is freeing itself of its traditional problems of 
sectionalism and over-bureaucratisation.
This having been said one would have to conclude 
that the PPO's have failed in their task. The evidence 
is that even in cases where they have succeeded in bringing 
about the formal organisational changes required, often 
it would seem with some difficulty, the changes have not 
brought about subsequent changes in the actual nature of 
bureaucratic performance. They certainly appear to have 
failed to bring about bureaucratic operations in what 
I take to be the spirit of the reforms.
What are the reasons for such a failure? The 
ministerial PPO's appear to have the formal power to bring 
about the required changes. Their control of personnel, 
their rights to investigate and act upon the performance 
of individual workers and to involve themselves closely
1 See above, pp. 104-106, 304-305.
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in ministry-enterprise relations should enable them 
to ensure the desired changes in organisational structure 
and performance.
There is the problem, recognised by the Soviet 
authorities, of a "psychological" barrier to change, of 
bureaucratic officials so set in their ways that they find 
it hard to change, particularly when the changes involve 
their giving up what they have seen as their main 
opportunities to exercise power. The Soviet authorities 
recognise that this problem is a long-term one, and their 
extensive indoctrination and training activities must be 
seen in this light.
But there is much about the problems facing the 
economic reforms that suggests more than "psychological" 
conservatism. There also seems to be the realistic 
recognition on the part of ministerial leaders of the 
implications of the reforms for their positions. There 
is also much about the activities of the PPO's, particu­
larly in the area of ministry-enterprise relations, which 
suggests that their failures are not simply the result of 
the psychological backwardness of ministerial workers, 
but that they themselves are involved in old-style 
bureaucratic methods. The question then becomes whether 
the failure is the result of collusion between 
ministerial leaders and ministerial party workers or of 
some "psychological" backwardness of the party workers
themselves.
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I have suggested that collusion is a real problem 
in other categories of PPO's, where secretaries tend to 
be making careers in the area of work with which the "host" 
organisation is concerned and where the interests of that 
area of work, professional and sectional, are quite clearly 
defined. The same motivation for collusion does not seem 
to be present in the case of ministerial PPO's. We have 
seen that ministerial leaders possess strong sectional 
interests. However it seems unlikely that these interests 
would have the same close hold over members of the apparatus 
below the very top level - the promotion of branch 
interests has little obvious effect on the welfare of 
officials below the very top level. This becomes particu­
larly so if, as appears probable, the secretaries of 
ministerial party organisations are more likely than those 
in other categories to be career party workers, or at 
least to have strong backgrounds in party work.^
Certainly there are fewer reports of collusion in ministries 
than in other institutions, and fewer since 1965 than 
before. Collusion, in the sense of party workers failing 
to fulfil their tasks because they feel that to do so would 
be contrary to their closest, sectional interests, does not 
appear to be a problem or an explanation for the apparent 
failure of ministerial PPO's.
1 See below, pp. 437-441.
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The explanation then must be the "psychological" 
backwardness of the PPO officials. The backwardness 
could be of two types. Firstly, the party workers could 
possess the same bureaucratic ways of thinking as the 
workers surrounding them. Although they may not 
consciously feel the need to defend the sectional 
interests of the bureaucracy, they may be so determined 
by their bureaucratic surroundings that they are unable 
to act in any way other than one that; defends the old 
methods.
However the data on modern-day ministerial party 
secretaries suggest that they are not typical bureaucratic 
officials, that they are subject to considerable indoctrina­
tion activities stressing their vanguard role specifically 
in the area of the economic reform, and therefore they 
should realise that the economic reform provides the 
framework for a successful career. Finally, in many of 
their activities they have shown themselves ready to act 
against the traditional bureaucrats.
This leaves the second type of "psychological" 
backwardness, derived from party secretaries' role as 
party workers, that is, the party's position towards the 
reform is "psychologically" backward. I have already 
said that the top authorities appear to be seriously 
committed to the reform, although the continuing formal 
restrictions on the associations could cause one to wonder
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whether the commitment extends to its full logical 
development. While one can see the commitment to the 
reform, there is always some doubt as to what the reform 
is committed to. Have the authorities been able to 
entirely separate the reform from political considerations? 
Both history and the facts of the reform would justify 
some doubts.
So there can be some doubt about the 
"psychological" position of the top authorities. But 
the problem is perhaps more in the ranks of the party 
apparatus itself. We have seen that the party apparatus 
workers do not have any particular strong objections to 
the reform. However they have no reason to be enthusiastic 
about it - while it reduces the power of the ministries, 
it does not particularly increase their own. This lack of 
commitment, and indeed probable opposition to some elements 
of the reform must be of some significance for the success 
of the reform and the role of the ministerial PPO's in it.
But the "psychological" backwardness of the 
party apparatus goes deeper than this. The natural tendency 
of the party apparatus, without necessarily seeing it 
consciously in terms of power considerations, is to 
involve itself directly in administrative and economic 
affairs. Even in times of campaigns against podmena, and 
since 1967 criticisms of podmena has been muted, the party 
apparatus is always ready to step in when problems occur,
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solve those problems, often very capably, and to consider 
its actions virtuous. The approach can be seen at present 
in the top levels of the government. The "party 
generalists", those top party officials who pride themselves 
above all on their ability "to get the job done", are 
being moved into those areas of government that have been 
causing particular problems. The best example is the 
appointment in recent years of party generalists as 
ministers in the difficult construction ministries."*" We 
have seen in the previous chapter the continuing involve­
ment of ministerial PPO's in this sort of problem-solving.
The critics of the operation of traditional staff 
agencies, whose concepts have provided the basic framework 
for this thesis, dealt well with the shortcomings of such 
an approach. If the party is to operate as any sort of 
"staff generalist" agency its concern is not above all 
with "getting the job done", but with how the job is done 
and whether it will be done any better next time. While 
the ministerial PPO's have apparently become powerful 
organisations within the ministries, and through their 
close links with the Central Committee have probably 
helped establish the predominance of the party over the
1 Tokarev, who became Minister of Industrial
Construction in 1967, had had a long career in 
the party apparatus, as had Khitrov of the 
Ministry of Rural Construction. Shcherbina, 
also a party generalist, became Minister of 
Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry 
Enterprises in 1973.
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state in the area of administrative management, they 
have not properly played their "staff generalist" role. 
Not only have they failed to induce the ministerial 
apparatus to operate in the spirit of the reforms, they 
have failed to so act themselves. While they have become 
highly important political bodies, they have not become 
true "staff generalist" bodies. While this could 
undoubtedly be explained to some extent in terms of 
political considerations, both at the top and middle 
levels of the party hierarchy, much of the explanation 
lies in the traditional but still reigning style of 
party work.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE SECRETARIES OF NON-PRODUCTION 
PRIMARY PARTY ORGANISATIONS
Clearly the most important person in the primary 
party organisation is the organisation's secretary - in 
normal circumstances he virtually is the organisation.
The principles of party discipline and democratic 
centralism ensure that he has virtually total control 
over the organisation and its membership. He will almost 
always be the only member of the organisation in a position 
to devote all or most of his time to party work. The 
personal contacts between PPO secretary and institutional 
head that are often preferred to formal contacts in party 
organs, as well as the personal contacts of the PPO 
secretary with higher party organs ensure his supremacy 
over other members of the PPO.^ "
1 It is possible that a rank-and-file party
member, particularly one interested in advancing 
himself through his enthusiasm for "political 
work", could escape the authority of a meek 
and reluctant PPO secretary. Such could be the 
situation in cases when administration-PPO 
collusion has been reported to higher party 
authorities. However for the purposes of this 
chapter it can be reasonably assumed that the 
secretary has total power of his PPO. Another, 
perhaps more serious problem, is that partic­
ularly in large PPO's there is some division of 
labour among PPO secretaries and their deputies. 
It might not, therefore, be necessary for the 
secretary to be experienced in all aspects of 
the PPO's tasks. I have some data on deputy 
secretaries, although they will probably only 
emphasise the problem, rather than contribute 
to solving it.
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In order to help make a prediction of the 
effectiveness of PPO's we must look at the type of people 
occupying positions as secretaries, why they occupy the 
position, and what their qualifications, backgrounds and 
ambitions are. While a study of PPO secretaries does 
nothing to enlighten us as to the formal powers of the party 
organisations, it can provide us with some data relevant 
to the ability of secretaries to use these powers and the 
possible effect this ability has on their relations with 
institutional leaders. These relations can lead to a 
conflict situation, affecting their ability to fulfil 
their functions; or to a collusive situation, affecting 
their willingness to fulfil their functions. In "staff 
generalist" terms a PPO secretary should have a wide- 
ranging, general knowledge of the goals and operations of 
the "host" organisation, but with a sufficient degree of 
more specialised knowledge to enable him to contribute 
to short-term problem-solving. He must have all this 
knowledge within a context which will not encourage collusion 
with institutional leaders.
I will begin by presenting some data on the back­
grounds, qualifications and career patterns of some PPO 
secretaries. The data will hopefully help us decide whether 
the secretaries have the necessary skills to fulfil their 
various functions, and whether their career patterns are 
likely to lead to cooperative, conflict or collusive
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relations with institutional leaders.
A brief discussion of the methods used to gain 
the information will make clear that there are significant 
methodological and statistical problems involved. I do 
not claim that the data have any statistical significance. 
However I consider that some general trends can be discerned 
and some general conclusions arrived at.
The procedure for gaining information begins with 
the identification of a PPO secretary (I have included 
some deputy secretaries and secretaries of subordinate 
organisations) simply by coming across mention of his name 
and post in the course of my reading.
I have found a considerable amount of additional 
information simply by noticing the names when they appear 
again in other sources. But most information has come 
through a more systematic procedure. The Letopis' 
zhurnal'nykh statei and Letopis ' gazetnykh statei, as well 
as setting out the author, title and reference of all 
articles published in Soviet journals and newspapers 
according to subject, also provide an alphabetical listing 
of authors. By using the lists of authors and articles it 
is possible to identify articles written by the secretaries 
whose names I have recorded. The titles in themselves can 
often be useful to us. But it is hoped that the actual 
article will be accompanied by some additional information
on the author.
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The first problem with this procedure is that I 
have not had time to subject all secretaries to the same 
degree of search through the Letopisi particularly since 
new secretaries are being identified all the time. A 
problem more inherent in the method itself is that one 
cannot always be certain that the author of the article 
and the party secretary are the same person, especially in 
cases of the more common surnames and when initials are 
missing.
Before beginning a detailed analysis of the 
information gained I will set out some basic figures - the 
number of secretaries identified, according to institutional 
category, the extent of search procedure applied to each, 
and the basic figures on the amount of different types of 
information gained. I have used six institutional 
categories:
(1) educational primary party organisations - 
these will be in tertiary institutions only, 
since I have not attempted to record the 
names of school party organisation secretaries. 
However I do have some information on unnamed 
school party secretaries.
(2) scientific - this category contains only 
institutes involved solely in scientific 
research. Institutes also involved in 
teaching are in the first category.
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(3) bureaucratic - primarily ministries,
State Committees and central agencies.
(4) hospitals
(5) Academies of Science
(6) cultural - I have combined cultural 
institutions such as theatres and orchestras 
in the same category as creative unions.
There are six rather complicated categories showing the 
different degrees of systematic search applied to each 
secretary:
(1) been subjected to search through Letopis ' 
zhurnal 'nykh statei for 1957-72 and Letopis ' 
gazetnykh statei for 1971-73.
(2) L.zh.s., 1962-72; L.g.s., 1971-73.
(3) L.zh.s., 1962-72; L.g.s., 1972.
(4) L. zh.s. , 1957-69.
(5) L.zh.s., 1962-69.
(6) no search has been conducted in the Letopisi. 
However information could have come from other 
sources in some cases.
The number of secretaries identified and the degrees of 
search undertaken can be seen in the following table.
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Table 1: The degree of search to which
PPO's secretaries have been subjected
Categories Total (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
educational 99 - 42 1 6 34 16
scientific 97 2 25 1 6 51 12
bureaucratic 115 11 47 1 11 33 12
hospitals 3 - 1 1 - 1 -
Academies 12 1 6 - 1 3 1
cultural 57 1 19 4 - 22 11
total 383 15 140 8 24 144 52
The most important information to be gained from this 
procedure includes articles written, other positions held, 
general description of occupation, and degrees and various 
academic and honorific titles held. The amount of 
information gained can be seen in the following table.
The different categories are as follows:
(1) no information found
(2) number of secretaries for whom articles have 
been identified.
(3) academic degrees identified.
(4) academic and honorific titles.
(5) other posts held. These need not be simultaneous 
or even in the same institution.
(6) work in other institutions or sub-units of the
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same institution. (Where actual position is 
not known).
(7) occupation. (Only where specifically mentioned).
(8) social work, including membership of 
delegations to conferences, etc.
In this chapter I have generally only utilised information 
from categories (2) , (3) and (5) .
Table 2: Information found on PPO secretaries
Categories (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
educational 23 61 36 8 32 8 10 2
scientific 38 57 32 7 18 25 4 4
bureaucratic 53 49 13 - 31 9 11 10
hospitals - 3 1 - 1 1 - -
Academies 5 2 4 1 4 2 4 2
cultural 32 27 - 6 9 - 10 4
total 151 199 86 22 95 45 39 22
My main concern in a more detailed examination of 
this information is to discover the basic orientations of 
PPO secretaries. It is hoped that the information will 
enable us to decide whether secretaries in different cate­
gories of party organisation tend to be above all ideological 
experts, technical specialists, administrative experts,
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party workers of the "party generalist" type, or some 
combination of these possibilities. The nature and 
strength of the different types of orientations could 
have a considerable influence on the degree to which PPO 
secretaries are able and willing to fulfil their various 
functions.
There are some further methodological problems 
which should be mentioned. These are primarily concerned 
with the great reliance I have placed on articles written, 
both as information in themselves and as providing the 
lead to further information. Firstly, there is the 
difficulty of evaluating the quality of an article simply 
from its title or even from a reading of the article by 
someone with no expertise in the particular discipline 
concerned. I am forced to assume that the fact of public­
ation of an article in a periodical is evidence of the 
expertise of its author.
There is the further problem that the listed 
author in fact might not have contributed at all to the 
writing of the article. Collective authorship has long been 
common practice in scientific publications throughout the 
world. In recent years, apparently for ideological reasons, 
it has become increasingly prevalent in Soviet science, 
including the social sciences. This has often suited 
senior members of institutions who are able to include
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themselves in lists of authors without in fact having 
contributed anything to the articles.^
There is the serious problem that some types 
of people are far more likely to have articles published 
than others. For example, an active researcher in a 
scientific institute is more likely to have articles 
published than an administrative worker in that institute. 
I will later come to the conclusion that party secretaries 
in research institutes are overwhelmingly research 
workers, since that is the nature of their articles. 
However it is a disturbing thought that the 54 research 
party secretaries on whom I have done some search but
2found no articles might all be administrative workers.
There is also the problem that even when an 
article has been found, it is not always easy to classify
1 See above, p. 106. The same can be
said about academic degrees. See p. 245.
2 It would be particularly interesting if a 
significant proportion of them worked in 
institute Personnel Departments, given the 
importance of Personnel Departments as 
centres of control of the working population 
and as the work-place bases of the security 
police. Nadezhda Mandel'shtam has a great 
deal to say about Personnel Departments in her 
memoirs. See, for example, Mandel'shtam, N: 
Hope against Hope, Collins and Harvill, 
London, 1970, pp. 344-345. In the last 
chapter we saw that a number of ministerial 
PPO secretaries have personnel backgrounds. 
See above, p. 380.
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it. For example, many party secretaries in tertiary 
educational establishments work in the area of party 
history. An article on the work of the Kazakh Communist 
Party in agriculture during the 1930's might be, to the 
historian author, a technical article, and need say nothing 
about his ability to engage in ideological agitation 
activities. Articles by economists on such matters as 
material incentive are also often difficult to categorise. 
However where an article implies a familiarity and some 
facility with Marxist ideology I have included it in the 
ideological category. There are similar difficulties in 
distinguishing technical and organisational articles in 
some areas.
I recognise these as serious problems. However 
I feel that the following information can still be of some 
value. I will now examine the secretaries I have identified 
according to the category of institution in which the 
party organisation is situated and attempt to decide on their 
basic orientations.
(1) Educational PPO's
Given the great emphasis laid on the importance 
of the ideological indoctrination of students and the 
ideological control of their teachers, and the extensive 
activities actually undertaken by PPO's in these areas,
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one might expect educational PPO secretaries to show 
strong ideological orientations, especially when we 
remember that all Soviet tertiary institutions have 
Departments of Social Sciences able to provide well- 
trained ideologists.
(a) ideological orientation
In fact only fourteen of the 76 educational party 
secretaries on whom I have some information appear to 
have purely ideological orientations, and three of these 
come from party schools, where one would expect a particular 
emphasis on ideology. Six of the fourteen are from univ­
ersities. Kh.A. Aminov (Samarkand), T.E. Dudareva 
(Belorussia), B.V. Zolotarev (Leningrad - deputy secretary),
E.A . Kuznetsov (Kazakhstan) and N.M. Shilintsev (History 
Faculty of Kishinev State University) are all historians 
writing in the area of party history. S.D. Roshka, of 
Kishinev State University, is a Candidate of Philosophical 
Sciences who has written one article "The struggle of ideas 
in contemporary philosophy" [Kom.Moldavii, 10/71, pp. 9-16), 
but also a more historically oriented one, "Some social 
questions in the parliamentary speeches of Mikhail 
Kogelnichanu" {Uch&nye zapiski Kishinevskogo universiteta, 
vol. 95, 1968, pp. 144-154). Five come from specialised 
institutes, yet show no evidence of expertise in the area 
in which their institutes' specialise. N.Sh. Inoiatov, of 
the Tashkent Institute of Irrigation and Agricultural
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Mechanisation Engineers, has apparently had one article 
published, on "The historic struggle of the Communist 
Party for the establishment and development of socialist 
culture" (Trudy Tashkentskogo instituta inzhenevov irrigatsii 
i mekhanizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva, 21/62, pp. 98-125).
I.A. Konstantinov, secretary of the party buro of the 
Moscow Conservatorium in 1972, was at the same time a 
dotsent and head of the Department of Marxism-Leninsim.
There is no evidence that he has any musical expertise.
Likewise there is no evidence of any medical expertise on 
the part of T.T. Mustafin of the Karaganda Medical 
Institute. Indeed, as well as being described as a dotsent 
and head of the Department of Party History and Scientific 
Communism one year after appearing as party secretary, 
he was also described as a Candidate of Historical Sciences 
who has written such articles as "From the history of the 
establishment of the Karaganda coal basin and the formation 
of labouring cadres" {Uchttnye zapiski Kazakhskogo universiteta> 
seviia istorii, vol. 54, no. 12, 1963, pp. 26-42). V.I.
Iurchuk, as well as being secretary of the party committee 
of the Ukrainian Agricultural Academy, was also a Doctor of 
Historical Sciences and head of the Department of Party 
History. His articles show no orientation whatsoever towards 
agricultural matters. (Iurchuk later went on to become 
director of the Institute of Party History of the Ukrainian 
Central Committee.) An interesting example of how far this
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can go can be seen in the case of E.S. Petropavlovskii, 
deputy secretary of the party committee of the Plekhanov 
Institute of Economics, who, although working in an 
economics institute, is not even a political economist, 
but rather an historian, writing such articles as 
"Memorials to comrades killed in the years of the Great 
Patriotic War", and "Leaflets as a guide to the pre- 
October period of the history of the CPSU" (Istoriia SSSR, 
6/68, pp. 201-213; Voprosy istorii KPSS, 8/63, pp. 105- 
111) .
(b) technical orientation
A considerably larger number, twenty-six, of 
educational party secretaries show purely technical 
orientations. Such technical specialties might be of 
some use for a staff generalist role in a specialised 
institute. But in universities and polytechnical 
institutes, providing teaching of a wide-range of 
disciplines, specialisation in one discipline is of little 
use. Thus only six of the 26 come from these types of 
institutions (Iu.K. Burlin - Moscow State University, a 
geologist; R.K. Buman - Latvian State University, a 
chemist; B. Voinov - Volgograd Polytechnical Institute, 
an engineer; V.V. Pushkarev - Urals Polytechnical Institute, 
a chemist; L.M. Tereshchenko - Moscow Technical College, 
an engineer. It would appear appropriate that B.A . Sokolov
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be a geologist, since he was secretary of the party buro 
of the Geology Faculty of Moscow State University. But 
considering that the Geology Faculty has its own social 
science teachers, it must still be considered significant 
that one of these teachers is not used as party secretary.^) 
All the others are from specialised institutes and appear 
to have specialisations consistent with the interests of 
their institutes, without any apparent orientation towards 
ideology at all. Just as one example we can take V.A. 
Beloguzhev who in 1972 was secretary of the party committee 
of the Uzbek Institute of Rail Transport Engineers.
In 1962 he had been an aspirant writing such articles as 
"Some questions of the application of polarity in the 
resolution of the most general tasks of the homology of 
second order curves" (Sbornik trudov Leningradskogo 
instituta inzhenerov zhelezno-dorozhnogo transporta, vol. 94, 
1962, pp. 65-81). The following year he was described 
as a senior lecturer in the Graphics Department of the 
institute, writing similar articles, something he was 
still doing in 1966. (See, for example, Nauohnye trudy 
Tashkentskogo instituta zhelezno-dorozhnogo transporta, 
vol. 39, 1966, pp. 3-32.)
1 Although there are cases of social science
teachers being used in such cases. In 1971 
the secretary of the party buro of the Faculty 
of the Mechanised Analysis of Economic Information 
of the Moscow Economics-Statistics Institute was 
a dotsent in the faculty's Department of Party 
History. Vestnik vysshei shkoly, 3/71, p. 85.
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It is interesting that such a great proportion 
of educational party secretaries have totally technical 
orientations compared to those with ideological orient­
ations. Could this be taken as evidence that educational 
PPO's are not as concerned with ideological matters as 
one might have thought? Such an extreme conclusion 
would not be justified. However it can be taken as 
evidence that, especially in specialised institutes, the 
technical expertise needed for involvement in control of the 
content of educational and research work is considered of 
first priority. This is not evidence that ideology is 
completely ignored in these institutions. It is quite 
possible that other party workers with more specialised 
ideological training, say a senior member of one of the 
Departments of the Social Sciences, are given responsibility 
for ideological activities. Although I have no data which 
would allow any firm conclusions on this some interesting 
observations can be made. We have seen that ideological 
training in specialised educational institutions is 
conducted within the framework of the institutions' 
specialisations.^ Yet we have just seen that in cases where 
PPO secretaries have had ideological orientations they have 
not been in the framework of their "host" organisations' 
specialisations. There is no evidence that Mustafin, for
1 See above, pp. 76-77.
411.
example, has any medical expertise. This raises the very 
interesting question, one on which I unfortunately have 
no information, of what is the training and experience 
of teachers of the social sciences in specialised 
institutions. Is Mustafin typical of all social science 
teachers in such institutions? If he is, considerable 
doubt must be cast on the effectiveness of the ideological 
activities both of the Departments of the Social Sciences 
and the PPO's.
The data does not allow any conclusions on this 
question. However it could be seen as suggesting that in 
the eyes of the party authorities technical expertise, and 
therefore technical control, are of higher priority, or 
greater practical applicability, than ideological expertise 
an d control.
This discussion has applied primarily to the 
specialised institutes. In these a technical speciality 
might be enough to provide a sufficiently broad under­
standing of the goals and operations of the "host" organ­
isation for the fulfilment of staff generalist functions. 
However even in these institutes, and certainly in the 
universities and polytechnical institutes, it appears 
unlikely to be sufficient. Some combination of technical 
and ideological orientations would be better, but best of 
all would be general educational and organisational expertise.
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I will now give detailed information on those secretaries 
possessing broader and combined orientations in an attempt 
to decide the capability of educational PPO's to fulfil 
staff generalist roles.
i) Berezhnoi, A .F. - Leningrad State University (1954)
(a) degree - Doctor of Historical Sciences and 
of Philological Sciences.
(b) other posts - member of the editorial board of
Vestnik Leningradskogo universiteta: seriia
istorii3 iazyka i literatury (1964)
- dotsent and dean of the Faculty 
of Journalism (1966-70)
- chairman of the editorial board 
of Voprosy zhurnalistiki (1960).
(c) articles - he has written articles of an 
ideological nature, both on the history of 
journalism ("V.I. Lenin and the press",
Voprosy zhurnalistiki, vol. 2, no. 1, 1960, 
pp. 175-184) and more contemporary topics.
("Reviewing achievements", 0 publitsitiki i 
publitsistakh, 2/66, pp. 24-44). I have 
identified 14 such articles. However there are 
also articles on educational matters. ("On 
some questions of the study and teaching of the 
history of the party-soviet press", Vopr.zhurnalistiki, 
vol. 2, no. 1 , 1960, pp. 3-24). I have found five
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such articles.
ii) Duchenko, N.V. - Kiev State University (1973)
(a) Doctor of Philosophical Sciences
(b) dotsent (1969)
deputy director for scientific work of the 
university's Institute for Raising the 
Qualifications of Social Science Teachers (1972)
(c) There is one article on the use of foreign 
languages in the university (Vestnik vysshei 
shkoly, 5/69, pp. 31-38), but also an 
ideological one, "The raising of the role of 
communist ideology in contemporary conditions".
(Kommunist Ukrainy, 8/72, pp. 37-46).
iii) Diuriagin, I.Ia. - Sverdlovsk Juridicial Institute 
(1970)
(a) Candidate of Juridicial Sciences
(c) His articles show a concern with an aspect of
the law, the nature of legal norms, which would 
require special ideological care. However he 
clearly also has legal expertise.
iv) Ivanov, A.S. - Timiriazev Agricultural Academy (1969)
(a) Candidate of Economic Sciences
(b) junior scientific worker in the All-Union Research 
Institute for Agriculture (1963)
worked in the Administration for Collective Farm 
Affairs of the All-Union Ministry of Agriculture (1966)
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dotsent in the Department of Political Economy 
of the institute (1966)
(c) While in the research institute he wrote a
technical article. However after that articles 
became more varied and difficult to classify.
Some were clearly propaganda ("The historic 
half-century (the 50th anniversary of Soviet 
power)", Izvestiia Timiriazevskoi sel'skok- 
hoziaistvennoi akademii, S/61, pp. 5-10); 
others closely related ideology and agricultural 
practice ("The September, 1965 Central Committee 
plenum and some questions of agrarian-economic 
theory", ibid, 1/66, pp. 3-21). There are 
articles on general Marxist ideology ("V.I. Lenin 
on the union of the working class and the peas­
antry" , ibid, 1/70, pp. 3-15); while there are 
some showing an interest in economic theory ("The 
role of economic interests in the development of 
socialist production", Doklady TSKhA, 139/68, 
pp. 67-73) . There is no evidence of any 
particular concern with educational matters.
v) II'in, R.N. - All-Union State Institute of
Cinematography (1971)
(a) Candidate of Art Criticism
(b) dean of the Faculty of Camera Work (1964)
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(c) He has written articles on camera techniques,
TV lighting and links between film and TV 
studios (Tekhnika kino i televedeniia, 5/62, 
pp. 17-20; 7/62, pp. 66-72; 4/64, pp. 66-67).
However articles on the need for cameramen to be 
"close to life" show a greater awareness of 
ideological concerns (Iskusstvo kino, 5/62,
pp. 111-118).
vi) Roger, K.E. - Tartu State University (1971)
(a) Candidate of Historical Sciences
(b) rector of Tallin Teachers' College (1973)
(c) His promotion to rector indicates some 
organisational skills. However his article on 
Lenin's views on socialist competition indicates 
ideological expertise. (Uohenye zapiski 
Tartuskogo universiteta, vol. 202, no. 4, 1968, 
pp. 3-30). Promotion into a teachers' college
is a sign of educational experience and interests.
vii) Krutov, V.I. - Moscow Technical College (1956)
(a) Doctor of Technical Sciences
(b) chairman of the Scientific-Technical Council of 
the Ministry of Tertiary Education (1968) 
dotsent (1960)
(c) He has written numerous technical articles on the 
manufacture of gears in machine construction. His 
articles on educational practice have either a
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technical bias (see his article in Vestnik 
vysshei shkoly, 9/72, pp. 29-30, on teaching 
students computer techniques), or an ideological 
bias ("Such is the formation of communist world 
view in vuzy", ibid, 6/64, pp. 7-19).
viii) Lavrov, S.B. - Leningrad State University (1969)
(a) Doctor of Geological Sciences
(c) He has written technical articles on geological 
geography. Sometimes these articles take on an 
ideological tinge ("On fundamental differences 
between capitalist and socialist regional 
production-territorial complexes", Vestnik 
Leningradskogo univevsiteta, no. 6, vol. 1,
1966, pp. 80-87). Although there is some 
evidence of a concern with the educational side 
of geography ("New methods or new principles", 
ibid, no. 6, vol. 1, 1971, pp. 79-84), this does 
not spread to the area of general educational 
practice.
ix) Men'shikov, V.V. - First Moscow Medical Institute (1968)
(a) Doctor of Medical Sciences
(b) head of the institute's Inter-clinic Hormone 
Laboratory (1971)
(c) He has written numerous purely technical articles, 
usually on illnesses of the glands. Some 
articles show a concern with laboratory services,
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which might indicate some organisational 
interests ("On the organisation of laboratory 
services in healing-prophylactic institutions 
of health care in the Czech Republic",
Laboratornoe delo, 5/71, pp. 311-314). The 
only evidence of any ideological orientation is 
one article describing the achievements of the 
laboratory on the occasion of Lenin's birthday 
(ibid, 3/70, pp. 131-134).
x) Mochalov, B.A . - Moscow State University (1966)
(a) Doctor of Economic Sciences
(b) rector of Plekhanov Economics Institute (1972) 
member of the editorial board of Tekhnologiia 
estetiki (1976)
(c) His earlier articles were on economic subjects 
with considerable ideological significance
("The development of social forms of satisfaction 
of the essential needs of workers", Vestnik 
Moskovskogo univevsiteta, series 8, no. 2, 1963, pp. 
13-24). Later articles show a concern with educat­
ional matters (an article on the quality of 
admissions into universities, Sovetskaia 
torgovlia, 24/8/71).
xi) Parimbetov, B.P. - Kazakh branch of the All-Union 
Academy of Construction and Architecture (1961)
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(a) Candidate of Technical Sciences
(b) Kazakh Minister of the Production of Construction 
Materials (1968)
(c) His promotion to minister would indicate some 
facility with all technical, ideological and 
organisational concerns. However I have been 
able to find only purely technical articles and 
articles of a general propaganda and informative 
nature written while minister. There is no sign 
of special ideological expertise.
xii) Prokof'ev, M.A. - Moscow State University (1948-51)
(a) Doctor of Chemical Sciences
(b) chemist-press operator in the Derbenov Chemical 
Factory
student, aspirant and deputy director of the 
Chemical Institute of Moscow University (all 
before WW2)
senior scientific worker and deputy director of 
the Institute of Chemistry (1946)
head of the Chief Administration for Universities 
and deputy minister of the All-Union Ministry of 
Tertiary Education (1951)
First deputy minister of the ministry (1959)
RSFSR Minister of Education (1966)
All-Union Minister of Education (at present)
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(c) I have not looked for articles by Prokof'ev, 
having only learnt recently that he had been 
a PPO secretary.
xiii) Protopopov, V.A. - Moscow State University (1975)
(b) aspirant in the Department of Accounting and 
Analysis of Economic Activity of Industrial 
Enterprises of the Economics Faculty (1967) 
first secretary of the Leninskii raikom, Moscow 
(1975)
(c) His technical articles are on khozrasoh'it and of 
a reasonably technical nature. There are also 
organisational articles ("The faculty and the 
factory", Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta.
Ekonomika, 2/67, pp. 71-77). However promotion 
to raikom first secretary should be enough to 
show that he is considered by the authorities
to possess all necessary skills, although there is 
no specific evidence of an interest in educational 
matters.
xiv) Rud', A.S. - Plekhanov Economics Institute (1972)
(a) Candidate of Historical Sciences
(c) There is no sign of economic expertise. He has 
published one article on party history (Voprosy 
istorii KPSS, 5/68, pp. 104-111) and articles on 
organisational matters ("Scientists in the factory", 
Moskovskaia pravda, 28/12/71).
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xv) Chukhno • A.A. - Kiev State University (1968)
(a) Doctor of Economic Sciences
(b) head of the Department of Political Economy 
of the Humanities Faculty (1971)
(c) He has written articles on interest theory and 
material incentive. This topic is one of 
ideological sensitivity, although some of his 
articles are quite technical ("The distribution 
of labour and consumption funds", Voprcsy 
ekonomiki, 3/63, pp. 49-54). There are other 
articles on economics, but with strong 
ideological content (an article on the importance 
of maintaining the supremacy of heavy over 
consumer industry, Pravda Ukrainy, 24/2/71,
pp. 2-3). There are also articles on educational 
matters ("Creatively work with foreign students", 
Ekonomicheskie nauki, 2/71, pp. 76-79).
xvi) Iagodkin, V.N. - Moscow State University (1968-70)
(a) Candidate of Economic Sciences
(b) dotsent in the Department of Political Economy 
of the Economics Faculty of MGU (1967)
Moscow govkom secretary for ideological affairs 
(1970-76)
deputy minister for personnel of the All-Union 
Ministry of Education (1976)
(c) He has written articles and books on personnel 
policies, productivity and material incentive.
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Such articles must have some ideological 
content. His later promotions (although his 
last change of job could not be considered a 
promotion) show some trust in his ideological, 
organisational and educational expertise.
It can be seen that by no means all of these secretaries 
can be described as having staff generalist qualifications. 
Although the combination of ideological and technical 
orientations exhibited by Diuriagin, A.S. Ivanov, II*in, 
Lavrov and Men'shikov presumably makes them more able to 
cope with their various functions, more is required to 
indicate an ability to play a staff generalist role. In 
educational establishments some concern with general 
educational matters is also required, although evidence of 
considerable organisational expertise and experience could 
be sufficient. Of the secretaries listed only Berezhnoi, 
Duchenko, Roger, Krutov, Mochalov, Parimbetov, Prokof'ev, 
Protopopov, Chukhno and Iagodkin could be said to 
exhibit a sufficient range of qualifications and interests 
to be described as "staff generalists". This is only ten 
secretaries out of the 76 on whom some information has been 
found. Of course I am not claiming that none of the other 
secretaries would be able to play a staff generalist role. 
However it could be said that to the extent that educational 
PPO's fail to fulfil staff generalist functions, the lack of 
the necessary training and experience of party secretaries 
is one of the reasons.
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The effect that the strong technical orientations 
of so many secretaries has on the possibilities for 
collusion is something which will be examined later.
Before going on to research PPO's I will give 
what data I have on school party secretaries. I have not 
gathered data on these secretaries by name; however I do 
have some interesting information on background and 
orientations. The amount of information is very small, but 
quite consistent. I have identified the non-party positions 
of ten school PPO secretaries. Of these one was the school's 
head teacher (zavuch) and two were deputy directors for 
academic work. This combination of responsibilities is 
rather frowned on by the Soviet authorities. In one of these 
cases a member of a school party organisation asked Kommunist 
Sovetskoi Latvii whether it is right that the deputy 
director for academic work be party secretary as well, as 
happens in his school, year in, year out. The journal 
replied that although the secretaryship is an elected 
position and it is up to the party organisation to decide 
who holds it, it is better that such positions not be held 
by the same person, since it makes it very difficult for 
the party organisation to involve itself in "production" 
control in the correct way. It says that it is better if 
the party organisation is headed by someone who does not 
have administrative power over all members of the collective, 
although it recognises that at times the deputy director
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might be the only person suitable for the job."*" That 
statement indicates, firstly, that the party authorities 
recognise the problems of collusion, and secondly, that 
the deputy director's skills are the sort of skills required 
for secretaries.
However what is perhaps more interesting is that 
six of the ten are teachers in the social sciences area.
Four are teachers of Russian language and literature; one 
of history; and one of history and social behaviour 
{obshchestvovedenie). Only one taught in a technical area, 
a teacher of mathematics. The scope of the activities of a 
school are probably sufficiently narrow that wide-ranging 
experience and qualifications are not essential for the 
successful fulfilment of a staff generalist role. It is 
interesting, therefore, that when more general expertise 
is not essential the Soviet authorities turn to teachers in 
the more ideologically oriented disciplines for their party 
secretaries.
(b) Research PPO's
Research institutions are in a very different 
position from educational institutions. They do not have 
social science departments, that is, they do not have
1 Kom.Sov.Latvii, 9/72, p. 49.
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structural sub-units of the institution specialising 
in ideological matters and providing ideologically trained 
personnel. However we have seen that ideological control of 
scientific research is considered to be of considerable 
importance by party authorities. Yet there is no evidence 
that secretaries in research institutions have ideological 
backgrounds of any type, except of course those working in 
institutions that specialise in areas of particular 
ideological content. For example, it is not surprising that 
L.E. Repida, secretary of the party buro of the Institute 
of History of the Moldavian Academy of Sciences, writes 
rather ideologically oriented articles ("The establishment 
of the Leninist ideas of the union of the working class 
and the peasantry of Moldavia in the process of the 
socialist re-organisation of agriculture in the republic", 
Uch&nye zapiski Kishinevskogo universiteta. Kafedra 
istorii KPSS, 5/71, pp. 18-33).
There are some curious exceptions to the rule that 
research secretaries do not show ideological interests.
V.A . Sergeev, the secretary of the party buro of the 
Institute of Elementary Organic Formations of the All-Union 
Academy of Sciences, wrote an article "According to the 
directions of Lenin,(on the role of the conference called 
in 1918 for working out methods for the manufacture of 
synthetic rubber)", (Nauohno-tekhnioheskoe obshchestvo SSSR, 
6/69, p. 5) although he is a Doctor of Chemical Sciences
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who has written 27 other articles, all on purely 
scientific subjects. Similarly F.I. Furdui, secretary 
of the party buro of the Institute of Zoology of the 
Moldavian Academy of Sciences, despite working in the 
Biophysics Laboratory and writing eight other articles 
on purely scientific matters, also wrote an article 
entitled "F. Engels and contemporary natural science"
(Izvestiia AN MSSR, Seriia biologii i khimicheskikh nauk, 
2/71, pp. 3-6). Finally V.S. Iablokov, deputy secretary 
of the party buro of the Institute of Geology of the All- 
Union Academy, as well as writing technical articles on 
geology and being a Candidate of Geological-mineralogical 
Sciences, has also written an article "The role of 
V .I. Lenin in the resolution of problems of the mineral 
resources of the USSR" (Litologiia i poleznye ispokaemye, 
2/70, pp. 6-34). These exceptions, curious as they are, 
are not sufficient to invalidate the generalisation that 
research party secretaries show little orientation towards 
ideological affairs.
Another aspect that must be considered is how 
well-equipped research party secretaries are in terms of 
organisational expertise. My data would indicate not very 
much. Few of the secretaries I have identified appear to 
have occupied more senior organisational positions or to 
have written organisational articles. The fact that a 
significant proportion are department or laboratory heads
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(eleven out of the 59 on whom I have information) does, 
however, indicate some experience in dealing with people 
and organising their work. The only secretaries who 
could be said to have exhibited organisational expertise 
beyond this level are L.E. Repida, already described as 
secretary of the party buro of the Institute of History 
of the Moldavian Academy of Sciences, who up to 1958 was 
apparently the Minister of State Control in the republic; 
and V.S. Iablokov, who, before being deputy secretary in 
the Institute of Geology in 1956, had had a wealth of 
experience dating from the 1930's in the apparatuses of 
different ministries and the Presidium of the All-Union 
Academy of Sciences, as well as being deputy director of 
the institute from 1950-52.
G.I. Popov could be another interesting case.
In 1971 he was secretary of party buro of the All-Russian 
Institute for the Organisation and Payment of Agricultural 
Labour. The next year he was described as party secretary 
in the All-Russian Institute for Agricultural Labour and 
Management. If these are two separate institutes it is 
interesting that he was party secretary in both. In 1969 
he wrote a reasonably technical article "New developments 
in the organisation of agricultural labour" (Sotsialistioheskii 
trud, 10/68, pp. 74-79).1
1 In the same year one G.I. Popov also published
a book entitled "On the style of party work".
However Popov is an exceedingly common name.
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But the overwhelming proportion of the 
secretaries of research party organisations on whom I have 
information, forty-seven of the 59, show interest purely in 
technical matters. The lack of orientation towards 
ideological or organisational matters can only make their 
task more difficult.
(c) Bureaucratic PPO's
It is probably in bureaucratic institutions that 
some organisational expertise on the part of the party 
secretary is most necessary. However this is not to deny 
the importance of technical and ideological expertise.
(1) technical orientation
Of the sixty bureaucratic party secretaries on 
whom I have found some information, eleven had some sort 
of academic degree. There were five economics degrees 
(all candidates), four degrees in the technical sciences 
(three candidates and one doctor), one Candidate of Physical- 
mathematical Sciences and one Candidate of Historical 
Sciences. All but the last seem to indicate a technical 
specialisation. The Candidate of Historical Sciences is 
I.E. Legas", of the Moldavian Ministry of Education, where 
a technical specialisation would be less appropriate.
One of the Candidates of Technical Sciences was
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described as an engineer, as was the Candidate of Physical- 
mathematical Sciences. Besides this, another seven 
secretaries were described as technical professionals, 
although without mention of academic degrees (six engineers 
and one economist).
In terms of articles, 36 secretaries wrote 
technical articles. In fact this is the total number of 
secretaries who show some involvement with technical 
matters. Of these 21 show evidence of interest in technical 
matters only.
(2) ideological orientation
Bureaucratic institutions are like research 
institutions in that they do not have any in-built ideol­
ogical sub-units to provide a pool of ideologically 
trained party workers. It could be said that ideology is 
less important in bureaucratic institutions. However it 
is still worth looking at the degree to which administrative 
secretaries have ideological orientations.
It would appear very little. I have already 
mentioned Legas' of the Moldavian Ministry of Education.
He has written articles on party history. Beyond this 
ideological articles are rare. V.S. Kulikov, secretary of 
the party committee of the All-Union Ministry of Finance, 
apparently wrote an article entitled "K. Marx on the place
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of the formal subordination of labour to capital in the 
formation of the capitalist method of production"
(Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta3 Ekonomika, 3/68, 
pp. 23-33) . V. Rudnev, the deputy head of the Agitprop 
Department of the Kazakh Central Committee, has written 
ideological articles. This might be the same V.F. Rudnev who 
earlier was the secretary of the party committee of the 
Ministry of General Machine Construction. Similarly it is 
uncertain whether the M. Soldatov, writing ideological 
articles as deputy head of the Agitprop Department of the 
Uzbek Central Committee, is the same M. Solatov who pre­
viously worked as secretary of the party committee of the 
All-Union Ministry of Production of Construction Materials.
In 1959 A. Iarilov was secretary of the party committee of 
the Chief Administration of the Civil Air Force. In 1963 
he wrote an article entitled "For ideological (ideinuiu) 
concreteness and reality" in his position as head of the 
Political Department of the Moscow territorial Administration 
of the Civil Air Force. (Gvazhdanskaia aviatsiia, 10/63,
pp. 10-11).
It can be seen that this constitutes little 
evidence of ideological expertise. However one important 
matter in this regard not yet discussed, although hinted 
at in the unconfirmed cases of Rudnev and Soldatov, is the 
number of secretaries in bureaucratic institutions who have 
come from or go onto more senior party positions. Many of 
these would require considerable ideological expertise.
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However the data on these secretaries will be left until 
later.
(3) organisational orientation
Organisational expertise is of particular 
importance in bureaucratic institutions. We have seen the 
tasks ministerial PPO's have in ensuring the implementation 
of the new economic reforms. Soon we will look at the 
administrative positions occupied by the party secretaries 
of this category of institution. However firstly I will 
give other evidence of organisational expertise. I have 
already given the data on academic degrees, taking these 
as evidence of technical expertise. It is possible that 
such degrees, especially in economics (of which there were 
five out of eleven), in individual cases provide organisational 
expertise. However this can only be confirmed by looking at 
the nature of articles published. Again classification is 
difficult, but these are the data as well as I can determine 
them.
i) M.A. Amstibovitskii of the Kazakh Ministry of
Construction has written articles on the 
organisation of construction, for example,
"The quick construction of the Chimkent Cement 
Factory (Ekonomika stroitel rstva, 3/62, pp. 37-40) 
and "Spreading leading experience" (ibid, 6/68, 
pp. 35-39 .
ii) S.I. Bogoliubov, All-Union Ministry of Construction -
"To perfect the material-technical supply of
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construction" (ibid, 7/64, pp. 35-53).
iii) la.I. Groisman, North Kazakh sovnarkhoz -
"Transport barriers and costs (on the 
improvement of the material-technical supply 
of industrial enterprises)" Narodnoe khoziaistvo 
Kazakhs tana, 8/65, pp. 37-38).
iv) V.S. Kulikov, All-Union Ministry of Finance -
articles on the economic reforms, for example,
"The new system of economic incentive in 
action" {Politioheskoe samoobrazovanie, 3/66, 
pp. 50-57).and more general organisational 
matters, for example, "To activate rationalising 
work" (Finansy SSSR, 2/69, pp. 24-25).
v) V. Nefedov, Krasnodar krai Finance Department - articles
on the economic reform and bureaucratic organis­
ation, for example, "We are controlling the 
quality of production" (ibid, 5/69, pp. 64-65).
vi) F. Popov, Kazakh Ministry of Light Industry - "The
reform at the centre of attention" (Narodnoe 
khoziaistvo Kazakhstana, 1/67, pp. 35-37).
vii) V. Shepetovskii, Ministry of Railways - "Cadres -
our great riches" (Gudok, 20/7/71).
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viii) I. Shlab'e, Latvian Ministry of Local Industry -
"In new conditions" {Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii,
7/67, pp. 53-56).
ix) M. Essenemanov, Kirgiz Ministry of Health - "Prompted
by practice (on the preparation of medical 
personnel in tertiary and secondary medical 
study institutions)" (Meditsinskaia gazeta,
19/1/71).
This is hardly overwhelming evidence of organisational 
expertise. It is true that bureaucratic expertise does not 
attract as many articles as does scientific research.
Stronger evidence of organisational expertise can be found 
when we consider other non-party positions held by bureau­
cratic party secretaries. I will now list these other 
positions, although excluding for the moment other party 
posts.
i) M.A . Amstibovitskii - head of the Planning Administration 
of the Kazakh Ministry of Construction (1960, 63)
- deputy chairman of the Scientific-Technical 
Society for the Kazakh construction industry (1962)
- (former) secretary of the party buro of the 
Kazakh Ministry of Construction (1964)
- member of the ministry's collegium (1964)
- member of the collegium of the Kazakh Ministry 
of Heavy Construction (1970).
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ii) S.I. Bogoliubov - (former) deputy secretary of the 
party buro of the All-Union Ministry of Construction 
(1954)
- head of the Supply Administration of the 
RSFSR Ministry of Construction (1964)^
iii) N.M. Verbitskii - senior scientific worker in the 
Laboratory for Grain Cultures of the Zernograd 
Selection Farm (1965)
- secretary of the party committee of the 
Moldavian Ministry of Food Industry (1967)
- head of the laboratory (1971)
iv) I. Gal'tsov - secretary of the party organisation of 
the Kirgiz republican Farm Machinery Association
Kirgizsel ' kho ztekhn-ika (1975)
- head of the Association's Administration for 
Production Services to Collective and State Farms (1975).
v) la. I. Groisman - head of the Transport Department of
the North Kazakh sovnarkhoz (1959)
- deputy secretary of the sovnarkhoz's party 
organisation (1960)
- deputy head of the Supply Administration of the 
Virgin Lands sovnarkhoz (1969)
- head of the Supply Administration of the Kazakh 
Ministry of Meat and Dairying Industry (1971).
1 This identification is far from certain.
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vi) N.A. Danilov - secretary of the party committee of 
the Ministry of Electrotechnical Industry (1966)
- engineer-captain in the Air Force (1966)
- engineer-colonel (1971).
vii) K.K. Ivanov - head of the Technical Department of the 
Administration of River Fleet Construction (1963)
- secretary of the party committee of the All- 
Union Ministry of Transport Construction (1966).
viii) V.S. Kulikov - chief editor of Finansy SSSR (1963)
- secretary of the party committee of the All- 
Union Ministry of Finance (1966)
- glavk head in the All-Union State Insurance 
Office (1971)
- chairman of the Central Commission for 
Rationalising Suggestions and Innovations of the 
Ministry of Finance (1971) .
ix) A.A. Malinin - secretary of the party committee of 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade (1966)
- chairman of Raznoeksport (1973).
x) V. Nefedov - secretary of the party organisation of the
Krasnodar krai Finance Department (1971)
- deputy head of the department's Department of 
State Revenue (1972) .
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xi) Novikov - secretary of the party buro of the Kazakh 
Ministry of Construction (1964)
- head of the ministry's Personnel Administration 
(1964) .
xii) V. V. Pavlovskii - deputy secretary of the party 
committee of the Ministry of Railways (1966)
- deputy head of the ministry's Personnel Admin­
istration (1971).
xiii) R.M. Polis - secretary of the party committee of the 
Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building 
(1966)
- deputy minister of the Ministry of Machine Building 
for Livestock and Fodder Production (1973).
xiv) A.A. Pomortsev - head of the Administration of Seed­
growing of the All-Union Ministry of Agriculture (1970)
- deputy head of the ministry's Chief Administration 
of Grain Cultures and General Questions of Land Use (1970)
- secretary of the ministry's party committee (1973)
- deputy minister for personnel (1974).
xv) F. Popov - head of the Financial Administration of the 
Kazakh Ministry of Light Industry (1967)
- secretary of the ministry's party buro (1969)
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xvi) S.V. Silkin - head of the Department of Credit and 
Financing of Agriculture of the Moldavian republican 
office of Gosbank (1964)
- secretary of the office's party buro (1965).
xvii) G.A . Tret'iakov - Air Force Major General (1966)
- secretary of the party committee of the All- 
Union Ministry of Radio Industry (1971).
This is stronger evidence of organisational expertise.
Nearly all of these secretaries (seventeen of the 62 on 
whom I have some information) have or will come to occupy 
relatively senior managerial positions within their "host" 
organisations, usually at head of department or administration 
level. It is interesting that eight of these seventeen 
are leading workers in strictly "staff" type departments - 
planning, technical, financial, supply and particularly 
personnel.'*' This could be taken as a particularly 
interesting pointer towards the types of skills the Soviet
1 With regard to personnel a curious report
appeared in Partiinaia zhizn' Kazakhstana 
in 1964. The new secretary of the party 
organisation of a Thermal Energy Centre had 
worked in the steam shop. However he wrote 
that there is an unwritten law in the Centre 
that the party secretary must also be head of 
the Personnel Department, and so he was shifted 
there on election as secretary. P.zh.Kaz.,
6/64, p. 69. Neither the secretary nor the 
journal express any surprise over the matter. 
However I have not seen any other such statements.
437 .
authorities see their bureaucratic party secretaries as
. . 1 requiring.
(4) orientation towards party work
Perhaps the most interesting thing about
bureaucratic secretaries is the number of them who have
come from or go on to other party posts. In 1965 Brezhnev
made a point of the need to have high-level, experienced
party workers as ministerial PPO secretaries, a sign of
the party authorities' distrust of the technically
specialised personnel who had been introduced into party
2work, without prior party experience, by Khrushchev.
Since the end of the sixties particularly, it seems to have
1 Two very interesting cases here are those of
Danilov and Tret'iakov. Both were at one 
time secretaries of the party committees of 
electronic and communication type industries, 
and at other times Air Force officers. I have 
identified two articles by Danilov: "The
influence of obstacles on the lines of radio­
telecontrol" (Vestnik protivovozdushnoi oborony, 
2/66, pp. 53-58) and "The organisation of the 
choice of maximal signals (in the use of radio- 
locational techniques)" (ibid, 5/71, pp. 66-67).
I have identified one article by Tret'iakov, also 
described as an engineer as well as a first-class 
combat pilot; "The pilot and flight safety" 
(ibid, 7/66, pp. 21-25). Agursky describes the 
Ministries of the Radio and Electronic Industries 
as both parts of the soviet "military-industrial 
complex". Agursky, op. cit., p. 1.
2 Rigby and Miller, op. cit., p. 17.
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been realised that some sort of combination of the two is 
required.^
I will now list all other party posts identified 
as being held by administrative party secretaries:
i) V.E. Aleshnikov - deputy secretary in the All-Union
Ministry of Chemical Industry (1969)
- at the time of his appointment as deputy 
director he was described as a chemist with experience 
of party work.
ii) N.Ia. Varakin - secretary in the All-Union Ministry of 
Chemical Industry (1969)
- similarly described as a chemist with experience 
of party work.
iii) N.M. Verbitskii - secretary of the party committee of 
the Floreshty Collective-State Farm Production 
Administration (1963)
- secretary in the Moldavian Ministry of Food 
Industry (1967).
1 Although there is evidence that the pendulum
might have swung back too far the other way 
again. Recent complaints have been made about 
PPO secretaries on the grounds that while they 
have the technical qualifications to cope with 
their control functions, they do not have 
sufficient experience in the ideological and 
party work areas. P.zh.Kaz., 2/73, p. 11; 
P.2/2., 5/7 5, p. 59.
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iv) K.K. Ivanov - secretary in the State Committee for 
Shipbuilding (1958)
- secretary in the All-Union Ministry of 
Transport Construction (1966).
v) P.P. Kalitin - secretary of the party committee of the
Moscow Combine for Heavy Alloys (1966)
- secretary in the All-Union Ministry of Chemical 
and Oil Machine Construction (1971-72).
vi) Krasnov - secretary of the party organisation of the 
Kuibyshev oblast' Agricultural Administration (1955)
- secretary in the Kuibyshev sovnarkhoz (1958).
vii) V.N. Krylov - secretary in the All-Union Gosplan (1966)
- instructor of the Kazakh Central Committee (1974)
viii) N.N. Orlova - deputy secretary for ideological affairs 
in the All-Union Ministry of Chemical Industry (1969)
- formerly instructor dealing with ministries 
of the Bauman raikom, Moscow.
ix) V.F. Rudnev - secretary in the Ministry of General 
Machine Building (1966)
- instructor in the Agitprop Department of the 
Kazakh Central Committee (1967)
- deputy head of the department (1969)
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x) Smirnov - secretary in Kemerovo sovnarkho z (1957)
- referred to in the same source as the former 
first secretary of a city raikom.
xi) M. Soldatov"- secretary in the All-Union Ministry of 
the Production of Construction Materials (1966)
- instructor in the Agitprop Department of the 
Uzbek Central Committee (1971)
xii) A.A. Solonitsyn - first secretary of Kashira gorkom 
(1961)
- secretary in the All-Union Ministry of Energy 
and Electrification (1966)
- first secretary of Moskvoretskii raikom,
Moscow (1971).
xiii) A.I. Fateev - secretary of the party committee of 
the Likhachev Automobile Plant (1954)
- secretary of the Proletarskii raikom , Moscow 
(1959)
- inspector in the Trans-Caucasian Büro of the 
All-Union Central Committee (1963)
- chief inspector of the All-Russian Committee of 
Party-State Control (1964)
- secretary in the All-Union Ministry of Automobile
1 Taken individually the identifications of
Krylov, Rudnev and Soldatov are not certain. 
However the similarities in the three cases 
increase the probability that the identific­
ations are correct.
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Industry (1966)
- first secretary of the Dzerzhinskii raikom,
Moscow, (1969).
It can be seen that many of these cases follow the pattern
outlined above.^  In 1966 new secretaries with previous
relatively senior party experience were elected. One
should not underestimate the technical experience of these
secretaries (see Fateev). Gradually these people went
back to other full-time party positions and were replaced
by people still with party experience, but apparently at
a far lower level (see Varakin). The technical qualifications
2of these people were probably more emphasised.
In conclusion I am somewhat surprised by the 
emphasis on the technical specialisations of bureaucratic, 
primarily ministerial, party secretaries. But as long as 
this is combined, as particularly in recent years it seems 
to have been, with organisational expertise gained from 
middle and higher level managerial work in the "host" organ­
isations and the general organisational and ideological 
expertise gained from party work, there is little reason to 
doubt the ability of the secretaries to cope with their tasks.
1 See above, p. 437-438.
2 It is interesting to note that sovnarkhoz 
party secretaries also tended to have previous 
party experience. Like the post-Khrushchev 
ministerial party organisations the sovnarkhoz 
party organisations were apparently very active.
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(d) Academies of Science
In Appendix A I discuss the difficulties entailed 
in deciding the functions of the PPO's of the Academies of 
Science. I do not have enough data on the secretaries of 
these PPO's to assist in reducing these difficulties.
However I have information on seven of the twelve secretaries 
identified, which makes them quite a visible group. I will 
present all the information I have on the seven and then 
give some brief commentary on it.
i) F.S. Akhmedbeili - secretary of the party committee
of the Azerbaidzhan Academy (1970)
- has written technical articles on geology and 
in 1968 worked in the Academy's Institute of Geology.
ii) Dzh. Malabaev - secretary in the Kirgiz Academy (1964)
- a Doctor of Historical Sciences who has 
written ideological articles, on Marxist and Leninist 
history (for example, "Leninist teaching on the 
Soviets", Izvestiia AN Kirgizskoi SSSE, 2/70, pp. 19-27) 
and more general articles on the foundation of the 
Soviet state (for example, "The political foundation
of the Soviet state", Sovetskaia Kivgiziia, 14/6/73).
iii) G.S. Migirenko - secretary in the Siberian department 
of the All-Union Academy (1961)
- a professor and Doctor of Technical Sciences
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- deputy director of the Academy's Institute of 
Hydro-dynamics (1970)
- a member of the buro of the Novosibirsk gorkom 
(1971)
- chairman of the administration of the Novosibirsk 
oblast' organisation of Znanie (1973)
- he has written one technical article, one on the 
organisation of technical education and one on teaching 
practice. His concern with teaching is curious, since 
there is no evidence of him being involved in teaching 
except as part of his social obligations, through 
Znanie and Novosibirsk's people's university, where he 
lectured, in 1970, on the most recent achievements of 
science and technology. His membership of the buro of 
the Novosibirsk gorkom suggests that he is an important 
personage in Novosibirsk, more important than any 
other of his positions suggest.
iv) E.N. Mukhin - secretary of the party committee of the 
Presidium of the All-Union Academy (1974)
- a biochemist who has worked in the Academy's 
Institute of Biochemistry and Photosynthesis and has 
published numerous technical articles.
v) M.M. Radul - born in 1910 in the Ukraine of poor
peasant family
- began his working life as a shepherd and did not
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go to school until after the Revolution
- being one of the leading komsomol rtsy of 
his village he took part in the formation of the 
collective farm and the liquidation of the kulaks
- graduated from Tiraspol Pedagogical Institute 
(1933)
- did a course through the Ukrainian Central 
Committee for the preparation of teachers in the 
socio-economic disciplines and for nine years 
lectured in economic geography in Tiraspol Pedagogical 
Institute
- in 1936 he completed externally a course in 
the Geography Faculty of Odessa University and then 
became a part-time aspirant
- deputy director for academic and scientific 
work of the Tiraspol Pedagogical Institute (1938)
- director of the institute (1939)
- became a party member in 1940 and organised and 
became director of the Kishinev Pedagogical Institute 
(after Bessarabia became part of the Soviet Union)
- deputy Commissar and Commissar for Education in 
Moldavia; deputy chairman of the Moldavian Council
of People's Commissars (1942-46)
- one of the organisers and deputy chairman of 
the Moldavian section of the All-Union Academy
(1946-47)
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- secretary of the Moldavian Central Committee 
(1947)
- went back to scientific work in the Moldavian 
Academy (1949)
- organiser and director of the Academy's 
Institute of Economics (1960)
- secretary of the Academy's party committee (1963)
- head of the newly formed Department of Geography 
of the Department of Physical-Technical and Mathematical 
Sciences of the Academy (1965)
- he died in 1971
- other positions included: member of the
Kishinev gorkom, deputy of the City Soviet, deputy 
chairman and chairman of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet, 
head of the Moldavian Geographical Society, member of 
the editorial board of Kommunist Moldavii, chairman
of the editorial board of the Moldavian Encyclopaedia, 
member of the Scientific Councils of several institutes.
- he has published many books and articles, 
usually propaganda-type articles on geography, although 
there are some on the teaching of geography.
vi) K.A . Tomulets - secretary in the Moldavian Academy 
(1971-73)
- deputy head of a department of the Moldavian 
Central Committee (1970)
- a Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, but
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also described as an economist
- his articles are technically oriented, but 
often deal with the new economic reforms, and so 
could be seen in an organisational light.
vii) S.S. Chibotaru - secretary in the Moldavian Academy 
(1963)
- deputy director of the Academy's Institute of 
Language and Literature (1965)
- director of the institute (1973)
- a Doctor of Philological Sciences who has 
published many articles on literary criticism and 
history, usually with a strong ideological content.
It can be seen that Akhmedbeili and Mukhin show evidence only 
of technical expertise, and Malabaev only of ideological 
expertise. The other four show some mixture of skills, 
including organisational skills. Tomulets and Radul both 
have party backgrounds, while Migirenko has played a 
reasonably strong role in local party politics. One 
interesting and rather curious feature is that Tomulets,
Radul and Migirenko all show interest in teaching practice, 
strange considering that the Academies are not teaching 
institutions. On the whole the Academy party secretaries 
appear to be highly qualified. The data does not help in 
solving the problem of the functions of Academy party 
committees, although the apparent calibre of the secretaries
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suggests that they are not insignificant organisations.
(e) Cultural institutions
Ideological control would seem to be of 
particular importance in cultural institutions, while 
technical specialisations are of less relevance. Thus I 
have only one possible case of the secretary of a cultural 
PPO exhibiting a technical orientation. One V.K. Marinchik 
has written technical articles on optics and the technical 
aspects of photography (for example, Optika i spektvoskopiia, 
vol. 28, no. 5, 1970, pp. 955-960). It seems possible that 
this is the same Marinchik who earlier was the secretary of 
the party committee of the Leningrad film studio Lenfil'm.
However there is more evidence of ideological 
orientations. I will now list those secretaries who in 
their artistic activities and articles have shown a special 
commitment to ideological concerns:
i) T. Akhtanov of the Kazakh Union of Writers: he has
written a novel on the "new style of leadership" 
and a play about a conflict between an obkom 
first and second secretary. He has also written 
ideological articles, for example, "National 
characteristics and the vigilance of literature"
(Prostor, 12/69, pp. 101-103).
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ii) A. Balodis of the Latvian Union of Writers: he has
written a poem about Lenin and one addressed 
"To communism".
iii) I.F. Vinnichenko of the Moscow Union of Writers: he
has been writing publicist essays (ocherki) with 
a strong political content for over twenty years, 
for example, a story about a delegate to the 
Supreme Soviet (Ogonek, 10/62, pp. 6-9).
iv) G. Grozova of the Latvian museums of history and
revolution: she has written an historical
article on the first Soviet state in Latvia 
(Nauka i tekhnika, 1/69, pp. 3-5) .
v) E.F. Dzigan of the Moscow film studo Mosfil'm: he
has written an article on the ideological 
requirements of a producer in his choice of 
subjects for films (Iskusstvo kino, 5/72, 
pp. 2-39).
vi) B. Egorov of the Sverdlovsk Union of Writers: he has
written an article entitled "Thoughts arising at 
the table of incorrect form" (Literaturnaia 
Rossiia, 31/3/72, p. 17.
vii) la. Kokha of the Estonian Union of Composers: he has
written cantatas entitled "Song of Lenin" and 
"Song of the Party".
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viii) la. Niedre of the Latvian Union of Writers: he has
written a biographical trilogy about P.I. Stuchka, 
a review of a book on the Latvian Revolution, and 
articles such as "Art serves the people" (Voprosy 
literatury, 1/63, pp. 22-24).
ix) N.P. Protasenko of the Artem Musical-Drama Theatre
(Ukraine): his roles include one as a komsomol
organiser and one as a chekist,
x) N. Skrebov of the Rostov Union of Writers: he has
written poem on party work and Lenin, a wartime 
ballad "The ballad of the raikom flag" and an 
article "The party in the life of my generation".
Thus, of the 25 secretaries of cultural party organisations 
covered ten have written works or articles with a direct 
ideological content. (Most of them have also written things 
not so directly ideological.) It should be noted that 
seven of the secretaries just listed come from creative 
unions. There are only six secretaries from such unions 
identified who did not appear on the list.
The proportion of cultural secretaries showing an 
ideological orientation is quite high. The proportion of 
those whose other posts suggest organisational expertise is 
considerably lower:
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i) L. Balandin of the Novosibirsk theatre "Red Torch"
(1955)
- chief producer of Novosibirsk Radio (1965)
ii) B.A. Egorov - Sverdlovsk Union of Writers (1967)
- deputy chief editor of Krokodil (1962)
- chairman of the Commission for Satire and 
Humour of the Moscow Union of Writers (1972).
iii) V.P. Kozachenko - Ukrainian Union of Writers (1966-71)
- chairman of the Prose Section of the Union
- first secretary of the administration of 
the Union (1974) .
iv) A. Syber - Estonian Union of Composers (dates not known)
- director of the Estonian State Academic Theatre.
There are three secretaries with other party experience.
G.K. Cherkasov has been secretary of the party organisations 
of both the Moscow Conservatorium and the Moscow Operetta 
Theatre. G. Enukidze in 1969 was the secretary of Tbilisi's 
Pervomaiskii ratfeom for ideological affairs. He had 
previously been secretary of the party organisation of the 
film studio Gruziia. A. Vasil'ev, in 1962 the secretary of 
the party committee of the Moscow Union of Writers, in 1971 
was the Moscow gorkom organiser attached to the Moscow 
Union.
The data on the secretaries of cultural party
organisations confirms the conclusions made in the body of
451.
the thesis, that ideological control is considerd partic­
ularly important in these types of organisations.
(f) Conclusion
In general the evidence suggests that the 
secretaries identified are not "staff generalists". The 
majority of them appear to be technical specialists, as the 
accompanying table shows} This is not surprising in the 
case of research institutes; however it is somewhat so in 
the cases of educational and administrative institutions.
I recognise that, particularly in the case of administrative 
institutions, technical expertise is more likely to show up 
in published articles, the basis for my conclusions, than 
organisational expertise. The data on other positions held 
in fact suggest that administrative party secretaries do 
have organisational experience. However the stress on 
technical specialisations is still curious. It is probably 
to be seen more as a characteristic of the Soviet 
administrative system as a whole than specifically of PPO 
secretaries, the traditional Soviet bias towards engineering 
and similar technical skills being evident throughout the 
administrative apparatus.
The strange thing about the technical orientations 
of so many educational secretaries is that in all these 
institutions there are readily available ideological experts.
1 See next page.
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Category (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
educational 76 26 14 3 7 7*
research 59 39 4 13 17 2**
bureaucratic 62 21 2 27 28 16 * * *
Academies 7 2 1 4 4 2 * * * *
cultural 25 1 3 5 16 -
hospitals 3 2 - 1 1 -
Total 232 91 24 53 73 27
(1) numbers on whom we have information
(2) purely technical orientations
(3) purely ideological orientations
(4) some signs of organisational expertise
(5) signs of mixed orientations
(6) with sufficiently varied qualifications and experience 
to be classified as staff generalists
* Berezhnoi, Krutov, Mochalov, Parimbetov, Prokof'ev, 
Protopopov, Iagodkin 
** Repida, Iablokov
*** Amstibovitskii, Bogoliubov, Groisman, Ivanov, 
Novikov, Pavlovskii, Polis, Pomortsev, Popov, 
Krylov, Orlova, Rudnev, Smirnov, Soldatov, 
Solonitsyn, Fateev 
**** Radul, Tomulets
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In the case of specialised institutes presumably technical 
knowledge is considered indispensable for control purposes. 
Could this be an indicator of the relative importance of 
ideological and "production" control functions? In the 
case of the general educational institutions this 
explanation can hardly be valid, in that no one technical 
specialisation can cover the technical concerns of the 
whole institution. When I asked a friend of Burlin, the 
present secretary of the party committee of Moscow State 
University, why Burlin, a geologist who had not wanted the 
job because it interfered with his scientific work, got the 
job rather than an economist, historian, philosopher, etc., 
he was unable to answer except to say that perhaps the 
authorities felt it necessary to give the natural sciences 
a turn after the position had been held for some time by 
economists.
It is only in cultural institutions that ideology 
seems to have a reasonably firm hold, presumably an indication 
that in literature and the arts ideological correctness is 
still considered of greater importance than professional 
ability and quality.
The overall proportion of secretaries attributed 
with staff generalist qualities might appear small. Their 
absence in the small cultural and hospital PPO's cannot be 
considered surprising. The absence of PPO secretaries with 
ideological backgrounds in research institutions also cannot
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be considered surprising, as long as the authorities 
continue to coopt their PPO secretaries from among the 
institution's research personnel. However it is a factor 
which must be given some significance in judging the 
effectiveness of research PPO’s in ideological control.
The relative lack of secretaries with organisational 
expertise is more surprising, in that institutes presumably 
have organisationally experienced personnel available for 
the post. The lack of ideological expertise is perhaps 
unavoidable. However if the authorities were seriously 
concerned to have staff generalist PPO secretaries in 
research institutions, one might expect to see greater 
attempts to recruit more experienced organisers.
The situation with regard to ideological expertise 
in educational institutions is quite different from that in 
research institutions. There is still the same relative 
lack of such expertise among secretaries, and yet in all 
tertiary educational institutions ideologically trained 
personnel are available. Equally strange is the lack of 
organisational expertise among educational PPO secretaries. 
It is dubious whether a purely technical specialisation 
provides the general knowledge of the functions of the 
organisation needed for a staff generalist role even in 
specialised institutes, much less the universities.
Although there is evidence of the use of staff generalist 
PPO secretaries, particularly in the larger universities,
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the Soviet authorities do not appear to have taken full 
advantage of the personnel available.
It is in the bureaucratic category, especially 
among ministries, that the strongest evidence of the use 
of staff generalist secretaries lies. Although only 25.8% 
of the bureaucratic PPO secretaries on whom information has 
been found could be described as staff generalists on the 
basis of that information, given the difficulties inherent 
in the search method and gaps in the search due to problems 
of time, the percentage must be considered significant.
The use of staff generalist PPO secretaries appears to have 
been particularly evident since 1965. This development 
tends to confirm the changes in the role of bureaucratic 
PPO's described in the last chapter.
On the whole the biographical data presented in 
this section are disappointing and fail to support even the 
limited evidence of PPO staff generalism gained from 
empirical data in earlier chapters. This is particularly 
so in research institutions. The data in this chapter 
must contribute to doubts about the ability of PPO's to 
play a staff generalist role. They do confirm one point 
made in earlier chapters, that the ability of PPO's to 
exercise ideological control is doubtful.
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The motivations of primary party organisation secretaries
Qualifications are not the only matter of concern 
in an examination of the functioning of PPO secretaries. 
There is the second question, beyond the ability of 
secretaries, concerned with their willingness to fulfil 
their functions. This is a matter of their motivations 
for working in the position. If a person is primarily 
oriented towards technical research, why would he want to 
become a PPO secretary? The answer to this question 
should help us to decide more definitely what effect a 
technical orientation has on the treatment of ideological 
matters and the nature of party-administration relations.
We must begin by asking ourselves whether people 
want to be PPO secretaries. Firstly, there are scraps 
of evidence appearing in Soviet sources that suggest that 
at least not all PPO secretaries are entirely happy with 
their positions. Partiinaia zhizn’ reports in 1971 the 
difficulties in one factory with shop organisation 
secretaries. They were all part-time party workers and 
many of them had not wanted to be involved in party work.'*' 
Although shop organisation secretaries are of considerably 
inferior status to PPO secretaries, the shop organisations 
in this case did have primary organisation rights and so 
the secretaryship was a reasonably important position. I
1 P. zh. , 9/71, p. 55.
457 .
feel that the experience could be applied to primary 
organisations.
In 1956 the same journal reported the case of the 
secretary of a shop organisation who applied to the party 
committee to be freed from his post. The party committee 
and the raikom granted the request without referring the 
matter to the members of the shop organisation, for which 
they were criticised by the gorkon, which reversed the 
decision.^
In 1964 Partiinaia zhizn' Kazakhstana reported a 
reverse case. The deputy secretary of a hospital PPO was 
expelled from the party by the organisation, a decision that 
was upheld by the raikom buro, for refusing to accept the 
position of secretary. However a commission from the obkom 
looked into the matter and found that the deputy secretary 
had a sick wife and daughter living some distance from his 
place of work and that therefore he would be unable to do 
the job properly. The commission recommended that the obkom 
buro reverse the decision, the recommendation being accepted.
In 1955 Partiinaia zhizn’ reported the case of 
an individual who was recommended by the obkom to fill a 
position as Machine Tractor Station party organisation
1
2
P.zh., 5/56, pp. 79-80. 
P.zh.Kaz., 3/64, p. 41.
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secretary. However he did not want to work in agriculture,
and so behaved in such a way as to necessitate his removal
from the post, for which he was given a strong reprimand
to be recorded on his party card.^ In 1964 Partiinaia
zhizn ' received a letter from the secretary of the PPO of
the Cheliabinsk oblast’ office of Gosbank in which he
rather hopefully suggested that the party members had made
a mistake in re-electing him since he was unable to control
the behaviour of his son. The journal supported the
re-election since the secretary was doing all he could
about his son. It also mentioned that he should not try to
2avoid his social obligations.
In 1971 an article appeared in Ogon&k about the 
Institute of Atomic Energy. The article spoke of one 
communist who had been away on field work collecting material 
for his doctoral dissertation. When he returned to the 
institute he needed leave in order to write up the dissertation. 
However it was decided that it was important that he stay 
in party work and he was elected to the position of party 
committee secretary. The article declares that it appeared 
that the interests of society and the individual were in 
conflict, but that this is sometimes unavoidable. In a 
socialist society it is essential that society's interests 
have priority. In this case the communist accepted his
1
2
P.3/2., 6/55, p. 77. 
P.3/2., 12/64, pp. 44-45 .
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social responsibilities and the position.
Partiinaia zhizn ' declared in 1970 that communists 
can be made candidates for party positions without their 
consent, the suggestion clearly being that it is not
2unknown for at least willing consent to be withheld.
Kommunist Estonii included as one of the factors 
leading to a 31% turnover rate among the republic's 
PPO secretaries in 1971, without any sign of disapproval, 
lack of time due to the demands of the individual's
3basic job or study.
Finally, personal conversations in the Soviet 
Union with a former party secretary and rank-and-file party 
members confirm that the position is often not regarded 
with favour. I spoke with the former secretary of the 
party organisation of a natural science faculty of Moscow 
State University who claimed that the job was a burdensome 
one, in that it forced one to neglect one's research for 
some number of years and that if often entailed disputes 
with faculty members that are embarrassing for all involved. 
He incidentally claimed that the present secretary of the 
university's party committee, also a natural scientist, had
1 Ogonek, 1/71, p. 15.
2 P.zh., 20/70, p. 23.
3 Kom.Estonii, 1/72, p. 70.
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not wanted the position.
A department head and rank-and-file party member 
in a medical institute told me that most people, especially 
good scientists, were unwilling to act as party secretaries 
because it meant giving up their scientific research for 
some time and could, therefore, have a serious effect on 
their careers.
This seems to be confirmed to some extent by 
the data I have on articles published by party secretaries. 
V .V. Men'shikov, identified as the secretary of the party 
committee of the First Moscow Medical Institute in 1968, 
published technical articles prolifically each year from 
1963 up to 1967 (1963 - six articles; 1964 - nine;
1965 - eight, 1966 - three; 1967 - six). However in 1968 
he published only one, another one in 1969 and two in 1970. 
This could be taken as indicating that he was secretary for 
three years, a normal term. In 1971 it was back to six and 
in 1972, four. D.B. Dunaevskii, described as secretary of 
the party committee of the All-Union Research Institute of 
Leguminous Plants in 1970, had articles published in 1965,
1966 and 1967, none in 1968, one in 1969, and none in 1970. 
Again one could presume that his term began in 1968.
B.A. Zhubanov was identified as being deputy secretary of 
the party buro of the Institute of Chemical Sciences of the 
Kazakh Academy of Sciences in 1963. He published articles 
in 1962 and 1963, but none in 1964 or 1965. From 1966 he
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became a very prolific publisher of articles. V.A. Sergeev 
was spoken of as the secretary of the party buro of the 
Institute of Elementary Organic Formations of the All-Union 
Academy in 1972. His previously regular articles stopped 
appearing in 1969. P.I. Iushkov has never been a prolific 
publisher of articles. However they have appeared under 
his name quite regularly except for the years 1967 to 1969.
He was reported to be secretary of the party organisation 
of the Institute of the Ecology of Plants and Animals in 
1968.
Admittedly there are cases where periods as 
party secretary have not led to a slackening of published 
articles. B.P. Parimbetov of the Kazakh branch of the 
All-Union Academy of Construction and Architecture continued 
publishing while secretary, as did A.A. Borisov of the 
All-Union Academy's Institute of Chemical Physics,
Iu.M. Polukarov of the Academy's Institute of Physical 
Chemistry, and F.I. Furdui of the Moldavian Academy's 
Institute of Zoology.
However, despite these exceptions there seems to 
be good evidence to support the views expressed in the 
conversations reported above. It could be said that the 
conversations and data apply only to educational and research 
institutions, where the publication of articles and a 
scientific career are of great importance and not easily
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reconcilable with party work. Can the same be said of
administrative institutions? We have already seen evidence
that, within the limits of the method used, suggested that
a large number of technical specialists have held positions
as administrative party secretaries. Although I have not
collected data on the point, it seems probable that there
is a fair degree of mobility between administrative and
research institutions.^  It therefore seems possible that
a term as an administrative party secretary could be seen
2as an unwelcome interruption to scientific work. However 
further examination of the motivations of administrative 
party secretaries would have to be made before this could 
be confirmed.
I have had one conversation with a former secretary 
of a ministerial party organisation. He expressed no 
dissatisfaction with the position, apparently considering
1 I have found sixteen such cases among the 
party secretaries in my file.
2 I have only one case where a term as an 
administrative party secretary has produced 
a reduction in published articles. N.M. 
Verbitskii has never published many articles, 
but his articles on agricultural science
have appeared in 1965, 1966, 1967, 1970 and 1971. 
In 1967 he was identified as secretary of the 
party committee of the Moldavian Ministry of 
Food Industry. Incidentally, in 1963 he was 
described as secretary of the party committee 
of the Floreshty collective-state farm 
production administration. No articles 
appeared before 1965.
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it as part of his career.^ I have also spoken with the
head of a quite small, but Union Republic level
bureaucratic organisation who told me that his party
secretary had not welcomed the position simply because it
took up so much of his time and made it very difficult
2to fulfil his non-party administrative duties.
This problem raises the question of the number 
of full-time party secretaries in non-production 
organisations. There is not a great deal of data on the 
question. However it can be said that in general the 
authorities prefer to keep the numbers of full-time 
secretaries as low as possible, but that their attitudes 
also change over time. Up until very recently it appears 
that the number was very low indeed. In 1957 196 of the 
215 PPO's in Noginsk vaion (Moscow oblast') were part-time, 
and in the same year Partiinaia zhizn ' reported that the
1 This career had included party work at the 
obkom secretary level, but was now 
concluding with a university teaching 
position.
2 He also told me that his wife, the full­
time editor of the student newspaper of a 
very large tertiary educational institution, 
was a member of the institution's party 
committee and spent three hours daily on 
party work! However a Soviet survey of party 
workers in the city of Mytishchinsk found that 
part-time PPO secretaries spent an average of 
1.44 hours daily on party work, and party buro 
members, 1.03 hours. Voprosy istovii KPSS, 1/74,
p. 106.
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number of full-time secretaries was being reduced. In
1964 it was reported that only 8% of the PPO secretaries
in Moscow were full-time, while in 1966 only 9% of the
2secretaries in Latvia were full-time. Both the reports
giving these figures expressed satisfaction that the
figures were so low and criticised those wanting more
full-time secretaries for their "distrust of the strength
of the collective". However since then the numbers of
full-time secretaries have risen. In 1968 Partiinaia zhizn'
declared that a PPO does not usually have a full-time
3secretary unless it has more than 150 members. This 
should produce a higher percentage than those just given. 
Kommunist Estonii reported in 1973 that all the farms of 
the republic had full-time party secretaries, while in 
1975 40% of the Soviet Union's farms had full-time
4secretaries. In recent years the faculty party organisations 
of Moscow State University have gained full-time party 
secretaries, although they still teach half the normal 
hours in order to keep them in touch with their disciplines.
It would appear probable therefore that in recent 
years the larger non-production PPO's have gained full-time
1 P.zh., 9/57, p. 57; 11/57, pp. 39-41.
2 Bugaev, op. cit., pp. 177-178; Kom.Sov.Latvii, 
3/66, p. 57.
3 P.zh., 8/68, p. 43.
4 Kom.Estonii, 9/73, pp. 50-51; P.zh., 4/75, p. 14.
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secretaries. Whether this is a long-term development 
remains to be seen, but is discussed in more detail in 
a broader context in the Conclusion to the thesis.
However there are still sufficient party organisations 
in the non-production sphere too small to have full-time 
secretaries that the problem of too little time to do two 
jobs is still a significant one.
The practice in Moscow State University of full­
time party secretaries maintaining some teaching indicates 
that the authorities are aware of the problems the position 
causes to career scientists and teachers. I have also been 
told by a Soviet official that after scientists have 
finished their terms as party secretaries they are often 
given time off by the administration of their institutions 
to finish their dissertations or to catch up on recent 
developments in their fields.
But this is enough in itself to indicate how 
dependent the career scientist-secretary is on his 
institution's administration. A secretary who had 
antagonised the head of the institution during his term 
in office could find it difficult to get this period of 
leave. The secretaryship is a position which can require 
taking stands against what might be popular demands within 
the "host" organisation, and often against the institutional 
leader, who is, after all, the secretary's institutional
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and professional superior. This was the complaint of 
the faculty party organisation secretary in Moscow State 
University to whom I spoke. The medical institute 
department head said that the combination of the absence 
from his research for a number of years and the professional 
enemies the secretary inevitably makes during his term 
means that if he was not a party "hack" before the term 
as secretary, he had little choice but to become one when 
it had finished.
Another reason that being secretary of a PPO might 
be considered undesirable is the degree of ambiguity 
apparently deliberately built into the position. It is 
not a position where one can every be sure of where one 
stands. One suspects that it is a job which could well 
be used for the provision of a scapegoat. Most of the 
people I have spoken to have said that the job is a 
difficult, demanding one, regardless of the effects it might 
have on the secretaries' careers.
If these are the possible reasons for not wanting 
the position, why is it that individuals accept it?
The most obvious reason is that the higher 
authorities give one no choice. Despite some of the 
references given above, where people have apparently 
successfully avoided the post, most of them suggest that 
the post is obligatory once the selection has been made.
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Partiinaia zhizn’'s statement that consent is not required 
for candidature, as well as suggesting that secretaries do 
not always welcome their selection, also suggests that they 
really have no choice in the matter.'1' The party member 
from the medical institute mentioned above told me that once 
one had been chosen for the post, the selection being made 
incidentally by the raikom, one had no choice but to accept.
Another possible reason is a simple sense of duty.
We could take at face value the report already cited from 
2
Ogonek. The article claims that although it was very 
inconvenient for the individual he recognised his social 
responsibilities and accepted the post. When I asked the 
former faculty party secretary from Moscow University why 
he took the position when he had not wanted it, he told 
me, I believe quite sincerely, that it was one's social 
and party responsibility to accept such positions.
Finally we must ask ourselves whether a term as 
party secretary might be useful for one's career, whether it 
be a party one or not, despite the data given above on 
interruptions to scientific and academic work. There are 
two ways one can see that work as party secretary could 
contribute to one's career. Firstly, particularly if one
1 See above, P* 459 .
2 See above. PP . 458-459
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were interested in a managerial or party career, the post 
could be an excellent way of gaining experience and 
demonstrating one's abilities in these areas. Secondly, 
it seems likely that the Soviet Union is at least as likely 
as anywhere else to experience the phenomenon of people 
gaining promotions not because of their abilities, but 
through their willingness to ingratiate themselves with 
their superiors. Again it is unfortunate that I am in no 
position to judge the quality of the scientific work done by 
the secretaries I have identified. However the party 
member from the medical institute referred to above complained 
bitterly about people who, although they were poor 
scientists, were given promotions simply because of their 
willingness to accept party and other "social" positions. 
There is other evidence that the party secretaries in 
institutes are not always top-rank scientists. In 1955 
Partiinaia zhizn' referred to the secretary of the party 
organisation of the Omsk Agricultural Institute who had 
finally received his candidate's degree after working on 
his dissertation for twenty years and then decided that 
his involvement with scientific work was over.^
Vucinich declares, unfortunately without any references or 
statistical evidence, that the leading positions in the 
party organisations of the Academies of Science tend to be
1 P.zh., 17/55, p. 64.
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occupied by scientists who have only distinguished them­
selves by their willingness to support the party at all 
times.^ Agursky implies that the promotions given 
retiring PPO secretaries in the Experimental Research 
Institute of Metal-cutting Lathes were not the result of 
scientific ability. He cites one particular case of a 
secretary who after completing his term became deputy 
director of the institute "for the development of the 
branch", a post with no clear functions. However he adds 
the qualification that he worked in the institute at the
time of Khrushchev's rule on the turnover, of PPO secretaries
2and is apparently reluctant to generalise.
The disadvantage of such secretaries is that they 
have so little authority among their colleagues that it is 
impossible for them to properly fulfil their functions.
It should also be remembered that to be party secretary 
is no easy task and requires considerable organisational and 
diplomatic skills. There appear to be strong disincentives 
against selecting party "hacks" as PPO secretaries.
Consideration will now be given to career data 
collected on PPO secretaries, to see what evidence there is
1 Vucinich, A: The Soviet Academy of Sciences,
Hoover Institute Studies, Series E: Institutions,
No. 3, Stanford U.P., Stanford, California, 1956, 
p . 38 .
2 Agursky, op. cit., p. 51.
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on where a term as party secretary fits into a career and 
to what degree and in what way it is useful for that 
career. (Note that the years given refer only to the 
identifications I have made and almost certainly do not 
cover the whole period that the particular position was 
occupied).
(a) educational party secretaries
i) V. A . Beloguzhev - aspirant in the Uzbek Institute of
Rail Transport Engineers (1963)
- senior lecturer in the Graphics Department (1964)
- secretary of the party committee (1972).
ii) A.F. Berezhnoi - secretary of the party committee of 
Leningrad State University (1954)
- head of the department at the university (1958)
- dotsent (1960)
- dean of the Faculty of Journalism (1966-70).
iii) G.I. Budylkin - aspirant at the Timiriazev Agricultural 
Academy (1965)
- secretary of the party committee (1971) .
iv) N.V. Duchenko - dotsent at Kiev State University (1969)
- deputy director for scientific work of the 
Institute for Raising the Qualifications of Social 
Science Teachers of the university (1972) (Note that 
this is not a full-time, but a "voluntary" position.)
- secretary of the party committee (1973) .
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v) I.Ia. Diuriagin - aspirant at Sverdlovsk Juridicial
Institute (1965)
- dotsent (1969)
- secretary of the party buro (1970).
vi) I.G. Ermolaev - secretary of the party committee of 
Gorky Higher Party School (1965)
- senior lecturer at Gorky Polytechnical 
Institute (1971).
vii) A.S. Ivanov - junior scientific worker ar the Research 
Institute for Agricultural Economics (1963)
- dotsent at the Timiriazev Agricultural Academy 
(1966)
- secretary of the Academy's party committee 
(1969) .
viii) R.N. II'in - dean of the Camera-operating Faculty of 
the All-Union State Institute of Cinematrography (1964)
- secretary of the party buro (1971) .
ix) N.Sh. Inoiatov - senior lecturer in the Tashkent 
Institute of Engineers of the Irrigation and 
Mechanisation of Agriculture (1963)
- secretary of the party committee (1972) .
x) K.E. Roger - secretary of the party committee of Tartu
State University (1971)
- rector of Tallin Teachers' College (1973).
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xi) I. A. Konstantinov - secretary of the komsomol committee 
of the Moscow Conservatorium (1960)
- secretary of the party committee (1968-72)
- dotsent and head of the Department of 
Marxism-Leninism (1972).
xii) V.I. Krutov - secretary of the party committee of 
the Moscow Technical College (1956)
- dotsent (I960)
- chairman of the Scientific-Technical Council of 
the Ministry of Higher Education (1968) (probably a 
part-time position).
xiii) Li Chan Van - secretary of the party organisation of 
the Tselinograd Agricultural Institute (1961)
- senior lecturer (1965).
xiv) L.D. Lipkin - secretary of the party commitee of the 
Leningrad Finance-Economics Institute (1939)
- head of the Department of Trade Finance of the 
Moscow City Financial Administration (1970).
xv) B.M. Mochalov - secretary of the party committee of 
Moscow State University (1966)
- rector of the Plekhanov Economics Institute 
(1972) .
xvi) R. Mürel' - secretary of the party buro of the Tallin 
Teachers' College (1969-72)
- dean of the institute (1973).
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xvii) T.T. Mustafin - secretary of the party buro 
of the Karaganda Medical Institute (1964)
- head of the Department of Party History and 
Scientific Communism (1965)
- dotsent (1971) .
xviii) B.P. Parimbetov - secretary of the party organisation 
of the Kazakh branch of the All-Union Academy of 
Construction and Architecture (1961)
- minister of the Kazakh Ministry of the Production 
of Construction Materials (1965).
xix) M .A . Prokof'ev - chemist-press operator in the 
Derbenov Chemical Factory
- student, aspirant and deputy director of the 
Research Institute of Chemistry in Moscow State 
University (all 1928-41)
- senior scientific worker and deputy director of 
the Institute of Chemistry of Moscow University (1946)
- secretary of the party committee of Moscow 
University (1948)
- head of the Chief Administration for Universities 
and deputy minister of the All-Union Ministry of 
Higher Education (1951)
- first deputy minister in the ministry (1959)
- minister of the RSFSR Ministry of Education (1966)
- minister of the All-Union Ministry of Education
(at present).
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xx) B.A. Protopopov - aspirant in the Department of 
Accounting and Analysis of the Economic Activity of 
Industrial Enterprises of the Economics Faculty of 
Moscow State University (1967)
- deputy secretary of the party committee (1971)
- secretary of the party committee (1975)
- first secretary of Leninskii raikom, Moscow 
(1975).
xxi) la. Reimand - deputy secretary of the party committee 
of Tartu State University (1971)
- secretary of the party committee (1973)
- acting dotsent in the Department of the 
Methodology of the Teaching of Mathematics (1973).
xxii) S.A . Roshka - secretary of the party committee of 
Kishinev State University (1973)
- dotsent (1973).
xxiii) V.E. Sokolov - deputy secretary of the party committee 
of Moscow State University (1969)
- director of the Institute of Evolutionary 
Morphology and Ecology of Animals of the All-Union 
Academy of Sciences (1973).
xxiv) P.M. Studennikov - secretary of the party committee 
of the Kuibyshev Agricultural Institute (1964)
- first secretary of the Bol'she-Chernigov 
raikom, Kuibyshev (1966) .
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xxv) L.M. Tereshchenko - secretary of the party committee 
of the Moscow Technical College (1969-74)
- senior lecturer (1970).
xxvi) K.M. Tiutina - secretary of the party organisation 
of the Moscow Chemical-Technical Institute (1966-71)
- dotsent (1966).
xxvii) F.P. Uryvskii - secretary of the party committee of 
the Kuibyshev Aviation Institute (1972)
- dotsent (1972)
xxviii) A.A. Chukhno - secretary of the party committee of 
Kiev State University (1968)
- head of the Department of Political Economy of 
the Humanities Faculties (1971).
xxix) N.M. Shilintsev - secretary of the party buro of the 
History Faculty of Kishinev State University (1965)
- dotsent (1968)
- head of the Department of Modern and Contemporary 
History (1973) .
xxx) V.I. Iurchuk - head of the Department of Party History 
of the Ukrainian Agricultural Academy (1969)
- secretary of the party committee (1973)
- director of the Institute of Party History of 
the Ukrainian Central Committee (1975).
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xxxi) V.N. Iagodkin - dotsent in the Department of
Political Economy of the Economics Faculty of Moscow 
State University (1967)
- secretary of the party committee (1968-71)
- secretary for ideological affairs of Moscow 
gorkom (1971)
- deputy minister for personnel of the All-Union 
Ministry of Education (1976).
Of these thirty secretaries it could be said that ten have 
gone on to quite senior positions Roger, Mochalov, Mürel', 
Sokolov and Iurchuk have gone on to become directors, deans 
or rectors of institutes; Krutov, Parimbetov, Prokof'ev 
and Iagodkin have gained senior bureaucratic positions; 
while Protopopov, Studennikov and again Iagodkin have 
gained significant party positions. Another five secretaries 
went on to positions as heads of departments and Berezhnoi 
became dean of a faculty. Thus it could be said that at 
least 50% of secretaries were later promoted beyond rank- 
and-file status of their institutions, surely a significant 
proportion.
It is interesting that of all these secretaries 
only one (II'in) could be said to have occupied a reasonably 
senior position before he was party secretary, although 
perhaps Duchenko could be included in this category.
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A period as party secretary at Moscow State 
University appears to be particularly valuable for a career. 
Of the five past secretaries of the university I have 
identified, one became a rector, one a director, one a 
minister, one a gorkom secretary and deputy minister, and 
one a raikom first secretary.
It should be noted that although a majority of 
those secretaries who went on to senior positions were from 
the general education institutions, they had by no means a 
monopoly of promotions. Although it is difficult to 
isolate the importance of the party post in these people's 
careers the evidence is that it has not hindered those 
careers.
(b) research party secretaries
i) P. Avdeev - secretary of the party buro of the All-
Union Research Institute for Grain-Growing (1963)
- chief agronomist of the Novonikolaevsk
Agricultural Production Administration, Volgograd 
oblast' (1967).
ii) V .A . Gudkovskii - secretary of the party organisation 
of the Research Institute for Fruit and Wine Growing 
of the Kazakh Ministry of Agriculture (1970)
- head of the Department of Fruit Storage
Technology (1972).
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iii) A. Gul'binskas - dotsent and senior scientific worker 
in the Institute of Economics of the Lithuanian 
Academy of Sciences (1969)
- secretary of the party organisation (1972).
iv) V.P. Derkach - secretary of the party committee of 
the Institute of Cybernetics of the Ukrainian Academy 
(1971)
- head of a department (1971) .
v) D.B. Dunaevskii - head of the Department of Mechanisation
of the All-Union Research Institute for Leguminous 
Plants (1965)
- secretary of the party committee (1970).
vi) I.V. Eremin - head of the Technical Department of the 
institute Teploproekt (1962)
- secretary of the party buro of the Institute of 
Geology and the Use of Fuel Minerals (1971).
vii) G.T. Kodyk - secretary of the party organisation of 
the Karaganda Coal Research Institute (1969)
- head of a laboratory (1969).
viii) L.M. Liamshev - secretary of the party buro of the 
Institute of Acoustics of the All-Union Academy (1971)
- head of a department (1971) .
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ix) V.M. Mel'nikova - senior scientific worker in the 
Central Institute for Traumotology and Orthopaedics 
(1969)
- secretary of the party committee (1971).
x) Iu.M. Polukarov - secretary of the party buro of the
Institute of Physical Chemistry of the All-Union 
Academy (1967-71)
- senior scientific worker (1971) .
xi) L.E. Repida - minister of the Moldavian Ministry of 
State Control (1955-58)
- secretary of the party buro of the Institute of 
History of the Moldavian Academy (1970)
- senior scientific worker in the institute (1970).
xii) A .V. Frolov - secretary of the party committee of 
the Research and Design Institute for the Production 
of Rare Metals (1971)
- laboratory head (1971).
xiii) K.G. Chulkov - head of the Laboratory of Automation 
and Cybernetics of the All-Union Research Institute 
for the Mechanisation of Agriculture (1968)
- secretary of the institute's party committee (1972).
xiv) E.V. Shorokhova - secretary of the party committee of
the Institute of Philosophy of the All-Union Academy (1970)
- sector head (1970).
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xv) V.S. Iablokov - studied at Moscow State University 
while teaching natural sciences at Moscow Gubernia 
Party School (1921-26)
- head of the Geological Search Administration 
of the Moscow Basin (1934)
- chief engineer and deputy head of the 
Administration of Coal Exploration of the All-Union 
People's Commissariats of Heavy Industry and Coal (1937)
- did responsible work in the apparatus of the 
Presidium of the All-Union Academy of Sciences (1943)
- organised and became head of the Department 
of Coal Geology in the Institute of Geological 
Sciences
- deputy director of the Academy's Institute of 
Geology (1950-52)
- deputy chairman of the Commission on Sedimentary 
Rocks of the Department of Geological-Geographical 
Sciences of the Academy (1954)
- deputy secretary of the party buro of the Institute 
of Geology (1956)
- work in the Department of the History of 
Geological Science of the Academy (1963).
It can be seen that research institutions present a rather 
different picture to that presented by educational 
institutions. Here no secretaries have been identified as 
going on to senior positions. Both Repida and Iablokov seem
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to have been in the decline of their careers while 
secretaries. The rest seem to have been middle-level 
workers - at worst, senior scientific workers; at best, 
department heads. They might have reached these positions 
before or after their terms as secretaries. It seems that 
their terms as secretaries have had no positive influence 
on their careers.
(c) Academy party secretaries
Are the secretaries of the party organisations 
of the Academies of Science like their research colleagues? 
Unfortunately I have career information on only four 
Academy party secretaries. The information, on Radul, 
Migirenko, Tomulets and Chibotaru, is given above.^
They are a mixed lot; Radul at the end of a long and quite 
illustrious political and academic career; Tomulets 
presumably still involved in his party career; and Migirenko 
and Chibotaru going on to academic positions. I think we 
can conclude that an Academy party secretary is likely to be 
a quite important person, and quite possible one on the way 
up.
(d) administrative party secretaries
All the relevant data have been given for the 
secretaries of administrative PPO's in the section above
1 See above, pp. 442-447.
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on their organisational and party experience. Again there 
is no strong evidence of bureaucratic party secretaries 
going on to more senior positions after the completion of 
their terms. Like research party secretaries they seem to 
be usually from the middle-level of their institutions and 
their rising to this level does not seem to be necessarily 
after their term as party secretary - it is more likely to 
be before. However there is also no evidence that these 
party secretaries are at the ends of their careers. Thus 
it would seem that although administrators of some proven 
competence are required, the position has no particular 
relevance for their careers. Even when we are considering 
those ministerial party secretaries who are pursuing 
party careers, the post as party secretary does not appear 
to indicate any particular stage in their career, being 
neither a sign of promotion or demotion. One can presume 
that adequate performance in the position would be grounds 
for promotion, particularly to more senior party posts.
(e) cultural party secretaries
We have already seen the limited amount of 
information available on the career patterns of cultural 
PPO secretaries. There is little evidence that the position 
is used in furthering a party, administrative or professional 
career. Balandin went on to be a radio chief producer, 
while Syber became a theatre director. Kozachenko served a
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term as first secretary of his Union's administration. 
Enukidze became a raikom secretary for ideological affairs, 
while Vasil'ev became a gorkom party organiser. The 
others appeared satisfied to continue as professionals 
in their particular area of cultural activity.
(f) Conclusions
Thus it is only in the educuational category 
that there is any relatively strong evidence that a term as 
PPO secretary can be useful for one's career, although 
there is some supporting evidence in the case of bureau­
cratic secretaries. Research party secretaries appear to 
have no reason to welcome the position as a means to further 
their careers. Although cultural secretaries are more 
ideologically oriented than their research counterparts, they 
also seem to gain nothing from the position in terms of 
their career.^
1 As some indication that a term as PPO
secretary is by no means obligatory for a 
party career can be seen in the figures given 
by Mzhavanadze, the party first secretary in 
Georgia, in 1976 that of 260 raikom and gorkom 
secretaries in Georgia, only 122 had been PPO 
secretaries. These figures include secretaries 
of PPO's of all types of institutions and 
enterprises. Zaria Vostoka, 23/1/76.
Of the 72 first secretaries of RSFSR kraikomy 
and obkomy (and the Moscow gorkom) examined by 
T.H. Rigby, only 9 of those occupying their 
posts in 1965 had first entered party work at 
the work-place level, while in 1976 the number 
had risen to thirteen. Rigby, T.H: "The
Soviet Regional Leadership: the Brezhnev
generation", forthcoming article.
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Therefore, if career is the only positive 
reason that people might welcome appointment as a PPO 
secretary, it appears that only some people working in 
educational establishments, particularly non-natural 
scientists working in general education establishments, 
would welcome the position. People in bureaucratic 
institutions would have little reason to oppose it, while 
scientific workers would have strong reasons to be opposed.
What, therefore, are the sort of problems one 
might expect the top authorities to he having with the 
people selected as party secretaries?
Firstly, one would expect to find them in many 
cases incapable of fulfilling their functions, through 
lack of the necessary ideological and administrative 
training and experience. One must particularly question the 
ability of research party secretaries and secretaries in 
specialised educational institutions to cope with the 
ideological requirements of the position. We should 
remember the extent to which technical specialisations and 
ideology are combined in the various methodological and 
philosophical seminars that seem to be such an important 
part of ideological indoctrination and control. We have 
seen some complaints about the use made of these seminars.'*' 
The data on party secretaries in these types of institutions
1 See above, pp. 59-60.
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suggest that the successful organisation of these 
seminars would be beyond the average party secretary.
The frequent lack of ability to fulfil their 
functions is evidently often compounded by the lack of 
desire to do so. If the position is of no benefit to 
their career, could in fact be a hindrance, one would not 
expect to see them making things even more difficult for 
themselves by antagonising their professional colleagues 
and superiors. The pressure towards collusion with 
administration would appear to be strong.
With regard to staff generalist party secretaries, 
they are most common in administrative institutions. In 
the sections of the thesis on administrative PPO's I came 
to the conclusion that in recent times they have tended to 
play some sort of staff generalist role, even if not entirely 
adequately. The data on administrative party secretaries 
do not contradict this conclusion.
The party secretaries in the general educational 
institutions are also likely to have staff generalist 
qualifications. Again the categories that seem to lack 
such secretaries are the research and specialised educational 
institutions. This might seem to contradict the findings in 
the body of the thesis, where I said that the party 
organisations in these institutions, through their problem­
solving activities, do play a staff generalist role. However
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I qualified this by saying that the staff generalist role 
in such institutions is a much narrower concept since it 
can, to some extent, be concentrated within a single 
technical specialisation. It is therefore possible that 
the narrow technical specialisations of the secretaries, 
combined with the middle-level positions they usually 
hold within the "host" organisation, are enough to provide 
them with a sufficiently broad staff generalist view.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PPO'S
The last chapter examined two basic questions - 
whether PPO secretaries are able to play their role, and 
whether they are willing to play it. These are questions 
which must be asked in the wider context of non-production 
PPO's as a whole. Many of the examples given in previous 
chapters concerned cases where PPO's were criticised for 
failing to take action on particular issues. However 
general conclusions on the effectiveness of PPO's are not 
easily made.'*' Nevertheless, some areas of particular 
ineffectiveness on the part of PPO's can perhaps be 
identified.
PPO's are most commonly criticised for their 
failures in the control of the illegal personal and 
operational behaviour of individuals and shortcomings in 
ideological indoctrination and control. In both these
1 Even if we were able to come to general
conclusions on the performance of Soviet 
institutions in the categories with which 
we are concerned, it would be very difficult 
to isolate the part played by PPO's. There 
is the further problem that press reports 
are probably weighted towards PPO's failing 
to play their roles efeectively. Certainly 
it is difficult to decide whether the more 
spectacular cases reported are aberrations 
or typical Soviet occurrences. The principle 
of criticism and self-criticism further 
ensures that all reports contain their 
measure of critical comment.
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areas reports critical of PPO's are sufficiently common 
to suggest that the problems go beyond individual 
aberrations, but are to some degree endemic in the system.
Often the existence of undesirable behaviour in
institutions is officially explained by the failure of PPO
indoctrination activities. For example, when a communist
in the Latvian Ministry of Forestry was found to have
used his administrative position to gain access to state
funds for the building of a personal dacha, Kommunist
Sovetskoi Latvii considered this to be a sign of the weak
involvement of the PPO in the indoctrination of party
members.'*' After the director of the All-Union Research
Institute for Medicinal Plants had been dealt with by the
Committee for Party Control for serious violations of
party and state discipline, the party secretary undertook
2to improve indoctrination work in the institute.
Complaints of poor indoctrination work appear to be most
3common in the research category. It is perhaps no 
coincidence that it is in this category that the authori­
ties appear to have the greatest difficulty with lax PPO 
ideological control. Ideological control is one of the
1 Kom. Sov.Latvii, 10/60, p. 4.
2 P.zh., 19/69, p. 46.
P.zh.Kaz., 12/60, p. 51; Kom., 3/65, p. 24; 
P.zh., 17/67, p. 6; Kom.Moldavii, 9/67,
p. 5.
3
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most important features of the Soviet system - failures
in this control are of the greatest concern to the Soviet
authorities. Many cases are reported of such failures
among educational and cultural PPO's, the categories of
the greatest inherent ideological sensitivity.^ However
many more cases concern research PPO's. We have seen the
examples in the chapter on ideology of the group of
scientists in a research laboratory who in 1957 allegedly
attacked party policies in a party meeting without the
PPO taking any action, of the Latvian Institute of
Economics in 1960, the Institute of Plant Breeding in
21937 and the Institute of Economics in 1955. PPO failures 
in such cases are of great significance for the legitimisa- 
tion of the regime and control of the population.
There are also complaints of the failure of
3PPO's to take action on specific operational problems.
1 For example, in 1955 the party buro of the 
Leningrad film studio Lenfil’m was criticised 
for allowing praise of a "vicious, degraded" 
film in a party meeting, while in 1963 the 
secretary of the PPO of the Kazakh Union of 
Writers was dismissed for allowing the appearance 
of nationalist tendencies in the works of some 
writers. P.zh., 1/55, p. 23; P.zh.Kaz., 3/63, 
p. 15. In 1955 Kommunist complained of the low 
level of party discipline which had allowed
some philosophers to praise the "bourgeois 
theory of sincerity" {iskrennost ') in a party 
meeting of the Philosophy Faculty of Moscow 
State University. Korn., 6/55, p. 61.
2 See above, pp. 63-69.
3 See, for example, P.zh.Kaz., 1/63, p. 40.
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However the majority of complaints in the operational 
area are directed against the style of PPO involvement, 
rather than the lack of involvement, and can usually be 
interpreted in terms of the failure of the PPO's to act 
in a staff generalist way. There are great numbers of 
complaints about PPO podmena, not so much in the narrow 
sense of taking formal decisions which it is not in their 
formal authority to take, but of involving themselves in 
the minor details of everyday operations.'*' It is of 
course essential to the staff generalist concept that staff 
agencies not be involved in petty operational decision­
making. Even in cases where some degree of involvement 
is recognised as unavoidable by the authorities, PPO's 
are often criticised for not drawing the right conclusions 
from the action they have taken, for not seeing the need 
for further, deeper remedial action. For example, at the 
1976 election-report meeting of the Uzbek Ministry of 
Power and Electricity the secretary of the party buro 
criticised the party control commission in the following 
terms:
They only note shortcomings, but do not 
uncover the reasons for them and do not 
place before the party buro the big, well- 
entrenched problems. Thus the commission
1 P.zh., 8/65, pp. 42-43; Kom., 4/67, p. 66; 
Kom. (Vilnius), 5/70, p. 50; Sovetskaia 
kul’tura, 23/11/73.
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for the control of the fulfilment of the 
directives of the party and state often 
limits itself to a perfunctory statement 
of facts without attempting to suggest 
any effective decisions.^"
In 1971 Shelest, at the time the First Secretary of the
Ukrainian Communist Party, criticised the party committee
of the Ukrainian Union of Writers for failing to do anything
about preventing the recurrence of shortcomings, ideological
and artistic, in individual works, although it was able to
2deal with them as they occurred. This is criticism of 
the failures of the PPO's to play their roles in the staff 
generalist style.
In summary the main areas of shortcomings in the 
activities of PPO's are in the prevention of the illegal 
behaviour of institutional leaders, in ideological indoc­
trination and control, and in the style of their involve­
ment in operational "production" concerns. It is now 
necessary to examine the reasons for these shortcomings.
As indicated in the last chapter there are two 
basic possibilities - that PPO's are unable to fulfil
1 Pravda, 4/11/76, p. 2. We have already seen the 
comments of Kommunist about the work of the
PPO of the Ministry of Construction Materials. 
See pp. 330-331.
2 Kom. Ukrainy, 6/71, p. 18.
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their functions in these areas, or that they are unwilling 
to do so. The latter is essentially a matter of PPO 
collusion with the "host" organisation; there are two 
possible reasons for the former - that the PPO leaders and 
members do not know what they should do or how to do it, 
or that they do not have sufficient power to do it.
(1) The uncertainty of PPO secretaries about their roles
In the last chapter we saw that the majority 
of PPO secretaries are part-time party workers, often with 
no particular background in party work. When we consider 
the variable expectations made of them, the onerous nature 
of their tasks and the consequences of error, it is not 
surprising that many of them exhibit a considerable degree 
of uncertainty about the tasks and the means of fulfilment. 
Sometimes the uncertainty is openly expressed, as in the 
case of the chairman of the party control commission for 
academic and indoctrination work (almost certainly a 
deputy party secretary) in an Estonian secondary school 
who told the election-report meeting of the PPO that the 
commission had not done anything because nobody had told 
him what it was supposed to do.^ In 1963 at a party 
meeting of the Donetskuglenosstroi Construction Administration 
a communist made the suggestion that the party buro be
1 Kom.Estonii, 1/73, p. 32.
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directed to recommend to the relevant people that there 
be changes in the organisation of the supply of fuel in 
the Ukraine. The PPO secretary opposed the suggestion 
because the vaikom had not asked for any suggestions and 
therefore it was not clear what it was that they were 
supposed to concern themselves with.^ Much uncertainty 
has been exhibited over the right of control. One 
suspects that often it is in fact no more than a cover for 
the secretaries' unwillingness to do their job. However, 
given the ambiguity over the right of control in authorita­
tive sources, one is willing to believe that much of the 
confusion is genuine. For example, in 1972 a member of the 
party buro of a polyclinic in Vitebsk wrote to Kommunist 
Belovussii asking if the right of control gave the secretary 
of the party buro the right to sign sick-leave certificates.
Not surprisingly the reply was that he may not, unless it
2is part of his non-party administrative duties. It is 
extraordinary that any party member should feel the need 
to ask such a question and surely indicates considerable 
uncertainty about the powers of PPO's.
It also causes one to wonder about the effective­
ness of the various seminars and conferences run by higher
1 P.zh., 1/63, pp. 60-61. For complaints about
PPO's that only take action on matters that have 
been indicated to them from above, see P.zh,, 15/56 
p. 15; 11/58, p. 23.
2 Korn.Belovussii, 1/72, p. 59.
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party authorities for PPO workers and the work of higher 
level instructors in PPO's. The seminars are designed to 
provide both basic training in the requirements of party 
work and communication of specific changes in policies 
and new campaigns. Their general training role can be 
seen in the case of the Riazan obkom which in 1958 called 
a conference of administrative PPO secretaries, at which 
the head of the Riazan gorkom's Organisational Department 
spoke of the proper style of PPO involvement in control 
activities.^ Similarly, when the Lvov obkom found that 
many secretaries of ispolkom party organisations did not 
have clear ideas of their functions, it organised seminars 
for them.^
In the chapter on ministerial PPO's I have shown
how the seminars are used as a means of communication of
new policies. There are other examples in other categories
of PPO. The Zubovo-Polianskii raikom in Mordovia runs
combined seminars for PPO secretaries on general and
theoretical matters, but on more specific matters divides
them into four groups - agricultural, industrial,
3educational and administrative. In 1971 the Moscow gorkom 
ran a conference for school party secretaries. One of the
1 P.zh., 15/58, p. 17.
2 Kom. Ukrainy, 7/70, p. 51.
3 P.zh., 1/74, p. 47.
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gorkom's secretaries addressed the conference on the main
educational task of the moment - universal secondary
education.'*' The permanent seminars organised by the Kharkov
obkom for rectors, prorectors, department heads and party
secretaries of tertiary educational institutions look at
the most important questions of current policy on
2scientific work in educational institutions.
The various instructors of higher party organs 
are expected to provide on-the-spot advice to party
1 Mosk.pravda, 9/1/71, p. 3.
2 Kom. Ukrainy, 3/71, p. 92. The most detailed 
report on seminars for PPO secretaries was 
published in Kommunist Estonii in 1971, 
describing a seminar run by the Kingiseppe 
raikom. The first secretary of the raikom gave 
a report on the conclusions reached by the 27th 
raion party conference and spoke of the tasks 
ahead. The second secretary then analysed the 
work of political lecturers (politinformatory) 
and examined the results of an exchange of 
opinions the local newspaper had conducted on 
the matter. Next a lecturer from Tallin State 
University spoke on relations between the members 
of his working collective. In the second half
of the seminar there was a discussion of PPO 
work plans, during which the party secretaries 
of a production association workshop and 
collective and state farms spoke. The PPO 
secretaries were then divided into two groups - 
farm secretaries had a session with the head of 
the raion Agricultural Administration on the 
fulfilment of tasks set by the previous Five 
Year Plan, while enterprise and institution 
secretaries looked at the problems involved in 
establishing a cost-cutting policy in 
collectives. Kom.Estonii, 4/71, p. 30.
496.
secretaries uncertain about their responsibilities.^
However most reports on the involvement of raikom and
gorkom instructors in the work of PPO's concentrate on
their supervision of PPO meetings, whether they be election-
report meetings or ordinary meetings. At election-report
meetings their involvement is designed above all to ensure
the election of the higher organ's candidate for secretary,
2whether the party members are in favour or not. In 1966 
the Novopromyshlennyi raikom was subject to the very common 
criticism that it shows interest in the PPO of the Kalinin 
oblast1 Symphony Orchestra only at the yearly election-
3report meetings. Complaints from PPO secretaries that 
they are being ignored by raikomy and gorkomy are very 
widespread. Sometimes the complaints specify that the 
higher party organs fail to advise the PPO secretary about
1 Partiinaia zhizn ’ stresses the importance of
raikom and gorkom training of PPO secretaries 
on the spot, not just in formal seminars.
P. zh., 15/54, p. 25.
2 P. zh., 15/55, pp. 61-62; 20/56, pp. 61-63;
13/61, p. 7; 21/63, p. 49; 19/64, p. 53;
16/65, pp. 43-44.
3 P.zh., 8/66, pp. 64-65.
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his duties.^- Although the Soviet authorities and PPO's 
appear to be relatively satisfied with the seminars run 
by higher party organs for PPO secretaries, the complaints 
about on-the-spot instruction are so common that one must
2conclude that it is a considerable and continuing problem.
The uncertainty of PPO's about their roles, for 
which raikomy and gorkomy must take most of the blame, is 
of particular relevance in explaining the failures of PPO's 
to work in a staff generalist style. The degree of 
involvement in operational concerns that the staff generalist
1 In 1955 the secretary of the party organisation 
of the Saratov oblast' Savings Bank 
Administration complained to Partiinaia zhizn ' 
that the raikom insisted that he organise 
socialist competitions, but would not give him 
any details on how to go about it. P.zh., 2/55, 
p. 69. When the secretary of the PPO of a 
Kazakh raion hospital was first appointed to the 
position she described herself as completely 
lost. She complained that she was given no 
help by the raikom, despite three visits to see 
one. of the raikom secretaries. P.zh.Kaz., 2/63, 
p. 45. The neglected PPO's tend to be concen­
trated in non-production institutions, particularly 
smaller administrative and service agencies, since 
these do not figure so largely in local production 
plans, on which basis the success or failure of 
the local party organ is decided. A 1974 Pravda 
editorial discussed the special problems small 
administrative PPO's face as a result of raikom 
and gorkom neglect. Pravda, 13/5/74, p. 1.
2 In 1973 Partiinaia zhizn' Kazakhstana made an 
interesting comment on this matter. The 
journal claimed that PPO secretaries were now 
technically qualified enough not to need advice 
from raikom or gorkom instructors on "production" 
matters. However they did need advice on party 
work. The report did not mention ideology. 
P.zh.Kaz., 2/73, p. 11.
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style demands, particularly in its Soviet application, 
varies considerably. Not only are there periodic changes 
in general policy on the degree of involvement required, 
but decisions need to be made in particular cases.
Raikomy and gorkomy are not expected to involve themselves 
in all such decisions - one of the advantages of the PPO 
system is that it provides an opportunity for decentralisation.^ 
However the number of complaints about PPO podmena, and 
the need to implement periodic campaigns against it, 
suggest that raikomy and gorkomy often fail to establish 
even a general understanding of the proper requirements in 
the minds of PPO secretaries.
The feeling of uncertainty experienced by PPO 
secretaries could well be a factor in some of their 
failures to control the illegal behaviour of institutional 
leaders. It is recognised by the Soviet authorities that 
in some cases illegal administrative procedures must be 
tolerated, since legal procedures have shown themselves 
to be inadequate. It is part of the PPO secretary's role 
to decide when an action of dubious legality is justified 
by circumstances. There are some cases where it seems 
possible that the PPO secretary was criticised for failing
Burns and Stalker write that the feelings of 
role ambiguity experienced by people working in 
an "organic" system, while perhaps being un­
comfortable for the individuals concerned, are 
not necessarily dysfunctional for the system. 
Burns and Stalker, op. cit., pp. 134-135.
1
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to take action over a matter that at other times might not
have been considered as requiring any action. For example,
the PPO's of the RSFSR Ministry of Consumer Services and
the ministry's Central Design-Construction and Technical
Bureau were criticised in 1974 by the Committee for Party
Control for failing to take action against the director of
the bureau and the ministerial glavk supervising it after
the bureau had neglected research and development work in
the improvement of consumer appliances and equipment in
order to concentrate on filling orders for outside
organisations.-^- Since the orders from outside organisations
were a better source of income for the bureau, it was
quite possibly ministerial policy to encourage such orders.
Probably this was a case where the PPO secretaries, subject
to conflicting demands, made the wrong choice. Similarly,
in 1976 the Committee for Party Control criticised the
secretary of the party committee of the Kharkov Aviation
Institute for taking no action when the rector employed
twenty more technical and administrative workers than the
2establishment allowed. This is a situation which in some 
circumstances could go unnoticed or be permitted.
Thus uncertainty about the tasks, powers and 
proper style of operations is a significant factor in the
1
2
P.zh., 16/74, p. 53. 
P.zh., 12/76, p. 41.
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failure of PPO's in the control of behaviour and the control 
of "production" concerns.'*' However this is not 
necessarily a matter of concern to the Soviet authorities, 
since a degree of ambiguity is probably deliberately built 
into the PPO system in order to gain the benefits of its 
de facto decentralisation. In such a situation the 
selective supervision given PPO's by higher party organs, 
particularly raikomy and gorkomy, becomes critical. They 
are apparently increasing their supervision and instruc­
tion through formal seminars and conferences. However such 
formal supervision is not the main requirement - what is 
needed is constant monitoring of the activities of PPO's 
in order to set things right when decentralisation is 
producing undesirable results. It is in this area that 
there is considerable evidence of raikom and gorkom neglect 
particularly among smaller PPO's. However this is not a 
problem inherent to the PPO system, nor is it the main 
reason for PPO failures.
1 Uncertainty appears to be less adequate as
an explanation for the failure of PPO's to 
exercise strict ideological control, the 
other area of PPO failure. Although some 
scientist PPO secretaries might be confused 
by some applications of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology to the natural sciences, the 
evidence suggests that their failures in 
this area are better explained by 
unwillingness, not uncertainty. This will 
be discussed in more detail soon.
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(2) The inability of PPO secretaries to play their role
A more serious problem arises when a PPO secretary 
knows what he has to do, but does not have the power to 
do it. Neither Sampson nor Golembiewski, on whose models 
the staff generalist concept is above all based, see this 
as a problem. Sampson specifically denies staff agencies 
the right to have any powers over the line, but assumes 
that the line will be happy to accept any staff suggestions. 
Golembiewski recognises the need to give staff agencies 
some formal powers for the implementation of measures 
they have decided on, assuming that the formal, open nature 
of these powers will be sufficient to ensure their 
legitimacy in the eyes of the line and therefore reduce 
line-staff conflict.
The Soviet authorities have adopted the latter's 
point of view. Chapter Two describes in detail the formal 
powers granted PPO's, including the strengthening of those 
powers with the granting of the right of control to non­
production PPO's in 1971. Not surprisingly they have not 
been readily accepted as legitimate or led to the end 
of PPO-administration conflict. Thus, for example, the 
secretary of the party committee of the Omsk Institute of 
Rail Transport Engineers is still able to complain that 
even with the right of control his party organisation is 
treated in the same old way by institutional leaders.
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When the Academic Council is studying the plan for research 
work it is required that the party organisation and party 
committee be given the opportunity to express their opinions. 
However "out of habit" they are only given the draft plan 
at the last moment. In the same article the secretary of 
the PPO of the Minsk Teachers' College comments that there 
have been sharp arguments in the college over the limits 
of the right of control.'*" The secretary of the PPO of the 
Podol central raion hospital wrote in 1972:
We must note that at the beginning of the 
establishment of control we had to break through 
a unique 'psychological' barrier. The 
administration and some other workers had 
the idea that control was something 
absolutely incompatible with a hospital.
They were ever on the alert for the word 
'control'. The work of medical institutions 
and health organs, as is well known, has 
always been under party and soviet control.
This was clear to all and well established.
But the control of the activity of the 
administration by the primary party organi­
sation - would this not lead to a lowering 
of the role of the leaders of the hospital
1 Pravda,11/2/72, p. 2.
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in the organisation of the medical 
process? Some of our comrades asked 
this question more than once.'*'
But while granting the right of control has not
led to the disappearance of PPO-administration conflict,
it certainly appears to have ensured the PPO's sufficient
power and authority to fulfil their functions. Before the
granting of the right of control there were many examples
of PPO's successfully controlling their "host" organisations.
However there were also many cases of institutional leaders
ignoring the work of PPO's and treating them with complete 
2disdain. Although cases of institutional leaders ignoring
1 P.zh., 12/72, pp. 50-51.
2 The frustration of the PPO secretary is particu­
larly evident in the complaint about the director 
of the Institute of Chemistry of the Kazakh 
Academy of Sciences who did not speak at party 
meetings, but "just sat there as if he's somebody 
special." P. zh., 6/56, p. 34. But he at least 
attended party meetings. It was reported in 1954 
that no top officials of the Ministry of Agricul­
ture attended the election-report meeting of the 
PPO. P.zh., 4/54, p. 69. In 1963 the party 
committee of the State Committee for the Chemical 
and Oil Industry was criticised for failing to 
operate as a collective body. Of the last 21 
meetings one deputy chairman of the State Committee 
had attended only four, as had three other members 
of the party committee, while three others had 
missed the majority of meetings. There had been 
meetings attended by only three of the eleven 
members. P.zh., 19/63, p. 42. The head of the 
Administration of Leather Footwear Production of 
the North Caucasus sovnarkhoz did not attend a 
single party buro meeting in three months.
7/64, p. 37. For cases of institutional leaders 
ignoring PPO recommendations, see P.zh.Kaz., 2/63, 
p. 47; P.zh., 5/63, p. 51.
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PPO's are still reported,'*' the powers of PPO's appear to 
have been strengthened by the 1971 changes. The change 
can be sensed in the 1972 report in Pravda from the 
chairman of the party control commission for research work 
in the Far Eastern Polytechnical Institute on the partici­
pation of party members in the meetings of the Academic 
Council. Pravda reported an interjected question: "Does
the administration like your activity?" to which the 
chairman replied: "It's possible that some people don't
like it much. But, control . . . Well, business is
2business." The suggestion is that the opposition does 
not count for much.
However, as was made clear in Chapter Two, the 
power of PPO's depends above all on support from higher 
authorities. It is not desired by the Soviet authorities 
that PPO's have absolute power over institutional leaders. 
Ideally some sort of balance is sought, so that whenever 
possible PPO's and administration cooperate. In cases 
where cooperation is impossible it is considered essential 
that higher authorities become aware of the conflict and 
adjudicate. Therefore neither side to the dispute is 
given dominating power.
1 See Kom. (Vilnius), 5/69, p. 67; Pravda,
15/10/71, p. 2; Kom., 6/72, p. 99;
JJchitel 1 skaia gazeta, 13/1/73, p. 1; Kom. 
Estonii, 8/73, p. 53.
2 Pravda, 24/2/72, p. 2.
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In the last section I mentioned raikom and 
gorkom neglect of smaller PPO's. Usually such neglect is 
rather benign. The PPO's are not considered important 
enough to warrant regular attention. This is not to say 
that they would not be given assistance if it were speci­
fically required. However there is always the danger that 
a PPO secretary who is consistently ignored by local party 
organs will not feel confident of their support in a conflict 
situation and so will be unwilling to oppose the institutional 
leadership, especially if the secretary is already inclined 
towards the leadership's point of view.
Sometimes the failure of higher authorities to 
support a PPO results from a conscious desire to maintain 
a balance between the party organisation and the adminis­
tration. In 1972 a party member from the Central Research 
and Design-Construction Institute for the Preventive 
Inspection of Pneumatics wrote to Pravda complaining that 
the institute's director opposed the party organisation's 
use of the right of control. A party meeting had elected 
a commission to check the scientific activity of the 
institute and had found serious shortcomings in the work of 
a deputy director. The latter was removed from his post, 
but four members of the commission received a reprimand 
to be recorded on their party cards from the gorkom. The 
same issue of Pravda also published a letter from the 
administrative secretary of the institute who complained
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about the one-sided nature of the commission's work, saying 
that it had been decided to make an example of the deputy 
director, in whose work there were admittedly some short­
comings, and concentrated on him at the expense of an 
examination of anything else in the institute. It had 
proved necessary to refer the matter to the gorkom after 
the party buro had done nothing about the commission's 
mistakes.
A little later Pravda summed up the conflict.
It criticised the PPO for its poor direction and super­
vision of the work of the commission. The commission had 
concentrated on the deputy director to the exclusion of 
all else when the case of the deputy director had already 
been decided and his dismissal was in hand. Pravda 
generally found in favour of the gorkom in its opposition 
to the commission, although declaring that it had somewhat 
over-reacted.^ This case is interesting in that it 
illustrates well a local party organ attempting to maintain 
a balance between functional and dysfunctional conflict.
The main question was one of degree of reaction, rather 
than dispute over facts, and it was the gorkom's task to 
establish the correct degree of reaction.
The role of higher party authorities is not 
always so disinterested. Cases of their siding with the
1 Pravda, 10/1/72, p. 2; 28/3/72, p. 2.
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institutional leadership even when the PPO appears to be 
in the right are common. The Soviet phenomenon of 
"family circles" obviously extends to this level, and 
PPO secretaries who upset the "family" are not likely to 
be welcomed. An excellent example of a "family circle" 
and the effect it has on PPO's could be seen in the Omsk 
Agricultural Institute in 1955. When a student of the 
institutte's director had had his dissertation initially 
rejected by the institute's Council of Agronomic 
Faculties, the director enlisted the support of the head 
of the obkom Department of Science and Culture for the 
dissertation at its second defence. This ensured that it 
gained majority support and that the party buro did nothing 
about the situation.^'
There are many examples of local party organs 
protecting institutional leaders from the proper criticisms 
of PPO's. In 1955 a deputy director of the Institute of 
Land Use of the Kazakh branch of the All-Union Agricultural 
Academy was expelled from the party by a PPO meeting and 
then removed from his post for being a troublemaker.
However the decision was reversed by the raikom, before 
being re-affirmed by the Büro of the Kazakh Central
1 P.zh., 17/55, pp. 62-65.
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Committee.'*' Raikomy and gorkomy are often in a position
to have a PPO secretary causing too much trouble removed
from his position. At the election-report meeting in 1964
in a Dubovskii eight year school (in the MariASSR) the
gorkom instructor present at the meeting opposed the
election as secretary of a woman with many years success
as a teacher ostensibly because, not having been deputy
secretary, she did not have sufficient experience. However
Partiinaia zhizn'reported that the real reason was that she
2had criticised the school's director in meetings.
1 P.zh., 8/55, p. 80. In 1968 the raikom 
similarly reversed the decision of the PPO of 
the Volgograd City Electricity Board to expel 
the deputy director from the party and instead 
strongly reprimanded him. This was after he 
had been gaoled for various misdeeds! P.zh.,
6/68, p. 48. When the secretary of the PPO of 
the Uralsk oblast' Highways Administration wrote 
to the Uralsk gorkom asking it to deal with the 
head of the administration for misappropriating 
state funds, the gorkom did nothing. P.zh.Kaz., 
11/61, p. 62. In 1975 at an open party meeting 
in the Kirgiz Farm Machinery Association 
(Kirgizsel 'khoztekhnika) there was strong criti­
cism of the first deputy chairman. The secretary 
of the PPO was chairman of the meeting, while a 
member of the Kirgiz Central Committee's Agricul­
tural Department was present. After the meeting 
the Central Committee official and the deputy 
chairman criticised the secretary for allowing 
criticism of a leading official in an open party 
meeting. P.zh., 11/75, p. 71.
2 P.zh-, 19/64, p. 53. See also Pravda, S/S/13,
p. 2. After the secretary of the party organisa­
tion of an Ordzhonikidze secondary school had 
reported the illegal activities of the director 
to the City Prosecutor, the raikom organised an 
election-report meeting, even though one was not 
yet due and the majority of the party members were 
away on holidays. The meeting elected a new 
secretary convenient to the director and the former 
secretary was subsequently transferred to another 
school. P.zh., 20/64, p. 77.
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Despite these examples of lack of support from 
higher authorities and of disagreements over the right of 
control, the evidence is that in recent years, with the 
right of control and support from higher authorities,
PPO's, on the whole, have been able to exert their influence 
over "host" organisations. This is not simply a matter of 
Sampson's "force of persuasion" or Golembiewski's "legitimacy 
through formalisation" leading to amicability between staff 
and line; it is more a matter of PPO's having the organi­
sational power to make their presence felt despite adminis­
tration opposition.
(3) The unwillingness of PPO secretaries to play their role
While Sampson ignored the problems of conflict, he 
recognised the possibility of collusion. Golembiewski 
recognised conflict, but ignored collusion, although he 
was inviting its presence with his closely integrated 
Colleague units. He hoped to avoid conflict and render 
collusion irrelevant by making the staff and line elements 
jointly responsible for performance. But this can only 
be successful when the functions of line and staff are 
separate, complementary and working towards the same goal. 
When the staff function is to exercise control over the line, 
that is, when their activities largely overlap but are 
directed to essentially different goals, such integration 
will almost inevitably lead to at least some cases of
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collusion at the expense of general organisational 
performance. The Soviet authorities recognise this, but 
lack a full solution. They want the sort of cooperation 
sought by Golembiewski and hope to achieve it by making 
both the institutional leader and the party secretary 
responsible for performance. However they recognise that 
the administration and the PPO are, or should be, acting 
according to different priorities. While the PPO is 
expected to give priority to protecting the state interest, 
it is recognised that the institutional leadership is 
primarily concerned with promoting the sectional interests 
of its branch or enterprise.^- A concern with different 
priorities seems to be implied in any controlling situation. 
Generally priorities are sufficiently compatible that the 
PPO and the administration are able to cooperate for the 
benefit of each. If priorities are incompatible the 
authorities expect PPO's to maintain their adherence to 
the social interest, try to persuade the administration 
to adhere to it also, and if necessary to signal to higher
1 Particularly since the mid-1960's Soviet
philosophers and economists have devoted 
considerable attention to what could be called 
"Soviet interest theory". They recognise the 
legitimacy of sectional interests and endeavour 
to devise mechanisms by which a pursuit of 
sectional interests by sectional leaders will 
automatically benefit the social interest.
The systems of material incentive described 
in Chapter One fit within this theory. However 
in situations where suitable mechanisms cannot 
be devised, or the mechanisms are open to abuse, 
PPO's are expected to protect the social interest.
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authorities that a conflict has occurred. But if the 
PPO's themselves abandon the social interest and adopt 
the sectional priorities of the institutional leadership 
conflict becomes unlikely. In such cases cooperation 
becomes dysfunctional since it will probably be at the 
expense of the social interest. Cooperation changes its 
nature and becomes collusion.
That is why the possibility of conflict between 
the administration and the PPO is recognised as, if not a 
good thing, at least a necessary evil. The desire to control 
the conflict so that a suitable party-administration 
balance is maintained is well illustrated in the case 
described above of the Central Institute for the Preventive 
Inspection of Pneumatics.^
Despite these efforts, collusion still occurs.
We have already seen examples of administrative collusion 
with higher party authorities. Collusion between the 
administration and PPO's is also a considerable problem.
There are some cases where one suspects that the
degree of cooperation is tending towards the excessive,
without positive evidence of collusion. For example, there
is the practice of school PPO's receiving advice from
2school directors on the agendas of party meetings. The
See above, pp. 505-506 
P.zh.r 6/56, p. 60.
512.
director of the Institute of Atomic Energy was so impressed
by the attitude of the new party secretary (who had accepted
the post although it seriously hindered completion of his
thesis) that he made him his personal assistant. Although
the Soviet report commented on this favourably, it would
seem to leave room for abuse.^ The situation was more
serious at an open party meeting in the Lgov Hospital when
the question "The conditions and tasks of surgical services
in the raion" was considered. The chief doctor was chairman
of the meeting. She invited her deputy to the meeting and
then directed him to write the minutes. There was also the
suggestion that the presidia of party meetings in the
hospital were "stacked". The effect was that the party
meetings were exactly the same as the work meetings of
2medical personnel. The same thing occurred in the Moscow 
Construction Administration in 1954. Decisions of party 
meetings were written with the cooperation of institutional 
leaders and indeed most were taken from their administrative
1 OgonSk, 1/1/71, p. 15.
2 P.zh., 10/63, p. 48.
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orders and decisions. Developments such as these seem to 
be the logical consequence of the involvement of party 
organisations in short-term problem solving and operational 
procedures. As Sampson's analysis made clear, this would 
divert the party organisation from its proper functions 
and make further collusion more likely.
There are innumerable cases in the Soviet press 
of administrative and party officials actually conspiring 
together to protect each other from criticism, to cover 
up shortcomings and unacceptable, if not illegal, 
activities. For example, in 1971 the director of a boarding 
school in Chapaevsk gave her relatives jobs in the school. 
The party secretary and the City Education Office allowed 
it. The gorkom buro gave the director a strong reprimand 
to be recorded on her party card and referred the matter
1 P.zh., 5/54, p. 60. Pravda had an interesting
comment to make about the use made by 
institutional leaders of party organisations 
in 1969, when it wrote about the All-Union 
Ministry of the Chemical Industry: "Reading
the decisions of the party committee, at 
times one begins to suspect that some glavk 
leaders are not entirely disinterested in their 
requests to be allowed to give reports (in the 
party committee). Clearly some hope to use the 
authority of the party committee to break through 
some administrative 'road block', to remind once 
again the minister and collegium of their needs, 
or to insure themselves against some future 
possible situation they could find themselves in." 
Pravda, 11/3/69, p. 2. Statements such as this 
suggest that the dividing line between PPO's 
representing "host" organisation interests to 
higher authorities without damaging the social 
interest, of which examples were given in Chapter 
Three, and cases of collusion is a fine one.
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of her dismissal to the Education Office. The head of the 
Education Office was given a reprimand on his party card, 
while the secretary was also blamed.'*'
The supression of criticism is not always over 
illegal activities. Often the cover-ups involve the inade­
quate performance of institutions. Thus the curriculum of 
the Dagestan Agricultural Institute required that fourth- 
year students undertake practical training on the leading 
farms of the republic. However the rector of the institute 
decided to send 39 of them to the institute's own experi­
mental farm. The students appealed to him to change this 
decision as they were of the opinion that they would learn 
nothing there. The rector still refused, so the students 
appealed to the obkom. The obkom sent their letter to the 
rector, who then expelled the complaining students from the
1 Pravda, 13/3/71, p. 2. In 1972 the deputy
chairman of the trade union committee in the 
All-Russian Research Institute for Agricultural 
Labour and Management criticised the administra­
tion for allowing illegalities in the distribution 
of housing and for restricting the rights of the 
trade union. The party secretary, director and 
trade union chairman responded by accusing him 
of a number of shortcomings and raised the question 
of his dismissal. The party buro supported the 
accusations. The Committee for Party Control 
investigated and gave the three leaders strong 
reprimands to be recorded on their party cards. 
P.zh., 12/72, pp. 48-49. At a party meeting in 
the Ukrainian Cooperative Union in 1955 a 
communist criticised the deputy chairman. The 
deputy chairman called him a slanderer and 
initiated party disciplinary proceedings against 
him. The primary party organisation secretary 
organised his expulsion from the party and removal 
from his administrative position. P.zh., 18/55,
p. 20.
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institute. The next day the party buro decided to expel 
the two ring-leaders from the party.^
Some of the most serious cases of collusion in 
the eyes of the party authorities occur when the PPO fails 
to defend Marxist-Leninist ideology against "anti-Marxist 
and bourgeois distortions". A number of such cases are 
cited at the beginning of this chapter, where lack of 
ideological control, particularly in research institutions, 
was described as one of the major failings of PPO's. 
Although there is not positive evidence that the lack of 
proper ideological control is due to collusion, there is 
no other convincing explanation. While at one particular 
moment a PPO secretary might be unsure of the correct 
ideological line to take, this uncertainty would not be 
allowed to continue for long. Similarly in the area of 
ideological control a PPO secretary could be strongly 
confident of the support of higher party authorities, and 
so a lack of power should not be a serious problem.
1 P.zh., 12/64, pp. 4-5. In 1963 Partiinaia zhizn’
Kazakhs tana criticised party organs which tried 
to cover up shortcomings in their "host" 
organisations, for example, party buros which 
failed to mention in party meetings that 
numbers of students were failing. P.zh.Kaz., 
1/63, pp. 19-20. In a party meeting in the 
Minsk Special Construction Bureau for Road and 
Irrigation Machinery a party member criticised 
the head of the bureau for his inoperative 
decisions on production matters and short­
comings in his work with personnel. The head 
of the bureau demoted the party member. The 
party organisation did nothing. P.zh., 18/67, 
p. 19.
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Thus collusion occurs in three main areas - in 
illegal behaviour, in covering up poor production performance, 
and in turning a blind eye to ideologically objectionable 
behaviour. The basic reason for all these types of collusion 
is the same, that the interests of the PPO, or its secretary, 
and institutional leaders become the same.
Often PPO secretaries involve themselves in or 
fail to prevent the illegal activities of institutional 
leaders because they stand to gain materially from the 
activities themselves. In 1960 the chief doctor and party 
secretary of the Kemerovo railway hospital cooperated to 
pay themselves for extra work which they had not done. ^
Bribery of PPO secretaries, usually by paying them a salary 
for a position which they occupy in name only, is not uncommon.
1 P.zh., 1/60, p. 80.
2 In 1959 the head of the Chief Administration of 
the Civil Air Fleet was severely criticised for 
paying the party committee secretary. P.zh.,
18/59, p. 71. In 1954 the secretary and deputy 
secretary of the party committee of the All-Union 
Ministry of Construction were removed from their 
posts and reprimanded when it was found that they 
had been receiving salaries for occupying fictional 
posts as deputy minister and glavk head respectively 
and had been given good new flats to which they were 
not entitled. P.zh., 3/54, pp. 46-50. One of the 
arguments that have been advanced against full-time 
secretaries is that they are subject to financial 
pressure from institutional leaders. In 1961 the 
Central Committee declared: "Sometimes the estab­
lishment of full-time party workers, who are paid
by the administrative organ, places them in 
dependence on the administration, interferes with 
their independence, and seriously damages the 
development of criticism and self-criticism and 
the correct indoctrination of personnel." P.zh., 
15-16/61, p. 142. Of course there is no reason to 
assume that part-time party workers are not subject 
to similar pressures.
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One should also remember that if party
secretaries are making their careers in the area of the
"host" organisation's activities rather than the party
apparatus, the institutional leaders are in fact their
official superiors and will probably still be so when
the secretaries have finished their terms in party work.
This is particularly so if party secretaries serve
relatively short and fixed terms.^ A party secretary
is unlikely lightly to antagonise the institutional
leader and thereby jeopardise his whole future career.
This, combined with the increased difficulties that
antagonising the institutional leader makes in the conduct
of his activities as party secretary, makes the secretary
unwilling to take strong action. Thus in 1960 Partiinaia
zhizn ' Kazakhs tana criticised the secretary of the party
buro of the South Kazakh sovnarkho z who allowed the PPO
to avoid its responsibilities in the apparatus, "fearing to
2spoil relations with the leadership of the sovnarkhoz."
1 The data given in the last chapter on inter­
ruptions to the publication of articles, what 
data I have on the terms served by party 
secretaries, and conversations in Moscow suggest 
that a three-year term is common. Data on 
secretary turnover suggest that a normal rate is 
about 33% per annum, giving an average three-year 
term. Armstrong, J.A.: The Politics of Totali­
tarianism, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
from 1934 to the present, Random House, N.Y., 1961, 
p. 332; P.zh., 6/71, p. 12; Kom.Estonii, 1/72, 
p. 70; Kom. Belorussii, 7/71, pp. 11-12.
2 P.zh.Kaz., 6/60, pp. 79-80.
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One would expect collusion in the "production" 
area to increase with the greater opportunities given for 
the furthering of sectional and personal interests through 
the use of such "economic" methods of management as 
khozras chet and material incentive schemes. In recent 
times there have been cases reported of abuses of these 
methods with some evidence of PPO involvement. For example, 
in 1974 the Committee for Party Control considered the 
situation in the Ulianovsk Research and Design-Technical 
Institute for Machine Construction. It found that leading 
officials had been overstating the value of research work 
that had been introduced into production. This would in­
crease the profits and therefore the bonus funds of the 
institute. The party buro took an unprincipled attitude 
and condoned the misrepresentation.1
PPO efforts to cover up shortcomings in production 
performance usually result from joint responsibility with 
the administration for performance. It is an inevitable
1 P.zh., 17/74, p. 58. Twice within three issues
of Partiinaia zhizn' in 1976 there were reports 
of the misuse of bonus funds and improper pay­
ments of bonuses in Soviet institutions and 
enterprises. The first, concerning the enter­
prises of the Kalinin oblast’ Transport 
Administration of the RSFSR Ministry of Road 
Transport, makes no mention of PPO's. P.zh.,
11/76, p. 51. The second concerns the locomotive 
depot in the city of Charsk (Semipalatinsk oblast '). 
The PPO is criticised for taking part in the 
illegal activities. P.zh., 13/76, pp. 52-54.
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side effect of attempts to reduce conflict by establishing 
joint responsibility for performance that when performance 
is poor collusion becomes necessary in order to avoid the 
consequences.
The effect joint responsibility has on performance 
is well illustrated in the case of the RSFSR Ministry of 
Road Transport and Highways. The party buro of the Chief 
Administration of Supply and Sales defended the practice 
of the glavk ordering new supplies of materials rather than 
using internal reserves."^ It is clearly as much in the 
interest of the glavk party organisation as the glavk 
leadership to have bigger reserves of materials in case 
of possible future shortages. The party organisation 
would be held as responsible for shortages as the leadership.
A case could be made for the view that the 
correspondence of interests goes deeper than this. Members 
of PPO's, beyond their party membership, are the same as 
any other workers in the "host" organisation. They are 
teachers, researchers, bureaucrats, etc. with the same 
sectional and professional interests as their colleagues.
The last chapter showed that to a large extent this is 
equally true of PPO secretaries. Partiinaia zhizn' wrote 
in 1958 that many administrative PPO's ignored bureaucratic
1 P.zh. , 15/58, p. 20.
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shortcomings because the bureaucratic (sluzhebnye) 
attitudes of the party officials were stronger than party 
attitudes. The same journal complained in 1954 that 
ministerial PPO's were reluctant to deal with staff levels, 
the simplification of procedures, etc, because the bureau­
cratic interests and attitudes of administrative officials
2were being carried over into their party work.
The effect of common professional interests is 
most strongly felt in the area of ideological control in 
research institutions. Research scientists have strong 
common interests going beyond material rewards. Although 
rivalry might be keen, they share a desire to unravel the 
problems of their particular areas of research. The 
traditional scientific values of truth and honesty in 
research provide scientists with a ready-made alternative 
ideology to the party's. These common values are most 
likely to become evident at times when the party's competing 
ideology introduces conflicting values. Scientists are 
likely to react strongly when they feel that the party 
ideology is compromising their professional principles of 
scientific truth and honesty. It is noticeable that a 
very large proportion of Soviet dissidents are natural 
scientists. In the last chapter we saw that research PPO
1 P.zh., 6/58, p. 66.
2 P.zh., 5/54, pp. 7-8.
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secretaries are usually co-opted research scientists.
There is nothing in their training, experience or 
motivations to suggest that in cases where the demands of 
the party's ideology conflict with the scientific values 
of their discipline the party's ideology will necessarily 
be victorious. The number of cases listed above in which 
research PPO's have failed to take action over "distortions" 
of Marxist-Leninist ideology lends support to this conclusion.'*'
1 It is interesting to speculate why dissent is not
proportionally greater among cultural institutions 
and their PPO's. The basic reason is undoubtedly 
that the Soviet authorities, despite Lysenkoist 
aberrations, consider the quality of research in 
the physical sciences to be more important than 
the quality of literature and the arts. Scientific 
quality largely depends on the values of scientific 
truth and honesty. This is reflected in the 
relative degree of ideological control exercised 
over the two categories through non-party organisa­
tions. The non-party administration of science 
is largely free of ideological influence. The 
Academy of Sciences, for example, is not an 
ideological organisation. Indeed, with its long 
and illustrious traditions, it contributes signi­
ficantly to the formation and maintenance1, of an 
independent scientific ideology. (It is interesting 
to read, therefore, Medvedev's claim that 
Khrushchev thought seriously of abolishing the 
Academy. Medvedev, op. cit., p. 218.) By way of 
contrast, the day-to-day administrative organs of 
the creative arts, the various creative unions, 
are important ideological bodies in their own 
right. They help ensure that no non-party ethos 
of artistic freedom can take any institutional 
form. It is also interesting to note that while 
research PPO secretaries have no ideological 
connections, most creative and cultural PPO 
secretaries show strong ideological orientations.
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As foreshadowed in the Introduction, collusion 
appears to be one of the main problems facing the staff 
generalist system in its Soviet application. Problems of 
uncertainty about roles, to the extent that they are not 
deliberately built into the system, can be removed by 
better training and supervision. The formal powers of 
PPO's now appear to be at least adequate for a staff 
generalist role. They have considerable powers of investi­
gation and recommendation, and institutional leaders must 
now find it difficult to ignore them altogether. There is 
still a considerable problem of PPO's being frustrated in 
their legitimate activities by lack of support from higher 
authorities. However this is essentially a problem of 
collusion - collusion between local party organs and 
institutional leaders.
There are features inherent to the staff 
generalist system that make collusion inevitable. It is 
essentially a control system. This means that both sides, 
the staff and the line, work on the same processes, but 
with different aims. The line aims at the most advantageous 
operation of its section of the process; the staff should 
derive its advantages from the best operation of the 
process as a whole. Control will be exercised only as
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long as these aims are different.^- But efforts must be 
made to prevent excessive conflict arising from these 
different aims. This is achieved by the close integration 
of line and staff agencies. The staff personnel are drawn 
from the membership of the line organisation in order to 
emphasise their basic compatibility with the line (this 
has the added advantage of ensuring that the staff personnel 
have a good understanding of the line organisation's 
functions) and they are made jointly responsible for 
performance in order to promote cooperation. But these 
developments, particularly when combined with the greater 
decentralisation that is seen as one of the advantages of 
the system, provide the ideal objective conditions for 
collusion, for the adoption of identical interests by 
line and staff. Decentralised procedures provide the 
opportunity for collusive manipulation of the work process 
in order to maximise the material rewards of all line and 
staff personnel; joint responsibility for performance 
makes it in the interest of the staff agency to hide 
operational problems, rather than work for their removal; 
and the overlapping memberships of the line and staff
1 Golembiewski appears to be hardly aware of the
difference between a control staff agency and 
a functional staff agency. A functional staff 
agency relates to the line in a completely 
different way. Because it works on a different 
part of the process than the line, their 
successful cooperation no longer depends on, 
in fact it could be hindered by/ different 
aims.
524.
organisations ensure that their attitudes, particularly 
in the more value-laden areas, are identical. All these 
problems show up in the Soviet system, in the failure of 
PPO's to prevent illegal behaviour in "host" organisations, 
in their willingness to cover up operational problems, 
and in their failure to maintain strict ideological control. 
They appear to be inherent to the PPO system. In the 
Conclusion I will attempt to determine how serious they 
are for the overall success of the system and what 
measures might be taken to overcome them.
525.
CONCLUSION
In the Introduction to this thesis I claimed 
that non-production PPO's had been seriously neglected, 
and in some cases actually misunderstood, by Western 
analysts of the Soviet system. The large amount of 
descriptive data presented in the thesis should hopefully 
serve as the basis for a fuller and more systematic 
understanding of the character and activities of non­
production PPO's.
I have taken the view that this understanding 
can best be provided by using a methodological framework 
I have called "staff generalism". Staff generalism is a 
composite concept derived from a number of different 
Western sources. However its basic principle is that, 
particularly under conditions of technological change, a 
system organised solely on the basis of functionally 
specialised operational hierarchies is too "departmentalised", 
too centralised and insufficiently flexible. The necessary 
response is the development of agencies with a combination 
of specialised skills and a general knowledge and under­
standing of the system's objectives as a whole. These 
agencies are closely integrated with the specialised 
hierarchies in order to assist them in coping with the 
demands made of them by administrative complexity and 
technological change. They should have sufficient powers
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to provide this assistance for long-term development 
without making it possible for them to become too closely 
involved in short-term operations.
The major hypotheses I have been concerned to 
test in the thesis are, firstly, that the top Soviet 
authorities expect PPO's to act according to staff 
generalist-type principles, and, secondly, that PPO's fulfil 
the expectations held of them. I have presented a con­
siderable amount of evidence to support both hypotheses.
The expectations of the top authorities are reflected in 
the Soviet concept of "control", discussed early in 
Chapter Two. Authoritative sources insist that control 
entails a broad concern with the activities of "host" 
organisations and their long-term development and 
improvement. The expectations of the authorities are 
further reflected in the structure of the PPO's, closely 
integrated with "line" organisations, to some extent in 
the recruitment of PPO secretaries (particularly in the 
case of ministerial PPO secretaries there is an evident 
desire to recruit people with the widest possible range 
of skills and experience), certainly in the training, 
particularly the technical training, given to PPO 
secretaries, and perhaps most importantly, in the nature 
of the powers given to the PPO's. These powers, 
described in Chapter Two, are wide-ranging and can be 
used to good effect for achieving staff generalist goals.
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However they are applied in such a way as to discourage 
an excessive involvement by PPO's in short-term 
operational activities.
The descriptive data in Chapters Three and 
Four contained some evidence that non-production PPO's do 
in fact behave according to staff generalist-type 
principles. The activities of ministerial PPO's since 
1965, described in Chapter Four, constitute a particularly 
clear case of PPO's working for the long-term development 
of their "host" organisations and the system as a whole, 
often against the opposition of elements with shorter- 
term, sectional interests to protect. A narrower use of a 
staff generalist style was evident in individual cases of 
PPO concern with problem-solving. The Western staff 
generalist theorists stress that the involvement of staff 
agencies in solving short-term operational problems is not 
incompatible with staff generalism, as long as they are 
concerned with understanding the basic causes of the 
problems, taking remedial action to remove those basic 
causes, and thus preventing the recurrence of similar 
problems. In all categories of PPO, and especially the 
research category, examples were found of PPO's apparently 
behaving in this way. The other important area of staff 
generalist-type activity was planning. PPO's in all 
categories, except, strangely, the administrative, took 
advantage of the de facto decentralisation evident in the 
Soviet planning process to involve themselves closely in
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the essentially long-term concerns of plan formulation 
and the establishment of priorities.
Nevertheless the balance of the evidence 
collected in the thesis tended to cast doubt on the 
hypothesis that PPO's behave in a staff generalist way.
It is difficult to speak about the ideological activities 
of PPO's, described in Chapter One, in terms of the staff 
generalist model. The latter has been developed in a 
Western context and therefore is not easily able to cope 
with the highly ideological nature of the Soviet system. 
Admittedly, it could be said that even in a Western context 
some degree of value and operational indoctrination is 
essential for the working of a staff generalist system, 
indeed of any organisational system. Even the very close 
control of social values and behaviour exercised by PPO's 
could be seen as not being incompatible with staff 
generalism. However it is hard to reconcile with staff 
generalist principles the use of ideology to directly 
influence the "production" activities of "host" organisa­
tions, often in very specific terms. There is strong 
evidence of PPO's in research institutes using ideology 
to justify and provide the means, through ideological 
seminars, for direct involvement in every-day research 
work. Neither the fact of the involvement nor its 
justification is compatible with staff generalism.
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Chapter Three concentrated on the "production" 
activities of PPO's, although in some cases ideological 
considerations were again evident. It was in this 
chapter that one of the most important areas of PPO involve­
ment - personnel - was discussed. PPO's have the right 
to vet and veto all appointments and re-appointments to 
all positions in "host" organisations below the very top 
level. This clearly is a right of enormous significance. 
Whether it is used for "political" or "technical" reasons, 
it gives PPO's far too much power to involve themselves 
in operational activities to be compatible with staff 
generalist principles. A proper staff generalist concern 
with broad recruitment and training policies does not 
imply the right to vet all appointments.
There is similar evidence of excessive PPO 
involvement in all other short-term operations of "host" 
organisations. Much PPO problem-solving takes on a form 
strongly warned against by Western line-staff theorists, 
a concern to solve the immediate problem by whatever means 
are available without any consideration of the underlying 
causes or without any inclination to prevent recurrence 
of the problem. There was a surprising amount of evidence 
of this type of problem-solving, with its implication of 
a very close involvement of PPO's in the short-term 
operations of "host" organisations, in all categories.
In the ministerial and research categories, and even to 
some extent in the educational, it was particularly evident
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in the relations of the PPO's with organisations 
subordinate to the "host" organisation. The ability of 
ministerial PPO's particularly to directly influence the 
day-to-day operations of production enterprises through 
their control of supervisory officials was considerable.
It alone must force us to raise greatly our evaluation of the 
significance of ministerial PPO's in the Soviet adminis­
trative system, although at the same time we must devalue 
the degree of their commitment to staff generalist-type 
principles.
There was even some evidence, in the adminis­
trative and other categories, of line elements, both 
within "host" organisations and outside them, making use 
of, if not entirely relying on, PPO's in purely short­
term operations. Western line-staff theorists are well 
aware of the consequences of such a development - the 
informal channels of command and communication through 
the staff agency come to be used as a matter of course, the 
formal channels atrophy even further, and the staff agency 
becomes so much a part of the short-term operational 
activities of the "host" organisation that it becomes 
impossible for it to play its staff role.
Why is it that PPO's apparently depart quite 
significantly from the principles of staff generalism?
There are two likely explanations. The first is that, 
despite my first hypothesis above, the top party authorities
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in the Soviet Union have never intended PPO's to behave 
as staff generalist agencies. The second is that there are 
difficulties inherent in staff generalism that make its 
practical application impossible.
The first explanation appears to have some degree 
of truth in it. While there are signs of a genuine 
commitment by the authorities to staff generalist-type 
principles, they do expect considerably greater operational 
involvement by PPO's than would seem to be compatible with 
staff generalism. Much of the blame for this must be 
attributed to the ideological functions of PPO's. The 
nature of the Soviet system demands that the top authorities 
require PPO's to strive for the ideological purity of 
Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism. The immediate effects of 
this on even operational activities of a "production" 
nature have already been mentioned. But it seems also to 
have a more indirect influence on PPO activities, through 
the effect it has on the "psychology" of party officials.
It appears to have encouraged the belief of party officials 
that party involvement in all areas of Soviet life is 
required, even when there is no ideological justification 
at all. The one ideological principle of the "leading 
role of the party" makes any further ideological justifi­
cation unnecessary. It appears that it has become part 
of the "psychology" of party officials (and if PPO 
secretaries are not as strongly affected by the "psychology"
532.
as higher officials it must still be reflected in the 
role expected of them) that no non-party organisation can 
be entrusted with any task without party supervision.
It is this cautiousness which gives that strong conserva­
tive element to what is still in many ways a radical 
political organisation.
The development of this "psychology" has been 
assisted by the history of the Soviet state. The fact and 
nature of the successes of Soviet development have 
encouraged party officials in the belief that problems can 
only be solved by the direct energetic and dictatorial 
involvement of the local party boss. Although there is no 
evidence that PPO secretaries are expected to act in the 
same way as local party bosses, the experiences of the 
bosses must affect the expectations they hold of the 
efficacy of a "party style of work" even at PPO level.
The top party leadership has a basic commitment 
to staff generalist-type principles for its PPO's. The 
nature of its careful and deliberate training of PPO 
secretaries and manipulation of PPO power makes this 
conclusion inescapable. However the traditional belief 
in the invariable effectiveness of direct party involvement 
in crises, combined with the perceived need for the 
closest possible ideological control of all aspects of 
Soviet life, has fundamentally compromised that
commitment.
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This is a problem specific to the Soviet system. 
Are there further problems that are inherent to the staff 
generalist concept itself? Western staff generalist 
theorists have developed their models primarily in reaction 
to the conflict that has inevitably appeared in line- 
staff relations in traditional models. They have different 
views on the powers that staff agencies should be given 
and the effect these will have on conflict. In the Soviet 
case the view has been adopted that limited but variable 
powers should be granted. Institutional leaders are 
expected to recognise the legitimacy of these powers. In 
the Soviet Union as in the Western models the integration 
of PPO's into "line" organisations is also expected to 
reduce conflict by making the PPO's and line administrations 
more familiar with the problems and tasks facing each other. 
Making both sides jointly responsible for performance is 
expected to make it too costly for them to engage in 
conflict.
But it could be said that all these measures 
aimed against line-staff conflict contribute to encouraging 
PPO encroachment on line authority. Although this need 
not necessarily lead to further conflict, it is certainly 
against staff generalist principles. Granting staff 
agencies powers over the line, particularly when, as in 
the Soviet case, these powers are deliberately left 
variable and ambiguous, encourages and simplifies staff 
involvement in everyday operations. Integration further
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simplifies such involvement by ensuring that staff 
officials have the necessary training and are in the physi­
cal position to involve themselves.
These pressures certainly do exist and are 
evident in Soviet experience. However they do not constitute 
an inherent or insoluble problem for the staff generalist 
model. The difficulties arise when attempts are made to 
remove conflict from line-staff relations altogether and to 
define in precise terms the powers of staff agencies. 
Golembiewski recognised the dangers of the latter and 
prescribed a system of variable power relationships.
Burns and Stalker recognised that conflict, anxiety and 
uncertainty are not necessarily dysfunctional in a 
situation of change since they encourage flexibility.
The Soviet authorities have adopted both these views.
Although they are concerned to encourage cooperation 
between PPO's and institutional leaderships, they are 
equally determined to ensure that when circumstances 
demand it, particularly when administrators are reluctant 
to accept and implement party policy, conflict will occur. 
This means that at times PPO power will be emphasised and 
PPO encroachment on line authority even encouraged.
However the ambiguity left in PPO power means that when 
such encroachment is no longer necessary or becomes 
excessive, it can be reduced.
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There is the danger that such a system will come 
to rely too much on supervision from above. If the correct 
balance of power between PPO's and "host" organisations 
can be maintained only by close and continual supervision 
from above, one of the advantages of the staff generalist 
system, its decentralisation, is removed. It could be 
said that the separate staff hierarchies called for by 
Sampson and Golembiewski (although in the latter case a 
very closely integrated one) and implemented in the Soviet 
Union are excessively wasteful of resources and likely to 
discourage the decentralisation that is one of the supposed 
advantages of staff generalism. In the Soviet case this 
can be blamed to some extent on the "psychological" 
factors described above. However a large part of the 
problem is probably inherent to the staff generalist 
system.
This aside, the Soviet authorities' solution to 
the problem of staff encroachment on line authority appears 
to be adequate. While it is true that for the 
"psychological" reasons given above they have chosen an 
excessive level of PPO involvement, they have shown that it 
is possible to manipulate the level of involvement to suit 
organisational goals.
Collusion can perhaps be dealt with in the same 
way. However it appears to be a more difficult problem. 
Efforts to prevent line-staff conflict certainly contribute
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very strongly to pressures towards collusion.
Integration means that line and staff tend to share the 
same values and concerns, usually the narrower ones of the 
line. Joint responsibility for performance further unites 
them by providing another very strong common concern - 
the desire to avoid the consequences of operational failure. 
Although it can lead to cooperative effort for production 
success, it can equally lead to collusive effort to hide 
production failure. Collusion resulting from both integration 
and joint responsibility for performance has been very 
apparent in the case of PPO's. PPO secretaries have failed 
to take action over ideological deviations apparently be 
because they share the philosophical values of the deviation- 
ists.1 They have also colluded with institutional leaders 
to cover up illegal behaviour and production failures.
Collusion appears to be a problem inherent to 
any staff generalist system. Any measures taken against 
it compromise the other principles of staff generalism.
The very close supervision of PPO' s described above is 
probably more a reaction against collusion than against 
PPO encroachment on line authority. It is an area where 
the party authorities' cautiousness is to some extent 
justified. However it cannot be seen as contributing to
1 Evidence of the failure of PPO's to provide
sufficiently strict ideological control is one 
of the most important findings of the thesis.
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a staff generalist mode of behaviour since it reduces the 
degree of decentralisation intended by staff generalism.
To the extent that collusion is caused by the 
relative lack of power and authority of PPO secretaries 
it could be reduced by strengthening PPO powers. However 
there are two main difficulties with such an approach. 
Firstly, not all collusion is a result of the lack of 
PPO power. Only in some cases have PPO's allowed 
unacceptable behaviour because they could not find a safe 
way to prevent it. Very often their lack of action was 
a result of the common interests of PPO and line leadership. 
In such cases increased PPO power would have no effect.
The second difficulty with this approach is that PPO's 
cannot be given much more power without encouraging an 
undesirable degree of PPO interference in line operations. 
Already PPO powers are such that they tend to become 
excessively involved in line operations. While in many 
individual cases there is certainly room for strengthening 
the position of PPO secretaries vis-a-vis institutional 
leadership, as a general principle the authorities have 
little room for increasing the powers of PPO"s.
Collusion must be attacked at its source, which 
is the common interests of the PPO's and their "host" 
organisations. Increasing the professionalism of PPO 
secretaries, that is, using as PPO secretaries people 
that are interested in pursuing party careers, would
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certainly have this effect. A professional party official 
is less likely than a-co-opted rank-and-file party member 
to hold unacceptable ideological views or have sectional 
interests. A trend towards professional PPO secretaries 
is already evident in ministerial PPO's. One might expect 
a similar trend to appear among other categories of non­
production PPO's, although probably only in the larger and 
more important ones. Such a development would have the 
added advantage of enabling more concentrated "generalist" 
training of PPO secretaries. Most of them at present, 
particularly outside the ministerial category, are narrowly 
trained specialists. Such training does not necessarily 
equip them for a useful understanding of the broad functions 
and objectives of their "host" organisations. Such part- 
time training as does presently occur, although very 
interesting in its content, can only be rather superficial. 
Particularly if the party apparatus is to assume a leading 
role in the "scientific-technical revolution", something 
which is allowed for by staff generalist principles and 
appears to be an empirical probability, more extensive 
and concentrated training of PPO secretaries in managerial 
and evaluation techniques is required.
The difficulty with increasing the professional- 
isation of PPO secretaries is that it reduces the degree 
of staff integration and therefore considerably increases 
the amount of conflict that is likely to occur. Institu­
tional leaders and rank-and-file workers are more likely
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to resent a party professional, particularly when one of 
his main tasks is to directly oppose sectional interests. 
Similarly a PPO secretary could see it as increasingly 
important to oppose the administration, since advancement 
in his career would rely on a striking performance. With 
continued responsibility for short-term production perfor­
mance and belief in the efficacy of the "party style of 
work", the use of professional PPO secreatries would 
increase the interference of PPO's in operational activities.
Another way of separating the interests of PPO 
and administration would be to take away the PPO's 
responsibility for short-term production performance.
This would both decrease its need to involve itself in short­
term operations and the temptation to collude. However 
the technical difficulties of such an approach appear to 
be insurmountable. How could a PPO be held responsible 
for long-term improvements in performance, but not for short­
term performance? This would be particularly difficult 
in a situation where the limits of PPO power are deliberately 
left variable. Even if such a division of responsibilities 
were possible, it would surely lead to an increase in con­
flict in that institutional leadership would strongly resent 
any attempts at long-term improvements that would jeopardise 
their short-term success. It appears very unlikely that any 
attempt will be made to take the responsibility for short­
term performance away from PPO's.
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In the future the Soviet authorities will 
probably maintain and even strengthen their belief that 
PPO's should act in a staff generalist way. However a 
number of factors appear likely to continue to contribute 
to the non-staff generalist behaviour of PPO's. The 
problem of collusion, apparently inherent in the staff 
generalist model, and the need for more concentrated 
training of staff generalist officials makes the wider use 
of professional party officials as PPO secretaries probable. 
Although the limit to the powers that can be given to PPO's 
appears to have been already reached, greater emphasis 
will be laid on the need to use these powers fully. The 
greater use of party professionals will assist in achieving 
this. However it will also strengthen at the PPO level a 
feature of party activities that has previously been con­
centrated at higher levels - the belief that a party 
official, through direct intervention, can solve any 
problem, short or long-term. This will serve, in turn, to 
strengthen the expectations of the party leaders that party 
organisations, including PPO's, closely supervise all 
operational activities. The overall effect should be a 
strengthening of the already excessive involvement of PPO's 
in the short-term operations of "host" organisations. 
Whether that results in endemic PPO-administration conflict 
or the PPO becoming an essential element in informal short­
term operational procedures, the staff generalist tasks of
PPO's must suffer.
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While it has not been possible to show in this 
thesis that PPO's behave strictly as staff generalist 
agencies, the intentions of the Soviet authorities and 
actual practice have been close enough to it that PPO 
behaviour can at least be examined in staff generalist 
terms. Departures from staff generalist principles are 
partly the result of features peculiar to the Soviet 
system and partly problems peculiar to the staff generalist 
model itself. Nevertheless one can see a basic Soviet 
commitment to a staff generalist-type system. While future 
developments are likely to strengthen the effect of some of 
these features, the basic commitment is likely to remain.
Finally it remains to be asked what the implica­
tions of the Soviet experience are for the staff generalist 
model in a Western context. The Soviet problems of the 
pervasiveness of ideology and the traditional belief in the 
efficacy of party involvement in all operational activities 
do not appear likely to be problems in Western organisations. 
It is not easy to generalise about Western organisational 
values and traditions; however there appears to be little 
reason to believe that senior authorities in Western 
organisations are influenced by ideologies or traditions 
that demand a high degree of staff involvement in everyday 
line operations.
542.
This is not to say that there is no tradition 
among staff agencies themselves to become excessively 
involved in short-term operations. This was one of the 
problems in reaction to which the staff generalist models 
were developed. Soviet experience suggests that a staff 
generalist approach can solve this problem. The Soviet 
authorities have recognised that it is not necessary to 
have the powers of PPO's strictly defined. By manipulating 
these powers they are able to manipulate the degree of 
PPO operational involvement. There appears to be no reason 
that such a system could not be adapted to Western use, 
as long as it is recognised that a degree of uncertainty 
and ambiguity in low-level power relations is not 
necessarily dysfunctional. The Soviet method does have a 
problem, in that it relies on a high degree of supervision 
of PPO activities. Higher authorities must be constantly 
aware of the state of PPO-line relations in order to be 
able to decide which side to support in specific conflict 
situations and when to effect more fundamental power shifts.
This high level of supervision is made even more 
necessary by what is probably the most serious problem of 
the staff generalist model, the problem of collusion. We 
have seen that many of the basic features of staff 
generalism contribute to collusion, and that it is a 
serious problem in the Soviet Union. Western organisations 
operating on a staff generalist basis would be equally 
susceptible to it. The reaction which seems to have the
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least effect on the basic nature of staff generalism is 
increased supervision. In the Soviet Union the enormous 
allocation of resources to the party apparatus's supervisory 
functions is such a fundamental part of the system that 
it probably does not enter into Soviet calculations of 
organisational efficiency. However Western organisational 
leaders are likely to regard the creation of a whole 
supervisory staff network parallel to line hierarchies 
with less favour, although it is true that most Western 
organisations do already have extensive supervisory 
networks. The increase in the amount of supervision might 
not be enormous.
The essential principle of having staff officials 
with broad experience and training closely integrated into 
line organisations, with powers of investigation and 
recommendation and the task of encouraging long-term 
improvements in performance, is therefore one that could 
be of interest and benefit to Western organisational 
leaders. Although it should not be thought that I am 
advocating the use of staff generalist systems, or the 
PPO system, in Western organisations, Soviet experience 
suggests that such a development would be feasible.
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APPENDIX A
SOME DESCRIPTIVE AND STATISTICAL DATA 
ON THE NUMBERS, MEMBERS AND INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION 
OF NON-PRODUCTION PPO' S
Although in my "staff" analogy I have compared 
the PPO to an administrative unit, the comparison cannot 
be considered precise, since the PPO is, after all, a 
group of members of a political party. While the CPSU 
is a long way from being a party in our Western sense, 
it does have some of the features possessed by almost all 
political parties, such as a membership only a small 
proportion of which is made up of full-time party 
officials and some semblance of democratic procedures.
If a PPO is to fulfil its administrative and political 
control functions, it is essential that these features, 
the mass membership and quasi-democratic procedures, be 
properly organised. Thus when we speak of the internal 
operational concerns of PPO's we are speaking of far 
more than simple internal administrative procedures such 
as collecting party dues and keeping membership records.
In fact these tasks are routine and have little significance 
for the life of the PPO in the wider social system.
Therefore they will be left aside.
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I) Organisation and structure
The first internal matter of significance to 
the workings of the PPO within the social system is a 
concern with attaining adequate and proper party membership 
levels and distribution of party membership.and the 
organisation of the membership into useful PPO's and 
subordinate party organisations.
Therefore in this section I will give data on the 
numbers of PPO's and where they are situated; their 
memberships; and their internal structure.
(a) Numbers of PPO's
The best source for brief, but authoritative and 
relatively comprehensive information on the structure of 
PPO's is the relevant paragraphs of the Party Rules.^
The party authorities are concerned to have PPO's 
in a position to control as many working establishments as 
possible. However the Party Rules state that an establish­
ment must have at least three party members before an
1 Ustav KPSS, 1971, op. cit., pp. 44-49.
The point is often made in Soviet sources 
that the Party Rules do not and cannot cover 
every possible situation. P.zh., 11/61, p. 66. 
Therefore from time to time the Central 
Committee issues official instructions on 
the conduct of intra-party affairs. For a 
list of these instructions, see 
Ovganizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy KPSS, 
spravoohnik v voprosakh i otvetakh, Politizdat, 
Moscow, 1973, p. 241
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independent PPO can be formed. If an establishment has 
fewer than three party members, the party members it does 
have become members of a territorially organised PPO, 
based in the country or in a housing unit, or of one com­
bining the party members of a number of establishments.
Before presenting what statistical data I have 
on numbers and membership of PPO's, I would like to discuss 
some problems connected with the formation of PPO's. The 
first problem lies in deciding exactly where PPO's may be 
situated. In general terms the problem is not a great one, 
since in the great majority of cases it is quite simple 
to identify the sort of institution which will have its 
own PPO. Factories and collective and state farms will, 
as long as they have at least three party members, a 
condition almost universally met in modern times. However 
the entitlement of some other types of institutions to 
their own PPO's is open to some doubt.
For example, there is no doubt that a glavk 
(chief administration), upravlenie (administration) or 
department of a ministry do not have their own PPO's. Yet
1 For example, Kommunist Estonii writes of
editorial offices with only one or two 
communists. The communists of six of the 
editorial offices are divided between two 
combined party organisations while those of 
another six offices and a publishing house 
are in the party organisations of higher 
institutions. The communists of one journal 
are in the PPO of the Union of Writers, while 
those of another are in the party organisation 
of the Ministry of Agriculture. Kom.Estonii, 
3/69, p. 48.
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it is considered possible, and indeed desirable that the
departments of local soviet ispolkomy (executive committees)
have independent PPO's.^ " Similarly it is considered
desirable that a school situated within a collective farm
have its own PPO, while a research institute situated
2within a factory need not.
The general principle appears to be that the 
more independent the institution the more likely it is to 
have an independent PPO. This is a principle undoubtedly 
both too obvious and too vague. The precise criteria 
for deciding when an institution is sufficiently independent 
are difficult to ascertain. However if we take ispolkom 
departments and collective farm schools as likely to have 
independent PPO's, while ministerial glavki and departments 
do not, the greater independence of the former can be seen 
in a number of ways.
Firstly the former are not subordinate to any 
one superior institution - they are both examples of the 
Soviet administrative principle of dual subordination.
An ispolkom department is subordinate to the ispolkom and 
the ministry of which it is a territorial sub-unit. A 
collective farm school might be subordinate to the farm 
directorate, but it is also subordinate to the local
1
2
P. zh., 12/73, p. 50; 7/74, pp. 73-74. 
P.zh., 11/67, p. 35; 12/69, p. 19.
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Department of Education.
This is reflected in the legal status of the 
institutions. While ministerial glavki and departments 
are established at the discretion of the minister, the 
formation of ispolkom departments is referred to in 
republican constitutions. Collective farm schools are 
established by the Ministry of Education, not the 
collective farm.^
It is also reflected in the functions of the
different institutions. The Soviet handbook on organisational
questions already cited says that independent PPO's should
be established in ispolkom departments, since they are
"Soviet institutions, each of which fulfils its own specific 
2functions". While there are obvious difficulties in 
deciding which functions are sufficiently "specific" to 
warrant independent PPO's, the difference can be seen 
between ispolkom departments, all pursuing quite separate 
functions, and ministerial glavki, which while functionally 
specialised nevertheless are united together in the 
fulfilment of the tasks of a specialised branch.
The concept of the "independence" of institutions 
enabling them to have independent PPO's is clearly a vague
1
2
See above, pp. 213-218.
Organizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy, op. cit.,
p . 20.
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one. The principle of dual subordination appears to be the 
most effective formal explanation. The other legal and 
functional explanations support the practice determined 
by it, that ispolkom departments and collective farm schools 
can have independent PPO's, while ministerial glavki and 
departments cannot.
Another possible explanation is the territorial 
situation of the particular institutions. In a recent 
handbook on PPO's there was a discussion on whether the 
medical services within enterprises should have their own 
PPO's or only subordinate party organisations within the 
enterprises' PPO's. The conclusion was that it depends on 
the individual circumstances. Some of the factors to be 
considered are the numbers of communists and the territorial 
situation of the enterprise and its sub-units.'*' The point 
of the territorial consideration is that a sub-unit could be 
situated in a different raion or even city, in which case it 
would be considered better for the control of the sub-unit's 
party membership if that sub-unit had an independent PPO, 
subordinate to a closer higher party organ. Thus the 
study farm of the Saratov Agricultural Institute in 1964 
had an independent PPO, subordinate to the party committee 
of the Alamedinsk production administration (the equivalent 
at the time to a raikom) . The fact that the PPO of the
1 Khaldeev, op. cit., p. 391.
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institute itself was subordinate to the Frunze gorkom would
indicate that the farm and the institute were situated in
different administrative areas.^ Similarly, the PPO of
the Academy of Community Services combined the communists
of the Academy's sectors and departments and of the Research
Institute of Communal Water Supply and Purification, while
the communists in the sub-divisions of the Academy in other
2parts of Moscow and other cities have independent PPO's.
Of course this explanation does not help with 
ispolkom departments and collective farm schools. However 
for some other difficult cases it does seem applicable.
So far I have referred only to the possibility
of forming PPO's in particular institutions. This raises
another matter that warrants some attention - the extent to
which it is obligatory to form a PPO in an institution which
has made itself eligible by being the right type of
institution and having at least three party members. The
Party Rules say simply that PPO's "are formed" and that this
3is done by raikomy or gorkomy. There is no suggestion that 
it is obligatory. Yet some commentators have attacked 
raikomy and gorkomy for failing to form PPO's in institutions 
that have fulfilled the formal requirements. Some
1 P.zh., 5/64, p. 36.
2 P.zh., 4/75, pp. 49-50.
3 Ustav KPSS, 1971, op. cit., pp. 43-45.
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commentators claim that the failure to establish PPO' s
whenever possible is a breach of the Party Rules,1 while
others admit that it is entirely up to the local party
2organisation to decide. It seems probable that the
latter is the correct interpretation, although of course
local party organisations can be subjected to considerable
3pressure from above regardless of the formal situation.
Another problem is connected with the place of the 
PPO's in the party hierarchy. It is a general principle 
that they are the lowest level of the hierarchy and are 
directly subordinate to a raikom or gorkom. This excludes 
the possibility of one PPO being subordinate to another. 
However there appear to be some situations where the matter 
is clouded.
For example, Sotsialis ticheskaia industriia
recorded in 1974 a report from the secretary of the party 
committee of Moscow oblast' organisations and institutions
1 P.zh., 5/63, p. 55; 
7/71, pp. 17-18.
Narodnoe obrazovanie,
2 P.zh., 3/67, pp. 68-69.
3 Raikomy and gorkomy are often reluctant to see
more PPO's established in their areas, since 
this means more work for them. This reluctance 
seems to be particularly evident in the case of 
school party organisations, although there are 
examples in lover-level administrative 
apparatuses. P.zh., 3/58, pp. 13-14; Narodnoe 
obrazovanie, 7/71, pp. 17-18; Kom.Belorussii, 
6/70, pp. 37-39; 8/73, p. 4; Kom.(Vilnius),
4/66, p. 37; Kom. Uzbekistana, 3/69, p. 16.
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{uchrezhdenii) that criticism of the head of the 
Construction, Repair and Building Adjustment Administration 
of the Construction Trust of the Moscow oblast' Consumers' 
Union had been found to be justified. He had been given a 
strong reprimand and dismissed from his post by the leader­
ship of the trust. Also the party buro of the administration 
was criticised for poor control of the activity of the 
administration. However practical measures were worked 
out by the party buro and these measures were put into 
practice, under the control of the party committee of Moscow 
oblast' organisations and institutions.-^- This party 
committee played an even more unusual role later in the 
same year. After an examination by the Committee of Party 
Control of the activity of the rector of the Moscow oblast' 
Teachers' College, the party committee of Moscow oblast' 
organisations and institutions removed the secretary of the 
institute's party committee from his post and gave the
former secretary a strong reprimand to be recorded on his 
2party card.
I am unable to discover what sort of party 
organisation this party committee of Moscow oblast' organ­
isations and institutions is. It has no place in the Party 
Rules and people in Moscow, knowledgeable in these areas,
1 Sotsialisticheskaia industriia, 2/6/74, p. 2.
2 P.zh., 11/74, p. 65.
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have assured me that there can be no such organisation.
If the party committee is the executive organ of a PPO, 
how does it have such authority over other PPO's? It is 
possible that it is not the executive organ of a PPO, 
but is a higher-level party organ established to supervise 
the PPO's of institutions which have sub-divisions 
scattered throughout Moscow, and therefore not having any 
single raikom to which they can be subordinated. This 
seems particularly possible when one considers the case of 
the construction administration but less so in the case of 
the Teachers' College.
The committee appears to bear some similarity to 
the party committees of the Academies of Sciences.
The research institutes of the Academies of 
Science have their own PPO's. One would expect these 
PPO's to be entirely subordinate to the raikom or gorkom 
in whose territory they are situated. However there is 
considerable evidence that to some extent they are also 
subordinate to the party organisation of the Academy of 
Science of which they are part. Before presenting this 
evidence I should mention that the party organisations of 
Academies of Science are of the administrative (uohrezhdenskii) 
type. The reason that commentators always gave for 
administrative PPO's not having the right of control is that 
such institutions often have numerous subordinate
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institutions with their own PPO's, often in other areas and 
so subordinate to different raikomy . For the administrative 
PPO to concern itself with the activities of the PPO's in 
these subordinate institutions would involve podmena of the 
raikomy. This would seem to indicate that the authority 
of the "host" organisation over a subordinate institution 
does not give the PPO of the "host" organisation authority 
over the PPO of the subordinate institution.
Yet Vucinich states, unfortunately without
reference to any source, that the party organisation of
the Presidium of the Academy of Science controls the entire
network of party organisations operating within the Academy 
2of Science. A member of the PPO of the Institute of
Economics of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences wrote to
Partiinaia zhizn ' in 1964 complaining that the party
committee of the Academy changed the decisions of his
party organisation on internal PPO matters without even
telling anyone. The journal found the criticism justified.
However neither the letter writer nor the journal were
complaining about the fact that the decisions were changed,
but rather about the fact that they were changed without
3the institute party organisation being told. A report on
1
2
3
See above, pp. 312-313. 
Vucinich, op. cit., p. 36. 
P.zh.f 14/64, pp. 54-55.
555 .
the Tenth All-Academy party conference of the Azerbaidzhan
Academy of Sciences speaks of the need "that the link
between the Academy party committee and lower party
organisations be stronger and that its help to them be
more substantial and concrete". This is immediately,
within the same paragraph, followed by discussion of the
shortcomings in the internal administration of the PPO's
in the Academy's institutes.^" The party committee of
the Moldavian Academy of Sciences involves itself in the
philosophical seminars run as part of the party indoctrin-
2ation programmes of institute party organisations.
The same party committee concerns itself with ideological
3mistakes make by scientists.
Other reports show that the involvement of 
Academy party organisations is not limited to internal 
and ideological matters. For example, at the election- 
report meeting of the party organisation of the Moldavian 
Academy in 1963 the organisation was criticised for 
failing to take measures to raise the role of the Scientific
4Councils of research institutes. In 1955 the party 
committee of the Ukrainian Academy was criticised for doing
1 Bakinskii rabochii, 2/12/70, p. 2.
2 Kom.Moldavii, 8/68, p. 53.
3 Sovetskaia Moldaviia, 14/7/72, p. 2. 
Sovetskaia Moldaviia, 19/11/63, p. 2.4
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too little about scientists of the Institute of Machine
Management occupying two positions at once (sovmestitel ’stvo)
and for not sufficiently concerning itself with evaluating
scientific work and its introduction into production and
not demanding these types of concerns of institute party
organisations.'*' In 1971 the party committee of the
Moldavian Academy examined the work of the party organisation
of the Institute of Chemistry, paying particular attention
2to raising the "vanguard" role of communists in science.
A general party meeting in the same Academy heard a report 
(otch'dt) from the secretary of the party organisation of 
the Institute of Geophysics and Geology, in which was 
summarised the experience of communists in deciding such 
matters as perfecting the organisation of labour and planning
3research activity.
What are the possible explanations for this 
influence of Academy party organisations over the party 
organisations of Academy institutes?
The first explanation that comes to mind is that 
the Academy party organisations are large enough to be given 
the rights of a raikom. The secretary of the party organisationft
of the Siberian section of the All-Union Academy declared in
1 Kom. Ukrainy, 8/55, pp. 48-49.
2 Sovetskaia Moldaviia, 8/7/71, p. 2.
3 Sovetskaia Moldaviia, 14/7/72, p. 2.
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1961 that the organisation had over 1,000 members.^ This 
would certainly be enough to give it the rights of a
raikom.
However there are a number of problems involved 
with this explanation. Firstly the rights of a raikom 
extend only to internal PPO matters - matters such as 
confirming the admittance of new members and applying 
party discipline. Therefore this cannot explain activities 
in the ideological or science areas, such as I have 
described above.
Secondly the granting of the rights of a raikom 
to a PPO does not give it any powers over other PPO's.
For example, a ministerial PPO with the rights of a raikom 
is not entitled to exercise these rights over the PPO of a 
factory in the ministerial system. Having the rights of a 
raikom means no more than the PPO is able to take decisions 
on internal matters concerning its own members without 
having to have them confirmed by the raikom.
Clearly this explanation is inadequate. The 
second possibility is that the party organisations of 
Academies (and of the Moscow oblast1 organisations and 
institutions referred to above) are not in fact PPO's. There 
is some evidence to support this view.
1 P.zh., 20/61, p. 31.
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Firstly there is the membership of these
organisations. I have already said that research
institutes have their own PPO's. All party members working
in these institutes belong to their institute's PPO. Since
a communist cannot belong to more than one PPO, this
leaves only those party members working in the administrative
apparatus of the Academy to belong to the Academy's party
organisation. It is hard to imagine that the apparatus
of the Siberian section of the All-Union Academy would
have over one thousand party members. This figure probably
refers to all party members working in the apparatus and
institutes, regardless of the PPO to which they belong.
The same could be said of the 1,500 members that work in
the Azerbaidzhan Academy.'*' These 1,500 communists were
represented at the Tenth All-Academy party conference.
Apparently this conference was different from a party
meeting of the Academy's PPO. Similarly there are references
to general party meetings of the Moldavian Academy, again
2attended by communists from all institute PPO's.
Presumably the Academy party committees are the 
executive organs of some party organisation higher than a 
PPO. The existence of PPO's specifically situated in the 
apparatuses of Academies supports this conclusion. Thus 
Kommunist (Litva) received a letter from a worker in the
1
2
Bakinskii rabochii, 2/12/70, p. 2. 
Sovetskaia Moldaviia, 14/7/72, p. 2.
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central apparatus of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences.
He wrote:
Our central institution (uchrezhdenie) , 
the party organisation of which I am a 
member, exercises leadership over research 
institutes. The party organisation is 
basically made up of the leaders and 
workers of individual departments, 
little connected with each other; the 
party organisation does not have the 
right of control of the activity of the 
administration, the leaders of the 
institution themselves being in other 
organisations.
He asks what this PPO may do. The journal replies that 
it may not directly concern itself with the work of 
subordinate institutes, that it must limit its concern 
to the operations of the apparatus itself."*" It is this 
PPO that is the equivalent to the party organisation of a 
ministry - it can concern itself with its departments 
etc., but not with subordinate, but independent institutions.
1 Kom.Sov.Latvii, 8/70, pp. 67-69.
2 I have also seen a reference to the "party 
committee of the Presidium of the All-Union 
Academy". Sotsialisticheskaia industriia, 
28/3/74, p. 1. Unfortunately the reference 
gives no information about the membership or 
tasks of this committee. All I know is that 
its secretary, E.N. Mukhin, had in earlier 
years worked and published as a botanist in 
the Academy's Institutes of Photosynthesis and 
Biochemistry.
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It appears probable that there are PPO's 
purely for Academy apparatus workers and that the party 
committee of Academies about which we read are not simply 
the executive organs of these organisations. They appear 
rather to be the executive organs of the general organis­
ations of all Academy party members. The basic problem is 
what kind of organisations and organs these are. There are 
no references to them in the Party Rules nor have I read 
any specific or detailed discussion of their formal status 
in the Soviet press. Also I have read no reports of their 
relations with other party bodies - particularly with 
raikomy or gorkomy. We should remember that Academy 
institutes are not necessarily all situated in the same 
raion. Therefore their party organisations are subordinate, 
according to the normal understanding of the party hierarchy, 
to different raikomy. This makes it difficult to decide 
which party body the Academy party committees might be 
subordinate to and what might be their relations with 
these different raikomy .
One possibility is that the All-Academy party 
conferences are similar to the general meetings of the party 
aktivy of creative unions referred to in Appendix B. These 
party aktivy are seen by Soviet commentators as being subject 
to the rules applying to party groups in non-party organis­
ations, as set out in Paragraphs 68 and 69 of the Party Rules.^
1 See below, pp. 660-661.
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This means that they are directly subordinate to the 
"relevant" party organisation, in the case of the 
Academies presumably the All-Union or republican Central 
Committees.
There are considerable differences between the 
situation in the Academies and the creative union.
Firstly, the party aktivy of the creative unions do not 
appear to have such formalised executive organs as the 
Academies', with party committees and buros and elected 
secretaries. The more formal the structure the more 
surprising it is that it has no formal expression.
More importantly there is the difference in the 
subordinate organisations of the Academies and the creative 
unions. The creative unions do not have the extensive 
network of subordinate organisations with independent PPO's 
that the Academies have. There appear to be no parallels 
to be found in the party aktivy of creative unions or 
party groups in non-party organisations with the powers 
of Academy party committees to influence the activities 
of the PPO's of subordinate institutes.
It is unfortunate that, because we can come to 
no conclusions about the formal status of the party 
committee and buros of Academies, it is difficult to come 
to any conclusions on their status and significance in
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practice. While the empiricial evidence suggests that 
some considerable powers exist in practice, it is not 
sufficient for us to essentially modify our view of the 
workings of the party apparatus and research PPO's according 
to the general understanding of its hierarchical structure.
In this examination of the place of PPO's in the 
party hierarchy there is one last problem that is rather 
more straightforward. What at first glance appears to be 
a similar situation to that I have just been describing 
turns out to be no more than terminological confusion.
Soviet commentators use a number of terms to refer to PPO's 
and their subordinate party organisations. I have always 
referred to "primary party organisation" as the organis­
ation of all party members in a single working institution 
(with the qualification that some PPO's will have communists 
from a number of institutions). Such an organisation is 
subordinate to a raikom or gorkom. Yet we read that the 
All-Union Ministry of Chemical Industry has forty PPO's 
and a single party committee supervising the lot.^ This 
is despite the fact that the Eighteenth Party Congress, 
formally defining the status and powers of the different 
types of PPO's for the first time, declared that there would 
be a single PPO for the entire apparatus of each People's 
Commissariat.^
1
2
P.zh., 14/54, p. 18.
KPSS v re zoliutsiiakh, vol. 2, 1925-53, op. cit., 
p. 922 .
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But what is actually meant is that the 
ministry's PPO has 40 subordinate party organisations 
with the rights of PPO's in their internal affairs.
Paragraph 54 of the Party Rules states:
In enterprises, collective farms and 
institutions, having over 50 members and 
candidates, within the general primary 
party organisation, with the permission 
of the raikom, gorkom or okruzhkom, there 
may be established party organisations in 
shops (tsekhi), sections, farms, brigades, 
departments, etc.'*'
Throughout the rest of the Rules these party organisations 
are referred to generically as shop {tsekhovy e) party 
organisations. Tsekh is the Russian word for shop, in the 
sense of a workshop in a factory. In administrative 
apparatuses the equivalent of the shop is the chief 
administration (glavnoe upravlenie or glavk), administration 
(upravlenie) or department [otdel). Sometimes one sees the 
words kantselariia and kontora (office). In universities 
the equivalents are faculties and departments and in research 
institutes departments, sections and laboratories.
But in Paragraph 57 the Party Rules go on to
declare:
1 Ustav KPSS, 1971, op. cit., pp. 45-46.
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In large enterprises and institutions, 
numbering over 300 members and candidates, 
and in special circumstances, taking into 
account production peculiarities and 
territorial factors, in organisations numbering 
over 100 communists, with the permission of 
the obkom, kraikom or Union Republic Central 
Committee there may be formed party committees, 
upon which the shop party organisations of 
these enterprises and institutions receive 
the rights of primary party organisations.^"
Thus the Ministry of Chemical Industry had at least 300 
party members working in its apparatus and therefore in 
40 glavki, administrations and departments there were 
subordinate party organisations with PPO rights in their 
internal affairs.
Throughout this thesis I use the term "primary 
party organisation" to refer only to the party organisation 
of a whole working institution. I usually speak of the 
party organisations in subdivisions of the institution as 
simply "subordinate party organisations" or else by the 
specific name of the subdivision, for example, glavk party 
organisation.
1 ibid, pp. 47-49.
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I will now try to ignore the problems just 
discussed and give as clearly as possible some general 
statistics on PPO1s. Unfortunately Soviet statistics 
are rarely complete or consistent. However, since I am 
not so much concerned with strict statistical accuracy as 
with giving some general impression, I will present what 
data I have.
1. Numbers of PPO's 
(i) Numbers
Table 1 gives the simple figures for the numbers 
of PPO's in the Soviet Union according to category. The 
categories with which I am concerned are the fourth and 
fifth. Tables 6 and 8 give the figures for these same two 
categories for Moscow city and oblast' and for Kazakhstan.
The figures for Estonia and Azerbaidzhan, presented in Tables 
2 and 7, give some further breakdown of these categories.
They give some idea of the proportions within the fourth 
category, although one could wish for greater detail on 
educational establishments. Unfortunately they do very 
little to give us a better picture of the fifth category.
(ii) Numbers of institutions with PPO's
Considering the party's motives in having PPO's 
in working institutions, more significant data are those 
that show the proportion of institutions having PPO's. 
Unfortunately Soviet data on the number of institutions 
in different categories are hard to come by, and also often
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infuriatingly difficult to correlate through different 
years, categories and regions. However such general data 
as I do have are presented in Table 3. It is obvious that 
there are very large gaps. Some commentary, supported by 
any additional statistical data, could help fill in the 
gaps.
(a) Educational establishments
It is almost certain that all tertiary educational 
establishments, particularly universities, have their own 
PPO's. The situation with regard to lower-level establish­
ments is less certain. It was reported in 1964 that the 
majority of secondary and primary schools in the Soviet 
Union had PPO's.^ In 1962 Orenburg oblast' reported that
2all its secondary and most of its primary schools had PPO's. 
In 1964 it was reported from the city of Bender in Moldavia 
that all but one of its schools had PPO's, while in 1972 
it was claimed that in Latvia every general education or
3technical school had a PPO or party group. Yet it was 
reported that in Moldavia in 1971 there were 735 
secondary schools while there were only 413 school
4(apparently of any type) PPO's. Similarly in Khorezm 
oblastf in Uzbekistan in 1972 there were 400 schools and
1 P.zh. , 17/64, p. 7.
2 P.zh., 17/62, p. 13.
3 Kom.Moldavia, 11/64, p. 25; Kom.Sov.Latvii,
8/72, p. 54.
4 Narodnoe obrazovanie, 3/71, p. 11.
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227 school PPO's.^
Although none of these figures allow any firm 
statistical conclusions, it would appear that by no means 
all non-tertiary educational establishments have their own 
PPO's. This would particularly apply to rural areas.
However the trend probably is towards more and more PPO's 
and the time when the vast majority of educational establish­
ments have their own PPO's might not be far off.
(b) Science, health and culture
Unfortunately statistics on scientific institutions, 
whether collated or isolated, appear to be almost non­
existent. About all I can do is make the rather obvious 
statement that the more important, and more particularly, 
the larger the institution, the more likely it is to have 
its own PPO. However it is less probable that all con­
struction buros and design offices would. One other 
consideration, mentioned in the discussion above, is the 
possibility of a research institute being part of a large 
production enterprise. For example, the Institute of 
Heavy Machine Construction is part of the Ural ’mashzavod
and its party committee is closely watched over by the
2factory party committee. This presumably means that the 
research institute does not have its own PPO, unless the
1
2
Kom.Uzbekistana, 1/72, p. 51 
P. zh. , 14/62, p. 19.
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type of situation that applies to Academies of Science 
also applies here. We should also remember that research 
institutes are becoming parts of scientific-production 
associations, with the apparently as yet undetermined 
party structures in these organisations.^"
The same comments apply to health and cultural 
institutions. Large hospitals and cultural institutions 
would probably have their own PPO's. However many such 
institutions, particularly those situated in more remote 
areas, are small and feature in lists of institutions 
without PPO's.^
(c) Administrative organs
The statistics for this category are again 
unfortunately sparse. It is clear that all ministries
and equivalent agencies have their own PPO's. However when
\
we get to the innumerable administrative units at lower,
particularly city and raion levels, PPO's probably become
rarer. Such institutions feature among lists of institutions
3that do not have PPO's. In Spasskii raion in Riazan 
oblast' in 1967 half the administrative units of the
1 Territorial disposition and size are apparently 
the main determinants of whether the member 
units of an association retain independent 
PPO's.
2
3
Kom. , 2/57, p. 22; P.zh., 1/62, p. 9; 1/65, p. 80.
P. zh. , 15/58, pp. 17-18; 1/65, p. 80.
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the raion did not have PPO's.^
2. Members of PPO's.
Even when an institution has a PPO, for that PPO 
to work properly it is important that it be strong in 
overall membership and that the membership be well distrib­
uted throughout the institution. The PPO leadership needs 
a reasonable number of rank-and-file party members to 
provide the constant informal observation of individuals
and institutional sub-units and to fulfil the numerous
2formal indoctrination and control tasks. Also, if party 
discipline is to be a significant weapon in the hands of 
PPO's, a significant proportion of "host" organisation
3members, particularly leading members, must be party members.
(i) Numbers of communists
The figures on numbers of communists come from 
the same sources as those on numbers of PPO's. Therefore 
there are the same problems of inadequate breakdown of 
categories. The figures are presented in Tables 4, 5, 6,
7, 8 and 9.
1 P. zh. , 16/67, p. 68.
2 P.zh. , 21/74, p. 58.
I have already described the involvement 
of PPO's in implementing party membership 
policies. See above, pp. 123-126.
3
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The most interesting feature about Table 4 is 
the drastic decline in the percentage of communists 
working in administrative organs. Presumably party 
membership is now granted to a greater proportion of 
non-administrative workers as party control of all 
sections of society strengthens. Table 5 shows that the 
fall was originally accompanied by a fall in the average 
number of communists in each administrative PPO. Indeed 
there was a fall in the average size of all non-production 
PPO's between 1946 and 1956, after which date they again 
rose and then substantially stabilised. The original fall 
can only be interpreted as a result of a drive to increase 
the number of PPO's, despite the fact that party membership 
was not growing at the same rate. Strangely the original 
fall is not reflected so strongly, or not seen at all, in 
the data from the republics in Tables 7, 8 and 9.
The figures on the proportions of communists 
working in different categories of institutions show that 
non-production institutions have far fewer party members 
than production enterprises. One might suspect, therefore, 
that middle and higher level party organisations might 
tend to neglect non-production PPO's. However the overall 
figures can be misleading in this regard, since often 
individual vaiony and cities have far greater proportions 
of non-production communists than national and republican 
averages. Thus in 1971 in the Soviet Union as a whole only
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16.5% of communists worked in science, education, health
or culture, while the figure for Moscow was 33.7%. The
proportions for administrative organs were: Soviet Union,
8.6%; Moscow city, 19.5%. In 1963 27.5% of the communists
in Leningrad's Petrogradskii vaion worked in scientific
establishments; 24.2% of those in Smol'nii; 23/9% of
those in Vasil' eostrovskii; and 19.9% in the Vyborg.^"
In 1970 over one third of the communists in the
Cheremushkii vaion of Moscow worked in scientific
institutions, while the same proportion in Moscow's
Oktiabrskii vaion worked in scientific and tertiary
2educational institutions. About one half of the party 
members of the Bauman vaion of Moscow and the Leninskii
3
vaion of Kuibyshev are administrative workers. About 
20% of the communists in the Leninskii vaion in Kishinev
4work in ministries and other administrative agencies.
(ii) Average membership of PPO's
It is the number of party members in each PPO 
which is perhaps the best statistical indicator of strength. 
Overall averages can be seen in Tables 5 to 9. Except for 
the decline between 1946 and 1956 already mentioned non-
1 P.zh. , 9/63, p. 18.
2 Kom. , 7/74, p. 43; Mosk.pvavda, 21/2/71, p. 2.
3 P.zh., 2/62, p. 13; 18/72, p. 31.
Kom.Moldavii, 7/66, p. 35.4
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production PPO's have reached not insignificant membership 
levels that appear to have stabilised somewhat in recent 
years. Of course, the categories used are very general.
I can only present some scattered data in an attempt to 
break the categories down further.
(a) Educational establishments
I have collected figures on 31 tertiary educational 
establishments. These have a total of at least 27,333 
party members at an average of 881.7 each. They ranged from 
over 7,000 party members in Moscow State University to the 
25 members of the First Donetsk Mining Institute.'*' I have 
figures for four universities. They are:
Moscow State University - 3,114 (1958)
- over 5,000 (1966)
- over 7,000 (1976)
Kiev State University - 2,700 (1973)
Kazakh State University - 710 (1974)
Latvian State University - 430 (1969)
(Sources: P.zh., 1/58, p. 15; 20/76, p. 32;
Korn., 10/66, p. 34; Pravda Ukrainy,
5/10/76, p. 1; P.zh.Kaz., 1/74, p. 51;
Kom.Sov.Latvii, 1/69, p. 39.)
Among schools in general I have identified 172 
establishments with 2,420 party members between them, making
1 Kom., 15/71, p. 48; P.zh., 20/76, p. 32.
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an average of 14.1. These ranged from 23 party members 
in a secondary school in Kirov oblast' to seven members in 
a Latvian secondary school.^
Among secondary schools I have found 13 with 17 8
party members, an average of 13.7. These range from 25 in
a secondary school in Akhtiubinsk oblast' in Kazakhstan to
2the seven in the Latvian school mentioned above.
I have also identified four technical schools that 
had 201 party members at an average of 50.3.
As one would expect the tertiary PPO's are far 
larger than those in schools. However I am somewhat 
surprised at the apparent size of school PPO's. However 
the data in the tables and my own data do not include 
schools without PPO's. If these data are considered we 
could conclude that schools, particularly those in rural 
areas, are among the poorest institutions in terms of 
party presence.
(b) Scientific institutions
The science category cannot be broken down further 
than the average seen in Table 7. However we can compare 
the figures for Azerbaidzhan given in that Table with some
1 P.zh., 7/61, p. 50; Sovetskaia Litva, 10/4/71,
p. 32.
2 P.zh.Kaz., 5/67, p. 23; Sovetskaia Litva
10/3/71, p. 2.
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All-Union figures:
year average number
of communists
1956 45
1962 74
1965 86
(Sources: Kom. , 2/62, p. 58; P.3/2., 17/65,
p. 18.)
The increases in average size are quite dramatic. The 
smaller size of the Azerbaidzhani scientific party organ­
isations indicates the republic's relative unimportance 
as a scientific centre.
Party memberships in scientific institutions I 
have identified range from 20 in the Moscow oblast' 
Tuberculosis Institute to the 700 approximately in the 
All-Union Electrotechnical Institute and the Paton Institute 
of Electrical Welding."^ One could conclude that, in general 
scientific party organisations are large enough to work 
efficiently.
(c) Medical institutions
Hospital party organisations vary considerably.
The Azerbaidzhani averages can be seen in Table 7. These 
compare with the 1967 All-Union average of 21.4. I have 
identified a size range from six (a raion hospital in
1 Pravda, 25/6/39, p. 2; P.zh., 10/72, p. 38; 
Kom., 6/4/73, p. 28.
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Magadan oblast1 2345678) to 245 (the Podol' central raion 
hospital).^
(d) Cultural institutions
Some republican averages for cultural institutions
in general can be seen in Tables 7 and 9. I can give some
scattered figures for a further breakdown. I have identified
8 theatres with 161 party members, an average of 20.1,
ranging in size from the Serov Drama Theatre of Sverdlovsk
(3 party members) to the Riga Academic Theatre for Opera and
2Ballet (40 party members). The only orchestra whose party
3membership I know is the Sverdlovsk Philharmonic with 25.
I have identified a single cinema, in Ulianovsk, with 19
4party members, although 16 of these are pensioners. The 
Moscow House of Culture has 16 communists, of whom 6 work
5in the institution. While in 1972 the Estonian Central
Library had 17 party members, the Riazan oblast1 library
6 7had 28. The Pavlodar Museum had 30 party members.in 1968.
The PPO of the Latvian museums of history and revolution
has a membership of 32. It combines the communists of threegcollectives, while 7 of the communists are pensioners.
1 P. zh., 16/67, p. 42; 3/70, pp. 41-42; 12/72, p. 50.
2 P.zh.,2/61, p. 53; Kom.Sov.Latvii, 8/72, p. 46.
3 P.zh., 2/67, p. 53.
4 P.zh., 19/70, p. 56.
5 P.zh., 19/70, p. 59.
6 Sovetskaia Estoniia, 10/10/72, p. 2; P.zh.3 
17/71, p. 16.
7 Kom.Ukvainy , 12/68, p. 41.
8 Kom.Sov.Latvii, 7/71, p. 59.
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(e) Administrative organs
I have found the party membership levels of ten
ministries and equivalent agencies. These range in size
from the 1,085 party members of the All-Union Ministry
of Chemical Production to the 65 of the Moldavian Ministry
of Food Production.^ The average membership of these ten
is 232.5. However it should be realised that six of these
are Union Republic and republican level ministries, which
are smaller than All-Union ministries. When we read that
in 1966 there were 46 ministries and State Committees
whose PPO's had the rights of a raikom, that is had at
least 1,000 party members, we realise that our average is
probably too low for the All-Union level, although possibly
2reasonably accurate for the lower levels.
Of administrative organs at the ob last' level I 
have identified five, with 380 party members at an average 
of 76.0. . •
At the city and raion level I have found 30 units
with 615 communists at an average of 20.5. These range from
the Spasskii raion Office for Local Enterprises with 5 party
members to the apparatus of the Leninskii raiispolkom in
3Alma-Ata with 36 communists. Note that five of the members 
of the latter are pensioners.
1 Pravda. 10/3/69, p. 2; Kom.Moldavii, 8/67, p. 59.
2 P.zh., 24/66, p. 30.
3 P.zh., 16/67, p. 68; 1/67, p. 36.
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(iii) Proportions of workers that are communists
A better indicator of the strength of a PPO is 
the proportion of the work-force of the "host" organisation 
that belongs to the party, and who the party members are, 
particularly whether they are institutional leaders.
Table 10 gives some very general proportions.
The only comment I would like to make is further to the
note on the proportions among administrative workers. They
are clearly overstated. However I would like to emphasise
that the proportion of communists among administrative
workers in the central apparatuses of ministries and
equivalent agencies is very high. The usual figures is
about 50%.^ Partiinaia zhizn' wrote in 1966 that often
up to 70% of workers in ministerial apparatuses are 
2communists. The proportions of communists in the work-force
of other non-production categories can also be high. In
1973 half the teaching staff of Soviet tertiary educational
3establishments were communists. In Estonia in the same 
year a surprising 40% of the teaching staffs of general 
education schools were communists, and 33% of the teachers
1 P.zh., 21/66, p. 30; 11/68, p. 18; 12/73,
p. 18; Kom.Sov.Latvii, 7/67, p. 53; 1/71,
p. 58; P.zh.Kaz., 8/69, p. 17; Kom. 
Belorussii, 11/72, p. 43.
2 P.zh. , 24/66, p. 26.
3 Kom.Moldavii, 9/73, p. 36.
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in technical schools. However in 1974 in Moscow only
12,700, that is, 28.9%, of the 44,000 school teachers
2were communists. This presumably indicates a far lower 
proporition of communists in primary schools. Similarly 
in Moscow in 1972 of the 70,196 workers in scientific
3institutions, only 15,630, or 22.3% were party members.
Probably more important than the proportion of 
the work-force that are communists is who these communists 
are. The only general figures I have apply to the workers 
of the Moskovskii raiispolkom in Leningrad. They are 
presented in Table 11. The table confirms the impression 
that most leading personnel in an institution are party 
members, but that as we pass down the ranks party member­
ship becomes ever rarer.
Isolated data I have found supports this 
impression, although they also suggest that to presume 
that all leading personnel are party members would be 
dangerous.
(a) Educational establishments
In one raion in Magadan oblast'all school
directors and zavuchi (head of studies) are communists and
all secondary schools in Shilal'sk raion in Lithuania are
4headed by communists. Yet in Lithuania in 1966 only 75%
1 Sovetskaia Estoniia, 1/9/73, p. 1.
2 P.zh. , 15/74, p. 12.
3 Kom., 11/72, p. 51.
4 P.zh. , 23/68, p. 64; Sovetskaia Litua, 23/12/71, p. 2
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of directors of primary schools and nearly all directors
of secondary schools were party members.'*' With regard to
lower-level leading personnel, 78% of department heads
at the Moscow Technical College were party members in 1971
2and 72% of the professors and 58% of the dotsenty.
However the dean of a faculty of the Taganrog Radiotechnical
Institute and the deputy director for administration of a
3secondary school were not party members. Apparently for 
many years the rector of Moscow State University was not a 
party member.
It is considered important that students of
tertiary institutions be represented in the party membership.
In 1958 there were just over 250 student communists (28.7%
of all communists) at the Moscow Agricultural Academy; 296,
that is 9.5%, at Moscow State University; and 77, 23.3%, at
the Moscow Institute of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy. These
4percentages were considered too low. ' At the Moscow
Conservatorium in 1971, out of 173 party members, 20 were
5students and four were aspiranty. In 1976 the PPO of 
Moscow State University had over 7,000 members. There were
1 Kom.Sov.Latvii, 4/66 , p. 34.
2 Kom. , 10/71, p. COin
3 P. zh., 2/72, p. 47; 18/74, p. 69.
4 P. zh., 1/58, p . 15.
5 Sovetskaia kul 'tura, 1/7/72, p. 1.
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over 7,000 academic workers in the university, but only 
one third of these were party members. This means that 
a surprising two-thirds of the PPO membership were 
administrative, service and technical workers and students."^
(b) Scientific institutions
It was reported in 1972 that communists were in
charge of nearly all important departments of the All-Union
2Institute of Elementary Organic Formations. Yet it could 
only be said that over half the heads of departments and 
laboratories of the Central Scientific-Research and Design- 
Construction Institute for the Organisation and Technique
3of Administration were party members in 1970. However 
ten out of twelve departments of the Institute of Acoustics 
were headed by communists in 1971 and 83% of departments 
and laboratories of the research institutes and construction
4buros in Obninsk oblast' in 1974.
(c) Administrative organs
In 1964 communists headed all the administrations
and over two-thirds of the departments of the North Caucases 
5sovnarkhoz. Communists usually headed administrations and
1 P.zh., 20/76, pp. 32-36.
2 Kom. , 6/72, p. 93.
3 Kom.Belovussii, 8/70, p. 20.
4 Mosk.pravda, 18/2/71, p. 2; P.zh., 2/74, p. 30. 
P.zh., 17/64, p. 33.5
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departments of the Latvian Ministry of Local Industry.^
Although the heads of the office and a department of the
Irkutsk oblast’ branch of Gosbank were not party members
2their deputies were.
3. Subordinate party organisations
This concludes the sections on probably the most 
important aspects of statistical data on PPO's - overall 
numbers and membership. However there are other aspects 
that are also of significance, particularly when related to 
the question of the strength and effectiveness of party 
organisations.
Firstly we have to consider the number and strengths 
of subordinate party organisations. I have already mentioned 
the importance of having party members well distributed 
throughout the "host" organisation, so that all areas of its 
work will be under constant party observation. I have also 
already referred to Paragraphs 54 and 57 of the Party Rules, 
relating to the establishment of subordinate party organis­
ations, and the possibility of them gaining some further 
3powers.
1 Kom. Sov.Latvii, 7/67, p
2 P. zh . , 10/61, pp. 55-56
3 See above, pp. 563-564.
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Statistical data on such organisations are 
presented in Tables 12 and 13. From data already 
identified on party membership in different categories 
of institutions it is not difficult to determine where 
subordinate organisations are likely to be concentrated.
(a) Educational establishments 
One would expect that subordinate party 
organisations would be concentrated in the PPO's of 
tertiary educational institutions, rather than schools, 
since they have the larger memberships. Of the 172 school 
PPO's whose memberships I have identified, none have the 
required 50 party members to establish a subordinate 
party organisation.^
1 However subordinate organisations are not unknown
in schools. For example, in Simferopol raion in 
the Crimean oblast’ in 1971 there were 13 school 
PPO's that had between them 235 party members and 
15 subordinate party organisations. Note that 
the average party membership of these is only 18.1. 
P.zh., 24/71, p. 61. Even stranger is the case of 
the 44 schools in Belgorod ob last' with subordinate 
party organisations with the rights of PPO's.
P.zh., 12/69, p. 61. Clearly in these cases the 
Party Rules have not been adhered to. Pavtiinaia 
zhizn’ Kazakhstana did say in 1961 that educational 
establishments having kursy could have a PPO in 
each kuvs (that is, a subordinate party organis­
ation with PPO rights). P.zh.Kaz., 5/61, p. 69. 
Unfortunately I am unsure what a kuvs is.
Usually it means a year of study - first year, second 
year, etc. Perhaps the Kazakh journal is differ­
entiating those schools that have students separated 
into different classes for their years and those 
with so few students that they all work, physically, 
together, as in Australian country schools.
However this would lead to an enormous number of 
very small subordinate party organisations with 
PPO rights, something which I feel is rare in 
practice.
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(b) Scientific, health and cultural institutions
Of the 183 scientific institutions whose party
membership I-have identified only 16 had over 50 party 
members, while six had over 300. Of 16 hospitals seven had 
less than 50 party members, as did all 15 cultural 
institutions.
(c) Administrative organs
Table 13 confirms what could be expected, that 
the PPO's of central and regional administrative apparatuses 
are more substnatial than those of raion apparatuses. I 
have not identified any raion or city-level administrative 
PPO's with over 50 party members. However all administrative 
units at higher levels do.
One thing that will affect the number of subordinate 
party organisations at lower administrative levels is the 
periodic campaigns to establish PPO's in ispolkom 
departments. In 1974 Partiinaia zhizn' was of the opinion 
that it was better to have independent PPO's in each ispolkom 
department, since they have greater powers than subordinate 
party organisations.'*' Such a development would obviously 
reduce the number of subordinate party organisations in the 
administrative category.
Among the ten ministries and equivalent agencies 
I have identified four have the 300 party members necessary
1 P.zh. , 7/74, pp. 73-74.
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to establish subordinate party organisations with PPO 
rights. Most seem to have quite extensive subordinate 
structures, ranging up to the 50 subordinate party 
organisations, all with PPO rights, in the RSFSR Ministry 
of Agriculture.^"
4. Organs of PPO's
The final aspect to be covered statistically is 
the executive organs of PPO's. The existence of a party 
buro rather than simply a secretary, or of a party 
committee rather than a buro is primarily an indicator of 
the strength of a PPO, rather than the source of that 
strength. The Party Rules state that primary or subord­
inate organisations of less than 15 members have no execut­
ive organ, the conduct of everday affairs being left to 
the party organisation's secretary and deputy.
However most party organisations elect for a 
period of one year a party buro, although those with more 
than 300, and in special circumstances, 100 members, 
elect a party committee. Party committees are elected for 
two to three years, their size being decided by a general 
party meeting.^
1
2
P.zh., 9/69, p . 51.
Ustav KPSS, 1971, op. cit., pp. 46-49.
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The figures show that in 1973 a surprising 
40.5% of PPO's had fewer than the 15 members needed to 
elect a party buro.^ It should already be evident to 
which categories these PPO's are likely to belong - 
schools, the lower levels of the administrative apparatuses 
and smaller cultural institutions.
In 1973 33,269 PPO's had party committees,
2of which 16,854 were non-production organisations. This
compares to the 1,981 non-production PPO's that had party
buros or committees in Moscow oblast1 in 1970, out of a
3total number of 4,119 PPO's with such organs. Figures 
for party committees in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Estonia 
are shown in Table 14. It can be seen that the numbers 
are very low.
(i) Membership of party buros and committees
In 1925 the All-Union Central Committee established
that a party organisation with up to 50 party members
would have a buro of 3 to 5 members; between 50 and 100
4members, a buro of 7 to 9; and 100 and over, 9 to 11. 
Although the Party Rules now say that the size is determined 
by a party meeting, there is no evidence that sizes are 
different today from those determined then. Party buros
1 P.zh., 14/73, pp. 22-23.
2 P.zh., 14/73, pp. 22-23.
3 Moskovskaia gorodskaia i Moskovskaia oblas tnaia 
ovganizatsii KPSS v tsifrakh, Moskovskii 
rabochii, Moscow, 1972, p. 178.
Petrovichev, op. cit., p. 88.4
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range in size in my reading from 5 to 11 members; party 
committees from 12 to 39.^
The people making up the membership of party
buros and committees is predictable up to a point.
Naturally the party secretary and his deputies are members.
One would expect the head of the "host" organisation to be
a member, although this does not appear to be always 
2certain. Besides the party workers and in most cases the
1 However very large PPO's, particularly those with 
raikom rights, have far larger party committees.
For example, the party committee of Moscow State 
University has 61 members. Such committees 
usually have a buro of about 11 members for 
everyday decision-making. P.zh., 20/76, p. 32.
2 It appears probable that ministers and the heads 
of governmental agencies equivalent to ministries
do not belong to the party committees. I have never 
seen them mentioned as members or even as giving 
reports before a committee. There are some reports 
that suggest, without being definitive, that deputy 
ministers are the senior officials in party comm­
ittees. P.zh., 19/63, p. 42; 4/66, p. 47. In
1958 Pavtiinaia zhizn’ complained about leading 
workers in tertiary educational institutions who 
try to avoid becoming members of party buros and 
committees, claiming pressure of work as their ex­
cuse. However there is no evidence that directors 
or rectors were included in the complaint. P.zh.",
1/58, p. 19. I have only one full list of party 
organ members from which the head of the institution 
is excluded. Although the chief doctor of the Penza 
Infectious Diseases Hospital is listed, the director 
of the hospital is not. P.zh., 1/70, p. 58. There 
are those occasions mentioned in Chapter Two when 
exceptionally serious PPO-administration conflict 
has led to the failure of the institutional head to 
gain a place on the party buro or committee (pp. 169-170), 
However in normal circumstances the directors of 
research and design institutes are members of the 
party buro or committee, as are the directors or 
rectors of educational institutions and the directors 
of film studios. Kom.Ukvainy, 6/71, p. 88; Ogonek, 
1/1/71, p. 16; P.zh., 9/60, pp. 34-36; 13/73,
p. 53; 15/69, p. 50.
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head of the institution, the chief executive official of
the institution - the academic secretary, chief producer,
chief doctor, etc. - usually seems to be a member of the
party buro or committee.^ The chairman of the institution's
trade union organisation seems to be an automatic choice
2for the party organ, while the secretary of the komsomol 
organisation, if the institution has one and particularly 
if it is an educational institution, would probably also be 
a member.^
These appear to be what could be called the
ex-officio members. The rest appear to be other important
people in the institution - occupying important staff
4positions or heading important subdivisions. There is
however some suggestion that an effort is made to have a
less important member of the institution on the party
5organ - a pensioner on a raiispolkom party buro;g
a statistician on an hospital party buro; and a radio 
fitter on the party committee of the Institute of Atomic 
Energy.^
1 P.2 /2., 6/63, p. 4 3; Kom. JJkrainy , 6/71, p. 0000
2 P.2 /2. , 1/70, 
6/71, p. 88.
p. 58 ; 15/69, p. 50; Kom. Ukrainy,
3 Kom.Ukrainy, 6.71, p. 88.
4 Pravda, 3/2/39, p. 2; 17/1/71, P - 2 ; P.2/2., 5 / 7 3
5 P.2 /2. , 1/67 , p. 38 .
6 P.2 /2. , 1/70 , p. 58 .
Ogonek, 1/1/71, p. 17.7
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I have full lists of the membership of two
party organs. The party buro of the Penza Infectious
Diseases Hosptial has six members - the party secretary
and his deputy, the chief doctor, a doctor concerned
with ideological matters, a statistician and the chairman
of the trade union committee.^ The party committee of
the Gruziia-fil’m film studio includes the party officials,
the director, the chief editor of the scenario-editing
collegium, a producer, an actor, the head of the sound
shop, the chairman of the control group (probably a deputy
party secretary), the chairman of the trade union committee
2and the director of the filming group.
The number of deputy secretaries a PPO has
depends on its size. The party organisation of the Moscow
Aviation Institute, with about 2,000 members, has three
deputy secretaries, one for party-organisation work, one
for ideological work, and one as the chairman of the control 
3group. This appears to be a normal situation.
(ii) Raikom rights
The final statistical matter to be considered is 
the number of PPO's with raikom rights. If a PPO has over
1
2
3
P.zh., 1/70, p. 58.
P.zh., 15/69, p. 50. 
P.zh., 4/65, p. 30.
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1,000 members its party committee can be given the rights 
of a raikom on questions of admittance to the party, 
keeping membership records, and the examination of the 
personal affairs of communists. These are significant 
rights in that they give the PPO relative freedom in 
deciding on new members and on disciplinary measures.
Under normal circumstances all such decision must be 
confirmed by the raikom. As we saw in Chapter Six it is 
not unusual for such decisions to be reversed by the raikom.
The All-Union figures for all categories of PPO 
are as follows:
year nos. of PPO's with 
raikom rights
1965 425
1967 449
1971 610
1973 694
1976 783
(Sources: Kommunist, 5/65, p. 46; 15/67, p. 101;
P. zh., 14/73, p. 23; 10/76, p. 18.)
In 1968 the Ukraine had 60 PPO's with raikom rights.^- In
21970 the figure was 91. In 1966 there were 46 ministry and
3State Committee PPO's with raikom rights. Among the 31
1
2
3
Kom. Ukrainy , 1/68, p. 61. 
Kom. Ukrainy, 12/70, p. 4. 
P.zh., 24/66, p . 30.
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tertiary educational establishments whose party 
memberships I have identified, eight had the necessary 
1,000 party members. I have identified no other non­
production PPO's with over 1,000 party members.
(e) Conclusion
Judging from the data presented in this section 
it would appear likely that school, cultural and lower- 
level administrative PPO's face problems relating to 
their size - problems of not having the manpower to do the 
work expected of them, and problems of not being taken 
seriously by the institutional leadership and higher party 
organs. Other non-production PPO's, particularly those in 
tertiary educational establishments, major research 
institutions and high-level bureaucratic organisations, 
appear to have no problems of size or membership.
II. Internal operations and conduct
Having established the structure of PPO's, it 
now remains for us to examine their internal activities. 
The basic question is whether it matters whether party 
meetings and elections are properly conducted, or is this 
irrelevant to the work of the PPO secretary?
One could only believe it irrelevant if one 
believed that the only function of a PPO was for the
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secretary to personally control the activity of the 
administration. From the discussion in the body of the 
thesis it should be clear that the PPO has many other 
highly important functions - communication, mobilisation 
and control of all members of the "host" collective.
We have seen that even control of the administration 
requires far more than the personal involvement of the 
secretary, particularly in the information-gathering 
area. Finally, there is the importance of maintaining 
the legitimacy of the social system, and the "leading" 
role of the party within it. All this requires the 
efficient organisation of all members of the party 
organisation, the presentation to the masses of the party 
and its organisations as highly efficient, and the 
maintenance of the contented commitment of party members 
by ensuring the proper operation of what democratic 
procedures they have available to them.
Thus the proper conduct of party elections and 
meetings is considered important. The election of 
secretaries and party organs takes place at election- 
report meetings, usually yearly.^ There will almost 
always be a raikom or gorkom representative at the meeting
1 PPO's with party committees hold their
election-report meetings every two or 
three years, depending on the regularity 
of raion or city party conferences. All 
others are yearly. Organizatsionno-ustavnye 
voprosy, op. cit., p. 129.
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to present the officially recommended list of candidates.
It is stressed that these official candidates are only
recommended. One raikom Organisational Department which
gave its representatives a chart before going to meetings,
including one section showing the recommended candidate,
was criticised by the obkom for a breach of intra-party
democracy. The raikom defended itself by saying that the
chart was only a guide for representatives, that the
meetings never saw it, and that the meetings were under no
obligation to vote for the indicated candiates. Partiinaia
zhizn’ supported the obkom, although making the point that
it was sometimes necessary for a raikom to recommend a
candidate.'*' In 1970 Kommunist Belorussii was optimistic
that most communists would agree with the local party
2organ's choice. In the vast majority of cases this 
optimism is undoubtedly well-founded. However it appears 
to be not unusual for the party members to express 
dissatisfaction with the recommended candidate. Often in 
these cases the raikom or gorkom representative will then 
adopt anti-democratic methods in order to get his candidate 
accepted. At the 1963 election-report meeting in the 
Dubrovka raion hospital the communists found the work of 
the secretary satisfactory and he was put forward as a 
candidate for re-election. However the representative of 
the party committee of the production administration (the
1
2
P.zh., 20/56, pp. 61-63.
Korn.Belorussii, 10/70, p. 25.
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equivalent at the time to a vaikom) declared in turn that 
his candidature was against Party Rules, against Party 
Instructions on elections, and finally against a party 
committee decision on the replacement of all secretaries. 
Eventually he got his way.^
Higher party representatives are also unwilling
to allow the possibility of a non-official candidate
getting onto the party buro or committee. This means that,
like the vaikom representative at the election-report
meeting of a secondary school in Vilnius, they are unwilling
to allow more candidates onto the list than there are
positions. However I should add that in this case, as in
2many others, the communists eventually got their way.
The higher party representatives are not the 
only people liable to be involved in illegal procedures.
It is the usual procedure for elections in one school PPO 
that the list of candidates for the party buro be prepared 
before the meeting and then simply read out by the zavuch 
on the instructions of the school director. Partiinaia 
zhizn ' reacted to this case by declaring that the 
preparation of lists of candidates was forbidden, except 
in large PPO's where conferences of representatives of 
subordinate party organisations could be arranged in order
1
2
P. zh., 21/63, p. 49. 
P.zh., 13/61, p. 7.
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to decide on a list.^ Despite this statement there is 
little doubt that there will always be some list of 
official candidates, which will be adhered to unless 
there is very strong opposition to it.
It is not easy to generalise on the democratic 
nature of PPO elections. It would appear that democracy 
does work in a rough-and-ready way, to the extent that 
party members have a good chance of eventually getting 
rid of anyone they are strongly opposed to. The higher 
party authorities realise that the PPO's rely on the active 
support of party members - this can only be guaranteed by 
ensuring that they are happy with leading personnel.
Next we have to consider the conduct of party 
meetings. Party meetings are important occasions, providing 
an important forum for both upwards and downwards communic­
ation. The first consideration is the regularity of 
meetings. A Soviet handbook declares that PPO's without 
subordinate organisations should hold a general meeting not 
less than once monthly. In PPO's with subordinate party 
organisations the subordinate party organisations should 
meet not less than once monthly, while a general PPO 
meeting should be held not less than once every two months.
1 P.zh. , 3/75, p. 73.
An extraordinary party meeting can be called 
if one third of the party organisation's members 
so desire. Organizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy, 
op. cit., pp. 41-42.
2
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The History Faculty of Kishinev State University has a
party meeting at least once monthly, and at least two
party buro meetings each month.^ The secretary of the
party organisation of the institute Kazgipropishcheprom
was criticised in 1963 for holding party meetings only
once or twice in three months. The secretary claimed that
he did not have enough matters to discuss to warrant more
2regular meetings. Subordinate party organisations in
the North Caucases sovnarkhoz were criticised when they had
3not met for two to three months.
The meeting having been called, it is then 
necessary to get a reasonable attendance. There is no 
suggestion that attendance at party meetings is compulsory 
or that there is a formal quorum. However there is 
evidence to suggest that the attendance of all party 
members is expected, and particularly at election-report 
meetings. At the election-report meeting of the Krasnoiask 
Machine Assembly Technical College 26 of the 34 party 
members were in attendance. Four of the absentees were 
sick; three were on leave; and only one, a candidate 
member, failed to attend without an excuse. The raikom 
representative at the meeting, the head of the Agitprop
1 Kom.Moldavii, 5/65, p. 37.
2 P.zh.Kaz., 2/63, p. 45.
3 P.zh., 2/72, p. 73.
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Department, claimed that the meeting did not have a 
quorum and forced it to disperse. Although Partiinaia 
zhizn’ in commenting on the case declared that it was 
reasonable to expect full attendance at election-report 
meetings it made no claim that it was obligatory. Indeed 
it said that the action of the raikom representative was 
wrong in the form that it took. (In usual Soviet fashion 
no indication is given of what might have been proper 
action in the circumstances).^ This report indicates 
both that such a large number of absentees is unusual, 
but that there is no formal rule to say that it is illegal. 
The Soviet handbook already referred to declares that 
there is no quorum for election-report meetings, but that 
they should not proceed if a significant proportion of 
communists are missing. It also gives as reasonable 
excuses for non-attendance; busy with work, accident, 
illness, holidays, attendance at examinations, business 
trip, etc.“
In recent years open party meetings, which non- 
party members are able to attend, have become an increasingly 
common occurrence, and apparently an important means of 
extending the party's communication network and influence 
among non-party workers. There are complaints from party 
secretaries about the difficulty in getting non-party
1
2
P.zh., 2/72, p. 73.
Organizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy, oo. cit., 
pp. 42, 140-141.
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workers to attend such meetings. In 1974 the secretary of 
a secondary school party organisation complained to 
Pavtiinaia zhizn’ about the difficulty she was having in 
this regard. By way of reply the journal allowed the 
secretary of another secondary school party organisation to 
describe her experiences. She claimed that by considering 
important matters from a different point of view', from 
the point of view of the "leading role of the party 
organisation in the resolution of academic tasks", and 
by preparing the meetings well, there were no problems 
of poor attendance. Although none of the measures she 
mentioned would have inspired me to attend her meetings, 
there was no suggestion in her reply of pressure being 
brought to bear on teachers to attend.'*'
While speaking of non-party attendance at party
meetings, it should be mentioned that it is possible to
invite non-party people to attend even closed party
meetings, including those of party buros and committees.
In cases where leading officials in the "host" organisation
are not members of the party, this becomes necessary on a
regular basis. Out of necessity the party buro of the
Radiotechnical Electronics Faculty of the Taganrog Radio-
technical Institute invited the non-party dean to its 
2meetings. Apparently for many years there was a non-party
1
2
P.zh., 18/74, pp. 68-69. 
P.zh., 2/72, pp. 48-49.
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rector of Moscow State University. As a matter of course 
he was invited to party committee meetings.^-
Party committees and buros, it seems, are not
immune from attendance problems. For three months in
1964 the head of the Administration for Leather Footwear
Production of the North Caucases sovnarkho z came to none
2of the administration's party buro meetings. In 1963 
Partiinaia zhizn ' criticised the party committee of the 
State Committee of Chemical and Oil Industry. Of its 
last 21 meetings a deputy chairman of the State Committee 
had attended only four, while three other members had 
missed a majority of meetings. Some meetings had gone on 
with only three to five of the eleven members in attendance. 
This suggests that party organs, like party meetings, 
have no formal quorum, but that high attendance levels are 
expected.^
Once the meeting has been called and those 
attending have arrived, it is then essential to ensure that 
the meeting runs smoothly. It would seem that meetings are 
highly organised beforehand, and that this is considered
5a good thing. Firstly, it is important that a good agenda
1 Conversation with party member in 
University.
Moscow
2 P.zh., 17/64, p. 37.
3 P.zh., 19/63, p. 42.
4 The Soviet handbook already cited 
Organizatsionno-us tavny e v op rosy"t
pp‘. 140-141.
confirms this, 
op. cit.,
5 P.zh., 18/74, pp. 68-69.
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be prepared by the party buro or committee or commission
used for preparing meetings.^- In 1954 the agendas of the
party meetings of most research PPO's were criticised by
2Kommunist for being too general. In 1966 the communists 
of Moscow State University were reported to be dissatisfied 
with party meetings because of the limited nature of the
3items being placed on the agendas. When the party buro of
a Kuibyshev school put three matters, the role of class
leaders in raising the quality of student knowledge, the
socialist obligations of the collective in the new
academic year, and the problems involved in improving
vocational guidance work, it was considered by some to be
immediately obvious that this was too much to be done in
one meeting. This feeling was said to be confirmed when
the meeting consisted of a lot of short "formalistic"
speeches containing no specific discussion of shortcomings
4or specific suggestions for remedial action. Matters
outside the limits of the agenda can be considered, although
5no conclusions are possible on how common this is.
1 Organizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy, op. cit.,
p. 135.
2 Korn. , 18/54, p. 65.
3 Korn. , 10.66, p. 35.
4 Barkusov, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
5 Organizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy, op. cit.,
p. 5 3.
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As well as the agendas being prepared beforehand, 
it seems that the list of speakers is also prepared. In 
1963 a party member complained to Partiinaia zhizn’ that 
before the election-report meeting in the PPO of the 
apparatus of the Donets oblast’ Council of Trade Unions 
he gave a list of those who wanted to speak to the raikom 
representative. However the representative used a list 
that had been prepared by the party buro secretary. The 
letter-writer complained that the secretary's list had 
been prepared the day before, suggesting that his had been 
prepared during the preliminaries to the meeting, and that 
it included one person who had not agreed to speak. 
Eventually the eight people on the secretary's list did 
speak, but all avoided any mention of any shortcomings in 
the work of the party organisation and apparatus.'*' A 
report on a party meeting in a Kazakh secondary school 
declares that nobody wanted to speak during a party 
meeting, so the chairman just read names of speakers off 
a list.^
It seems that not only are the speakers decided 
beforehand, but that, particularly in the case of key-note 
addresses, what they will say is also prepared. When a
1 P.zh., 4/63, pp. 46-47. This report is also
interesting in that it suggests that it is the 
raikom representative who runs the meeting. It 
is unfortunate that there is no general data on 
who chairs PPO meetings.
2 P.zh.Kaz., 4/65, p. 35.
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communist deputy minister in the Latvian Ministry of
Local Industry gave a report (doklad) at an open party
meeting, he had been helped in its preparation by eight
party members, including members of the control group.^
The Soviet handbook already cited declares that the main
report [otchetny e doklad) at an election-report meeting,
usually given by the secretary, must be confirmed before-
2hand by the party buro or committee.
Even further than this, it appears that the
decisions of the meetings are also prepared beforehand.
Partiinaia zhizn ' considers it permissible for the party
secretary or his deputy to prepare a draft decision by
himself, although it is far better if more people are 
3involved. The Soviet handbook declares that the 
decisions of party meetings are usually prepared beforehand, 
but that they should be checked before the meeting with
4all those affected by them. In 1970 Partiinaia zhizn' 
spoke of a collective farm PPO that uses special commissions 
to prepare the decisions of party meetings. The process 
is described as follows:
1 Kom.Sov.Latvii, 7/67, p. 55.
2 Organizatsionno-ustavnye voprosy, op. cit., 
p. 136 .
3 P.zh., 18/74, p. 71.
4 Organizqtsionno-ustavnye voprosy, op. cit.,
pp. 48-50.
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A few words about these commissions would 
be in order. Once they were elected by the 
meetings in the process of discussion of 
a question. This interfered with their 
ability to deeply study the question and work 
out a solid draft decision. Now the commissions 
are formed, as a rule, earlier. At the party 
meeting, after the report has been given, one 
of the members of the commission immediately 
gets up and acquaints the communists with 
the draft decision.'*'
In 1955 the same journal reported a rather different
procedure. At a party meeting of the Sverdlovsk Union of
Writers there was apparently no decision prepared beforehand.
But when the meeting found serious shortcomings in a book,
it came to no decision itself, but directed the presidium
of the meeting to work out one itself. When the minutes of
the meeting appeared they allegedly contained a verbose,
2empty decision, about which the members knew nothing.
Given all this preparation, one might ask oneself 
how democratic a party meeting is. There are many cases 
of wide discussion of the shortcomings of various leaders
1
2
P. zh. , 6/70 , p . 36 . 
P. zh. , 4/55, p. 33.
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that strike one, when reading the reports, as being 
patently unspontaneous. However there are many examples 
of the various controls and preparations either failing 
or being pressured to such an extent that they pass the bounds 
of legality. Criticisms of occasions when party meetings 
have been used as the forum for putting forward various 
allegedly anti-party positions indicate that party members 
are willing to discuss controversial political matters in 
party meetings.^ It appears that meetings, like elections, 
can provide the opportunity for rank-and-file party members 
to express extreme discontent. However the discontent, 
if it is to have any positive effect, must be so extreme 
that higher party authorities will have no option but to 
take it into consideration.
What we must remember is that to some extent it
is in the party's interest to leave room for spontaneous
involvement in party meetings, since they should be an
important source of information on grass-roots feelings
and activities. Thus in 1970 we find Pavtiinaia zhizn'
was concerned at the apathy in PPO meetings that had derived
from the number of motions that came from higher authorities.
However it considered that the situation was improving - in
the last ten months of 1969 only 117 of the 443 motions
considered in PPO meetings in the Demidov raion of Smolensk
2
oblastf came from above.
1
2
P.zh., 5/55, pp. 53-57; Kom., 17/57, p. 41. 
P.zh., 3/70, pp. 31-38.
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It is because PPO meetings are considered so 
important as a means of upward communication that so much 
attention is devoted to the minutes of the meetings. PPO 
secretaries clearly find it burdensome to have to send the 
minutes of all meetings to the raikom or gorkom. In 1974 
the secretary of the PPO of the Pskov oblast' administration 
of the State Savings Bank complained to Partiinaia zhizn ' 
that the gorkom expects the minutes of all party meetings. 
However the journal emphasised the importance of minutes 
being sent on to higher organs, although also making the 
point that they should not be relied on to the exclusion 
of the on-the-spot presence of gorkom instructors.'*'
In Chapter One I discussed the importance of party 
meetings for downwards communication. This section has 
given some indication of the importance the party authorit­
ies attach to them as a means of upward communication. This 
means that some degree of democracy must be permitted.
Indeed in all aspects of the internal operations of the PPO's 
there is an apparent awareness of the functional necessity 
of a minimum of democratic procedure, to enable the PPO's 
to operate as an effective means of communication and to 
preserve the legitimacy of the party in the eyes of the 
masses and its own members.
1 In recent years there has been considerable
enthusiasm over a punch-card system of recording 
PPO activities. Special codings of matters 
considered in party meetings are devised. When 
translated onto punch cards these allegedly allow 
the quick analysis of all the information 
coming from different PPO's. Korn.Belorussii,
5/69, p. 35.
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TABLE 1.
Numbers of primary party organisations 
in the Soviet Union
1946 1956 1967
Types of PPO's Nos.of PPO'S
% of 
Total
Nos.of 
PPO' s
% of 
Total
Nos.of 
PPO's
% of 
Total
Enterprises 34965 14.3 73631 21.0 85899 25.4
State farms 4045 1.7 5806 1.7 14053 4.2
Collective farms 35200 14.4 80015 22.8 37086 11.0
Science, education, 
health, culture 13326 5.4 50258 14.3 76800 22.7
Administrative
organs 46717 19.1 59809 17.0 54389 16.1
Trade & social 
nourish. 6133 2.5 11810 3.4 14146 4.2
Others 104321 42.6 69920 19.8 55542 16.4
Total 244707 100.0 351249 100.0 337915 100.0
1971 1976
Enterprises 95375 25.8 101472 26.0
State farms 16972 4.6 18941 4.9
Collective farms 33644 9.1 29081 7.4
Science 5148 1. 4 6018 1.5
Education 61881 16.7 67446 17.3
Culture 5169 1.4 5280 1.4
Health 15341 4.1 16147 4.1
Administrative
organs 59809 16.2 65060 16.7
Trade & social 
nourish. 14848 4.0 14488 3.7
Others 61508 16.7 66454 17.0
Total 369695 100.0 390387 100.0
(Sources: Partiinoe stroitel'stvo3 nagliadnoe posobie,
Moscow, 1971, chart 24; Korn., 15/67, p. 100, P.zh. , 
10/76, p. 18.)
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TABLE 3.
Numbers of primary party organisations, as 
proportions of the total number of institutions
(i) Soviet Union
1965- 67***
Types of PPO's Nos. of institutions
Nos. of 
PPO' s % with PPO's
Science, education, 
health, culture 375098** 76800 20.5
Administrative NA 54389 NA
Others 1281817* 206726 16.1
Total NA 337915 NA
1970- 71
Science 5307# 5148 97.0
Education 195028 61881 31.7
Culture 129324 5169 4.0
Health 26200 15341 58.6
Administrative NA 59809 NA
Others 1416625* 222347 15.7
Total NA 369695 NA
(ii) Estonia
1965-66
Science NA 26 NA
Education 1109 435 39.2
Culture 1055** 60 5.7
Health 198 80 40.4
Administrative NA 386 NA
Others 9123* 1686 18.5
Total NA 2673 NA
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TABLE 3 (contd.)
Types of PPO's Nos. of institutions
Nos. of 
PPO's % with PPO's
1970- 71
Science NA 48 NA
Education 855 448 52.4
Culture 920** 52 5.7
Health 188 98 52.1
Administrative NA 487 NA
Others 9742* 1564 16.1
Total NA 2697 NA
(iii) Uzbekistan
1965-66
Science NA 130 NA
Education 8854 2813 31. 8
Culture 4933** 182 3.7
Health 1205 396 32.9
Administrative NA 2090 NA
Others 40578* 4563 11.2
Total NA 10174 NA
(iv) Azerbaidzhan
1965- 66
Education 5573 1411 25.3
Science NA 87 NA
Cultural-indoct. 2446** 117 4.8
Medical 724 273 37.7
Administrative NA 1267 NA
Others 22295* 3374 15.1
Total NA 6529 NA
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TABLE 3 (contd.)
Types of PPO's Nos. of institutions
Nos. of 
P PO' s % with PPO's
1970- 71
Education 5207 1835 35.2
Science NA 110 NA
Cultural-indoct. 2971** 126 4.2
Medical 779 311 39.9
Administrative NA 1598 NA
Others 25595* 3700 14.5
Total NA 7680 NA
(v) Kazakhstan
1965- 66
Science, education, 
health, culture 19324**' 3369 17.4
Administrative NA 3045 NA
Others 57506* 7221 12.6
Total NA 13635 NA
1970-71
Science, education, 
health, culture 19960**'' 4637 23.2
Administrative NA 3805 NA
Others 65562* 8362 12.8
Total NA 16804 NA
* "others" is made up of industrial and other enter­
prises^, state and collective farms,2 communications 
organisations, banks, trading organisations and 
organisations for the provision of everyday services.
** "culture" is made up of libraries, museums and 
theatres.
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TABLE 3 (contd.)
*** there are no figures for the numbers of PPO's by 
category for the Soviet Union for 1965 or 1966, 
so 1967 figures have been used.
' excludes all scientific institutions.
'' excludes all scientific institutions except the
research institutes of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences.
# taken from Narodnoe khoziaistv o SSSR v 1972,
statisticheskii ezhegodnik, Izd. "Statistika",
Moscow, 1973, p. 129.
1 All-Union figures for enterprises are derived from a 
chart showing the numbers of enterprises working on 
the new economic system and these as a proportion of 
the total. The Estonian figures for enterprises are 
further derived from the result of this calculation 
and the application to it of the proportion of the 
total number of industrial personnel working in 
Estonia.
2 the Estonian figures for state and collective farms 
are derived from the proportion of the total value 
of agricultural production that comes from Estonia.
(Sources: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSR v 1970, statisticheskii
ezhegodnik, Izd. "Statistika", Moscow, 1971, 
pp. 527-689.
Partiinoe stroitel 'stvo nagliadnoe posobie,
op. cit., chart 24.
P. zh., 10/76, p .18.
Kom. Estonii, 1/71, p. 11. Kom, 15/67, p. 100. 
Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Turkestana i Uzbekistana 
v tsifrakh (Sbornik statisticheskikh materialov) 
1918-1967 gg.r Izd. "Uzbekistan", Tashkent,
1968, p. 193.
Kompartiia Kazakhstana za 50 let (1921-1971 gg.), 
rost i regulirovanie sostava partiinoi organizatsii 
respubliki, Izd. "Kazakhstan", Alma-Ata, 1972, 
pp. 287-288.
Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Azerbaidzhana v tsifrakh, 
statisticheskii sbornik, Azerbaidzhanskoe gos. 
izd., Baku, 1970, pp. 62-78.)
TABLE 4.
Numbers of communists - Soviet Union
Type of PPO Numbers of communists % of total
1946
Science, education, 
health, culture 567619 10.3
Administrative 1195857 21.7
Others 3747386 68.0
Total 5510862 100.0
1956
Science, education, 
health, culture 896690 12.5
Administrative 1104722 15.4
Others 5172109 72.1
Total 7173521 100.0
1967
Science, education, 
health, culture 2092882 16.5
Administrative 1128878 8.9
Others 9462373 74.6
Total 12684133 100.0
1971
Science 574903 4.0
Education, health, 
culture 1796570 12.5
Administrative 1236040 8. 6
Others 10765050 74.9
Total 14372563 100.0
612.
TABLE 4 (contd.)
Type of PPO Numbers of communists % of total
1976
Science 672472 4.3
Education, health, 
culture 1939223 12.4
Administrative 1344945 8.6
Others 11732251 74.7
Total 15688891 100.0
(Sources: Partiinoe stroitel ' stvo3 nagliadnoe posobie ,
op. cit., charts 9, 24.
Kom., 15/67, p. 99.
P. zh., 10/7 6, p. 17. )
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TABLE 5.
Average memberships of primary party 
organisations - Soviet Union
Type of PPO Numbers of PPO's
Numbers of 
communists
Average No. of 
communists
1946
Science, education, 
health, culture 13326 567619 42.6
Administrative 46717 1195857 25.6
Others 184664 3747386 20.3
Total 244707 5510862 22.5
1956
Science, education, 
health, culture 50258 896690 17.8
Administrative 66407 1104722 16.6
Others 234584 5172109 22.0
Total 351249 7173521 20.4
1967
Science, education, 
health , culture 76800 2092882 27.3
Administrative 54389 1128878 20.8
Others 206726 9462373 45.8
Total 337915 12684133 37.5
1971
Science 5148 574903 111.7
Education, health, 
culture 82391 1796570 21. 8
Administrative 59809 1236040 20.7
Others 222347 10765050 48.4
Total 369695 14372563 38.9
TABLE 5 (contd.)
Type of PPO Numbers of PPO's
Numbers of 
communists
Average No. of 
communists
1976
Science 6018 672472 111.7 ‘
Education, health, 
culture 88873 1939223 21.8
Administrative 65060 1344945 20.7
Others 230436 11732251 50.9
Total 390387 15688891 40.2
(Sources: Partiinoe stroitel 'stvo3 nagliadnoe posobie,
op. cit. , charts 9, 24.
Kom. , 15/67, pp. 99-100.
P. zh., 10/76, pp. 17-18.)
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TABLE 6.
Numbers of communists and PPO's 
(i) Moscow ob last '
1966
Type of PPO Nos.of PPO's
% of 
total
Nos.of 
commos
% of 
total
av. no. 
per PPO
Science,
education, health 
and culture
1841 32.5 49131 16.5 26.7
Administrative 704 12.4 16756 5.6 23.8
Others 3122 55.1 231765 77.9 74.2
Total 5667 100.0 297652 100.0 52.5
1971
Science,
education, health 
and culture
2077 33.0 64369 18.3 31.0
Administrative 686 10.9 18698 5.3 27.3
Others 3535 56.1 268366 76.4 75.9
Total 6298 100.0 351433 100.0 55.8
(ii) Moscow city
1966
Science,
education, health 
and culture
3257 38.3 210939 34.8 64.8
Administrative 1361 16.0 108382 17.9 79.6
Others 3880 45.7 286152 47.3 73.8
Total 8498 100.0 605473 100.0 71.2
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TABLE 6 (contd.)
Type of PPO Nos.of PPO's
% of 
total
Nos.of 
commos
% of 
total
av. no. 
per PPO
1971
Science,
education, health 
and culture
3571 40.9 240319 33.7 67.3
Administrative 1500 17.2 138953 19.5 92.6
Others 3657 41.9 334257 46.8 91.4
Total 8728 100.0 713529 100.0 81.8
(Source: Mo skovskaia gorodskaia i Moskovskaia oblastnaia
organizatsii KPSS v tsifrakh, Moskovskii rabochii, 
Moscow, 1972, pp. 124-127, 155-156.)
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TABLE 7.
Numbers of communists and PPO's - Azerbaidzhan
Type of PPO Nos.of % of Nos.of % of av. no.PPO's total commos total per PPO
1946
Education 222 4.4 3941 4.6 17.8
Science 21 0.4 520 0.6 24.8
Cultural-indoct. 30 0.6 469 0.6 15.6
Medical 123 2.5 1846 2.2 15.0
Administrative 
(centre to rai.) 496 9.9 12433 14.5 25.1
Rural rai. admin. 477 9.5 6011 7.0 12.6
Others 3651 72.7 60351 70.5 16.5
Total 5020 100.0 85571 100.0 17.0
1956
Education 1101 16.8 11895 9.9 10.8
Science 55 0.8 1760 1.5 32.0
Cultural-indoct. 77 1.2 1023 0.9 13.3
Medical 182 2.8 2698 2.3 14.8
Administrative 
(centre to rai.) 674 10.3 15910 13.3 23.6
Rural rai. admin. 702 10.7 9047 7.5 12.9
Others 3767 57.4 77441 64.6 20.6
Total 6558 100.0 119774 100.0 18.3
TABLE 7 (contd.)
Type of PPO Nos.of % of Nos.of % of av. no.PPO's total commos total per PPO
1966
Education 1411 21.6 21117 10.0 15.0
Science 87 1. 3 5259 2.5 60.4
Cultural-indoct. 117 1.8 1987 0.9 17.0
Medical 273 4.2 5588 2.6 20.5
Administrative 
(centre to rai. ) 563 8.6 16849 8.0 29.9
Rural rai. admin. 704 10.8 13380 6.3 19.0
Others 3374 51.7 147789 69.7 43.8
Total 6529 100.0 211969 100.0 32.5
1970
Education 1835 23.9 26629 10.7 14.5
Science 110 1.4 6322 2.5 57.5
Cultural-indoct. 126 1.6 2092 0.8 16.6
Medical 311 4.0 6417 2.6 20.6
Administrative 
(centre to rai.) 759 9.9 20189 8.1 26.6
Rural rai. admin. 739 9.6 14865 6.0 20.1
Others 3800 49.5 173156 69.3 45.6
Total 7680 100.0 249670 100.0 32.5
(Source: Kommunisticheskaia partiia Azerbaidzhana, op. cit.,
pp. 62-78.)
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TABLE 8.
Numbers of communists and PPO's - Kazakhstan
Type of PPO Nos.of PPO's
% of 
total
Nos.of 
commos
% of 
total
Av. no. 
per PPO
1946
Non-production
- rural territ. 247 2.4 2935 2.0 11.9
- others 2869 28.8 45164 30.4 15.7
Production 6863 68. 8 100513 67.6 14.6
Total 9979 100.0 148612 100.0 14.9
1956
Science,
education, health 
and culture
2147 11.7 25712 10.0 12.0
Administrative 2969 16.2 50867 19.8 17.1
Others 13248 72.1 180476 70.2 13.6
Total 18364 100.0 257055 100.0 14.0
1966
Science,
education, health 
and culture
3369 24.7 57558 12.0 17.1
Administrative 3045 22.3 68413 14.2 22.5
Others 7221 53.0 355611 73. 8 49.2
Total 13635 100.0 481582 100.0 35.3
1971
Science,
education, health 
and culture
4637 27.6 70725 12.3 15.3
Administrative 3805 22.6 82981 14.4 21.8
Others 8362 49.8 421733 73.3 50.4
Total 16804 100.0 575439 100.0 34.2
(Source: Kompartiia Kazakhs tana
205, 246-247, 328, 287-
za SO let,
288. )
op. cit. , pp. 204-
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TABLE 9.
Numbers of communists and PPO's - Uzbekistan
Type of PPO Nos.of PPO's
% of 
total
Nos.of 
commos
% of 
total
Av. no. 
per PPO
1949
Education 470 5.3 7895 5.9 16.8
Science 45 0.5 1376 1.0 30.6
Cultural-indoct. 44 0.5 684 0.5 15.5
Medical 161 1. 8 1935 1.5 12.0
Administrative 
(centre to rai.) 903 10.1 16466 12.4 18.2
Rural rai. admin. 849 9.5 9832 7.4 11.6
Others 6452 72.3 94730 71. 3 14.7
Total 8924 100.0 132918 100.0 14.9
1958
Education 1510 19.6 18071 10.4 12.0
Science 48 0.6 1248 0.7 26.0
Cultural-indoct. 113 1.5 1367 0.8 12.1
Medical 198 2.6 2436 1.4 12.3
Administrative 
(centre to rai.) 1000 13.0 21642 12.5 21.6
Rural rai. admin. 1018 13.2 14044 8.2 13.8
Others 3814 49.5 114296 66.0 30.0
Total 7701 100.0 173104 100.0 22.5
TABLE 9 (contd.)
Type of PPO Nos. of % of Nos.of % of Av. no.PPO's Total commos Total per PPO
1966
Education 2813 27.6 38910 11. 5 13.8
Science 130 1.3 4867 1.4 37.4
Cultural-indoct. 182 1.8 2600 0.8 14.3
Medical 396 4.0 6806 2.0 17.2
Administrative 
(centre to rai.) 1150 11. 3 28786 8.5 25.0
Rural rai. admin. 940 9.2 15702 4.6 16.7
Others 4563 44.8 241055 71.2 52.8
Total 10174 100.0 338726 100.0 33.3
(Source: Kommunistickeskaia Partiia Turkestana i Uzbekistana 
v tsifrakh, op. cit., pp. 148, 171, 193.)
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TABLE 10.
Numbers of communists
(i) Soviet Union
Type of PPO Nos. of workers
Nos. of 
commos
% of worker- 
commos
1967
Science, education, 
health and culture 17646000 2092882 11.9
Administrative 1980000 1128878 57.0*
Others 62648000 9462373 15.1
Total 82274000 12684133 15.4
1970-71
Science, education, 
health and culture 16755000 2371473 14.2
Administrative 2271000 1236040 54.4*
Others 71160000 10765050 15.1
Total 90186000 14372563 15.9
(ii) Azerbaidzhan
1965-66
Science 28000 5259 18.8
Education and 
culture 114000 23104 20.3
Medical 72000 5588 7.8
Administrative 24000 30229 126.0*
Others 807000 147789 18.3
Total 1045000 211969 20.3
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TABLE 10 (contd.)
Type of PPO Nos. of workers
Nos. of 
commos
% of worker- 
conunos
1970
Science 37000 6322 17.1
Education and 
culture 157000 28721 18.3
Medical 89000 6417 7.2
Administrative 37000 35054 94.7*
Others 953000 173156 18.2
Total 1273000 249670 19.6
(iii) Kazakhstan
1965-66
Science, education 
health and culture 822000 57558 7.0
Administrative 93000 68413 73.6*
Others 3168000 355611 11.2
Total 4083000 481582 11.8
1970-71
Science, education, 
health and culture 870000 70725 8.1
Administrative 117000 82981 70.9*
Others 3667000 421733 11.5
Total 4654000 575439 12.4
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TABLE 10 (contd.)
(iv) Uzbekistan
Type of PPO Nos.of workers
Nos. of 
commos
% of worker- 
commos
1965-66
Science 53000 4867 9.2
Education
culture
and 279000 41510 14.9
Medical 139000 6806 4.9
Administrative 58000 44488 76.7*
Others 1591000 241055 15.2
Total 2120000 338726 16.0
(Sources: Narodnoe 
Naro dno e 
Kom. , no 
Partiia .
khoziaistvo 
khoziaistvo 
. 15, 1967, p 
Azerbaidzhana
SSSR v 1965, pp. 562-563; 
SSSR v 1970, pp. 514-515; 
. 100; Kommunisticheskaia 
v tsifrakh, op. cit.,
pp. 62-78, Kommunisticheskaia Partita Turkestana 
i Uzbekistana v tsifrakh, op. cit., p. 193; 
Kompartiia Kazakhstana za 50 let, op. cit., 
pp. 287-288 , 328; Partiinoe s troitel ' stvo
nagliadnoe posobie, op. cit., chart 9.)
One of these percentages is clearly absurd and most of 
the others look too high. The probable explanation is 
the number of pensioners, housewives and communists 
from subordinate organisations that are placed in lower- 
level administrative apparatus PPO's. For example in 
1954 only three of the 31 members of the party 
organisation of the Stalin raisobes in Gorky were 
workers in the institution,! while only eight of the 33 
party members of the Zlynkov city soviet apparatus in 
Briansk oblast' worked in the apparatus in 1956.^
1
2
P.zh., 17/54, pp. 66-68. 
P.zh., 22/56, p. 71.
6 25.
TABLE 11.
Party membership of apparatus workers - Moskovskii 
raiispolkom, Leningrad
(in percentages)
Type of worker 1962 1964
Party
member
Non-
party
Party
member
Non-
party
Chairman, deputy
chairmen and 
secretary
100.0 100.0
Heads & deputy
heads of departments; 
heads of sectors
88.8 11.2 90.4 9.6
Specialists
(inspectors, 
instructors, etc)
23.6 76.4 27.5 72.5
Clerical - 100.0 - 100.0
All apparatus 
workers 35.2 64.8 37.8 62.2
1966
Chairman, deputy 
chairmen and 
secretary
100.0 -
Heads and deputy 
heads of departments; 
heads of sectors
95.4 4.6
Specialists 
(inspectors, 
instructors, etc)
28.4 71.6
Clerical 9.0 91.0
All apparatus 
workers 39.5 60.5
(Source: B.D. Lebin and M.N. Perfil'ev: Kadry apparata
upravleniia v SSSR> sotsiologicheskie pvoblemy 
podbora i rasstanovki: Izd. "Nauka", Leningrad,
1970, pp. 194 and 197.)
TABLE 12.
Numbers of subordinate party organisations - Kazakhstan
Type of PPO Nos. of Nos. of Nos. withPPO's tsekhorgi PPO rights
1956
Science, education, 
health and culture 2147 61 17
Administrative 2969 130 79
Others 13248 976 283
Total 18364 1167 379
Type of PPO Nos. of PPO's
Nos. of
tsekhorgi
Nos. of 
party groups
1967
Science, education, 
health and culture 3626 347 626
Administrative 3241 446 425
Others 7500 11262 12201
Total 14367 12055 13252
1971
Science, education, 
health and culture 4637 512 828
Administrative 3805 533 711
Others 8362 14046 14154
Total 16804 15091 15693
(Source: Kompartiia
pp. 244-247
Kazakhs tana
, 326-328.)
za 50 let, op. cit.,
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TABLE 13.
Numbers of subordinate party organisations - Uzbekistan
Type of PPO Nos.of Nos. of Nos.with Nos. ofPPO's tsekhorgi PPO rts. p. groups
1958
Education 1510 90 32 143
Science 48 27 27 8
Cultural-indoct. 113 - - 15
Medical 198 - - 4
Administrative 
(centre to rai.) 1000 211 89 51
Rural rai. admin. 1018 - - 8
Others 3814 1462 520 2086
Total 7701 1790 668 2315
1966
Education 2813 144 110 331
Science 130 39 12 57
Cultural-indoct. 182 2 - -
Medical 396 4 - 13
Administrative 
(centre to rai.) 1150 224 129 141
Rural rai. admin. 940 - - 7
Others 4563 11695 10772 4155
Total 10174 12108 11023 4704
(Source: Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Turkestana i
Uzbekistana v tsifrakh, op. cit., pp. 171, 193.)
TABLE 14
Numbers of party committees 
(i) Kazakhstan
1960 1963 1966
Type of PPO of Nos.of Nos.of Nos.of Nos.of Nos.ofs p.cttees PPO's p. cttees PPO's p.cttees
Science,
education, „
health and 4 2832 4 3369 26
culture
Administrative 2690 3 2860 5 3045 16
Others 7354 339 6984 609 7221 1468
Total 12496 346 12676 618 13635 1510
(Source: Kompartiia Kazakhs tana za 50 let, p. 289.
(ii) Uzbekistan
1958 1966
Type of PPO Nos. of Nos. of Nos. of Nos.ofPPO's p.cttees PPO' s p.cttees
Education 1510 4 2813 14
Science 48 1 130 4
Cultural-enlight. 113 - 182 -
Medical 198 - 396 -
Administrative 
(centre to rai-) 1000 5 1150 8
Rural rai. admin. 1018 - 940 -
Others 3814 46 4563 1096
Total 7701 56 10174 1122
(Source: Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Turkestana i Uzbekistana
v tsifrakh, op. cit., pp. 171, 193.)
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(iii) Estonia
TABLE 14 (contd.)
1966 1971
Type of PPO Nos. of Nos. of Nos. of Nos.ofPPO' s p.cttees PPO ' s p.cttees
Education 435 4 448 3
Science 26 - 48 -
Cultural-enlight. 60 - 52 1
Medical 80 - 98 -
Administrative 386 2 487 4
Others 1686 29 1564 54
Total 2673 35 2697 62
(Source: Kom.Estonii, 1/71, p. 11.)
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TABLE 15.
Numbers of subordinate party organisations and
party committees - Soviet Union
1971 1976
No. of P P O 's with party 
committees 31219 35951
with raikom
rights 610 783
No. of subordinate party 
organisations 352871 400388
with PPO rights 235660 274454
party
committees 415 955
No. of party groups 443233 528894
(Source: P.zh., 10/76, p. 18.)
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APPENDIX B
THE PRIMARY PARTY ORGANISATIONS OF CREATIVE UNIONS1
There are three reasons for dealing with the 
PPO's of creative unions in a separate appendix. Firstly, 
their "host" organisations are completely different from 
all other "host" organisations in the non-production 
sphere; secondly, there are such considerable gaps in 
my knowledge of the operations of both the creative unions 
and their PPO's that they could not be included in the body 
of the thesis. Finally, despite these gaps, a study of 
the activities of creative PPO's, particularly in the 
context of the 1962-64 literary debate, provides an 
interesting example of the ideological activities of PPO's 
in general.
What sets the PPO's of creative unions apart 
from all other PPO's is the special and uncertain nature 
of the creative unions themselves. The basic difficulty 
arises in deciding just what type of organisation a
1 "Creative" is a direct translation of the
Russian word tvoroheskii. While sounding perhaps 
slightly strange in English, it seems to be the 
best word to include the whole range of 
activities covered by the unions, while 
excluding such institutions as theatres, 
orchestras, etc. that are included in the 
word "cultural". There are six unions, for 
writers (including literary critics), for 
artists, composers (including musicians), 
journalists, cinematographers and architects.
This appendix will be devoted primarily to the 
first three.
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creative union is. A.I. Shchiglik describes the various
views held by Soviet authorities regarding the nature of
creative unions. Some consider them to be voluntary social
organisations like organisations such as Znanie. Others
consider that because they profess to protect the legal
and economic interests of their members they contain some
of the characteristics of trade unions. Others would wish
to put them in a category of their own.^ The last would
appear to be the necessary view - a creative union has
significantly greater powers over its members and more
influence in its area of concern that a voluntary organi-
2sation such as Znanie, while they cannot be seen as
trade unions because their members usually belong to a
trade union as well as the creative union, because the
creative union does not have its own organisations within
working institutions, because trade union membership is
decided by the branch of the economy in which one works
rather than by a strict definition of one's profession,
and because membership of a creative union is not
guaranteed to a potential member but is only available
3to those with the necessary qualities. For these 
reasons Shchiglik comes to the conclusion that creative 
unions are not covered by any legal statutes for voluntary
1 Iampol'skaia: Tvorcheskie soiuzy, op. cit.,
pp. 7-8.
2 ibid, p. 17.
3 ibid, PP- 15-17.
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organisations or trade unions, but only by Article 126 
of the Soviet Constitution'*' and the Rules of the unions 
themselves. The exact legal situation and subordination 
of creative unions appear to be uncertain. Shchiglik 
writes:
An analysis of relations between the Soviet 
state and creative unions at the present 
time indicates that they are established 
not on the basis of subordination, control 
and supervision, but on the principles of 
collaboration, coordination and agreement 
and on the basis of help for these organi­
sations and rewards for their activities on
2the part of the Soviet state.
Shchiglik considers that the Rules of the creative unions,
being rules for the conduct of the internal affairs of
the unions, cannot be considered legal acts. Certainly
none of them have been confirmed by any Soviet government 
3organ.
1 Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution declares 
that the CPSU is "the vanguard of the workers in 
their struggle for the construction of communist 
society and embodies the leading nucleus of all 
organisations of workers, both social and state". 
This it gives the party, and its PPO's, the same 
authority as they have over any other non-party 
organisations.
2 ibid, p. 34.
Although Shchiglik states that some of the 
earlier ones, in the 1930's, were confirmed "by 
the Soviet government." ibid, p. 18.
3
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However there is some evidence that the Soviet
government, specifically the Council of Ministers, does
have some legal powers over creative unions. Thus in
1959 the RSFSR Council of Ministers was able to confer
on the administration of the RSFSR Union of Writers the
right to confirm the structure and staff of the
administrative-managerial component of the RSFSR Literary
Fund.^ " The 1967 edition of the Soviet textbook
Administvativnoe pravo claims that the All-Union Ministry
of Culture directs (napravliaet) the activity of the Union
of Composers, Writers and Artists, and that its local
departments direct the activity of the local departments
2of these unions. Other orders appear to exclude the formal 
subordination of creative unions to any government organs, 
but strongly imply such subordination in practice. For 
example, in 1958 the All-Union Ministry of Culture obliged 
administration and department heads to help in the prepara­
tion and conduct of plenums of creative unions and to
3examine the work of the plenums. This order places the 
obligation on the ministerial officials to involve themselves 
in the plenums, rather than on the creative unions to take 
any notice of them. One can confidently predict, however,
1 ibid, p. 112.
2 Administvativnoe pravo, 1967, op. cit., 
pp. 419-421.
3 Iampol'skaia: Tvovcheskie soiuzy, op. cit.,
p. 30.
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that in practice the role of the ministerial officials is 
an important one.
In some cases the leaders of state organs have 
ex officio positions in creative union administrations - 
the chairman of the State Committee for Cinematography is 
elected as a member of the administration of the Union of 
Cinematographers and the chairman of Gosstroi's State 
Committee for Civil Construction and Architecture of the 
administration of the Union of Architects.'*'
The legal situation of creative unions appears
to be somewhat uncertain. Their financial situation is
apparently equally uncertain. It appears that they are
responsible for their own finances. They obtain money
from membership subscriptions and profits from subordinate 
2enterprises. From these funds they pay for their full­
time apparatuses. However it is possible for the state to 
give them direct financial assistance. In fact they are 
usually heavily subsidised by state funds, the apparatuses
of all local organisations of the Union of Writers even
3being financed directly by local Soviet budgets.
1 ibid, p. 32. It is not
are elected ex officio.
2 ibid, p. 33.
3 ibid, p. 93; Ogen, op.
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Subordinate enterprises include the Literary,
Art and Music Funds, publishing houses, educational 
institutes and various other production enterprises 
such as the ceramics factories and factories for the 
production of paints and other art materials of the Union 
of Artists. These enterprises are not subject to any 
non-union control beyond the usual functional control 
exercised by Gosplan, the Ministry of Finance, and the 
State Committee for Labour and Wages.'*'
It appears that creative unions are largely free 
from direct ministerial supervision. The relations 
between state organs and creative unions are important 
in deciding the degree of party involvement in the 
affairs of the unions. If there is no particular 
government supervision of creative unions, the party is 
far more likely to be directly involved.
Another thing that might make direct party 
involvement more likely is the nature of the unions' 
tasks, although paradoxically this might in fact at the 
same time reduce the significance of their PPO's, in so 
far as the creative unions themselves are specialised 
ideological agencies. Although creative unions have 
quite significant administrative functions, particularly 
in the areas of determining payments to creative workers
1 Iampol'skaia: Tvorcheskie soiuzy, op. cit., p. 106.
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and the conditions of their work/ the most important
areas of their activities have a strong ideological
colouring. Shchiglik describes the work of creative unions
in consideration of "ideological-creative problems".
These problems become "the subject of wide discussion in
the course of which is worked out the collective opinion
of literary-artistic society (obshchestvennost ') on the
2cardinal questions of literature and art". These dis­
cussions have their public airings at the congresses and 
plenums of the creative unions. The book goes no further 
than to say than that such topics as "Contemporary problems 
of realism and modernism", "Actual problems of socialist
realism" and "Problems of national drama" are considered
3in the unions' congresses, conferences and plenums.
It gives no idea of their political significance, of the 
debates and conflicts that can occur over them within 
creative unions, and the concrete measures used to ensure 
that the "collective opinion" is observed by all.
Some idea of the degree to which such creative 
matters take on political significance and become the 
subject of political debate, and the role creative unions
1 The book on creative unions edited by Iampol'skaia 
describes in some detail the concern of creative 
unions with protecting creative workers' rights, 
giving them financial and creative assistance,
and ensuring their material welfare, ibid, 
pp. 144-252.
2 ibid, p. 64.
3 ibid.
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play in that debate, can be seen in Priscilla Johnson's 
account of the literary debates of 1962 to 1964,^ while 
Ogen describes the more prosaic, but nevertheless total 
control of the appearance of creative works by the Union 
of Composers.^
Our task is to discover how much the PPO's of 
creative unions are involved in these matters. Is there 
any particularly strong party involvement in creative 
matters reflected in the activities of the PPO's, does the 
strongly ideological nature of creative unions' activities 
increase the importance of their PPO's, or does it take away 
some of their functions? How closely and in what way are 
these PPO's involved in policy-making and disputes in the 
creative area?
Firstly, it is necessary to examine just where the 
PPO's of creative unions are situated. Unfortunately, this 
is difficult to specify with precision. Structural units 
of creative unions exist at the All-Union and union
1 Johnson, P.: Khrushchev and the Arts3 the
politics of Soviet culture3 1962-64, MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass., 1965.
2 Ogen, op. cit.. Accounts of such control are also 
available in Soviet sources. Thus Partiinaia 
zhizn’ Kazakhstana writes that not a single thing 
is published in Kazakhstan without being examined 
by the relevant section and secretariat and 
presidium of the Kazakh Union of Writers. P.zh. 
Kaz., 10/64, p. 67.
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republic level. Departments (otdeleniia) of union
republic unions are established at autonomous republic,
krai, oblast1 2 and city levels. The Unions of Journalists
and Architects have primary organisations situated within
working institutions, while in territorial-administrative
units not having a department, organisational groups can
be established.^ Although I have nowhere read of any
formal or informal rules on which of these structural
units should have PPO's they seem to be concentrated at
union republic and department level. Most union republic
unions have PPO's, although the RSFSR and Ukraine are
apparently different from the rest in also having PPO's
at department level - Moscow, Leningrad, the Tatar ASSR,
Orlov, etc in the RSFSR; Kiev, Donets, etc in the
Ukraine. Presumably the PPO's are decentralised as much
as possible. The smaller union republics either do not
have department level units or they have too few communists
2to support a PPO.
But the more important point when speaking of 
the membership of the PPO's of creative unions is that in
1 Iampol'skaia: Tvorcheskie soiuzy, op. cit., 
pp. 73-74.
2 It is uncertain who belongs to the RSFSR and 
Ukrainian Republic PPO's. If the unions in 
these republics have departments with PPO's, 
presumably the union-republic level party 
organisations are made up only of the communists 
working full-time in the unions' apparatuses.
In this case they would be very small PPO's.
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fact not all communist members of a creative union are 
members of the union's PPO. Communist creative workers who 
are on the payroll of a working institution are members 
of the PPO of that institution, not of the creative union. 
Only those communists who work full-time in the adminis­
trative apparatus, those who are not attached to any 
particular working institution, and those working in 
institutions too small to have their own PPO's belong to 
the PPO of the creative union. Thus in 1970 there were 
640 communist members of the Moscow department of the RSFSR 
Union of Writers. However only 350 of them were in the 
department's PPO.'*'
This fact will obviously have a great effect on
the functioning of creative PPO's. Firstly, it signifi-
2cantly reduces their size.
1 Iampol'skaia: Tvorcheskie soiuzy, op. cit.,
pp. 42-43.
2 However in most cases they seem to be of signi­
ficant size. Up to 1959 the party organisation 
of the Moscow Union of Artists had 273 members; 
in that year the party members working in the 
Moscow department of the National Art Fund were 
included in the party organisation, raising the 
membership to 550. Zhizn1 2- istochnik
vdokh.noveniia3 iz opyta partiinoi raboty v 
tvorcheskikh organizatsiiakh Soiuza khudozknikov 
RSFSR, Izd. "Khudozhnik RSFSR", Leningrad, 1960, 
p. 15. In 1967 the Sverdlovsk Union of Writers 
had 25 people in its party organisation, while the 
Sverdlovsk Union of Artists had 14. P.zh., 2/67, 
p. 53. However in 1973 the Estonian Union of 
Composers had only six people in its PPO, all the 
other communists of the Union belonging to work­
place PPO's. Kom.Estonii, 12/73, p. 58.
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But it is not the numerical reduction in 
membership that is most significant. More significant 
is that the PPO no longer represents or controls all party 
members of the union. This makes necessary the use of other 
forms of party organisation - party groups, meetings of 
the party aktiv, etc. While these forms of organisation 
are in no way signs of limitations on the role in creative 
matters of the party as a whole, they could represent a 
significant limitation on the role of PPO's. It is some­
thing to be discussed in more detail when we attempt to 
come to some conclusions on the effectiveness and strength 
of creative union PPO's.
But first we will look at some examples of their 
activities. I have said that the most important tasks of 
creative unions have a strong ideological colouring.
This fact is reflected in the activities of their PPO's. 
Their functions can be broadly divided into the ideological, 
the organisational and the creative, but all would seem 
to have some ideological content. Their ideological 
functions can be divided into legitimisation and control.^
The party organisations of creative unions run 
the same sort of political indoctrination seminars for 
legitimisation purposes as other PPO's. A 1972 Central
1 I have not found any evidence of organised
mobilisation activities in creative unions. 
However the sending of union members on trips, 
to be discussed in more detail on p. 648, has 
been described as a form of moral incentive. 
See above, p. 114.
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Committee decision said:
Alongside the mastering of the general 
theoretical problems of Marxism-Leninsim 
it is recommended . . . for cadres of the
creative intelligentsia (the study of) 
current problems of Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy and aesthetics and of the con­
temporary ideological struggle.^
In 1969 Kommunist Belovussii reported that for several 
years Belorussian creative workers had been studying
2Marxist-Leninist aesthetics in their theoretical seminars. 
The party buro of the Estonian Union of Writers has one 
member who specialises in the organisation of political
3indoctrination seminars.
Of all categories of non-production workers none 
are more directly affected in their everyday work by 
ideological considerations than creative workers. The 
effect the ideological control of PPO*s has on creative 
workers can be seen in the following examples.
PPO's are concerned to prevent the appearance 
of various disturbing ideological aberrations among creative 
workers. In 1965 the creative PPO's of Kazakhstan were
1
2
3
Quoted in Rigby and Miller, op. cit., p. 25.
Kom.Belovussii, 9/69, p. 14.
Kom.Estonii, 2/70, p. 53.
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criticised for concerning themselves with minor matters
while such things as nationalism were appearing in the
works of some creative workers.^ Presumably the same
tendencies were the subject of concern of the party
organisation of the Estonian Union of Composers when it
considered the question of Estonian emigres who were
allegedly trying to split the unity of Soviet Estonian 
2creative work. In 1955 the party organisation of the 
Leningrad Union of Artists was criticised for allowing 
some artists to maintain the anarchistic belief in the
3creative "freedom" of the artist.
The general concern PPO's have for the ideological 
attitudes of creative workers is most practically illus­
trated in the specific actions taken by the party 
organisations over particular creative works. The control 
exercised by the PPO's in the area of the selection of 
works for publication, performance and exhibition appears 
to be considerable. A party meeting of the Lithuanian 
Union of Artists examined the laxity shown by some artists
4in the choice of works for reproduction, while the party 
buro of the Moscow Union of Artists examines the selection
5of works for exhibitions. In some cases the PPO appears
1 P.zh.Kaz., 3/63, p. 15.
2 Kom.Estonii, 12/73, P-
3 P.zh., 1/55, p. 23.
4 Kom., 14/71, p. 58.
Mosk.pravda, 18/9/71, p. 2.5
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to have the initiative in the commission of works. Thus 
in 1971 the party committee of the Moscow Union of 
Writers passed a decision that a literary-artistic collec­
tion on the Krasnaia Presnia section of Moscow be published.
In 1955 the party organisation of the Leningrad
Union of Artists was criticised for allowing a "liberal"
attitude to appear in Artistic Councils during creative
discussions and considerations of new works. For example,
some artists were allowed to express the opinion that two
paintings, "Rest after the Fight" and "Latest Issue of the
Workshop Paper", were in opposition to the principles of
socialist realism, when really they were the best paintings
2to have come out of Leningrad in recent years. The party
committee of the RSFSR Union of Artists examined the 
question of the supposedly unhealthy tendencies evident 
in the paintings of some artists being exhibited in the 
Central House of Artists and gave a correct evaluation 
of them.^
Don Ogen describes in some detail the process 
leading up to the banning of the opera "The Master and 
Margarita" by the Leningrad department of the RSFSR Union 
of Composers. He makes the point that such an occurrence
1 Literaturnaia gazeta, 17/3/71, p. 3.
2 P.zh., 1/55, p. 23.
3 Zhizn '
p. 11.
istochnik v dokh.no vleniia, op. cit. ,
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is rare, in fact it was the only time such a thing had 
happened in twenty years. However he also makes the point 
that the PPO has no special responsibility for defending 
"socialist realism" in music, primarily because the party 
leadership itself is not particularly interested in 
socialist realism in music. One might expect, and the 
cases described above tend to support the view, that in 
the artistic and literary areas ideologically unacceptable 
works are more easily recognisable.^
When the opera "The Master and Margarita" was
first presented to the Administration of the Leningrad
Union of Composers, some party members were concerned and
turned to the gorkom for advice. So it was played again
at a meeting of the Administration with a gorkom instructor
present. There was then a meeting of the Administration
leadership, PPO members and the gorkom instructor, where
the decision was taken not to allow the public performance 
2of the opera. This case makes a number of interesting 
points - firstly, that the matter was decided, apparently 
quite independently at Leningrad level, without the 
involvement of the All-Union Union. But more importantly 
for us is the degree of party involvement. Probably most
1 Indeed one suspects that in this case it was 
the novel which provided the basis for the 
opera as much as the music itself which was 
considered unacceptable.
2 Ogen, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
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significant is the role of the gorkom. However that will 
be discussed in more detail later. For the moment the 
significant point is the involvement of the PPO.
Ogen does not specify what was considered wrong
with the opera. However other case histories give us some
idea of what is likely to be considered unacceptable. We
have already seen the concern with such obviously
ideologically sensitive matters as nationalism, "freedom"
of the artist and socialist realism. However concern
with the nature of creative work can be far more specific
and less obviously ideologically motivated. In 1971 a
party meeting of the Lithuanian Union of Artists examined
the abandonment of contemporary themes by some artists.^
The party buro of the Rostov department of the RSFSR Union
of Writers went further. When it was felt that a poet
was concentrating too much on war themes the party buro,
together with the editorial board of the journal Don,
sent him on a tour of the countryside in order to provide
2him with new ideas. Similarly the communist members of 
the RSFSR Union of Artists spoke to and sent on a trip a 
young painter who had limited his paintings to Russian
3fairy tales.
1 Kom., 14/71, p. 58.
2 P.zh., 7/63, pp. 52-53.
3 Zhizn' - istochnik vdokhnovleniia, op. cit.,
p. 27.
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PPO involvement in deciding candidates for trips
seems to be an important incentive and means of discipline
of creative workers. The deputy secretary of the party
buro of the Latvian Union of Writers could say no more
than that the party buro and the administrative secretaries
of the Union concerned themselves with the material
incentive of workers. However it was clearly no coincidence
that the party buro's concern with trips for writers was
mentioned in the same paragraph.^ The party committee of
the Moscow Union of Writers must confirm candidates for
trips, while the party buro of the RSFSR Union of Artists
2itself sends artists on trips abroad.
Another area in which PPO' s are directly involved 
in creative matters is the establishment of creative con­
tacts with other organisations, generally production 
organisations. It is considered important for the 
ideological and cultural development of the general popu­
lation, as well as for widening the horizons of creative 
workers, that the latter have a close connection with 
production affairs. On the initiative of the Moscow Union 
of Writers in 1974 creative contacts were established with 
Moscow production enterprises. Writers' brigades were
1 Korn. Sov. Latvii , 2/70, p. 61.
2 Zhizn' - istoohnik vdokhnovleniia, op. cit., 
p. 57.
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established directly in workshops."^ The party buro of the
Latvian Union of Writers has combined open party meetings
with production enterprise communists on matters of
2literary interest in production enterprises. The same
party buro, together with the secretariat of the adminis­
tration of the Union, widens the horizons of writers by
organising meetings with leading administrative and party
officials.3
The PPO's of creative unions also have organisa­
tional tasks, although again with a political or ideological 
colouring. These tasks are primarily in the preparation 
and conduct of meetings and conferences of creative unions 
and their organs. The party buro of the Leningrad Union 
of Artists hears reports (doklady and soobshcheniia) on 
the preparation of congresses/ In early 1971 the party 
committee of the Moscow Union of Writers was involved in
5preparations for the Third RSFSR Writers' Congress.
Later in the same year it was reported that the party 
committee took an active part in the preparation of the election
report meetings of the creative sections within the Union.6
1 P.zh., 1/75, pp. 54-55.
2 Kom.Sov.Latvii, 8/72, p. 47.
3 Kom.Sov.Latvii, 2/70, p. 59.
4 Zhizn’ - istochnik vdokhnovleniia, op. cit., p. 57.
5 Mosk.pravda, 22/1/71, p. 2.
Mosk.pravda, 18/9/71, p. 2.6
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Ogen discusses the process in some detail in the 
case of the Leningrad Union of Composers. In elections 
for the representatives of the Administration in the leader­
ship of the various sections of the Union, the party organi­
sation offers a list of candidates. The list would have 
been agreed to by the gorkom. He goes on to say:
In 'recommending' its list, the party 
organisation must consider the popularity 
among the masses of different composers.
Otherwise an embarrassing situation (konfuz) 
might arise in the failure of the list 
recommended by the party,
but adds that there has never been a case of a konfuz in 
the Leningrad Union.'*'
The evidence suggests that the PPO's of creative 
unions have the opportunity to and do in fact involve 
themselves in both the creative and organisational aspects 
of the unions' activities, the involvement being concerned 
above all to ensure the maintenance of the correct 
ideological attitudes in creative work. However the party 
organisations' activities seem to be very like the 
activities of party organisations in other categories 
of "host" organisation. The highly ideological nature of 
the activities of creative unions appears to neither increase
1 Ogen, op. cit., p. 60.
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nor decrease the degree of involvement of the PPO's , nor 
to change the nature of that involvement. The emphasis 
is still on "control" and the avoidance of podmena.
Control of individuals and the work of the administration 
is still exercised through the usual recommendations to 
the administration and influence over bodies of collective 
decision-making. Reporting to higher authorities still 
appears to be one of the PPO's most important weapons.
Ogen, in summarising the role of the PPO in "The Master 
and Margarita" affair, says:
Thus, the role of the low-level party cell 
consists simply of signalling, in good 
time, 'danger'.“*"
The evidence suggests that the PPO's of creative 
unions are not unduly concerned by the fact that many of 
the communist members of their "host" organisation do not 
belong to them. There are two possible reasons for this. 
Firstly, for the fulfilment of many of the functions of 
the PPO's the representativeness of its membership is 
irrelevant. Particularly in the area of the control of 
the administration the rank-and-file membership of the 
party has little role to play. The PPO has a formal right 
to engage in various activities that both in theory and 
practice are quite independent of the rank-and-file
1 ibid, pp. 36-37.
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membership. As long as the leading officials of the 
creative union are members of the PPO,^ the PPO is able 
to question them about their activities, offer 
recommendations, and if necessary take party disciplinary 
action against them.
However the membership problem could be signifi­
cant in the control of rank-and-file workers. If the 
individual to be controlled is not a member of the union's 
PPO, the party organisation could face difficulties, since 
it presumably would not have the right to question or 
discipline him. However it appears likely that cooperation 
between PPO's would surmount these difficulties, although 
I have little specific evidence of such cooperation. We 
have reports of the combined party meetings of the 
Estonian Union of Writers, the Estonian Publishing House 
and the State Committee for Publishing, Printing and the 
Book Trade, and the close contacts between the party
organisations of the Tallin Art University and the
2Estonian Union of Artists. Unfortunately these reports 
give no details of the nature or the reason for such 
cooperation, nor whether it is truly cooperation among
1 Since they usually work full-time in the 
union's apparatus, and are therefore unlikely 
to work in any other institution, they almost 
certainly are members of the PPO.
2 Kom.Estonii, 12/73, p. 55; Sovetskaia Estoniia,
2/6/71, p. 2.
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equals or whether one party organisation assumes dominance. 
Despite the lack of detail one can feel confident that 
such cooperation could go a long way towards solving the 
membership problem.
While there is evidence to the effect that the 
PPO's of creative unions are able to effectively involve 
themselves in all areas of the activity of their "host" 
organisations and that they are able to cope with the 
membership problem, there is also evidence of the failure 
of PPO's to do so. The implication in some reports often 
is that the lack of involvement and the membership problem 
are connected. The connection is in fact most doubtful.
I think that we will find that organisational measures 
implemented by the authorities, ostensibly to solve the 
membership problem, have in fact been designed to deal with 
problems of PPO ineffectiveness which have arisen for 
reasons quite unconnected with the membership problem.
Cases of criticism of the PPO's of creative 
unions can be seen above. All the cases have a very strong 
ideological content - allowing the appearance of 
nationalism, the criticism of socialist realist paintings 
and the belief in the "freedom" of the artist.^ If such 
lack of involvement is common it is highly significant, 
since this is probably the most important area of PPO
1 See above, pp. 643-645.
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concern - to maintain the correct ideological line in 
all creative endeavour.
Of course it is not possible to quantify how 
much PPO’s allow such ideological aberrations. However we 
can speculate, using somewhat circumstantial evidence, 
about some of the pressures that might be on PPO workers 
to allow laxer ideological control than is expected of 
them by higher authorities. Most Soviet authorities pay 
at least lip-service to the special nature of the creative 
process. The deputy head of a Kazakh Central Committee 
department wrote in 1973:
Clearly the tasks of each (creative) party 
organisation can be formulated in such 
expressions as: to influence the collective
and each individual person. But when we 
consider that in a particular case 'each 
person' is an artist with his own view of 
the world, with a whole complex of uniquely 
individual features making up his creative 
character, which requires enthusiasm 
as well as understanding, then the 
difference in approach to the methods of 
party work in a creative collective become 
evident. . . . The approach to the con­
sideration or resolution of creative matters 
in a meeting of the party organisation or 
party buro must be creative itself.
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But such an attitude can go too far. The author complains
that some party organisations, in attempts to avoid
complications, have deemed it not to be among their
functions to deal with creative matters.^ The deputy
secretary of the party organisation of the Latvian Union
of Writers is treading on dangerous ground when he begins
a 1970 article by speaking of the special nature of the
role of party organisations in creative unions:
In art, as in science, it is dangerous to
react against creative searches even when
they sometimes at first galnce appear 
2questionable.
The Kazakh Central Committee worker concludes his article 
by saying:
Of course, when we are speaking of party 
discipline and the observance of legal 
requirements, then there can be no allowances 
for the 'peculiarity' {svoeobrazie) of the 
artist.^
Should we be surprised if PPO's, made up after all of 
creative workers, are reluctant to impose ideological 
limitations on their own creative work? It can be seen 
that this is the same problem that questions the effectiveness
1 P.zh.Kaz., 4/73, p. 66.
2 Kom.Sov.Latvii, 2/70, pp. 58-59.
3 P.zh.Kaz., A/13, p. 66.
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of all primary party organisations - the controllers are 
basically no different in attitudes and interests from 
those they control. Ogen says that the PPO of the 
Leningrad Union of Composers does not press for socialist 
realism in music since many of the members of the PPO's 
themselves do not write socialist realist music.^
However it is significant that this problem 
appears to be more serious in scientific institutions 
than in cultural and creative institutions. This is 
because state interests, the technological development 
of the Soviet economy, demand that greater intellectual 
freedom be given to scientists than need be given to 
creative workers. This means that far tighter ideological 
control can be exercised over creative workers, that 
dissident writers, artists and composers are more readily 
dismissed from their jobs, gaoled or exiled, and that far 
more party "hacks" are permitted to pursue their "careers" 
in creative work than could ever be allowed to occur in 
scientific research if the quality of Soviet science were 
not to suffer drastically. This means that lax ideological 
control is far less evident in the creative unions than in 
research institutions.
1 Ogen, op. cit., p. 36. Although it should also
be mentioned that he believes that the top 
leadership is not particularly concerned about 
socialist realism in music.
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Such a view is supported by the data on the 
orientations of the secretaries of creative union PPO's.
What data I have suggest that they are firmly committed 
to the party line.^
Despite this, evidence does exist to suggest 
that at times creative union PPO fail to control the 
ideological content of creative work as firmly as higher 
authorities might wish. Such failures should be explained 
as a sign of lack of will, not a lack of means.
One particularly interesting case that illustrates 
this revolves around the literary debates of 1962 to 1964 
in the Moscow Union of Writers. Although information on 
the role of the PPO in the events is sketchy, some specu­
lation is possible.
Priscilla Johnson describes the whole conflict
in her book Khrushahev and the Arts. It began in April,
1962 when the "liberal" writers gained control of the
administration of the Moscow Union of Writers, while the
conservatives were on tour in the provinces. Unfortunately
no details are available on the role of the PPO in the
2election. Presumably there was a konfuz, since the member­
ship of the party committee was not yet to the liking of
the liberals.
1 See above, pp. 447-451.
2 Ogen, op. cit., p. 60.
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It was not until December, 1962 that the old 
party committee was replaced by a new one, headed by 
Mal'tsev and containing such liberals as K. Simonov and 
A. Tvardovskii.  ^ The report in Literaturnaia gazeta 
gives no details of the election, except the results and 
to say that the meeting was addressed by the first 
secretary of Moscow's Frunze raikom. It appears, therefore, 
that there were no representatives from the Moscow gorkom 
present at the meeting. The higher authorities must have 
been expecting trouble, so one can only take the absence 
of a gorkom representative as a prior admission of defeat.
Johnson shows that the reaction against the 
liberals and their eventual defeat was centred at a far 
higher level than the PPO, Khrushchev himself being 
closely involved. However the action taken against the 
PPO indicates that it did have some role to play in the 
conflict - that the liberals could not be finally defeated 
until the PPO had been dealt with. But more interesting 
are the methods used to deal with the PPO. It was bypassed 
and dismantled.
1 The full list of members of the new party
committee is:
(secretary) E. Mal'tsev; (deputies) I. Sutyrin, 
T. Matyleva, P. Sazhin; (others) Iu. Korol'kov, 
P. Nilin, A. Solynskii, K. Simonov,
A. Tvardovskii, I. Chicherov, S. Shchipachev. 
Lit.gazeta, 29/12/62, p. 2.
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The dismantling took the form of transferring
the members of the party organisation to other party
organisations in working institutions.^ I have already
spoken of communist members of creative unions working in
other institutions as being members of the PPO's of those
other institutions. But this development was different -
there is no evidence that the communists transferred at
this time worked in the institutions to whose PPO they
were transferred. It was simply a tactic, and one probably
strictly speaking against the Party Rules, to break up a
party organisation which was unwilling to accept control 
2from above. Although it is unlikely that the PPO went
1 Sovetskaia Rossiia, 31/8/63, p. 2; Lit.gazetar
11/7/63, p. 1. For example, the writer Tikhon 
Semushkin became a member of the PPO of the 
Arctic and Antarctic Administration of the Chief 
Administration for Hydrometeorological Services 
of the All-Union Council of Ministers. He claims 
to have already been friendly with scientist 
members of the PPO, so presumably his literary 
work had been concerned with the Arctic and 
Antarctic. The reason given for the transfers 
was that it enabled writers to become closer to 
production. Semushkin wrote that previously 
writers had had only episodic access to the 
enterprises of Moscow, "but to be in the party 
organisation and live its life is a completely 
different matter. This means being at the source 
of the stormy activity of this or that collective, 
and is nothing like conducting an interview". 
Lit.gazetar 14/1/64, p. 1.
2 In Appendix A, I discuss the uncertainty about 
the formal obligations to create PPO's. However 
the implication of the relevant paragraphs of the 
Party Rules and Soviet commentaries on them is 
that PPO's should be formed in institutions with 
three or more party members and that all party 
members in that institution should be members of 
the PPO.
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out of existence altogether, it appears certain that it 
ceased to function in any meaningful sense.
What replaced the PPO as the source of party 
influence in the Union? General meetings of the party 
aktiv and meetings of union party groups have always been 
used as part of the solution of the membership problem. 
(However the problem has usually been a naturally occurring 
one, not an artificially manufactured one.) "Party group" 
is a difficult and very loosely used term which deserves 
much more attention than I am able to give it here. I have 
referred elsewhere in this thesis to party groups in sub­
units of institutions - these groups are subordinate to 
the PPO and do not concern us here. We are concerned with 
the "party groups in non-party organisations" described in 
paragraphs 68 and 69 of the latest Party Rules. The Rules 
state:
In congresses, conferences and meetings 
called in Soviet, trade union, cooperative 
and other mass organisations and in the 
elected organs of these organisations, 
where there are no less than three party 
members, there are organised party groups.
. . . The party groups are subordinate to
the relevant party organisations (Central 
Committee of Union Republic parties, kraikom, 
obkom, okruzhkom, gorkom, raikom). ^
1 Ustav KPSS, 1971, op. cit., para. 68-69.
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This means that all communist delegates to the All-Union 
Supreme Soviet form a party group subordinate to the 
All-Union Central Committee, all communist delegates to an 
Oblast' Soviet and all communist members of the oblispolkom 
belong to party groups subordinate to the obkom, etc.
Shchiglik applies these paragraphs of the Party 
Rules to creative unions:
Such party groups are established, consequently, 
in the congresses of creative unions, and also 
in the administrations, presidiums and secre­
tariats of the administrations of these unions.'*' 
He goes on to say that just as these party groups are under 
the direct leadership of the responsible party organ, so
the party aktivy of creative unions also work under the
2leadership of this party organ.
Meetings of the party aktiv, that is meetings 
of all the communist members of the union regardless of 
their PPO, have always been used to avoid the membership 
problem. However in 1963 they were used quite blatantly 
as a means of bypassing the PPO altogether.
1 Iampol'skaia: Tvoroheskie soiuzy, op. cit., p.43.
2 ibid, pp. 43-44. However he does not make clear 
how the quoted paragraphs of the Party Rules are 
connected with meetings of the party aktivy.
They are not conferences, congresses or elected 
organs of the creative unions. Neither can they 
be considered as examples of the meetings referred 
to in the Party Rules - a party group is of no 
relevance in a meeting made up exclusively of 
party members.
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In this case the relevant party organ was the 
Moscow gorkom. It acted primarily through its party 
organiser attached to the Union of Writers, Tevekelian.
The post of Moscow gorkom party organiser attached to 
the Moscow Union of Writers is a mysterious one. It seems 
doubtful that it existed before 1963 - if it did exist 
the holder of the post was apparently not present at the 
1962 election-report meeting.^" Nevertheless, it was clearly 
an important one. Egorychev, the first secretary of the 
Moscow gorkom, declared in 1963, following mention of 
the transfer of creative union communists to work-place 
PPO's:
For the party leadership of the ideo-
creative life of the unions we have formed
in them party groups headed by party
2organisers of the Moscow gorkom.
The secretary of the party buro of the Arctic and Antarctic 
Administration asked Semushkin: "How do things stand now
1 But neither did he attend the 1966 election- 
report meeting. Lit.gazeta, 22/12/66, p. 1.
Yet the post was still in existence in 1970.
In fact it was filled by one A. Vasil'ev, 
presumably the same A. Vasil'ev who was 
removed as secretary of the party committee 
in the liberals' "coup" of December, 1962. 
Lit.gazeta, 29/12/62, p. 2; Voprosy literatury, 
10/70, p. 26.
2 Lit.gazeta, 19/6/63, p. 5. This report suggests 
that the same process that occured in the 
Writers' Union also occured in other creative 
Unions.
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with literary questions? Surely in our party organisation 
they will not be considered to the degree you would find 
necessary?", to which Semushkin replied that "we have in 
the Moscow department of the Union of Writers a party 
organiser of the Moscow gorkom. The party organiser will 
gather together the scattered writers specially for the 
consideration of our creative problems."'*'
Thus Tevekelian, incidentally also a member of 
2the Union's secretariat, assumed direct command of the 
party presence in the Moscow Union of Writers. On July 9, 
1963 he opened the meeting of the party group of the 
Union, newly established as the combined organ of all 
Moscow communist writers. The status of this party group 
is not altogether clear. It appears to be very similar 
in concept to the party aktiv of the creative union. In 
practice it appears to have operated quite differently, 
in that its membership apparently changed from issue to 
issue. Tevekelian once said:
We have already convened meetings of the 
party group on individual questions. In 
these meetings writers meet who have a direct
3interest in the questions to be considered.
1 Lit.gazeta, 14/1/64, p. 1.
2 Literaturnaia Rossiia, 2/8/63, p. 3.
3 Sovetskaia Rossiia, 31/8/63, p. 2.
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It appears that the gorkom determined which communists 
would be called on to discuss particular matters."*'
The party group became the effective party body
in the Moscow Union of Writers. Tevekelian was assisted
at the July 9 meeting by the first deputy head of the
Ideology Department of the Central Committee and the head
of the Cultural Department of the Moscow gorkom, quite a
different presence from that which had been evident in
December, 1962. The meeting considered the June Central
Committee Plenum, heard that the work of distributing
communist writers throughout the workplace organisations
of the city would soon be completed and that the group
would be called together whenever creative matters needed
2to be discussed.
Whether it was this meeting of the party group or 
a subsequent one that discussed the August Plenum of the 
Moscow Union is not clear. However that plenum was the 
shortest on record, having been preceded by two meetings 
of the secretariat and the administration and a meeting 
of the party group. It was at this plenum that a large-scale
1 Like the party aktiv proper there is doubt
about whether this party group is covered by 
the Party Rules. It does not appear to be 
based in any conference, congress, meeting 
or elected organ of the Union and so formally 
is not covered by Paragraphs 68 and 69 of the 
Party Rules.
2 Lit.gazeta, 11/7/63, p. 1.
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re-organisation of the Union was announced. Tevekelian 
spoke at the meeting."*"
By this time the liberals' revolt had virtually 
ended. Certainly all the organisational re-arrangements 
needed to quell the revolt had been effected. I am not 
concerned here with the basic issues of the revolt as a 
whole. What does interest me is the apparent importance 
of the PPO in it. The liberals' victory in the PPO came 
after their initial victory in the elections to the 
administration, so it cannot be said that control of the 
party organisation was an essential forerunner to gaining 
control of the Union itself. However the rather extreme 
organisational re-arrangements that the PPO was later 
subjected to suggest that it was a considerable stumbling 
block to the re-establishment of control by the higher 
party authorities. If the authorities were concerned to 
maintain at least a facade of democracy, in what was already 
an embarrassingly public dispute, it became very difficult 
for them to force changes in the PPO, which in turn, with 
the reliance on the party organisation for recommending 
candidates in elections and disciplining recalcitrant 
members, made it very difficult to establish party control 
over the Union itself.
1 Literaturnaia Rossiia, 2/8/63, p. 2.
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Conclusions
A great deal more research could be done into 
the activities of creative unions and their PPO's. However 
the information in this appendix, sketchy as it sometimes 
is, has been useful for a number of reasons. It has 
provided more evidence of the difficulties the Soviet 
authorities face in establishing ideological control in 
institutions, the members of which share common non-party 
values. The 1962-64 episode illustrated this particularly 
well. It was a clear example of a PPO adopting and 
defending the attitudes of those elements of society which 
it was supposed to be controlling. While it could be said 
that the PPO's resistance was quickly rendered ineffectual, 
the fact that there was resistance, and resistance which 
in Soviet terms required a rather radical response, must be 
considered significant in any general discussion of the 
value of PPO's to higher authorities.
Further attention was drawn to the different 
treatment the research sciences and the arts receive at 
the hands of the ideologists. The ideological control 
of the arts is apparently very much tighter than that of 
the research sciences and cases of failures of that control 
fewer. PPO's contribute to it significantly.
Finally, it was made apparent that even when 
the functions of a PPO are primarily ideological it still 
uses essentially the same methods of operation as the
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more "production" oriented PPO's. The PPO's still rely 
above all on the powers of the right of control, the 
powers of investigation and recommendation, and the power 
of party discipline. The highly ideological nature of 
their task does not change or strengthen the means they 
have available for its fulfilment.
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SOURCES
The main source of information for the thesis 
has been the Soviet political press, principally the 
journals Pavtiinaia zhizn' and Kommunist, the newspaper 
Pravda and their republican equivalents. I have not 
referred to, nor have I listed in the Bibliography, 
individual articles from these sources. Articles published 
in Western journals have been referred to and listed 
individually.
I have not listed in the Bibliography journals 
in which articles by PPO secretaries referred to in 
Chapter Five were published. There is an enormous number 
of such journals, they are usually technically specialised, 
and their contents are of no direct relevance for this 
thesis.
All Western and Soviet monographs and books 
referred to and quoted in the thesis are listed in the 
Bibliography.
While attached to Moscow State University from 
September, 1975 to February, 1976 I had conversations with 
Soviet citizens directly involved in or knowledgeable of 
the activities of non-production PPO's. Although some of 
these conversations were semi-official, I have decided - 
in a situation where it is always better to err on the side
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of caution - not to identify the people with whom I spoke 
or the occasions on which the conversations took place.
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